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 The thesis explores the history of the Scottish Enlightenment in its transatlantic 
context and, in particular, the diffusion of Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy in 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scotland and the United States. This project 
is the first full-scale attempt to examine the tensions between late eighteenth-century 
Scottish Enlightenment intellectual culture and counter-Enlightenment interests in the 
Atlantic World. My comparative study focuses on two of the most influential university 
educators in Scotland and the newly-founded United States. These are Dugald Stewart 
at the University of Edinburgh and Samuel Stanhope Smith at the College of New 
Jersey (which later became Princeton University). Stewart and Smith are ideal for a 
transatlantic comparative project of this kind, because of their close parallels as moral 
philosophy professors at the University of Edinburgh (1785-1810) and the College of 
New Jersey (1779-1812) respectively; their conflicts with ecclesiastical factions and 
counter-Enlightenment policies in the first decade of the nineteenth century; and finally 
their uses and adaptations of Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy. The broader 
question I address is how the diffusion and fate of Scottish Enlightenment moral 
thought was affected by the different institutional and, above all, religious contexts in 
which it was taught. 
 Dugald Stewart’s and Stanhope Smith’s interpretations of central philosophical 
themes reflected their desire to improve the state of society by educating enlightened 
and virtuous young men who would later enter careers in public life. In doing so, their 
teaching of natural religion and metaphysics brought them into conflict with religious 
factions, namely American religious revivalists on Princeton’s Board of Trustees and 
members of the Scottish ecclesiastical Moderate party, who believed that revealed 
religion should provide the foundation of education. The controversies that emerged 
from these tensions did not develop in an intellectual vacuum. My research illustrates 
how the American and Scottish reception of the French Revolution; the 1793-1802 
Scottish Sedition Trials; Scottish and American ‘polite’ culture; Scottish secular and 
ecclesiastical politics; American Federalist and Republican political debates; American 
student riots between 1800 and 1807; and American religious revivalism affected 
Smith’s and Stewart’s programmes of moral education. While I identify this project as 
an example of cultural and intellectual history, it also advances interests in the history of 
education, ecclesiastical history, transnational history, and comparative history.  
 The thesis has two main parts. The first consists of three chapters on Dugald 
Stewart’s system of moral education: the circumstances in which Stewart developed his 
moral education as a modern version of Thomas Reid’s so-called Common Sense 
philosophy, Stewart’s applied ethics, and finally, his defence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in the context of the 1805 John Leslie case. Complementing the 
chronology and themes in part one, the second part consists of three chapters on Smith’s 
programme of moral education: the circumstances that gave rise to Smith’s creation of 
the Princeton Enlightenment, Smith’s applied ethics, and finally, Smith’s defence of his 
system of moral education in the contexts of what he saw as two converging counter-
Enlightenment factions (religious revivalists and rebellious students) at Princeton. In 
examining these areas, I argue that Dugald Stewart and Samuel Stanhope Smith 
attempted to systematically sustain Scottish Enlightenment ideas (namely Scottish 
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 Reflecting on an accomplished life spent in the forefront of American politics, 
education, and medicine, Benjamin Rush remarked that ‘the two years I spent in 
Edinburgh, I consider as the most important in their influence upon my character and 
conduct of any period in my life [and] perhaps there is at present no spot upon the earth 
where religion, science, and literature combine more to produce moral and intellectual 
pleasures than in the metropolis of Scotland’.1 Rush’s enthusiasm for Edinburgh and the 
Scottish recipe for fostering Enlightenment was not uncommon. Eighteenth-century men 
of letters, including a reluctant Voltaire, largely shared Rush’s esteem for Edinburgh’s 
culture of ‘polite’ taste and high intellectual standards.2 At the height of the late 
eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment, the so-called Moderate literati developed 
innovative notions of human nature, ethics, and political economy from the ethos of 
improving the human condition in society.3 The concepts of this enlightened generation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Benjamin Rush to James Rush 1809, quoted in David Freeman Hawke, Benjamin Rush: 
Revolutionary Gadfly, (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 63.  
 
2 See John Dwyer, ‘The imperative of sociability: Moral culture in the later Scottish Enlightenment’, 
British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Science, 13:2, (1990): 169-184; Lorraine Daston, ‘The ideal and 
reality of the Republic of Letters in the Enlightenment’, Science in Context, 4:2, (1991): 367-386; 
Michel Malherbe, ‘The Impact on Europe’, in CCSE, 298-315.  
  
3 William Robert Scott coined the term Scottish Enlightenment to describe eighteenth-century 
Scotland’s age of improvement (William Robert Scott, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and 
Position in the history of Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), 265). Richard 
Sher’s seminal work on the Church of Scotland and Edinburgh University shows that several members 
of the ecclesiastical Moderate party and Edinburgh University, particularly William Robertson, Hugh 
Blair, Alexander Carlyle, John Home, and Adam Ferguson, developed the ideology of ‘Moderatism’ 
that harmonised Calvinist principles with ‘polite’ society and the pursuit of philosophical truths (Sher, 
CU). Hugh Trevor-Roper suggests that the shared interest amongst Scottish philosophers in improving 
humankind’s social and moral conduct marked a leading characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 322, (1977), 371-88). For 
further information on the emergence of the Scottish Enlightenment see Jane Rendall, The Origins of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, (London: Macmillan, 1978); R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds.), The 
Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1982); 
Alexander Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment: The historical age of the historical nation, 
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which included prominent figures such as Adam Smith, William Robertson, David 
Hume, Thomas Reid, and Adam Ferguson, were not restricted to Edinburgh nor were 
their ideas confined to Scotland.4 The transnational dissemination of Scottish 
philosophical writings, particularly in North America, testified to its wide appeal.5 Of the 
distinctive ideas associated with the Scottish Enlightenment, Alexander Broadie suggests 
that the so-called Scottish School of Common Sense dominated late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy and was ‘among Scotland’s most 
successful invisible exports’ of the time.6 From its distinct Scottish origin and some 
disagreement over the term ‘common sense’, Common Sense philosophy gradually 
became known in the Republic of Letters as ‘Scottish philosophy’.7 The enthusiasm for 
Scottish philosophy did not imply that other philosophical systems were not practised at 
this time in Scotland. For instance, the Moderate literati of Edinburgh such as Adam 
Ferguson drew heavily from a version of Stoicism whilst David Hume was known for his 
mitigated scepticism.8 Despite this diversity in thought, Scottish philosophy was central 
to late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy and, from its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001); Nicholas Phillipson, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment and the science of man’, 
Theoretische Gechiedenis, 8, (1981): 3-19; Idem, ‘Towards a definition of the Scottish Enlightenment’, 
in City & Society in the 18th century, edited by Fritz and Williams, (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), 125-147. 
 
4 Distinct versions of Enlightenment thought and values emerged at this time in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, 
and Glasgow. Despite measurable differences, the Scottish literati of these cities were closely linked in 
an overarching national pursuit for improvement and use of philosophy from offices in universities and 
the Church. For further reading on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in Glasgow and Aberdeen see 
Jennifer Carter and Joan Pittock (eds.), Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, (AUP, 1992); Paul Wood, 
The Aberdeen Enlightenment, (AUP, 1993); Andrew Hook and Richard Sher (eds.), The Glasgow 
Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press, 1995).   
 
5 See Henry May, The Enlightenment in America, (OUP, 1976), 88-105; Michel Malherbe, ‘The Impact 
on Europe’, in CCSE, 298-315; Samuel Fleischacker, ‘The impact on America: Scottish philosophy 
and the American founding’, in CCSE, 316-337. 
 
6 See Alexander Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy, (EUP, 2009), 3. 
 
7 See Selwyn Grave, The Philosophy of Common Sense, (OUP, 1960), 1-10. 
  
8 While Hume counted prominent Moderates including Robertson, Blair, and Ferguson as friends, I am 
not suggesting he was a Moderate since this group consisted of Presbyterian ministers and their 
religious convictions largely characterised the Moderates of Edinburgh.  
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dominance, this philosophical system played a part in developing transnational notions of 
ethics and modernity.9   
 During this period and beyond, Scottish philosophy occupied a central place in 
university curricula on either side of the Atlantic.10 Its popularity in higher education 
largely stemmed from its compatibility with revealed religion whilst addressing complex 
metaphysical questions. Richard Sher and Lawrence Williams have shown that Scottish 
professors of moral philosophy were often ordained Presbyterian ministers, however, 
they rarely held both ecclesiastical and professorial offices at the same time.11 
Furthermore, the Scottish tradition of using professorial chairs to test and perfect 
philosophical theories in a pedagogical context assisted in its wider application. As 
Gordon Graham has shown, ‘the ambition of Scottish philosophy is to be found in its 
continuous attempt to combine the educational and investigative roles of philosophy 
within a single method or discipline’.12 This Scottish tradition in moral philosophy 
facilitated a clear model for moral education. But interpretations of Scottish philosophy 
were not uniformly followed across universities in the Atlantic World. The particular 
interests of moral philosophers, different circumstances, and distinct national cultures 
encouraged different adaptations of central philosophical themes in preparing young men 
for public life. The variations between these interpretations of Scottish philosophy reveal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See George Davie, The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, The Dow 
Lecture, (Dundee: University of Dundee, 1973).  
 
10 The noteworthy efforts by Pierre Paul Royer-Collard and his disciples Victor Cousin and Théodore 
Jouffroy influenced the nineteenth-century French adoption of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense 
philosophy. See Edward Madden, ‘Victor Cousin and the Commonsense Tradition’, History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 1:1, (1984): 93-109.  
 
11 See Richard Sher, ‘Professors of virtue: The social history of the Edinburgh moral philosophy chair 
in the eighteenth century’, in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by M.A. 
Stewart, (OUP, 1990), 87-126; Lawrence Williams, ‘Pulpit and Gown”—Edinburgh University and the 
Church, 1760-1830’, in Scottish Universities: Distinctiveness and diversity, edited by Carter and 
Withrington, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1992), 87-95.  
 
12 Gordon Graham, ‘The Ambition of Scottish philosophy’, The Monist, 90:2, (2007): 154.  
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telling information about the circumstances in which it was taught and how prominent 
Scottish Enlightenment ideas and values were transmitted in the Atlantic World.  
 In the late eighteenth century, the College of New Jersey (which later became 
Princeton) and Edinburgh University were famous for diffusing the ideas and spirit of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.13 James McCosh, who was in a position to reflect on both 
Princeton and Edinburgh, later remarked that ‘the chairs of mental science in the Scottish 
colleges have had more influence than any others in germinating thought in the minds of 
Scottish youth, and in giving a permanent bias and direction to their intellectual 
growth’.14 By extension, the particular values and ideas taught in the moral philosophy 
course informed the expected ideals that a graduate of Princeton or Edinburgh should 
possess. While John Witherspoon’s administration and Adam Ferguson’s ‘Moderate’ 
contemporaries continue to attract considerable interest, their respective successors in 
moral philosophy have until recently received relatively little attention.15 Despite 
teaching during the supposed decline of the Scottish Enlightenment, Dugald Stewart at 
Edinburgh University and Samuel Stanhope Smith at the College of New Jersey were 
considered the most influential educators of their time. Although they are often 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The College of New Jersey was originally located in Elizabeth, New Jersey for its first year in 1746 
and then relocated to Newark, New Jersey for nine years. After Nathaniel FitzRandolph donated land 
in Princeton, New Jersey and upon that land grant the College built Nassau Hall in 1756, the College 
officially found a home where it remains today. From 1756 onwards, people also referred to the 
College of New Jersey as Princeton or Nassau. Considering the College’s diverse degree and course 
offerings instituted during James McCosh’s administration from 1868 through 1888, the Board of 
Trustee’s renamed the College after its location, Princeton University, in 1896. For further reading on 
Princeton’s transformation see Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, Princeton, 1746-1896, (PUP, 1974). 
 
14 James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to 
Hamilton, (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1875), 8.  
 
15 A special issue on Dugald Stewart edited by Knud Haakonssen and Paul Wood will appear in a 
forthcoming issue of History of European Ideas in March 2012. In this collection, Jane Rendall’s 
‘Adaptations: History, Gender and Political Economy in the Work of Dugald Stewart’ offers excellent 
coverage of Stewart’s moral philosophy and his reception by women writers. Some recent examples of 
works devoted to Witherspoon in a transatlantic context are: Gideon Mailer, ‘Anglo-Scottish union and 
John Witherspoon’s American Revolution’, The William & Mary Quarterly, 67:4, (October 2010): 
709-746; Daniel Howe, ‘John Witherspoon and the Transatlantic Enlightenment’, in Atlantic 
Enlightenment, edited by Susan Manning and Francis Cogliano, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 61-80. 
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understood in relation to their predecessors and teachers (Reid and Witherspoon), Smith 
and Stewart conceived exceptional programmes of moral education. In the decades that 
followed the French Revolution, Smith and Stewart combated modern philosophical 
scepticism and the supposed decay of morals and high intellectual standards from the 
classroom. In doing so, their respective programmes modernised earlier ideas of 
cultivating the mind and morals for a new generation of public figures in the Atlantic 
World.  
 This doctoral thesis therefore will compare Stewart’s and Smith’s programmes of 
moral education in their transatlantic context. Stewart and Smith are ideal for a project of 
this kind, because of their close parallels as moral philosophy professors at the University 
of Edinburgh (1785-1810) and the College of New Jersey (1779-1812) respectively; their 
conflicts with ecclesiastical factions and counter-Enlightenment policies in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century; and finally their uses and adaptations of Scottish 
philosophy. The broader question I address is how the diffusion and fate of Scottish 
Enlightenment moral thought was affected by the different institutional and, above all, 
religious contexts in which it was taught.  
 Stewart and Smith flourished in an age when factions within the Scottish and 
American Presbyterian Church advanced counter-Enlightenment policies to censor the 
teaching of metaphysics and eliminate secularism in the faculty of arts.16 Isaiah Berlin 
has been credited with first considering the existence of late eighteenth-century counter-
Enlightenment movements.17 Berlin’s example of exploring the counter-Enlightenment in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See Emma Vincent Macleod, ‘The responses of Scottish churchmen to the French Revolution, 1789-
1802’, SHR, 73:196, part 2, (Oct., 1994): 191-215; Mark Noll, ‘The Princeton Trustees of 1807: New 
Men and New Directions’, PULC, 41, (1980): 208-230. 
 
17 See Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 2, (1973), 
100-112. Berlin’s seminal essay was reprinted in his widely published edited volume, Against the 
Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, (London, 1979; New York, 1980; OUP, 1981; New York, 
1982; London, 1997; PUP, 2001).  
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eighteenth-century Germany led others to question if similar movements targeted other 
types of Enlightenment. Darrin McMahon and Graeme Garrard extended the scope of 
Berlin’s notion of counter-Enlightenment to include revolutionary France and the 
possibility of its existence in other transnational contexts.18 This thesis defines the 
counter-Enlightenment as reflecting inverse views of a particular version of 
Enlightenment thought and ideology. An intolerance to free public expression and 
opposition to ideas that questioned the policies of established institutions (namely the 
government and the church) were widely shared threads across transnational counter-
Enlightenments. This does not imply that proponents of counter-Enlightenment policies 
opposed all the aspects of Enlightenment thought or values. Just as there were various, 
distinct types of Enlightenment (often categorised by its national origin), different kinds 
of counter-Enlightenment also emerged. Despite the Scottish Enlightenment’s support of 
Calvinist principles and its prominent figures’ association with the Church of Scotland 
and American Presbyterianism, conservative clergymen on either side of the Atlantic 
embraced counter-Enlightenment policies toward this type of Enlightenment.  
 These counter-Enlightenment campaigns were strengthened through partnerships 
with political parties. While American and Scottish secular and ecclesiastical politics 
involved largely different objectives, they were host to Presbyterian clergymen with 
similar counter-Enlightenment sentiments. Both agreed on the need to safeguard morality 
and Christian principles from political radicalism and atheism associated with the French 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Darrin McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the 
Making of Modernity, (OUP, 2002); Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments: From the eighteenth 
century to the present, (New York and London: Routledge, 2006). For a thorough discussion of the 
long eighteenth-century Enlightenment and its counter-Enlightenment see Jonathan Israel, Democratic 
Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750-1790, (OUP, 2011); Idem, 
Enlightenment Contested: philosophy, modernity and the emancipation of man, 1670-1752, (OUP, 




Revolution.19 These counter-Enlightenment movements in Scotland and America feared 
impressionable young men were particularly vulnerable to disruptive and atheistic beliefs. 
They advocated that the teaching of Christian principles to young men would protect the 
social and religious welfare of society. Consequently, these counter-Enlightenment 
factions were alarmed by Stewart’s and Smith’s use of metaphysics, teaching of natural 
religion, and pedagogical diffusion of ‘Moderate’ beliefs. Richard Sher argues that 
Scottish ‘Moderatism’ was ‘dedicated to propagating many of the leading values of the 
Enlightenment, especially religious tolerance and freedom of expression, reasonableness 
and moderation, polite learning and literature, humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism, 
virtue and happiness’.20 In light of Sher’s definition of ‘Moderatism’, Stewart’s and 
Smith’s programmes of moral education harmonised these ‘Moderate’ values with 
Thomas Reid’s philosophical system. The circumstances that gave rise to ‘Moderate’ 
values at Edinburgh and Princeton before the French Revolution, however, did not 
continue in its wake.  
 Stewart’s and Smith’s teaching of ‘Moderate’ values and natural religion as 
central parts of their respective systems of moral education brought them into conflict 
with religious factions, namely American religious revivalists on Princeton’s Board of 
Trustees and members of a new generation of the Scottish ecclesiastical Moderate party, 
who believed that revealed religion should be taught as the foundation for moral conduct. 
The controversies that emerged from these tensions did not develop in an intellectual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For further readings that touched upon the role of counter-Enlightenment policies in American and 
Scottish politics of the time see Richard Matthews (ed.), Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest: Political 
values in the eighteenth century, (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1994); Alison LaCroix, The 
Ideological Origins of American Federalism, (HUP, 2010); T.M. Devine, ‘The failure of radical reform 
in Scotland in the late eighteenth-century’, in Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society 1700-1850, 
edited by idem, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1990), 51-64; Gordon Pentland, ‘The French 
Revolution, Scottish Radicalism and “People Who Were Called Jacobins”’, in Reactions to 
Revolutions: The 1790s and their aftermath, edited by Ulrich Broich, H.T. Dickinson, Eckhart 
Hellmuth, and Martin Schmidt, (Berlin: Lit Veriag, 2007), 85-108.  
 
20 Sher, CU, 328.  
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vacuum. This study examines how the American and Scottish reception of the French 
Revolution, the 1793-1794 Scottish Sedition Trials, Scottish and American ‘polite’ 
culture, Scottish secular and ecclesiastical politics, American Federalist and Republican 
political conflict, American student riots, and American religious revivalism affected 
Smith’s and Stewart’s programmes of moral education. While Stewart prevailed against 
the censorship policies—associated with the Henry Dundas interests—and a counter-
Enlightenment faction within the new Moderate party, Smith’s programme of moral 
education fell victim to the rallied efforts of American religious revivalists. In their 
respective struggles with counter-Enlightenment factions, Stewart’s ability to galvanize 
support from former students and Smith’s conflicts with unruly students proved deciding 
factors in determining the fate of their moral programmes at Princeton and Edinburgh. 
Their experiences provide examples of the tensions between late eighteenth-century 
Scottish Enlightenment thought and values and the interests of its counter-Enlightenment 
in the Atlantic World. Furthermore, Stewart’s and Smith’s programmes of moral 
education offer an explanation for the different ways in which Scottish philosophy was 
transmitted and adapted in its transatlantic context. 
 The numerous philosophical influences and the diverse themes that Smith and 
Stewart taught certainly exceed the scope of a single study. Although such projects merit 
further attention, this study does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of Smith’s and 
Stewart’s moral philosophy, trace the full span of their notions of moral education, or 
write their intellectual biographies. Instead, this comparative study focuses on the reasons 
why they created systems of moral education, their adaptations of the philosophical 
theme of the ‘moral faculty’, and their tensions with counter-Enlightenment factions. 
While both Smith and Stewart appealed to a wide range of theories that circulated in the 
transnational Republic of Letters, they both drew heavily from the writings of Thomas 
Introduction +!
Reid in creating unique systems of moral education and in treating the theme of the 
‘moral faculty’ as an innate source of moral conduct. Their ‘Moderate’ convictions and 
shared belief that other branches of knowledge (such as natural philosophy and literature) 
cultivated the ‘moral faculty’ also receives attention in this project.21 Before explaining 
my methodology, chapter structure, and how this project addresses gaps within several 
historiographies, the next section will briefly discuss the main characteristics of Scottish 
philosophy, Reid’s treatment of the ‘moral faculty’, and this principle’s relation to natural 
religion. 
 
Common Sense Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment 
 Dugald Stewart and Samuel Stanhope Smith’s programmes of moral education 
cannot be properly understood without reference to the so-called Scottish School of 
Common Sense philosophy ‘clustered around Thomas Reid’.22 Stewart remarked that 
Reid ‘has exemplified, with the happiest success, that method of investigation by which 
alone any solid progress can be made; directing his inquiries to a subject which forms a 
necessary groundwork for the labours of his successors’.23 With equal enthusiasm, Smith 
wrote that ‘in this field no writer has distinguished himself with greater zeal, ability, and 
success than Dr Reid of Glasgow, first in his treatise on the human mind, and afterwards 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 My treatment of Scottish ‘Moderatism’ relies heavily on Sher’s broader definition. While I shall 
show in the following chapters how Smith and Stewart appealed to ‘Moderate’ values in their 
respective systems of moral education, this project does not centre on the transatlantic transmission or 
reception of ‘Moderatism’.   
   
22 Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy, 236.  
 
23 Dugald Stewart, ‘Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D.D. F.R.S. Edin.’, in Idem, 
Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith, LL.D., of William Robertson, D.D., and of Thomas Reid, D.D., 
(Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1811), 443. Reid’s prominent representation of Common 
Sense philosophy did not imply that his contemporaries in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (also 
known as the Wise Club) such as George Campbell and later James Beattie did not contribute to the 
development of Common Sense. But it is safe to credit Reid with diffusing this philosophical system as 
an alternative to modern philosophical scepticism. 
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in his essays on the intellectual, and the active powers of man’.24 Similar to other 
intellectual disciples of Reid, Smith’s and Stewart’s use of Scottish philosophy furnished 
the ‘bones rather than the flesh or muscles’ of their moral philosophy.25 In this regard, the 
function of Reid’s philosophical system provided governing maxims or ‘principles of 
common sense’ as starting and referencing points for philosophical inquiries. He believed 
these principles were universally self-evident in the divinely inspired constitution of 
human nature. Moreover, Reid and other Common Sense philosophers suggested that 
sane people were conscious of these principles and the existence of sensed objects as well 
as personal identity. This approach was grounded in Francis Bacon’s Inductive Method as 
a science of the mind. Through the evidence of introspective reflection, observing human 
nature, and past displays of human nature in historical record Common Sense 
philosophers performed empirical experiments in this science. While this system did not 
dictate a particular philosophical conclusion, Reidian themes had a profound influence on 
so-called ‘common sense’ philosophers. Moreover, Smith’s and Stewart’s respective 
interpretations of the ‘moral faculty’ and natural religion is best understood by first 
reviewing how Reid treated these philosophical themes. An in-depth examination of 
Reid’s Common Sense philosophy would distract from this project’s focus on Smith and 
Stewart, but a brief review of Reid’s philosophical system and his thoughts on the ‘moral 
faculty’, ‘causation’, and natural religion will provide clarity for the philosophical themes 
discussed in the forthcoming chapters.26      
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Samuel Stanhope Smith, The Lectures, Corrected and Improved, which have been delivered for a 
series of years, in the College of New Jersey; on the subjects of Moral and Political Philosophy, vol. 
one, (Trenton: Wilson, 1812), 139.  
 
25 McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, 2.  
 
26 For a more in-depth discussion of Reid and his philosophy see Terence Cuneo and Rene Van 
Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, (CUP, 2004). 
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   As a Presbyterian minister and later as a regent at King’s College, Aberdeen from 
1751 to 1764, confronted with David Hume’s mitigated scepticism, Thomas Reid claimed 
that Hume’s ‘reasoning appeared to me to be just: there was therefore a necessity to call 
in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion’.27 From 
this conviction, he countered Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) with An 
Inquiry into the Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764). Dugald Stewart later 
remarked that Reid’s ‘leading design was evidently to overthrow the modern system of 
scepticism; and at every successive step of his progress, new and unexpected lights break 
in on his fundamental principles’.28 Reid’s efforts in vindicating his philosophical system 
and ridiculing the foundations of modern philosophical scepticism were not intended to 
comprehensively treat every philosophical theme. Instead, he sought to establish a new 
empirical system based on Bacon’s Inductive Method for future inquiries in the science 
of mind. Reid’s philosophy offered an innovative approach to epistemology, and in doing 
so, he was deeply indebted to previous theorists. Of the numerous theories that influenced 
Reid’s philosophy, he drew heavily from the early Enlightenment writings of Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746) on innate cognitive ideas, George Turnbull (1698-1748) on 
providential naturalism in moral philosophy, and Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) on natural 
religion. Of course, other theorists of this period such as Gershom Carmichael (1672-
1729) and Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) also heavily influenced Reid’s philosophy, 
but for the present purpose I shall trace how Reid drew from the writings of Hutcheson, 
Turnbull, and Clarke in creating Common Sense philosophy.   
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27 The regent system involved one professor who taught logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and 
natural philosophy to a group of students over the course of three years. See Alexander Campbell 
Fraser, Thomas Reid, (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1898), 20-26. Thomas 
Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the principles of Common Sense, (Edinburgh: Kincaid and 
Bell, 1764), iv. 
  
28 Stewart, ‘Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid’, in, Idem, Biographical Memoirs, 452-
453. 
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 Paul Wood suggests that in understanding Reid’s philosophy ‘we must first 
recognize that Reid was as much a man of science as he was a moralist’.29 His earlier 
studies at Marischal College from 1722 to 1726 under the direction of George Turnbull 
introduced Reid to the concept of approaching moral philosophy as an experimental 
science. Turnbull remarked:    
I was led long ago to apply myself to the study of the human mind in the same way 
to the study of the human body, or any other part of Natural Philosophy: that is, to 
try whether due enquiry into moral nature would not soon enable us to account for 
moral, as the best of Philosophers teaches us to explain natural phenomena.30 
 
Like Turnbull, Reid’s enthusiasm for Bacon’s Inductive Method later played a central 
part in his Common Sense philosophy to the extent that Reid suggested that ‘he who 
philosophizes by other rules, either concerning the material system, or concerning the 
mind, mistakes his aim’.31 By drawing philosophical conclusions on the evidence of 
introspective reflection and the external observation of human nature, Reid rebutted the 
reasoning of David Hume, Rene Descartes, Nicholas Malebranche, John Locke, and 
George Berkeley as prominent theorists in the so-called ‘Ideal Theory’. Reid’s use of the 
scientific method, however, did not imply he failed to draw a distinction between moral 
laws and the laws of nature.32 According to Robert Callergard, neither ‘the activity and 
passivity of things, nor final or efficient causes, are within the reach of the kind of 
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29 Paul Wood, ‘Thomas Reid and the Culture of Science,’ found in The Cambridge Companion to 
Thomas Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo and Rene van Woudenberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 71. 
  
30 George Turnbull, The Principles of Moral Philosophy: An Enquiry into the Wise and Good 
Government of the Moral World in Which the Continuance of Good Administration, and of Due Care 
about Virtue, for ever, is inferred from present Order in all Things, in that Part chiefly where Virtue is 
concerned, (London: John Noon, 1740), iii.  
 
31 Reid, An Inquiry into the Mind, 3. 
 
32 For further reading on Reid’s use of the Inductive Method see Peter Anstey, ‘Thomas Reid and the 
justification of induction’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:1, (1995): 77-93; Larry Laudan, 
‘Thomas Reid and the Newtonian turn of British methodological thought’, in The Methodological 




“Newtonian” physics that Reid defends’.33 Hume also sought to establish ‘an experience 
based science of human understanding’ through the use of Bacon’s Inductive Method or 
the so-called ‘experimental method of reasoning’.34 Contrary to Hume’s mitigated 
scepticism in the understanding of human nature (best shown in Book One of Treatise), 
Reid recognised that progress in this science required establishing governing maxims and 
delineating self-evident or ‘common sense’ principles as a foundation for future work. 
Reid’s notion of self-evident principles also appealed to Turnbull’s moral thought. 
Turnbull claimed that ‘no being can know itself, project or pursue any scheme, or lay 
down maxims for its conduct; but so far as its own constitution is certain; and constant; 
for so far only, are things ascertainable; and therefore so far only, can rules be drawn 
from them’.35 Similar to Turnbull, Reid argued that ‘principles of common sense’ 
supported the existence of a benevolent deity. Thus, Reid’s Common Sense philosophy 
expanded upon Turnbull’s belief that ‘human nature and the ways of god to man 
vindicate, by delineating the general laws to which the principal phenomena in the human 
system are reducible, and shewing [sic] them to be wise and good’.36 This religious and 
philosophical conviction was predicated on the belief that God designed the mind with 
innate faculties and limited powers for its cultivation and exercise toward perfection.     
 The concept of ‘common sense’ in describing ‘mother wit’ or an intuitive sense 
did not originate with Reid. Francis Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy (1755) had 
previously popularized this belief in Scottish moral philosophy. Often considered as the 
father of Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy, Hutcheson focused his moral theory 
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33 Robert Callergard, ‘Reid and the Newtonian Forces of Attraction’, The Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy, 3:2, (2005): 140.  
 
34 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Norton and Mary Norton, (OUP, 2009), 
114-115.  
 
35 Turnbull, The Principles of Moral Philosophy, 3. 
  
36 Ibid., 1. 
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on the natural virtues of humankind and the moral-sense cognitivism in evaluating 
sentiments and ideas.37 He believed this natural ability of the mind existed without the 
instruction of secular or divine laws. Hutcheson remarked that ‘to each of our powers we 
seem to have a corresponding taste or sense, recommending the proper use of it to the 
agent, and making him relish or value the like exercise of it by another’.38 The common 
experience of these cognitive powers in human conduct suggests a moral truth or 
‘realism’ to this belief. Reid later expanded upon this philosophical concept of ‘realism’ 
in Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). There Reid drew from Hutcheson’s 
example of the ‘moral sense’ in illustrating the active powers of the so-called ‘moral 
faculty’. Reid remarked that ‘the testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external 
senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it’.39 Yet, 
Reid differed from Hutcheson by suggesting that people did not merely sense moral 
qualities but formed moral judgments through this sense whilst possessing the active 
power to fulfill moral obligations to themselves, others, and God. Gershom Carmichael 
who taught Hutcheson at Glasgow first considered the branches of duty.40 Reid’s 
treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ included and expanded upon these duties in teaching 
practical ethics at Glasgow University. Contrary to orthodox Calvinism, Reid believed 
that the perfection of the divinely inspired ‘moral faculty’ provided the primary source 
for moral behavior. The tension that followed between conservative Calvinists and 
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37 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment, 
(CUP, 1996), 66.  
 
38 Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, vol. one, (London: Millar, 1755), 59. This work 
was published posthumously in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and London. Elements of Hutcheson’s moral 
philosophy resembled his earlier professor, Gershom Carmichael, who he succeeded as professor of 
moral philosophy at Glasgow University in 1729. In addition, Hutcheson heavily influenced the 
thought of Adam Smith who later taught moral philosophy at Glasgow from 1752 until Reid’s 1764 
election.    
 
39 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), 238.  
 
40 See James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (eds.), Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish 
Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael, (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), 46-48. 
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Common Sense philosophers over the primary source of morality was reinvigorated 
during the height of Samuel Stanhope Smith’s and Dugald Stewart’s teaching careers.  
 In addition to questions regarding the primary source of morality, Reid’s 
fundamental treatment of ‘causation’ also relied heavily on natural religion and its 
relation to innate ‘active powers of the mind’.41 Of the various subjects discussed in 
eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy, the controversial debate over liberty and 
necessity generated the most attention.42 This debate involved the extent of God’s 
influence in causes and effects and whether agents acted out of necessity or possessed the 
free will to determine a particular action. Reid argued that ‘the name of a cause and of an 
agent, is properly given to that being only, which, by its active power produces some 
change in itself, or in some other being’.43 His conclusion on this subject was influenced 
by Samuel Clarke’s sermons on natural religion.44 According to R. F. Stalley, ‘Reid’s 
endorsement of Clarke’s argument shows that, for him too, the idea that we are free 
agents is bound up with the idea that motives are not causes’.45 Reid suggested that the 
concept of necessity reduced all human actions to the exclusive determination of God 
and, therefore, denied any human independence in choosing to act or refrain from an 
action. Reid argued that if the system of necessity existed ‘there can be no moral 
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41 For a more in-depth discussion of Reid’s treatment of causation and freedom see William Rowe, 
Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 49-93. 
  
42 For further reading on the debate over necessity and liberty in eighteenth-century Britain see James 
Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy, 
(OUP, 2008). 
  
43 Reid, Active Powers, 276. 
 
44 As a Presbyterian minister at New Machar, Reid read Clark’s Boyle Lectures to his congregation on 
several occasions (Paul Wood, ‘Thomas Reid and the Tree of the Sciences’, The Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy, 2:2, (2004): 128).  
 
45 R.F. Stalley, ‘Reid’s Defence of Freedom’, in Thomas Reid: Context, Influence and Significance, 
edited by Joseph Houston, (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2004), 44.  
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government, nor moral obligation [and] there can be no display of moral attributes’.46 He 
likened the concept of necessity to a mechanical engine or compass where people had no 
choice in obeying or transgressing the secular and religious laws of the world.  
 Reid concluded that it was improbable that God would create humankind without 
the ability to merit moral rewards and punishments for vicious conduct. For this reason, 
Reid advocated that God designed the human species with limited active powers to be 
agents of cause. He wrote that ‘it has pleased the Almighty to bestow upon some of his 
creatures, particularly upon man, some degree of active power, and of reason, to direct 
him to the right use of his power’.47 The significant connection between the liberty to act 
or refrain from an action and the ability to reasonably determine God’s moral design of 
that power, for Reid, represented humankind’s ‘moral liberty’.48 Reid argued that humans 
are ‘not merely a tool in the hand of the master, but a servant, in the proper sense, who 
has a certain trust, and is accountable for the discharge of it’.49 The provision of limited 
free will designed ‘after the image of God’ came with the moral obligation to make 
virtuous choices with the use of reason.50 Although ‘moral liberty’ made benevolent 
interactions that merited approbation from others possible, Reid believed that God 
ultimately judged an agent’s use of ‘moral liberty’. In this respect, he noted that 
humankind ‘must finally render an account of the talent committed to him, to the supreme 
Governor and righteous Judge’.51 The notion that God created humankind with the ‘moral 
liberty’ to fulfill His benevolent design and judge how an agent responded to immoral 
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‘passions or appetites’ demonstrated Reid’s marriage of limited free will and religious 
faith.52 Reid did not claim to understand the entirety of God’s purpose for creating 
humankind with limited freedom, but he suggested that the cultivation of these innate 
powers better served God and benevolent affections between people than the 
philosophical concept of necessity.53  
 The transatlantic diffusion of Scottish philosophy and its defence of the belief in a 
supreme deity did not prevent controversy over its use in higher education. This study 
will demonstrate how two of Reid’s most distinguished intellectual disciples adapted his 
philosophical system in a pedagogical context whilst defending ‘Moderate’ values. The 
following chapters illustrates how Smith and Stewart adapted the functions of the ‘moral 
faculty’ as the primary source of moral behaviour and ‘moral liberty’ as the limited 
power to cause an intended effect in preparing young men for public life. The fact that 
Smith and Stewart did so in radically different circumstances reveals a fascinating, yet 
unexplored, dimension to the Scottish Enlightenment in the Atlantic World.       
   
Methodology & Historiography 
 The emergence of Atlantic History as a paradigm for historical inquiry has, for 
over a decade, exemplified an emphatic move towards a transnational perspective. 
Through this paradigm historians are reevaluating the traditional notions of commercial, 
cultural, political, and intellectual currents in the Atlantic World.54 In recent years, the 
methods and definitions of Atlantic History have generated much scholarly debate. For 
instance, The American Historical Review and the William and Mary Quarterly published 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Ibid., 84.  
 
53 Ibid., 310-11.  
 
54 See Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, (HUP, 2005), 3-4. Another key work 
in defining Atlantic history is Jack Greene and Philip Morgan (eds.), Atlantic History: A Critical 
Appraisal, (OUP, 2009).  
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special issues devoted to discussing future horizons for Atlantic History.55 In defining a 
methodology for Atlantic History, the writings of David Armitage and Alison Games are 
particularly instructive. According to Armitage, there are three separate approaches to 
Atlantic history: ‘trans-Atlantic history’ compares a theme or themes on either side of the 
Atlantic; ‘circum-Atlantic history’ explores maritime activities in the Atlantic; and 
finally, ‘cis-Atlantic history’ focuses on an isolated area near an Atlantic coastline.56 The 
current project is an example of Armitage’s definition of ‘trans-Atlantic history’. Alison 
Games suggests that Atlantic History provides an excellent model for bridging 
multidisciplinary interests in understanding the exchange of ideas, commerce, people, and 
culture.57 This project’s investigation of the transatlantic practises of Scottish philosophy 
in a pedagogical context contributes to this new wave of historical inquiry. Does this 
enthusiasm for transnational history permit space for national perspectives? This 
comparative study suggests that it does. Moreover, transnational and national approaches 
in examining a historical period or theme are not mutually exclusive. National interests 
greatly influenced and distinguished contributions to transnational dialogues, particularly, 
in the diffusion of ideas.58 The following chapters will show how the unique 
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55 ‘AHR Forum: Entangled Histories in the Atlantic World’, The American Historical Review, 112:3, 
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56 David Armitage, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History,’ in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, 
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circumstances in Scotland and the United States influenced the receptions of Scottish 
philosophy and prominent ‘Moderate’ beliefs as examples of the Scottish Enlightenment 
in the Atlantic World.   
  The comparative nature of a transatlantic approach could be seen as challenging 
for three reasons. First, without a clear narrative and an explicit overall argument, 
comparative studies often run the risk of appearing disjointed. Secondly, the transatlantic 
connections or disconnections drawn must be treated as existing in different national 
contexts as well as being linked in the wider Atlantic World. Finally, there must be a 
significant reason why a comparison in a transatlantic context contributes something that 
a ‘cis-Atlantic’ approach could not. This study demonstrates how Stewart’s and Smith’s 
programmes of moral education were connected by their use of Scottish philosophy and 
appeal to the ‘Moderate’ ideology of the Scottish Enlightenment. The different contexts 
in which they taught these ideas and values encouraged different modifications, 
particularly, in response to counter-Enlightenment factions of clergymen. Only a 
comparative study of this kind can demonstrate how different national circumstances 
influenced the adaptation and defence of Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy in the 
Atlantic World. 
 As an example of intellectual and cultural history, this project is heavily 
influenced by the writings of Quentin Skinner, William Bouwsma, and Richard Rorty. 
According to Rorty, intellectual history analyzes the conception, transmission, and 
reception of ideas and culture without imposing anachronistic beliefs as a way to 
accommodate contemporary concerns.59 While analytic philosophy, often associated with 
the history of philosophy, investigates contemporary applications to timeless 
philosophical debates, it does not account for the historical contexts that influenced a 
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Rorty, Skinner, and Schneewind, (CUP, 1984), 67-74. 
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particular philosophical debate or tradition. Skinner remarked that ‘no agent can 
eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to 
accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done’.60 Interpretations of 
philosophy must therefore consider the historical contexts in which they emerged and 
existed. In this regard, William Bouwsma suggests that philosophy treated within the 
contexts of its time permits a more nuanced understanding of its meaning.61 By devoting 
equal attention to Smith’s and Stewart’s moral thought, this study examines the various 
ways in which applied ethics touched upon other branches of knowledge. Moreover, the 
reasons for their adaptations of Scottish philosophy reflected the national circumstances 
in which they were taught as well as cultural and intellectual attachments within the 
Atlantic World.  
 This project is not an intellectual biography of Stewart and Smith, but rather sheds 
new light on a significant part of Stewart’s and Smith’s moral thought. Although 
biographical memoirs of Stewart and Smith appeared shortly after their deaths, they did 
not fully explain their respective accomplishments in education.62 The fact that there is 
only one modern biography of Stewart’s life and none for Smith provides further proof of 
neglect.63 This study reevaluates Smith’s and Stewart’s historical significance as moral 
educators in a transatlantic context. To date, no full-scale attempt has been made to 
explain Smith’s and Stewart’s systems of moral education, the significant role of the 
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‘moral faculty’ within these systems, or the reasons for their tension with counter-
Enlightenment factions.  
 My discussion of Smith and Stewart draws heavily on their lecture notes as well 
as their published and unpublished manuscripts on moral philosophy.64 Stewart’s and 
Smith’s published textbooks offer the best source for their ideas on moral education.65 
Stewart’s Outlines of Moral Philosophy (1793), which appeared in several editions 
during his lifetime, provided an outline of his ideas on central philosophical themes and 
Smith’s ‘A System of Moral Philosophy for the Students of Nassau Hall’ served a similar 
function. In discussing the nuances of their moral thought, Smith’s Lectures (1812) and 
Stewart’s Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792) delineate their concepts 
of moral education and examples of its practical application. Their other publications on 
morals and metaphysics likewise include relevant material; their central ideas on 
education, however, were best expressed in the previously mentioned sources.66 Evidence 
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Outlines of Moral Philosophy, for the use of students in the University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: 
William Creech, 1793); Samuel Stanhope Smith, The Lectures, Corrected and Improved, which have 
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Philosophy, (Trenton: James Wilson, 1812). 
 
66 Dugald Stewart, Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith, LL.D., of William Robertson, D.D., and 
Thomas Reid, D.D., (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1811); Idem, Lectures on Political 
Economy, two vols, edited by Sir William Hamilton, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1877); Idem, 
Philosophical Essays, (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1815); Idem, The Philosophy of the 
Active and Moral Powers of Man, (Edinburgh: Adam Black, 1828); Samuel Stanhope Smith, Sermons, 
(Newark, NJ: Jacob Halsey and Co., 1799); Idem, A Comprehensive View of the Leading and Most 
Important Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, second edition, (New Brunswick: Deare & 
Myer, 1815); Idem, An Essay on the Causes of Variety of the Complexion and Figure in the Human 
Species, second edition, (New Brunswick: J. Simpson and Co., 1810).  
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from correspondence, diaries, faculty and trustee minutes, and newspapers found at 
Edinburgh and Princeton repositories suggests that politicians, ministers, students, 
parents, and faculty members discussed the merit and demerit of their systems of moral 
education, its service for secular interests, and its effect on diffusing Christian principles.  
 There have been several excellent articles on Stewart’s and Smith’s influence as 
professors of moral philosophy.67 Of this research, Knud Haakonssen and Mark Noll 
have dominated the respective historiographies.68 The following treatment of Smith as 
primarily appealing to Reid and Scottish ‘Moderatism’ diverges from Noll’s argument 
that Smith followed a version of Witherspoon’s so-called ‘republican Christian 
Enlightenment’. This project’s understanding of Stewart’s moral thought in relation to 
other prominent Scottish moralists and Scottish ‘polite’ culture is heavily influenced by 
the writings of Haakonssen and Nicholas Phillipson. Furthermore, my approach to 
Stewart’s notion of education builds upon the earlier work of Jennifer Tannoch-Bland 
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Scottish Enlightenment, (CUP, 1996), 226-248; Idem, ‘From moral philosophy to political economy: 
The contribution of Dugald Stewart’, in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by V. Hope, 
(EUP, 1984), 211-32.  
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and Donald Winch in exploring the contexts in which Stewart taught and his influence on 
prominent Scottish Whigs.69  
 Douglas Sloan’s The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal 
(1971) has greatly influenced several aspects of this project, primarily by showing that a 
transatlantic approach is valuable in understanding the influence of Scottish thought on 
early American higher education.70 Sloan investigates how early American colleges and 
Presbyterian academies drew from Scottish Enlightenment thought and values with case 
studies of Francis Alison, John Witherspoon, Samuel Stanhope Smith, and Benjamin 
Rush. In discussing Smith, Sloan remarked that ‘as forces of an aggressive Protestantism 
gathered in the early years of the new century, Smith found himself standing more and 
more alone, the representative of an earlier time’.71 Indeed, Smith became alienated 
largely from his use of Reidian themes and ‘Moderate’ beliefs toward the end of his 
career at Princeton. Yet was he the only moral philosophy professor who defended 
Scottish Enlightenment ideals from the obstruction of counter-Enlightenment policies? 
This question sparked the conceptual starting point of this project. By comparing Smith’s 
system of moral education with Stewart’s, this thesis demonstrates how ‘Moderate’ 
values and Scottish philosophy were adapted in moral education whilst shedding new 
light on the tensions between late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scottish 
Enlightenment moral philosophy and versions of counter-Enlightenment in the Atlantic 
World.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Donald Winch, ‘The system of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils’, in That noble science of 
politics, (CUP, 1983), 23-62; Jennifer Tannoch-Bland, The Primacy of Moral Philosophy: Dugald 
Stewart and the Scottish Enlightenment, unpublished doctoral dissertation at Griffith University, 
Brisbane, Australia (December 2000). 
  
70 Douglas Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal, (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1971). 
 
71 Ibid., 184.  
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Structure 
 This thesis has two main parts. The first consists of three chapters on Dugald 
Stewart’s system of moral education: the circumstances in which Stewart developed his 
system of moral education from 1790 to 1794, Stewart’s applied ethics in treating the 
‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’, and finally, his defence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in the context of the 1805 John Leslie case. Complementing the 
chronology and themes in part one, the second part consists of three chapters on Smith’s 
system of moral education: the circumstances in which Smith created the Princeton 
Enlightenment between 1794 and 1799, the role of the ‘moral faculty’ within his system 
of moral education, and lastly, Smith’s defence of his programme in the context of what 
he saw as two converging counter-Enlightenment campaigns from 1800 through 1812. 
The concluding chapter examines the question why the academic careers of Smith and 
Stewart represented the final days of the Scottish Enlightenment in the Atlantic World 
and the epilogue on James McCosh’s administration at Princeton supports this conclusion 
whilst offering an opening for future research.  
 The first chapter, ‘Building Upon Reid’s Legacy’, explores how Stewart as an 
intellectual product of the Scottish Enlightenment interpreted mid-eighteenth-century 
‘Moderatism’ and how these values were put into effect in his programme of moral 
education. Michael Brown suggests that Stewart’s appeal to the thought and values in 
writing biographical memoirs of Adam Smith (1793), William Robertson (1796), and 
Thomas Reid (1802) justified his teaching of moral philosophy by establishing a canon of 
orthodoxy of which he could appeal. Indeed, Brown’s argument is correct and can be 
modified to include Stewart’s earlier publications. His Elements (1792) and Outlines 
(1793) explain and justify his system of moral education before authoring these 
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biographical memoirs.72 Jennifer Tannoch-Bland argues that Stewart did more than 
‘popularize’ Reid’s Common Sense philosophy as Norman Daniels, Anand Chitnis, and 
Bruce Lenman suggest.73 In agreement with Tannoch-Bland, this chapter goes further by 
demonstrating the reasons why and how Stewart developed a modern version of Reid’s 
philosophical system. These adaptations of Scottish philosophy came in response to the 
circumstances of his time, namely the Scottish reception of the French Revolution, the 
1793-1794 Scottish Sedition Trials, and the rise of counter-Enlightenment policies 
associated with the Henry Dundas interests. Similar to Reid, Stewart attempted to combat 
modern philosophical scepticism. He extended this aim to oppose other forms of 
radicalism with particular attention to the emergence of counter-Enlightenment policies 
that targeted the teaching of natural religion and metaphysics. In doing so, Stewart’s 
programme of moral education exercised the innate faculties of the mind with the 
objective of conditioning his students to discern on their own the difference between truth 
and error. He believed ‘it is the business of education, not to counteract, in any instance, 
the established laws of our constitution, but to direct them to their proper purposes’.74 
From this conviction, Stewart’s system of moral education provided a practical and 
modern version of Reid’s Common Sense philosophy that was intended to prevent the 
adoption of modern philosophical scepticism whilst opposing the acceptance of counter-
Enlightenment policies at Edinburgh University.   
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72 Michael Brown, ‘Creating a Canon: Dugald Stewart’s Construction of the Scottish Enlightenment,’ 
History of Universities, vol. XVI, (2000), 135-154. 
 
73 Jennifer Tannoch-Bland, The Primacy of Moral Philosophy, 2; Norman Daniels, Thomas Reid’s 
Inquiry: The geometry of visible and the case for realism, (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1974), 120; 
Anand Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History, (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 175; 
Bruce Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization: Scotland 1746-1832, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981), 95.  
 
74 Stewart, Elements, 388.  
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 His teaching of practical ways in which his audience, primarily young men, could 
develop virtuous habits and prevent bad intellectual habits forms the theme of chapter 
two, ‘The Science of Applied Ethics’. This chapter traces the practical nature of Stewart’s 
system of moral education and his ideas on social improvement in treating the four 
‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’. These principles consisted of the ‘moral taste’, 
‘sensing the ridiculous’, ‘sensing decency’, and ‘sympathy’. Although these principles 
have not attracted scholarly attention, they reveal how Stewart sought to improve the 
human condition as part of civil society. Stewart remarked that ‘in order to secure still 
more completely the good order of society, and to facilitate the acquisition of virtuous 
habits, nature has superadded to our moral constitution a variety of auxiliary principles, 
which sometimes give rise to a conduct agreeable to the rules of morality and highly 
useful to mankind’.75 Of these four principles, Stewart devoted more attention in treating 
‘moral taste’ and ‘sympathy’; these four principles, however, relied upon each other for 
their advancement and cultivation. In discussing his treatment of these principles, this 
chapter examines Stewart’s vision of a benevolent and intellectually vibrant society led 
by virtuous citizens and how the application of his programme of moral education could 
realise this ambition. 
 The third chapter, ‘In Defence of the Scottish Enlightenment’, explores Stewart’s 
role in the 1805 John Leslie case where he defended Leslie and secularism in the Faculty 
of Arts at Edinburgh University. The new Moderate party of the Church of Scotland 
threatened Stewart’s system of moral education by insisting that candidates for 
professorial chairs should also hold ecclesiastical positions. The Presbytery of Edinburgh 
exercised this practise in their 1805 endorsement of Thomas McKnight’s candidacy for 
the Chair of Mathematics. The circumstances of the chair canvass turned controversial 
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75 Stewart, Outlines, 1:154.  
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when “Moderate” clergymen of Edinburgh attacked John Leslie, a well-respected 
scientist with no affiliation to the Church of Scotland, for his questionable religious 
principles. The Moderates were offended by Leslie’s Whiggish ideas of liberal scientific 
progress and promotion of Humean thought expressed in Note Sixteen attached to his 
Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation Heat (1804). Stewart had a prominent role in 
proving that Leslie’s praise of Hume’s premises on the theme of ‘causation’ in nature did 
not imply that he endorsed Hume’s mitigated scepticism. While the Leslie case was 
charged with political, ideological, ecclesiastical, and philosophical concerns as shown by 
Ian Clark, John Burke, J.B. Morrell, and John Wright, it ultimately centered on the extent 
of the Church’s involvement in university affairs.76 This chapter suggests that Stewart’s 
defence of Leslie embodied his on-going campaign to safeguard his programme of moral 
education from the obstruction of counter-Enlightenment interests. His appeal to Reidian 
thought amongst other Scottish philosophers in the context of the Leslie affair sought to 
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76 Clark discussed the agendas between the Scottish ecclesiastical parties and the specific theological 
arguments waged against Leslie by the Moderates. He argued that ‘ecclesiastical and secular politics 
played an important part in the struggle, but what was really at stake was “moderatism” as a theological 
and ecclesiological system’ (Ian Clark, ‘The Leslie Controversy, 1805’, Records of the Scottish Church 
History Society, 14, (1962): 179). Burke explored the earlier tension between David Hume and James 
Beattie over Hume’s controversial theory on causality and the subsequent philosophical and 
ecclesiastical repercussions of Leslie’s public fiasco.  He argued that ‘the election of Leslie and his 
subsequent trial, however, while surrounded by conflict and ill will, did succeed in producing a 
rapprochement between theological dogma and the scientific enterprise; and further, it directed 
attention to one of the most important philosophical problems involved in the search for scientific 
knowledge’ (John Burke, ‘Kirk and Causality in Edinburgh, 1805’, Isis, 61:2, (1970): 354). Morrell 
oriented his investigation around the unpublished private correspondence of John Leslie that conveyed 
his intimate thoughts of his public ordeal with James Brown, Joseph Banks, and Thomas Wedgewood. 
By primarily investigating Leslie’s point of view, Morrell revealed Leslie’s tumultuous history with the 
Hill family who dominated St. Andrews University and his frustration expressed during the 1805 
ordeal as what he interpreted as a personal attack. Ultimately, Morrell concluded ‘there is, then, 
evidence to confirm that the chief components of the Leslie affair were personal feuds, and differences 
of party and ecclesiastical politics’ (J.B. Morrell, ‘The Leslie affair: careers, kirk and politics in 
Edinburgh in 1805’, Scottish Historical Review, 54:1, (1975): 79). Wright provides a philosophical 
analysis of John Leslie’s infamous Note Sixteen, Dugald Stewart’s defence of Leslie, the Moderate 
clergymen’s interpretation of Hume’s theory of causation, and Thomas Brown’s defence of Leslie. 
Wright argued that ‘what developed from these charges was an elaborate debate about the 
interpretation of Hume’s accounts of causation and causal power, and their implications for rational 
religion’ (John Wright, ‘The Scientific Reception of Hume’s Theory of Causation: Establishing the 
Positivist Interpretation in Early Nineteenth-Century Scotland’, in Hume and Hume's Connexions, 
edited by John Wright and M.A. Stewart, (EUP, 1994), 15). 
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re-establish the earlier ‘Moderate’ belief of tolerance and support for the teaching of 
Enlightenment science, particularly the science of the mind.     
 The forth chapter, ‘The Princeton Enlightenment’, explores the contexts in which 
Samuel Stanhope Smith developed and applied his programme of moral education at 
Princeton. After succeeding Witherspoon as Princeton’s seventh president in 1795, Smith 
took immediate action in reforming Princeton’s curriculum. For a better picture of how 
Smith’s reforms changed Princeton’s traditional religious purpose, this chapter first 
discusses the College of New Jersey’s strong connection with American religious 
revivalism and examines its later reception of Scottish philosophy.77 Samuel Holt and 
William Hudnut have shown that Smith united his religious convictions with an 
enthusiasm for fostering scientific progress.78 Yet they do not show how Smith’s 
initiatives transformed Princeton into America’s premier institution for liberal education 
and how this purpose contrasted with Witherspoon’s earlier administration. Smith’s use 
of Scottish philosophy underpinned his creation of the Princeton Enlightenment. While 
Sydney Ahlstrom and Mark Noll have shown that American Evangelicals drew from 
Scottish thought, Smith’s moral thought differed from his Evangelical brethren.79 
Contrary to treating Smith as an intellectual disciple of Witherspoon’s so-called 
‘republican Christian Enlightenment’, this chapter demonstrates the reasons why and how 
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founded the College of New Jersey, and Witherspoon’s reforms of the curriculum. Two prominent 
works that influence this discussion are Ned Landsman, ‘Presbyterians, Evangelicals and the 
Educational Culture of the Middle Colonies’, Pennsylvania History, 64, (Summer, 1997): 168-182; 
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Smith expanded Enlightenment science in preparing future statesmen of the early 
republic and from enhancing the arts at Princeton, he hoped to rival Edinburgh’s success.  
 In league with Princeton’s reception of the French Revolution, the emergence of 
political party tensions between the Federalists and the developing Republicans created a 
divisive atmosphere in the final years of the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, Smith’s 
Princeton Enlightenment attracted considerably more students with the promise of 
‘enlightened learning’ comparable to that found in Europe. Amongst this increased 
student body, Smith saw factions of unruly students as so-called ‘Jacobins’. He 
interpreted ‘Jacobin’ principles as a form of radical counter-Enlightenment that dismissed 
his system of moral education. Smith’s response to these respective conflicts from the 
classroom occupies the focus of chapter five, ‘The Primacy of the Mind at Princeton’. 
From the belief that times of conflict and domestic hardships created excellent 
opportunities for scientific innovation, he advanced the Princeton Enlightenment. 
Contrary to Evangelicals such as Reverend Ashbel Green, Smith taught that the exercise 
of the ‘moral faculty’ and its ‘rules of duty’ was the best way to combat so-called ‘French 
Impiety’ and unite Americans under shared values. Smith’s mingling of metaphysics and 
revealed religion alarmed Green who believed Witherspoon’s legacy and Christian 
principles were improperly enforced at Princeton. This chapter suggests that Smith’s 
teaching of the ‘moral faculty’ and the ‘rules of duty’ shed new light on how his applied 
ethics addressed the circumstances of the time.  
 The sixth chapter, ‘Princeton’s War of 1812’, examines how Smith resisted what 
he saw as two converging counter-Enlightenment campaigns during the first decade of 
the nineteenth century. Between 1800 and 1807, a faction of rebellious students (known 
by Smith as ‘Jacobins’) resisted Princeton’s authority with various acts of vandalism, 
protest, and rebellion. As Steven Novak has shown, the dilemma of preventing vicious 
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conduct from unruly young men was not exclusive to Princeton.80 Despite this wider 
uprising of American youth, Princeton was unique insofar as it struggled between two 
conflicting solutions to youthful rebellions: an expansion of Smith’s system of moral 
education and a revival of Christian principles. As a member of Princeton’s Board of 
Trustees, Ashbel Green orchestrated a campaign to remove Smith’s system of moral 
education. Alarmed by how Smith’s programme fell short in producing future ministers 
and the perceived presence of irreligion amongst the students, Green and like-minded 
Evangelicals questioned the content of Smith’s moral philosophy. Complementing Mark 
Noll’s thorough discussion of Princeton’s 1807 ‘Great Rebellion’, this chapter connects 
how earlier student disruptions established the ‘Jacobin’ tradition at Princeton.81 Instead 
of expanding the efforts to diffuse Christian principles as Evangelicals demanded, Smith 
utilized ‘Jacobin’ activities to enhance his system of moral education and improve 
Princeton’s campus. In the course of addressing Smith’s tensions with these converging 
counter-Enlightenment movements, this chapter suggests reasons why Smith’s 
programme of moral education and its creation of a Princeton Enlightenment gradually 
declined until meeting its end in 1812.   
 The following chapters suggest that the battles between the late eighteenth-
century Scottish Enlightenment moral thought and emerging counter-Enlightenment 
movements were fought at institutions of higher education on both sides of the Atlantic.82 
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80 Steven Novak, The Rights of Youth: American Colleges and Student Revolt, 1798-1815, (HUP, 
1977).  
 
81 Mark Noll, ‘Before the Storm: Life at Princeton College, 1806-1807’, PULC, 42, (1981): 145-164; 
Idem, ‘The Princeton Trustees of 1807: New Men and New Directions’, PULC 41, (1980): 208-230; 
Idem, ‘The Response of Elias Boudinot to the Student Rebellion of 1807: Visions of Honor, Order, and 
Morality’, PULC, 43 (1981): 1-22.  
  
82 While George Davie credits the Reform Bill of 1832 as a defining moment towards ending ‘the 
peculiar institutional inheritance of Scottish Democracy’ associated with its Enlightenment, David 
Allan traced the steady decline of the primacy of Scottish moral philosophy decades before the passing 
of this Act. George Davie’s important work on the role of Scottish thought in nineteenth-century 
Scottish universities did not include a discussion on the first decade of the nineteenth century or its 
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William Hamilton and James Ferrier were celebrated successors of the Scottish School of 
Common Sense, but neither rivaled Stewart’s success nor his systematic efforts to sustain 
and modernise Scottish thought. Across the Atlantic at Princeton, Smith’s programme of 
moral education marked the last full-scale effort to institutionalize an American version 
of the Scottish Enlightenment. As David Hoeveler, Bradley Gundlach, and W.B. 
Carnochan have shown, the 1868 appointment of James McCosh, signified a turning 
point of the earlier counter-Enlightenment movement.83 McCosh certainly reintroduced a 
sophisticated teaching of Scottish philosophy whilst harboring Enlightenment ambitions 
for Princeton. But McCosh’s restructuring of Princeton’s curriculum, which will be 
examined in the epilogue, did not resemble Smith’s earlier Enlightenment where the 
primacy of the mind provided the overarching institutional purpose. By treating these 
prominent moral pedagogues, Smith and Stewart, within the contexts in which they 
taught, this thesis sheds new light on the adaptation of Scottish thought and values in the 
face of fierce counter-Enlightenment opposition during the final years of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in the Atlantic World. 
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Enlightenment: ideas of scholarship in early modern history, (EUP, 1993). 
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Dugald Stewart and the Scottish Counter-Enlightenment 
Chapter One 
 






 Reflecting on early nineteenth-century Edinburgh, the author and jurist Henry 
Cockburn wrote that ‘in an age which requires all the dignity of morals to counteract the 
tendencies of physical pursuits and political convulsion, [Dugald Stewart] has exalted the 
character of his country and his generation’.1 As the professor of moral philosophy at 
Edinburgh University from 1785 to 1810, Stewart flourished as one of the most 
influential moral educators of his time. Although Stewart was active during the decline of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, his thought cannot be explained without reference to the 
previous generation of enlightened literati. Stewart claimed that ‘I shall follow the 
footsteps of those illustrious men who have gone before me on this subject, Hutcheson, 
Reid, Smith and Ferguson; adapting at the same time as the professor of this science 
should always do my lessons to the time I live in and the situation in which I am placed’.2 
Yet his appeal to Scottish Enlightenment philosophers as well as numerous others in the 
Republic of Letters did more than ‘popularize’ Scottish philosophy for a new age.3 In 
adapting Scottish philosophy to the circumstances of his time, Stewart sought to sustain 
late eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment thought and ‘Moderate’ values from the 
obstruction of counter-Enlightenment policies.4  
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1 Henry Cockburn, Memorials of His Time, vol. one, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1856), 26. 
 
2 Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1793-1794, taken by Archibald Bell, EUL Dc.4.97, 
24. 
 
3 See introduction, fn72. In examining Stewart’s methodology with particular attention to his ongoing 
feud with Francis Jeffrey, Tannoch-Bland has shown that Stewart’s achievements were more 
substantial than strictly adhering to Reid’s earlier thought (Tannoch-Bland, The Primacy of Moral 
Philosophy, 2-29). This chapter furthers this assessment by investigating Stewart’s system of moral 
education with particular attention on the contexts in which it was created and taught.  
 
4 By reviewing the corpus of Stewart’s writings on history, gender, and political economy, Jane 
Rendall has shown that Stewart’s adaptations of the writings of previous theories were not limited to 
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 At a time when counter-Enlightenment factions of clergymen and politicians—
clustered around Henry Dundas—were increasingly hostile toward free expression, 
particularly ideas promoting social and political liberty, the education of impressionable 
young men was the subject of fierce debate. As Biancamaria Fontana has shown, these 
counter-Enlightenment interests resulted ‘in the viral paralysis of political and intellectual 
life in Edinburgh’.5 Responding to this situation, Dugald Stewart created one of his 
greatest contributions to Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy and ‘Moderate’ 
values: a modern system of moral education. But to what extent should Stewart’s 
programme of moral education be seen as a reaction to counter-Enlightenment policies 
and should Stewart be considered a representative of the earlier generation of Scottish 
literati?  
 Stewart’s experience as a professor’s son and later as a tutor and professor at 
Edinburgh University during William Robertson’s administration certainly developed his 
reverence for ‘Moderate’ values.6 While many of these beliefs were expressed through 
his political affiliation with the Scottish Whig party, Stewart’s appeal to Thomas Reid’s 
Common Sense philosophy advanced a more elaborate purpose of ‘Moderate’ values in 
the wake of the French Revolution. Of the various philosophical themes taught in the 
three branches of his moral philosophy course,7 Stewart’s treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ 
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morals (Jane Rendall, ‘Adaptations: History, Gender and Political Economy in the Work of Dugald 
Stewart’, History of European Ideas, 38:1, (March 2012): 143-161. While Rendall’s examination 
included Stewart’s thoughts on education and its reception by women writers of the time, this chapter’s 
attention to the circumstances that gave rise to Stewart’s system of moral education sheds new light on 
the ambition of this programme and how it modernised Scottish philosophy for the interests of a new 
generation.  
 
5 Biancamaria Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-
1832, (CUP, 1985), 11. 
 
6 See Gordon Macintyre, Dugald Stewart: The Pride and Ornament of Scotland, (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2003), 14-36.  
 
7 Stewart’s lectures on moral philosophy consisted of three parts: the intellectual powers of man, the 
active and the moral powers of man, and man considered as the member of a political body. From 
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and the branches of duty as ‘active and moral powers of the mind’ best portrays how he 
sought to combat counter-Enlightenment policies whilst upholding central ‘Moderate’ 
beliefs. The exercise of these faculties gradually developed virtuous habits within ‘real 
life’ situations. In doing so, Stewart’s programme of moral education heavily influenced 
a generation who would later defend the ‘Moderate’ ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment 
as prominent members in the Scottish Whig party.8   
 Stewart’s significance in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scottish 
Enlightenment occupies the attention of the thesis’s first part. Before exploring the role of 
his applied ethics in Scottish ‘polite’ culture and his later defence of Scottish 
Enlightenment moral philosophy in the context of the 1805 John Leslie case, this chapter 
will first investigate the circumstances that gave rise to Stewart’s system of moral 
education. Stewart’s early affiliation with the Moderate literati of Edinburgh, the 
emergence of counter-Enlightenment policies, and his promotion of the science of mind 
as the best source for improving morals and society had a part in his creation of this 
pedagogical system. In the course of examining these areas, this chapter suggests reasons 
why Stewart (considered by some to be the ‘Scotian Plato’) received a devoted following 






popular demand, Stewart taught political economy as a separate course from 1800 until his 1810 
retirement from active teaching.   
 
8 See John Clive, Scotch Reviewers: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1815, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1957).  
 
9 Alexander Campbell, ‘An Ode to Dugald Stewart’, on 31 Dec 1806, EUL MS 35480. 
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Dugald Stewart in the age of Scottish ‘Moderatism’, 1753-1785 
 On a 1771 tour of Scotland, the Scottish author and surgeon Tobias Smollett 
declared that Edinburgh ‘is a hot-bed of genius’.10 He observed that ‘even the Kirk of 
Scotland, so long reproached with fanaticism and canting, abounds at present with 
ministers celebrated for their learning, and respectable for their moderation’.11 Through 
his friendship with Rev. Dr Alexander ‘Jupiter’ Carlyle,12 Smollett socialised with 
William Robertson, Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, and Adam Ferguson.13 With the exception 
of Smith, this group of Edinburgh clergymen and professors were celebrated for their 
‘Moderate’ values. Richard Sher remarked that ‘nowhere else did clergymen and 
professors make up such a large proportion of the men of letters or produce so many 
major works of polite literature’.14 As an operating ideology, ‘Moderatism’ consisted of 
leading ideals of the Enlightenment such as religious tolerance, free expression, 
humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and scientific improvement.15 These values were 
justified from the conviction that philosophical truths, Enlightenment science (both 
physical and metaphysical), and ‘polite’ sociability could coexist with an enlightened 
interpretation of Calvinist principles.  
 The concept of ‘Moderatism’ did not necessarily imply taking the middle ground 
or vacillating between positions in philosophical or ecclesiastical debates. Instead, this 
ideology opposed forms of extremism. The Moderates of Edinburgh staunchly defended 
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10 Tobias Smollett, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, vol. three, (London: W. Johnston and B. 




12 See Alexander Carlyle, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle minister of Inveresk, edited 
by Burton Hill, second edition, (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1861), 527. 
 
13 Smollett, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, 6.  
 
14 See Sher, CU, 151. 
 
15 Ibid., 328.  
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academic patronage in the Kirk and the right of clergymen to participate in ‘polite’ 
culture by, for example, attending the theatre.16 Their appreciation of genius and 
tolerance of controversial ideas was evinced from their socialising with David Hume who 
was widely known as a sceptic. Thomas Ahnert argues that ‘while Moderates did not 
necessarily agree in every respect with the ideas of such figures such as David Hume or 
Lord Kames, they did block an attempt by the more conservative members of the General 
Assembly in 1755-6 to have these two philosophers excommunicated for their allegedly 
blasphemous moral theories’.17 The Moderates’ victory in the 1757 Douglas Affair over 
the Evangelical party (who at that time endorsed many counter-Enlightenment interests) 
denoted their early dominance of ecclesiastical politics.18 In light of their prominence, 
Nicholas Phillipson suggests ‘there is an important sense in which the history of the 
Scottish Enlightenment is the history of Edinburgh’.19  
 At the heart of the ‘Moderate’ Enlightenment in Edinburgh, William Robertson’s 
administration of Edinburgh University from 1762 to 1793 and leadership of the 
Moderate party of the Church of Scotland linked ‘Moderate’ values with Scottish 
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16 See Roger Emerson, Academic Patronage in the Scottish Enlightenment: Glasgow, Edinburgh and St 
Andrews universities, (EUP, 2008), 150-177. 
 
17 Thomas Ahnert, ‘Clergymen as polite philosophers: Douglas and the conflict between Moderates 
and Orthodox in the Scottish Enlightenment’, Intellectual History Review, 18:3, (2008): 375-376.  
 
18 For further reading on the Douglas Affair and the differences between the Moderates and 
Evangelicals reference Thomas Ahnert, ‘Clergymen’, 375-383; On the different interests within the 
Kirk, reference Friedhelm Voges, ‘Moderate and Evangelical Thinking in the Later Eighteenth 
Century: Differences and Shared Attitudes’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 22, 
(1986): 141-158. 
 
19 See Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Towards a Definition of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in City and Society in 
the Eighteenth-century, edited by Fritz and Williams, (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), 147. On the central 
role of Edinburgh in the Scottish Enlightenment also reference John Gibson, ‘How did the 
Enlightenment seem to the Edinburgh Enlightened?’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 
1, (1978): 46-50; James Buchan, Capital of the Mind: How Edinburgh Changed the World, (London, 
2003). Compelling evidence for the existence of distinct Enlightenments in Glasgow and Aberdeen 
suggests Edinburgh did not have the only claim for embracing ‘Moderate’ interests. For further reading 
on the Enlightenment in Glasgow and Aberdeen reference Jennifer Carter and Joan Pittock (eds.), 
Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, (AUP, 1992); Paul Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment, (AUP, 
1993); Andrew Hook and Richard Sher (eds.), The Glasgow Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Tuckwell 
Press, 1995). 
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institutions.20 Robertson advanced this ambition with the establishment of new secular 
chairs and influenced the appointment of prominent Scottish Enlightenment men of 
letters.21 Meanwhile, ‘Moderates’ harmonised their values with Calvinist principles from 
Edinburgh pulpits.22 In league with their achievements from didactic and ecclesiastical 
offices, the ‘Moderates’ were active authors whose publications circulated with 
considerable success throughout the British Atlantic World.23 These ideas and values 
were not confined to Edinburgh lecture halls, churches, or in print. Like other interest 
groups of this time, the Moderates’ met weekly to test and debate ideas at a number of 
Edinburgh literary and philosophical societies.24 For example, their debates within the 
‘Select Society’ (established in 1754) and the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 
(established in 1737) furthered the ‘Moderates’ reputation as a cohesive group of 
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20 See R.G. Cant, ‘The Scottish Universities and Scottish Society in the Eighteenth Century’, Studies 
on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 58, (1967): 1953-6. 
 
21 Nicolas Phillipson noted that during Robertson’s administration every University chair became 
vacant and ‘such was Robertson’s formidable standing with the Senatus, the town council and the 
government that all but a handful went to his nominees; indeed, it was only in the 1780s, when his 
health was failing, that his influence showed signs of waning’ (Nicholas Phillipson, ‘The Making of an 
Enlightened University’, in The University of Edinburgh: An illustrated history, edited by Robert 
Anderson, Michael Lynch, and Nicholas Phillipson, (EUP, 2003), 79-81). For further discussion of 
Robertson’s administration reference Roger Emerson, Academic Patronage in the Scottish 
Enlightenment: Glasgow, Edinburgh and St. Andrews Universities, (EUP, 2008), 9; J.B. Morrell, ‘The 
University of Edinburgh in the Late Eighteenth Century: Its Scientific Eminence and Academic 
Structure,’ Isis, 62:2, (Summer, 1971): 158-171. 
 
22 Sher, CU, 151-174.   
 
23 See Richard Sher, The Enlightenment & the Book: Scottish authors & their publishers in Eighteenth-
century Britain, Ireland & America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 443-596. For 
further reading on Scottish readership during this period reference Mark Towsey, Reading the Scottish 
Enlightenment: Books and Their Readers in Provincial Scotland, 1750-1820, (Leiden: Brill Academic 
Publishing, 2010); John Crawford, ‘Reading and Book Use in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, 
Bibliotheck, 19, (1994): 23-43; Idem, ‘The Ideology of Mutual Improvement in Scottish Working Class 
Libraries’, Library History, 12, (1996): 49-61; R.A. Houston, ‘Literacy, Education and the Culture of 
Print in Enlightenment Edinburgh’, History, 78, (1993): 373-92. 
 
24 For further reading on the Moderates participation in Edinburgh clubs and societies reference Davis 
Dunbar McElroy, Scotland’s Age of Improvement: A survey of eighteenth-century literary clubs and 
societies, (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1969); John Clive, ‘The Social 
Background of the Scottish Renaissance’, in Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish 
History in the Eighteenth Century, edited by Phillipson and Mitchison, (EUP, 1970), 225-244.  
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savants.25 Reflecting on Robertson’s role in the ‘Select Society’, Dugald Stewart 
remarked that ‘while it lasted, Dr Robertson contributed his most zealous 
support…deriving from it an addition to his own fame’.26 Despite receiving praise across 
the Republic of Letters, the Moderates’ phenomenal success did not endure. Their rapid 
ascent to influential offices within the Kirk and University was followed by an equally 
swift decline in the 1790s. This transition followed the 1791 election of George Hill 
(principal of St Andrews University) to the leadership of the ecclesiastical Moderate 
party. Hill gradually replaced the earlier ‘Moderate’ beliefs with counter-Enlightenment 
interests. Hill’s close affiliation with his patron Henry Dundas strengthened a counter-
Enlightenment campaign that allegedly safeguarded impressionable youth by entrusting 
their education to clergymen. This objective challenged the practise of secularism in the 
faculty of arts at Scottish universities. As the ambitions of Hill’s Moderate party were 
allied with conservative politicians later known as ‘Tories’, Dugald Stewart undermined 
its success by diffusing the thought and values of the earlier ‘Moderates’ in teaching 
moral philosophy. From birth Stewart was well placed to become a ‘Moderate’ and later 
defend this ideology.  
 In the old college buildings of Edinburgh at Whitsunday, the professor of 
mathematics Matthew Stewart welcomed the birth of Dugald on 22nd November 1753.27 
As an attentive father, Matthew Stewart had a profound influence on his son’s intellectual 
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25 See Roger Emerson, ‘The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1737-1747’, The British Journal for 
the History of Science, 12:2, (1979): 154-191; Idem, ‘The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1768-
1783’, The British Society for the History of Science, 18:3, (Nov., 1985): 255; Idem, ‘The Social 
Composition of Enlightened Scotland: the “Select Society of Edinburgh”, 1754-1764’, Studies on 
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 114, (1973): 291-330; Kathleen Holcomb, ‘A Dance in the Mind: 
the Provincial Scottish Philosophical Societies’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 21, (1991): 89-
100.   
 
26 Dugald Stewart, ‘Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson’, first read at the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh on 21 March 1796, in Biographical Memoirs, of Adam Smith, LL.D., of William 
Robertson, D.D., and of Thomas Reid, D.D., (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1811), 167-
168.  
 
27 Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 11.  
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development whilst providing familial connections to the Church of Scotland.28 His 
embrace of academic patronage as a minister, contribution to scientific innovation, 
esteem for Francis Hutcheson, and his friendship with prominent ‘Moderates’ such as 
William Robertson were some reasons why he should be considered a ‘Moderate’.29 
These ‘Moderate’ qualities and beliefs among others were certainly on display during 
Dugald Stewart’s childhood.  
 As the professor of mathematics, Matthew Stewart was provided with a residence 
near the South Bridge in Edinburgh just a short walk from the Old College building.30 In 
addition to living in close proximity to the University, the Stewarts had six professors, 
including the principal William Robertson, as neighbours. Although the Stewart family 
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28 Dugald was named after his paternal grandfather who was a Presbyterian minister at Rothsay Church 
in the Isle of Bute (John Playfair, ‘Account of Matthew Stewart,’ read at the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh on 3 April 1786, in Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1, (Edinburgh: J. 
Dickson, 1788): 57). 
 
29 In 1734, Matthew Stewart had enrolled at Glasgow University with the intention of joining his father 
(who also held the name Dugald) as a Presbyterian minister (Ibid). Like other divinity students, Stewart 
diversified his studies by attending Francis Hutcheson’s lectures on moral philosophy and Robert 
Simson’s lectures on mathematics (Ibid., 57-8). Often considered as the father of Scottish moral 
philosophy, Hutcheson heavily influenced the foundations of Scottish moral philosophy to which the 
‘Moderates’ of Edinburgh later appealed. Knud Haakonssen and Luigi Turco offer excellent 
discussions on Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and its significant role in the Scottish Enlightenment. 
See Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, (CUP, 1997), 63-84; Luigi Turco, ‘Moral Sense and the Foundations of Morals’, in 
CCSE, 136-56. Martin Fitzpatrick argued that ‘as in other aspects of [Hutcheson’s] work, over the issue 
of patronage he articulated the attitudes of the emerging moderate interest in the Church’ (Martin 
Fitzpatrick, ‘The Enlightenment, politics and providence: some Scottish and English comparisons’, in 
Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, edited by Knud 
Haakonssen, (CUP, 1996), 74). Stewart attended Hutcheson’s lectures when his Considerations on 
Patronage, Addressed to the Gentlemen of Scotland first appeared in 1735. His position as a minister at 
Rothsneath church later in life whilst pursuing academic interests through the patronage of the Earl of 
Roseneath and the Duke of Argyle evinced that Stewart supported academic patronage (Playfair, 
‘Account of Matthew Stewart’, 60). Although there is no evidence that suggests Stewart supported or 
opposed Hutcheson’s moral thought since his research interests never strayed from mathematics, he 
probably held it in a similar regard as his ‘Moderate’ contemporaries. Encouraged by Robert Simson 
professor of mathematics at Glasgow University, Stewart furthered his research interests under the 
guidance of Colin MacLaurin at Edinburgh University. After the death of MacLaurin in the summer of 
1746, Stewart’s Some General Theorems of Considerable Use in the Higher Parts of Mathematics 
(1746) proved the deciding factor in his 1747 appointment as MacLaurin’s successor. For further 
reading on MacLaurin reference J.V. Grabiner, ‘MacLaurin and Newton: The Newtonian Style and the 
Authority of Mathematics’, in Science and Medicine in the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Withers 
and Wood, (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press, 2002), 143-171.  
 
30 Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 10.  
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later spent half the year at their house Catrine in Ayrshire during the University’s recess, 
Edinburgh’s intellectual culture remained a considerable part of their daily lives.31 At 
eight years old, Dugald Stewart joined William Robertson’s son, ‘Willie’, at the nearby 
Royal High School of Edinburgh where it was said ‘men of the highest and lowest rank in 
society [sent] their children to be educated together’.32 During his four years at High 
School, Stewart’s father supplemented the rector Alexander Matheson’s lessons with 
further exercises in mathematics. Apart from Stewart’s proficiency in mathematics, 
Alexander Adam (who replaced Matheson in Stewart’s final months at High School) 
introduced his lifelong appreciation for classical Roman and Greek literature.33  
 In the autumn of 1765, Stewart commenced a degree in arts at Edinburgh 
University. This degree required attending all the courses in the Faculty of Arts such as 
rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Stewart’s earlier 
mastery of geometry rendered attendance at his father’s course unnecessary. He did, 
however, attend John Stevenson’s course on logic, Hugh Blair’s lectures on rhetoric and 
belles lettres as well as Adam Ferguson’s lectures on moral philosophy twice.34 The 
concepts taught in Blair’s and Ferguson’s courses played a prominent role in developing 
his moral philosophy. Like many Scots who attended Blair’s course, Stewart actively 
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31 Ibid.  
 
32 Henry Brougham quoted in Ibid., 14. Brougham later attended Stewart’s lectures on moral 
philosophy as a young man and contributed to the Edinburgh Review. 
  
33 Ibid., 14-16. Adam’s pedagogical interest in Roman literature extended to authoring a book on 
Roman manners, which received five Edinburgh editions before his 1809 death. See Alexander Adam, 
Roman Antiquities: or, an Account of the Manners and Customs of the Romans, (Edinburgh: Creech, 
1791). For further reading on Adam reference Alexander Henderson, An Account of the Life and 
Character of Alexander Adam, LL.D., Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: D. Shaw 
and Son, 1810). Adam’s role in the Scottish Enlightenment, however, has received woefully little 
attention.  
 
34 Stevenson held the chair of logic since 1730 and taught many of his future colleagues such as Blair 
and Robertson (Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 20-22).  
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sought to refine his ‘polite’ manners and improve upon the exposition of his prose.35 
Meanwhile, Adam Ferguson’s examination of the modern relevance of ancient Rome 
certainly appealed to young Stewart’s interests. As a Gaelic speaking Highlander from 
Perthshire, Ferguson was different from his ‘Moderate’ contemporaries.36 In addition to 
upholding ‘Moderate’ beliefs and a version of Stoicism in the classroom, his membership 
of the ‘Poker Club’ and ‘Select Society’ suggests his different background did not 
exclude him from activities within the ‘Moderates’ social circle. Ferguson’s moral 
philosophy was best known for his ideas on the relationship between human nature and 
the progress of society.37 Although Stewart did not follow Ferguson’s version of 
Stoicism, his attention to sociological and historical factors that gave rise to morals 
within society heavily influenced Stewart’s later thought.38 Moreover, it was Ferguson 
who identified Stewart’s aptitude for moral philosophy and encouraged him to cultivate 
this talent under Thomas Reid’s instruction at Glasgow University. In 1771, at the age of 
seventeen with a degree from Edinburgh completed, Stewart relocated to Glasgow.  
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35 The following chapter will provide a more in-depth discussion of how Stewart appealed to Blair’s 
writings.  
 
36 See David Allan, Adam Ferguson, (EUP, 2006), 1-20.  
 
37 Ferguson taught that ‘in treating [man] as a subject of moral science, we endeavour to understand 
what he ought to be; without being limited, in our conception, to the measure of attainment or failure, 
exhibited in the case of any particular person or society of men’ (Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral 
and Political Science: Being chiefly a retrospect of lectures delivered in the College of Edinburgh, vol. 
one, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1792), 2). For further reading on Ferguson’s moral philosophy reference John 
Bernstein, ‘Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress’, Studies in Burke and His Time (now The 
Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation), 19, (1978): 99-118; David Allan, Virtue, Learning 
and the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of scholarship in early modern history, (EUP, 1993), 216. For 
further reading on Ferguson’s treatment of how historical progress informed notions of virtue reference 
Adam Ferguson, History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, (Edinburgh: Creech, 
1783); Idem, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, (Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell, 1767). 
 
38 Stewart referenced and quoted several sections of Ferguson’s History of Civil Society in the third part 
of his lectures on moral philosophy from 1789 through 1799. From 1800 through 1810, Stewart 
continued discussing Ferguson’s History in his lectures on political economy, but paid little attention to 
Ferguson’s moral philosophy in his Outlines or lectures apart from citing his work in a footnote as an 
example of Stoicism (Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, for the use of students in the 
University of Edinburgh, second edition, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1801), n287).   
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 As previously discussed in the introduction, Thomas Reid’s Common Sense 
philosophy provided an alternative to modern philosophical scepticism (known by him as 
the ‘Ideal Theory’).39 Reid’s ‘principles of common sense’ later formed the ‘fixed 
principles’ of Stewart’s moral philosophy. How Stewart’s later writings enriched Reid’s 
legacy at the dawn of a new age will be discussed in the following sections. While the 
ideas and friendships (including Archibald Alison) that developed during Stewart’s time 
in Glasgow cemented a life spent investigating the principles of the mind, this formative 
period of learning did not last beyond a year. Due to the declining health of his father, 
Stewart returned to Edinburgh and taught his father’s course on mathematics between 
1772 and 1785.40  
 Stewart’s tenure in this office reflected his devotion to his father rather than a 
deep satisfaction from teaching mathematics. In a letter to William Robertson, Stewart 
requested that ‘if a vacancy [in moral philosophy] should take place I would have you 
start with me without delay, and take such steps as appear to yourself to be most prudent 
without waiting a moment to consult me’.41 Robertson honoured Stewart’s wishes with 
the assistance of Ferguson. Shortly after Matthew Stewart’s death on 23rd January 1785, 
the Town Council agreed to accept Stewart’s and Ferguson’s resignations from their 
respective chairs. Afterwards they appointed Stewart as the professor of moral 
philosophy and provided Ferguson with a salary as the joint professor of mathematics 
with the newly appointed John Playfair.42 Although Stewart’s “elections” as professor of 
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39 See introduction, 9-16. For a more detailed examination of how Common Sense philosophy 
challenged modern philosophical scepticism reference Heiner Klemme, ‘Scepticism and Common 
Sense’, in CCSE, 117-135. 
 
40 See Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 25. 
  
41 Stewart to Robertson, quoted in Ibid., 46.  
 
42 Although Playfair and Ferguson both drew a salary as professors of mathematics, Playfair 
exclusively taught the course until his 1805 appointment as professor of natural philosophy (Ibid., 46).  
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mathematics and later moral philosophy appeared to be a birthright, he soon discovered 
that the ‘Moderate’ Enlightenment of his youth was under attack from counter-
Enlightenment policies. As the professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, no one was 
better prepared or situated than Stewart to defend the so-called ‘Moderate’ values of 
Robertson’s administration.    
 
Dugald Stewart and the Scottish Counter-Enlightenment, 1790-1802 
Dugald Stewart created and refined his system of moral education during an age 
of revolutions (French Revolution and Britain’s Industrial Revolution). Meanwhile, the 
French Revolution strengthened the justification of emerging British counter-
Enlightenment policies. The Scottish response to the French Revolution (particularly after 
the 1793-1794 ‘Reign of Terror’) reflected the fear that Scottish institutions could share a 
similar fate as France’s ancien régime. John Veitch, a nineteenth-century Scottish 
historian and philosopher, wrote that ‘the dread shadow of the French Revolution lay 
heavily on the minds of those in power, and party interest and existence were identified 
by them with the maintenance of the constitution [and] every change was therefore 
deemed revolutionary, and every novelty dreaded as a fatal innovation’.43 This counter-
Enlightenment mindset—championed by Henry Dundas and his associates—jeopardised 
the tolerance for scientific, literary, and philosophic innovations which William 
Robertson had laboured to establish at Edinburgh University.44 Of Dundas’s agents, 
George Hill’s leadership of the Moderate party transitioned these counter-Enlightenment 
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43 John Veitch, Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1869), 76.  
 
44 See David Brown, ‘Henry Dundas and the Government of Scotland’, (unpublished PhD, University 
of Edinburgh, 1989). For a contrasting view of Dundas’s activities reference Michael Fry, The Dundas 
Despotism, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1992), 155-206.   
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policies as influential interests within the Church of Scotland.45 Hill’s allegiance to 
Dundas at this time was not an overstatement. Shortly after his 1791 election to the 
Principality of St. Andrews University, Hill wrote to Dundas 
I will not attempt to express by words the gratitude which I feel, but it shall be the 
study of my life to preserve, as a clergyman, in that conduct upon which you have 
generously conferred repeated marks of your approbation, and to make every 
exertion in my power, as a member of the University, to maintain the credit, and to 
preserve peace.46 
 
Hill’s notion of preserving the peace closely coincided with Dundas’s counter-
Enlightenment policies. From the early 1790s through Dundas’s 1805 impeachment, the 
Moderate party (with powerful factions at St Andrews and Edinburgh) advanced 
Dundas’s interests within the Kirk. Since Hill and his cohort gradually leaned toward a 
more fundamentalist interpretation of Calvinism, the former ‘Moderate’ values of 
religious tolerance and free expression were replaced with counter-Enlightenment efforts 
to safeguard Christian principles.47 Consequently, the new Moderate clergymen targeted 
secularism in the liberal arts and curricula that strayed from religious orthodoxy.48 This 
campaign demarcated the emergence of a new radical counter-Enlightenment interest 
within the so-called Moderate party.49 
 Dugald Stewart believed that the counter-Enlightenment efforts to prevent the 
spread of atheism and political radicalism created a vacuum for their adoption and 
practise. He suggested that the censorship of controversial theories did not address the 
foundations of allegedly misguided philosophical scepticism and political radicalism. 
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45 See George Cook, The Life of the Late George Hill D.D., Principal of St. Mary’s College, St. 
Andrews University, (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1820), 213-4.  
 
46 Ibid., 238.  
 
47 See Emma Vincent Macleod, ‘The responses of Scottish churchmen to the French Revolution, 1789-




49 See Ian Clark, ‘From protest to reaction: the moderate regime in the church of Scotland, 1752-1805’, 
in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, edited by Phillipson and Mitchison, (EUP, 1970), 200-224. 
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Instead, Stewart believed these ideas must be shown as false. His opposition to radicalism 
extended to clergymen with counter-Enlightenment views towards the teaching of 
metaphysics and natural religion. Stewart wrote:  
Certain divines in Scotland were pleased, soon after this critical era, to discover a 
disposition to set at nought [sic] the evidences of Natural Religion, with a professed, 
and, I doubt not, in many cases, with a sincere view to strengthen the cause of 
Christianity. Some of these writers were probably not aware that they were only 
repeating the language of Bayle, Hume, Helvetius, and many other modern authors 
of the same description.50 
  
He taught that the prerogative of enlightened men was to combat the ‘errors’ of the 
French Revolution (its association with philosophical scepticism not its pursuit for 
political liberty) and radical responses to these ideas. Consequently, this proposed task 
received staunch opposition from counter-Enlightenment factions.  
 Stewart’s response of the French Revolution as well as his reaction to counter-
Enlightenment policies were central to the development of his system of moral education. 
Like many of his Scottish Whig contemporaries, Stewart had supported the revolutionary 
principles that emerged in France.51 As a witness to the early stages of the French 
Revolution during a 1788 tour of France with his student George Ramsay, the language 
of political equality and social leveling excited Stewart. Although he later wrote to 
Archibald Alison the following year when he returned to Paris that the elections in the 
Tiers Etat were ‘by no means respected by the people of rank in this country, and who are 
certainly of all men the least qualified for new-modeling a constitution’, he endorsed the 
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50 Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, vol. one, (Edinburgh: 
Adam Black, 1828), vi.  
 
51 Prominent Scottish Whigs, such as William Robertson, Henry Erskine, and Archibald Fletcher 
celebrated the removal of the French aristocracy, which they believed to be corrupt and contrary to the 
ideals of liberty and Enlightenment. See Bob Harris, The Scottish People and the French Revolution, 
(London: Pickering and Chatto Publishers, 2008); Henry Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution, 
(Glasgow, 1912), 49.  
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early objectives of this uprising.52 Despite opposing the later so-called ‘barbarities at 
Paris’, he remained hopeful that ‘the storm may blow over, and that the mercantile 
interest of the country may have the sense and spirit to come forward as they ought’.53 
While tensions flared between Britain and France, Stewart agreed with the minority of 
Parliament that a war would ‘risk the prosperity and the tranquility of this country [and] it 
will open a new source of political events, the final cause of which is beyond 
calculation’.54 A month after expressing these concerns, on 1st February 1793, France 
declared war against the United Kingdom. The outbreak of war provided the necessary 
traction for counter-Enlightenment attacks against the diffusion of revolutionary ideas. 
Despite political differences, Dundas and Edmund Burke (a member of the Whig party) 
shared the belief that Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man (1791) encouraged radical acts of 
political defiance and rebellion.55 In this controversial work, Paine wrote that ‘it is the 
free and unbiased voice of society that is to decide their rights and comforts, and when 
they feel them perverted or diminished, it is their province to renovate them’.56 Shortly 
before France’s ‘Reign of Terror’, Stewart openly endorsed Paine’s concept of political 
liberty. For example, in reference to the birth of Archibald Alison’s son, Stewart pledged 
that ‘I promise to do all I can to make him a Philosopher and an Economist; and I engage, 
as soon as he begins to snuff, to make him the present of a very handsome box which I 
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52 Stewart to Alison, in Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by William Hamilton, vol. ten, 
(Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Company, 1858), cxxiv.  
 




55 For an example of this shift in Whig ideology see Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the 
Old Whigs, in consequence of some late discussions in Parliament, relative to the Reflections on the 
French Revolution, (London: J. Dodsley, 1790). In the third edition of this pamphlet (1791), Burke 
wrote that ‘Mr Paine’s works had been extensively and industriously circulated throughout England 
and Scotland’. (Ibid., 432). On the British criticisms of Paine reference H.T. Dickinson, ‘Thomas Paine 
and his British Critics’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 27, (2011): 19-82.  
  
56 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, (London: J.S. Jordon, 1791), iv.  
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received lately, with the Rights of Man inscribed on the lid’.57 Yet Stewart’s support of 
political and social reform was not limited to Paine’s writings.  
  As early as 1792, Scottish liberals expressed interest in progressive political 
reforms from within the first National Convention of the Friends of the People in 
Scotland.58 Clearly inspired by events in France, the Friends of the People sought better 
representation of public interests in Parliament but achieved little due to internal 
discord.59 As an attendant, Stewart observed that the Convention was ‘a set of men 
brought together from different corners of the country, full of mutual jealousy and 
distrust; and you may believe that those who are afterwards to guide their deliberations, 
will be the least forward to not show themselves till they know their ground’.60 
Consequently, Stewart distanced himself from the Friends of the People after the 
subsequent meetings became decidedly more radical. Despite his support for greater 
representation of popular interests in Parliament, Stewart identified himself as a ‘North 
Briton’ and did not entertain ideas of overthrowing the government.61 He sought, 
however, to improve the state of society under the Constitution. Thomas Reid held a 
similar view of the French Revolution at this time. Reid wrote in 1791: 
Some few here think or affect to think that to be a Friend to the Revolution of France 
is to be an Enemy to the Constitution of Britain, or at least to its present 
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57 Stewart to Alison 1793, in Collected Works, vol. ten, cxxxv. In an ironic turn of events, Archibald 
Alison later became a prominent ‘Tory’ in Victorian Scotland whose publications ardently opposed the 
French Revolution. For further reading on Alison reference Michael Michie, An Enlightenment Tory in 
Victorian Scotland: The Career of Sir Archibald Alison, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1997). 
 
58 See Richard Brown, Church and State in Modern Britain 1700-1850, (London: Routledge, 1991), 
343.  
 
59 See Mark Philp, ‘The Fragmented Ideology of Reform’, The French Revolution and British Popular 
Politics, edited by Idem, (CUP, 1991), 50-78. 
 
60 Stewart to Alison 29 October 1792, in Collected Works, vol. ten, cxxxiv.  
 
61 See Colin Kidd, ‘North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms’, 
Historical Journal, 39, (1996): 361-82. 
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Administration. I know the contrary to be true in my self, & verily believe that most 
of my Acquaintance who Rejoice in that Revolution agree with me in this.62 
 
This conventional Whiggish belief was not new (albeit increasingly dangerous to express 
in the public sphere), but his teaching of these political sentiments attracted the attention 
of counter-Enlightenment proponents.   
 From 1793 through 1794, Stewart ventured beyond abstract concepts in teaching 
systems of government as he had done in previous years. By discussing the importance of 
the Habeas Corpus Act, Stewart took a firm stance in a fiercely debated policy of the 
time. In a 1794 lecture, Stewart remarked:  
This act can never be suspended except in cases of the most urgent necessity by a 
solemn act of the legislative body, which sometimes, for a very limited space, 
permits the executive power to imprison suspected persons at will, and without 
assigning any reason for so doing. This measure is similar to the ‘Senatus 
consultum ultimae neccessitatis’ of the Romans, which preceded the election of a 
dictator and is adapted with similar caution.63   
 
Shortly after teaching that Habeas Corpus was vital for British liberty, it was suspended 
in May 1794. Led by the efforts of Henry Dundas,64 this suspension lasted until July 1795 
and was once again suspended from April 1798 through March 1801.65 As an active 
member of the ‘Speculative Society’, Stewart questioned ‘if any circumstances justify the 
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62 Thomas Reid, The Correspondence of Thomas Reid, edited by Paul Wood, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002), 224. 
 
63 Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1793-4, taken by Archibald Bell, EUL Dc.4.97, 360.   
 
64 From the offices of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1791-1793),War Secretary 
(1794-1801) and representing Edinburgh in the House of Commons (1790-1802), Henry Dundas, was 
central in the 1794 suspension of Habeas Corpus. See The Parliamentary Register; or History of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the House of Lords, (London: J. Debrett, 1794), 71-72; R.G. Thorne, The 
House of Commons, 1790-1820, vol. one, (London: Haynes Publishing, 1986), 81.  
 
65 The Habeas Corpus Act, established under the reign of Charles II in 1679, was slightly different than 
the previously established writ of Habeas Corpus, which prevented the unlawful detention of those 
charged with a crime through petitioned pleas to the court. The Habeas Corpus Act provided legislation 
that English Magistrates or Judges could not imprison suspected criminals without evidence as 
practised in the writ of Habeas Corpus. However, the 1679 Act did not extend to Scotland, Ireland and 
British colonies (The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, edited by K.M. Brown, (St 
Andrews, 2007-2010), 1700/10/234). The Act of 1701 and the later 1707 Anglo-Scottish Treaty of 
Union extended the Habeas Corpus to Scotland as part of the incorporated union. The Act Anent 
Wrongous Imprisonment was the Scottish equivalent to the Habeas Corpus Act, which Parliament also 
suspended at this time. The irregularity of the Scottish Sedition Trials demonstrated the loss of British 
liberties that the Habeas Corpus Act and the Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment safeguarded.  
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suspension of Habeas Corpus’ amongst a diverse group of Whig and politically 
conservative University students.66  
 During this period, Stewart’s fears over the consequences of suspending Habeas 
Corpus were realised in the 1793-1802 Scottish Sedition Trials. These trials exemplified 
how counter-Enlightenment policies censored the free expression of political and 
philosophical ideas. Whig Parliamentary ministers, including the Earl of Stanhope, shared 
Stewart’s concerns that ‘such an entrapping mode of trial’ corrupted the judicial process 
and led to despotism.67 These objections, however, had little effect. Those convicted of 
sedition faced sentences of imprisonment, transportation to the British colonies, and 
social contempt as perceived dangers to British political, social and moral order. The 
consideration of the defendant’s intentions rendered sedition as a criminal act both 
peculiar and subjective. Later, as a Scottish judge, Cockburn noted that sedition was 
considered the ‘only offence as against the public, though this offence may be committed 
by libeling individual public officers as such, that is dealt with as sedition by the law of 
Scotland’.68 Stewart’s praise of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, attendance of the first 
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66 Stewart’s list of questions proposed at a Speculative Society’s Tuesday meeting was undated but 
probably appeared between 1793 and 1802, EUL Ds.6.111, MS 35480.  
 
67 The Parliamentary Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Lords, (71-
2.  
 
68 Henry Cockburn, An examination of the trials for sedition which have hitherto occurred in Scotland, 
vol. one, (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1888), 3. In light of this ambiguity and the difficulty in 
determining viable evidence, from 1703 through 1848 only twenty-three cases of sedition were tried in 
Scottish courts. Of these twenty-three cases, nine cases were tried in Scottish courts between 1793 and 
1802 with the next recorded case occurring in 1817 (Ibid., 2). Of these trials, Thomas Muir’s sedition 
trial received considerable transnational attention. Muir, a Glasgow jurist and leader of the Friends of 
the People, was sentenced to fourteen years’ at Botony Bay, Australia for his support of political 
reform and his dissemination of Paine’s Rights of Man. Muir was charged with four distinct crimes of 
sedition that involved exciting disaffection by seditious speeches, advising the purchase, use of 
seditious publications and circulating these seditious publications and reading them in public. After 
furnishing no evidence that Muir spoke against the Constitution, circumstantial evidence such as his 
travels to France whilst on bail contributed to his conviction. After hearing the verdict, Muir stated that 
‘when our ashes shall be scattered by the winds of heaven, the impartial voice of future times will 
rejudge your verdict’ (Ibid., title page). For further reading on Muir’s case reference Thomas Muir, An 
Account of the Trial of Thomas Muir, Esq. Younger of Huntershill, before the High Court of Justiciary, 
at Edinburgh, on the 30th and 31st days of August, 1793, for Sedition, (New York: Samuel Campbell, 
1794); Frank Clune, The Scottish Martyrs: Their trials and transportation to Botany Bay, (Sydney: 
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National Convention of the Friends of the People in 1792, travels to revolutionary France, 
and discussion of controversial philosophers such as David Hume and Condorcet alarmed 
Scottish counter-Enlightenment advocates that his politics might corrupt impressionable 
young men.69  
 Stewart’s discussion of Condorcet (whose theories were connected with French 
Revolutionary principles) in Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792), in 
particular, led to suspicions that he endorsed political radicalism.70 Stewart certainly did 
not support all of Condorcet’s political or philosophical views, but they agreed on the 
liberating qualities of education and its vital importance in an advanced state of society. 
In quoting Condorcet, Stewart wrote that ‘if we attack oppressors, before we have taught 
the oppressed we shall risk the loss of liberty, [we] rouse them to oppress the progress of 
reason’.71 Those associated with counter-Enlightenment interests and even the prominent 
Scottish Whig Francis Jeffery interpreted these sentiments as dangerous to social order.72 
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Angus and Robertson, 1969); Marjorie Masson and J.F. Jameson, ‘The Odyssey of Thomas Muir’, The 
American Historical Review, xxix, (1923): 49-72. 
 
69 Dugald Stewart received a passport for Paris on 8 September 1792 from Abraham Guyot, Edinburgh 
University Library Special Collections MS 35480.    
 
70 Stewart mentioned Condorcet by name seven times in his first major publication. Dugald Stewart, 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1792), 36, 204, 211, 221, 256, 
529, and 555.  
 
71 Ibid., 256. In quoting Condorcet, Stewart continued ‘How often, in spite of the efforts of the friends 
of freedom, has the event of a single battle reduced nations to the slavery of ages! And what is the kind 
of liberty enjoyed by those nations, which have recovered it by force of arms, and not by the influence 
of philosophy? Have not most of them confounded the forms of republicanism with the enjoyment of 
right, and the despotism of numbers with liberty? How many laws, contrary to the ights of nature, have 
dishonoured the code of every people which has recovered its freedom, during those ages in which 
reason was still in its infancy! Why not profit by this fatal experience, and wisely wait the progress of 
knowledge, in order to obtain freedom more effectual, more substantial, and more peaceful? Why 
pursue it by blood and inevitable confusion, and trust that to chance, which time must certainly, and 
without bloodshed, bestow? A fortunate struggle may, indeed, relive us of many grievances under 
which we labour at present, but if we wish to secure the perfection, and the permanence of freedom, we 
must patiently wait the period when men, emancipated from their prejudices, and guided by 
philosophy, shall be rendered worthy of liberty, by comprehending its claims’ (Stewart, Elements, 256-
257).  
  
72 As Jennifer Tannoch-Bland has shown, Francis Jeffrey (one of the founding editors of the Edinburgh 
Review and a Scottish Whig) believed Stewart’s use of metaphysics should be censored (Tannoch-
Bland, The Primacy of Moral Philosophy: Dugald Stewart and the Scottish Enlightenment, 
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After being approached by one of Dundas’s agents, Lord Abercromby, Stewart wrote that 
‘I shall ever regret that I dishonoured some of my pages by mentioning with respect the 
name of Condorcet’.73 Since the Scottish Sedition Trials targeted those suspected of 
diffusing French revolutionary principles, Stewart was under intense pressure to amend 
his discussion of Condorcet in future editions and lectures. In the second edition of 
Elements (1802), Stewart added a footnote to his discussion of Condorcet’s writings: 
To some of my readers it may appear trifling to remark, that, in availing myself an 
occasional coincidence of sentiment with a contemporary Author, I would not be 
understood to become responsible for the consistency of his personal conduct with 
his philosophical principles, nor to subscribe to any one of his opinions, but those to 
which I have expressed my assent by incorporating them with my own 
composition.74 
 
Despite dispelling suspicions that he was a ‘Jacobin’, Stewart’s reaction to his critics did 
not imply that he failed to challenge counter-Enlightenment policies.75 Michael Brown 
has shown that Stewart repositioned his public views on the French Revolution to 
‘inoculate him from the charge of political heresy’ and afterwards was active in 
combating radical revolutionary principles.76 This objective became a prominent interest 
in what would become his system of moral education. On this reformed purpose of his 
moral philosophy course, Stewart claimed: 
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unpublished PhD thesis, Griffith University, 2000). In an 1804 letter to Francis Horner, Jeffrey wrote 
that ‘I think your sensibilities about Stewart somewhat too nice…I have only joined his name with 
Condorcet’s in reference to a subject on which he himself quotes that author [and] I cannot help 
thinking that there is some value in my view of the limitation of metaphysical discoveries’ (Jeffrey to 
Horner 19 February 1804, in Henry Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey: with selection from his 
correspondence, vol. two, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1852), 87). 
 
73 Stewart to Lord Abercromby 1794, quoted in Clive, Scotch Reviewers, 108.  
 
74 Dugald Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, second edition, (Edinburgh: 
Creech, 1802), n259.  
 
75 See John Brims, ‘The Scottish “Jacobins”, Scottish Nationalism and the British Union’, in Scotland 
and England, 1286-1815, edited by Roger Mason, (EUP, 1987), 247-265; Gordon Pentland, ‘The 
French Revolution, Scottish Radicalism and “People Who Were Called Jacobins”’, in Reactions to 
Revolutions: The 1790s and their aftermath, edited by Ulrich Broich, H.T. Dickinson, Eckhart 
Hellmuth, and Martin Schmidt, (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007), 85-108. 
 
76 Michael Brown, ‘Dugald Stewart and the Problem of Teaching Politics in the 1790s’, Journal of 
Irish and Scottish Studies, 1:1, (2007): 122-123. 
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The danger with which I conceived the youth of this country to be threatened by that 
inundation of skeptical or rather atheistical publications which were then imported 
from the Continent, was immensely increased by the enthusiasm which, at the dawn 
of the French Revolution, was naturally excited in young and generous minds [which 
prompted] me to a more full and systematical illustration of these doctrines than had 
been attempted by any of my predecessors.77 
 
But Stewart’s prominent role in preventing the spread of political radicalism and the 
adoption of philosophical scepticism did not conform to the censorship policies of the 
counter-Enlightenment movement, which were aligned with the so-called ‘Gagging Acts’ 
of 1795.78 In order to safeguard the development of impressionable young men, Stewart 
suggested that the public across all ranks in society must be educated to recognise 
philosophical scepticism and political radicalism as false.79 This ambition required 
diffusing a properly regulated programme of moral education that sharpened the 
‘reasoning and reflective powers and enabled [his students] equally to throw off the 
chains of superstition and to combat the fallacies of scepticism’.80 With this objective in 
mind, Stewart created a system of moral education that addressed the political, social and 
intellectual conflicts of his time as a modern version of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense 
philosophy. Contrary to the earlier age of ‘Moderatism’, the climate in Scotland that 
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78 The ‘Gagging Acts’ of 1795 consisted of two parliamentary acts: the Seditious Meetings Act and the 
‘Treasonable Practices’ Act. The Seditious Meetings Act stipulated that public gatherings of over fifty 
people required a magistrate’s licence. In league with this Act, the Treason Act of 1795 (which revived 
the earlier Sedition Act of 1661) sought to prevent those who conspired to harm the King, government 
officials, or oppose the government. It also included transportation as a punishment for those found 
guilty. See Jennifer Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution, 1785-1795, (Keele: Keele 
University Press, 1997), 252-259. 
 
79 Stewart reflected that ‘I blush, however, to confess, that even among ourselves it is only now that the 
more candid and intelligent are beginning to acknowledge, that the radical source of the calamities of our 
age has been the ignorance and prejudices of the people; and that it is only by diffusing the light of 
knowledge and of liberality in those countries which have survived the general storm, that a provision can 
be made against these political convulsions which, in our own times, have derived their origin from the 
artifices of ambitious demagogues, operating on the credulity and profligacy of an uneducated multitude’ 
(Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. one, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1877), 19-20). 
  
80 Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1793-1794, 15. 
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followed the French Revolution was deeply hostile to the purpose of Stewart’s 
programme. 
 
Creating a Modern Scottish Philosophy: Stewart’s system of moral education  
 Dugald Stewart’s system of moral education cannot be properly understood 
without reference to the so-called Scottish School of Common Sense philosophy grouped 
around Thomas Reid.81 Reid’s efforts in vindicating his philosophical system were not 
intended to examine comprehensively every philosophical theme and its application in 
society.82 Stewart later remarked that Reid ‘has exemplified, with the happiest success, 
that method of investigation by which alone any solid progress can be made; directing his 
inquiries to a subject which forms a necessary groundwork for the labours of his 
successors’.83 Of Reid’s disciples, no one rivaled Stewart’s success in adapting Reidian 
principles into an accessible and practical paradigm for moral education.  
 Yet Stewart did more than ‘popularize’ Reid’s philosophy for a new age, and his 
enthusiasm for Reid’s philosophy did not imply that he strictly followed all of Reid’s 
conclusions. They diverged on several philosophical themes; there are, for example 
notable differences in their treatment of ‘attention’, ‘conception’, and ‘imagination’ as 
‘intellectual powers of the mind’.84 In part, Stewart’s adaptations of Reid’s philosophy, 
particularly in discussing the term ‘common sense’ and the role of hypotheses, reveal 
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1983), 305-322.  
 
82 See Heiner Klemme, ‘Scepticism and Common Sense’, in CCSE, 117-135.  
 
83 Dugald Stewart, An Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D.D. F.R.S., (Edinburgh: 
Creech, 1803), 75. 
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their responses to pressing concerns of different circumstances. Stewart claimed that 
Reid’s use of the term ‘common sense’ to describe intuitive senses misled critics such as 
Joseph Priestley about the sophisticated nature of this approach. Stewart remarked:  
Drs Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, in their answers to Mr Hume’s attack upon 
this kind of evidence, employ very erroneously the expression Common 
Sense (which is commonly used to express a certain prudence or sagacity 
possessed by uneducated men) to signify an essential law of our 
constitution; And have thereby [misled] their opponents, particularly Dr. 
Priestley of an allegation against them which they by no means deserve.85 
 
Stewart’s preferred use of the so-called ‘fundamental laws of human belief’ or ‘principles 
of the human constitution’ in teaching Reidian principles could be interpreted as an 
attempt to avoid such criticisms. But this adaptation of Reid’s philosophy amongst others 
also reflected Stewart’s response to counter-Enlightenment attacks against the teaching of 
metaphysics.  
 At a time when the mobilisation of the ‘uneducated masses’ was feared, Stewart 
certainly wanted to draw a firm distinction between universal powers of the mind and the 
actions of the so-called ‘vulgar’. 86 For Stewart, Reid had not succeeded in this objective. 
Reid had claimed:  
On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpracticed in philosophical 
researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other 
side stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern, every man without exception 
who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classified with 
the vulgar.87    
  
Reid did not deny the merits of further philosophical inquiries in metaphysics, but rather 
suggested that operating from erroneous philosophical systems improperly exercised and, 
in turn, corrupted the perfection of the mind. Since the counter-Enlightenment censorship 
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86 See Bob Harris, ‘Political Protests in the Year of Liberty, 1792’, in Scotland in the Age of the French 
Revolution, edited by Idem, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 2005), 49-78; For further reading of 
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87 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1785), 135. 
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policies that followed the French Revolution were predicated on the belief that the public 
could not discern on their own the difference between true and false philosophy, Stewart 
advocated that everyone in an advanced society should have a fundamental knowledge of 
human nature, particularly the ‘intellectual, moral and active powers of the mind’. 
According to Stewart, ‘it is such a knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can 
enable a person to judge of his own acquisitions; and to employ the most effectual means 
for supplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient habits’.88 In consequence of the 
different circumstances, Reid’s and Stewart’s moral thought reflected fundamentally 
different concerns. For Reid, the vindication of his alternative to modern philosophical 
scepticism was paramount; for Stewart, however, the future of metaphysical inquiries 
depended on combating counter-Enlightenment policies with a superior solution to the 
intellectual and political trials of his time. Stewart claimed that ‘the inclination to 
scepticism is much more prevalent now than of old: and I think it much more detrimental 
to the interests of science than over credulity’.89 Consequently, he taught that hypotheses 
in metaphysics could reveal unexplored truths in the science of man. Stewart suggested 
that Reid ‘pushed his attack upon hypotheses too far’ in claiming that approach did not 
prove ‘any important fact or law of nature’.90 But he did this with the confidence that his 
system of moral education prevented the adoption of philosophical scepticism. According 
to Stewart, ‘it is the business of education, not to counteract, in any instance, the 
established laws of our constitution, but to direct them to their proper purposes’.91 This 
task of educating the public to properly exercise the faculties and operations of the mind 
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whilst elevating intellectual standards required appealing to the practical needs of the 
public in an accessible way.92  
 Since Stewart followed the Scottish tradition of using professorial chairs to test 
and perfect philosophical theories in a pedagogical context, his moral philosophy course 
was intended to instruct and his lectures were made available to the wider public through 
his publications.93 He believed that ‘the object of the Philosopher is to inform and 
enlighten mankind’.94 Criticised by some for excessive references to earlier and 
contemporary theorists, his delineation of how ideas developed over time and the 
dialogue between theorists allowed those unacquainted with philosophy to better 
understand the progression in the treatment of complex metaphysical themes. His success 
in this task was best shown in Dissertations commissioned by the Encyclopedia 
Britannica.95 Despite criticisms of Stewart’s writings as ‘vague and heavy’ and not 
contributing ‘many new truths to the philosophy of mind’, his blend of pedagogy and 
philosophical inquiry did not lack originality, albeit often hidden.96 In addition to 
inserting his opinion in the context of discussing earlier theories (as he had done with 
Condorcet’s writings), he clearly outlined what he believed a properly regulated moral 
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education should entail. According to Stewart, the cultivation of the mind must involve ‘a 
comprehensive survey of human nature in all its parts; of its various faculties, and 
powers, and sources of enjoyment; and of the effects which are produced on these 
principles by particular situations’.97 ‘Without some degree of it,’ Stewart continued, 
‘every man is in danger of contracting bad habits, before he is aware; and of suffering 
some of his powers to go to decay, for want of proper exercise’.98 He warned that ‘it is 
evident, at the same time, that as no system of education can be perfect, many prejudices 
must mingle with the most important and best ascertained truths’ since they derive from 
the same source in human nature.99 Beyond teaching the faculties and powers of the 
mind, threads of ‘Moderate’ values concerning cultural tolerance, freedom of expression, 
and ‘polite’ sociability were consistently present. 
 In illustrating the purpose of his course, Stewart taught that the ‘object of Moral 
Philosophy is to ascertain the general rules of a wise and virtuous conduct in life, in so far 
as these rules may be discovered by the unassisted light of nature; that is, by an 
examination of the principles of the human constitution, and of the circumstances in 
which man is placed’.100 While his teaching of natural religion and metaphysics drew 
heavily from the earlier writings of Thomas Reid, Stewart advanced a more specific 
ambition for their application towards exercising virtuous habits in public life.101 Of the 
various faculties and methods of exercise taught in his programme of moral education, 
Stewart’s treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ and the branches of duty as ‘active and moral 
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powers of the mind’, best reflected his ideas on how to improve society. According to 
Stewart, ‘the moral faculty is an original principle of our constitution, which is not 
resolvable into any other principle or principles more general than itself; in particular, 
that it is not resolvable into self-love, or a prudential regard to our own interest’.102 In 
agreement with Reid, Stewart believed that from this faculty agents exercised ‘moral 
judgments’ and determined to act or refrain from action based on imposed duties or 
obligations to God, others, and themselves independent of external motives. As the 
source of notions of ‘right and wrong’, Stewart taught that ‘it is absurd to speak of 
morality as a thing independent and unchangeable’, and, as such, actions previously 
believed to be ‘right or wrong’ should be treated as complex perceptions existing within 
distinct contexts. For example, the ‘immutability of moral distinctions’ was affected by 
the particular experiences of the agent who judged a respective act. An action in a 
particular situation, therefore, might be perceived as right and the same action performed 
in a different context could receive a contrary judgment.  
 At a time when the Scottish Enlightenment and its counter-Enlightenment 
advanced different notions of ‘right and wrong’ and ‘merit and demerit’, Stewart 
proposed that through the ‘moral faculty’ agents could fulfill God’s intention concerning 
moral conduct independent of revealed religion. Similar to Reid, Stewart remarked that 
‘our ideas of the moral attributes of God must be derived from our own perception [and] 
it is only by attending to these, that we can form a conception of what his attributes are; 
and it is in this way we are furnished with the strongest proofs that they really belong to 
him’.103 In teaching natural religion and the ways to exercise the divinely inspired 
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faculties of the mind, Stewart did not question the veracity of Scripture.104 But he did 
question if ecclesiastical and secular laws were best suited to govern universal moral laws 
of the ‘moral faculty’. Since secular laws could not try a suspect based on the immorality 
(rather than illegality) of an action, the cultivated ability of the public to do so became 
important particularly in the context of the time. In lecturing on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes, Stewart commented that a magistrate ‘has no right to punish 
crimes in a moral view, but only as they tend to disturb the peace & order of society’.105 
Moreover, Stewart treated religious laws with more distrust. He wrote that ‘religion is a 
species of authoritative law, enforced by the most awful sanctions and extending not 
merely to our actions, but to our thoughts’.106 By debunking the authority of secular and 
religious laws to govern innate ‘moral laws’, Stewart argued for the necessity of 
exercising the natural inclination to restrain vicious acts and cherish virtue. This 
contradicted the orthodox Calvinist belief taught by George Hill that revealed religion 
had absolute moral authority over and was more ‘sublime’ than ‘occasional passages in 
the writings of philosophers’.107 Stewart suggested that reliance on secular and religious 
laws for moral instruction distorted the pursuit of philosophical truths. He, therefore, 
taught that the ‘object in my future lectures will guard you against a bigoted attachment 
to any opinions, without properly canvassing their truth, a failing extremely prejudicial to 
the interests of science’.108 In an important sense Stewart’s paramount concern in creating 
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a system of moral education was his opposition to counter-Enlightenment policies 
(political and religious) that obstructed progress in the science of the mind.  
 The exercise of the ‘moral faculty’ did not occur within the classroom or 
exclusively during solitary periods of introspective reflection. Stewart suggested that 
diverse social interactions and a refined appreciation for the arts exercised the ‘moral 
faculty’ as well as other ‘intellectual, active and moral powers of the mind’. For instance, 
the sensations of pain or pleasure of perceiving ‘moral beauty and deformity’ in art and 
‘polite’ culture awakened an agent to the moral qualities of ‘polite’ manners, creations, 
and the ‘moral beauties’ of the natural world. ‘By teaching the youth to associate the 
ideas of happiness with what is virtuous and good and of pleasure with the pursuits of 
literature’, Stewart remarked, ‘his choice will be directed to what is right’.109  
In an appeal to Reid’s treatment of natural religion, Stewart believed God 
designed the mind with the power to merit moral approbation through the perfection of 
the ‘moral faculty’. Stewart proposed that ‘in my speculations for instance upon Natural 
Religion, I will not produce proofs, which taken by themselves would have a conclusive 
force…but I will shew [sic] you the propriety and reasonableness of the idea [and] I will 
shew [sic] you that it is from partial and limited views of nature that scepticism arises’.110 
His considerable attention to the divinely imposed duties with respect to a Deity, duties 
which respect our fellow creatures, and which respect ourselves demonstrated his 
response to counter-Enlightenment challenges to the teaching of natural religion.111 
Stewart taught: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, taken by James Bridges, Winter 1801-1802, EUL 
Dc.5.88, 43.  
 
110 Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 1793-4, 24. 
 
111 Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, vi.  
 
Building Upon Reid’s Legacy  ($!
Such an examination [of the branches of duty], besides, being the reasonable 
consequence of those impressions which his works produce on every attentive 
and well-disposed mind, may be itself regarded, both as one the duties we owe 
Him, and as the expression of a moral temper sincerely devoted to truth, and 
alive to the sublimest emotions of gratitude and of benevolence.112 
 
Stewart qualified that the existence of God and His intentions were not an intuitive 
truth. Through the faculty of reason and the observation of human nature, however, 
enlightened men found it probable that God existed. Moreover, the agents’ obligation 
to reflect introspectively on their practise of prudence, temperance, and fortitude, for 
Stewart, was ‘a duty so important and comprehensive, that it leads to the practice of 
all the rest, and is therefore entitled to a very full and particular examination in a 
system of Moral Philosophy’.113 Although everyone benefited from them, the nature 
of these virtues demanded that agents reflect on their own behavior as separate from 
the wider public. In discussing an agent’s duties to others, Stewart identified the 
virtues of benevolence, justice, and veracity as obligations to the wider society. He 
suggested:  
Unless we admit these duties to be immediately obligatory, we must admit the 
maxim, that a good end may sanctify whatever means are necessary for its 
accomplishment; or, in other words, that it would be lawful for us to dispense with 
the obligations of gratitude, of veracity, and of justice, when ever, by doing so, we 
had a prospect of promoting any of the essential interests of society.114  
 
These moral obligations of exercising virtue and justice were certainly relevant in the 
contexts of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the Scottish Sedition Trials and the 
counter-Enlightenment’s attempts to censor the teaching of metaphysics. By instructing 
students to value and exercise these branches of duty, Stewart strengthened his students’ 
attachments to moral improvement as members of a wider society. In his final remarks to 
his class in 1790, Stewart stated ‘that in life they should not consider the various times of 
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fortune as the instilments of happiness or misery to them—however—true happiness was 
to him found in a steady adherence to our duty and in that alone’.115 By design, every 
theme taught in Stewart’s system of moral education relied upon every other for the full 
perfection of the mind; certain themes, however, had more practical applications in public 
life. Stewart’s teaching of the ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’ (which forms the 
subject of the next chapter) demonstrated the practicality of this faculty when applied in 




 In the last decade of the eighteenth century, elements of ‘Moderatism’ in the 
Scottish Enlightenment appeared to be fading rapidly in the wake of the French 
Revolution. Counter-Enlightenment policies targeted many of the circumstances that 
enabled the earlier dominance of the ‘Moderate’ literati at Edinburgh University. John 
Veitch remarked that ‘the political spirit which in other times had issued in civil war, 
found outlet and relief in bitter personalities, social hatred, and exclusion [and] such was 
the state of things, that Dugald Stewart confessed to despair for his country’.116 
Responding to these counter-Enlightenment interests, Stewart adapted Reid’s philosophy 
in creating a system of moral education. He claimed that ‘the happiness of Individuals 
depends very much on fixed principles [and] the characters of the greatest part of the men 
are formed by the influence of Education, Situation or Example…in consequence of 
wanting fixed principles their characters suffer as much as their happiness’.117 Despite 
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enduring early tensions over the political nature of his lectures and his favourable 
discussion of Condorcet, Stewart positioned his moral system as a formidable defence 
against philosophical scepticism, political radicalism, and the counter-Enlightenment 
censorship of metaphysics. By creating an accessible and modern version of Thomas 
Reid’s so-called Common Sense philosophy, Stewart contributed to the endurance of 
Reid’s legacy at the dawn of a new age.  
 In the Scottish context of political tensions and intellectual repression during the 
1790s, Stewart’s programme of moral education sought to revive the ‘Moderate’ Scottish 
Enlightenment through the diffusion of applied ethics. The popularity of his lectures had 
a considerable influence on rising figures of the Scottish Whig party (such as Francis 
Horner, Henry Cockburn, Thomas Brown, and Sydney Smith). According to Robert 
Gillies, ‘his class-room was usually so crowded that without going before the hour it was 
not possible to find a seat; and so desirous it were noble families to obtain his direct 
advice and guidance for youth, that it was said he had refused the sum of [£] 2000, as 
annual pension, for one pupil’.118 Stewart’s ‘didactic eloquence’ was celebrated for 
diffusing useful knowledge in ‘polite’ society and securing virtuous habits in the process. 
His treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ and the branches of duty, in particular, demonstrated 
that exercising the innate faculties of the mind were practical for improving morals and 
the state of society whilst refining ‘polite’ manners. Stewart’s treatment of the ‘auxiliary 
principles of the moral faculty’, which is the subject of the following chapter, supported 
this ambition. The principles of ‘a regard to character’, ‘sense of the ridiculous’, 
‘sympathy’, and ‘moral taste’ illustrated the purpose and operations of a properly 
cultivated mind in ‘real life’ situations. According to Stewart, ‘where they all maintain 
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their due place, in subordination to the moral faculty, they tend at once to fortify virtuous 
habits, and to recommend them, by the influence of amiable example, to the imitation of 
others’.119 Whilst practical for securing refined manners in ‘polite’ society, the ‘auxiliary 
principles’ strengthened attachments to the branches of duty. Through reinforcing the 
innate obligations to God, others, and oneself, Stewart sought to encourage the practise of 
universal benevolence at a time when the counter-Enlightenment policies bred prejudices 
toward metaphysics and natural religion. For these reasons, Stewart remarked that ‘at 
present, I must content myself with recommending it to the serious attention of moralists, 
as one of the most important topics of practical ethics which the actual circumstances of 
this part of the world point out as an object of philosophical discussion’.120 As a product 
of Scottish Enlightenment thought and of ‘Moderatism’, Stewart’s efforts to revive its 
ideals in response to powerful counter-Enlightenment interests ‘exalted the character of 
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 In the decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century, Dugald Stewart 
encountered on-going opposition toward his support of ‘Moderate’ values and the 
teaching of metaphysics. This counter-Enlightenment movement emerged in response to 
the French Revolution, but its agenda threatened to eliminate the circumstances that had 
permitted the earlier rise of the Scottish Enlightenment. The censorship of free 
expression, in particular, greatly hindered Scottish creativity and scientific innovation 
that flourished in Scotland’s previous age of improvement. Stewart recognised that the 
survival of the ‘Moderate’ Enlightenment required addressing these new political, social, 
and intellectual challenges with a superior solution. This came in the form of his system 
of moral education. This task of sustaining the Scottish Enlightenment demanded that 
Stewart show how the cultivation of the mind and ‘Moderate’ beliefs directly benefited 
and were useful in modern ‘real life’ situations. As a central part of his system of moral 
education, Stewart’s treatment of applied ethics addressed this objective.         
 Examining Stewart’s contribution to applied ethics, the Scottish philosopher and 
historian James Mackintosh wrote that ‘few men ever lived, who poured into the breasts 
of youth a more fervid, and yet reasonable, love of liberty, of truth, and of virtue’.1 In 
doing so, Stewart aimed at systematically exercising the mind as a way to foster an 
enlightened and benevolent society. His treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ and the branches 
of duty as ‘active and moral powers of the mind’ portrays how he sought to cultivate 
virtue through the activity of introspective reflection and the experience of sociable 
interaction. Stewart’s teaching of these innate powers offered a more nuanced and 
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textured coverage than Reid had previously attempted. For example, Stewart suggested 
that the ‘moral faculty’ was assisted in its perfection by the exercise of other instinctive 
principles. He taught that ‘in order to secure still more completely the good order of 
society, and to facilitate the acquisition of virtuous habits, nature has superadded to our 
moral constitution a variety of auxiliary principles, which sometimes give rise to a 
conduct agreeable to the rules of morality and highly useful to mankind’.2 These 
‘auxiliary principles’ consisted of ‘regarding character’, ‘sensing the ridiculous’, 
‘sympathy’, and ‘moral taste’. Each depended upon one another for their exercise toward 
perfection and, at the same time, drew heavily from elements of Scottish ‘polite’ culture 
as a central factor of their development. In treating these principles Stewart distanced 
himself in significant ways from earlier Scottish moralists such as Hutcheson, Hume, and 
Smith whilst building upon Reid’s philosophical system in a new way. While Stewart’s 
use of these principles represented an original part of his programme, they have received 
little attention. Their role in his system of moral education, their intended application in 
Scottish ‘polite’ culture, and how their exercise and application in society combated 
counter-Enlightenment interests is the focus of this chapter.  
 I shall first address the question of how Stewart appealed to the earlier ‘Moderate’ 
literati of Edinburgh’s use of Scottish ‘polite’ culture. Then I shall discuss Stewart’s role 
in Edinburgh’s ‘polite’ culture as a member of philosophical and literary societies and 
how counter-Enlightenment policies hindered his pedagogical objectives in the public 
sphere. Finally, I shall turn to the question how, according to Stewart, the exercise of the 
‘auxiliary principles’ developed virtuous sociability when applied in the contexts of 
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Scottish ‘polite’ culture. In the course of examining these areas, I argue that Stewart 
combined his applied ethics with the refinement of ‘polite’ manners as a way to 
undermine counter-Enlightenment policies and realise his vision of Enlightenment. By 
showing how the overlapping interests of social, ethical, and intellectual improvement as 
the practical intent of Stewart’s system of moral education, this chapter suggests his 
process of learning informed the creation of a new age of modernity. 
 
Dugald Stewart and Scottish ‘polite’ culture 
 During the long eighteenth-century, ‘polite’ manners and ‘sensibility’ were a 
prominent force in British culture.3 Bernard Bailyn and John Clive have shown that 
eighteenth-century notions of ‘sensibility’ and ‘politeness’ in London received an 
enthusiastic reception across the provinces of the British Atlantic World.4 As Roger 
Emerson and Nicholas Phillipson have argued, the Scottish Enlightenment (particularly 
its role in Edinburgh) also adopted a version of English ‘polite’ culture.5 At this time the 
writings of early eighteenth-century British moralists (such as the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and slightly later Adam Smith) situated 
morals within idioms of ‘polite’ culture.6 This shared practise did not imply that moralists 
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4 See John Clive and Bernard Bailyn, ‘England’s Cultural Provinces: Scotland and America’, WMQ, 
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of this tradition followed the same philosophical approach or were in agreement of how 
best to develop virtue through sociability.7 Yet Knud Haakonssen argues that the Scottish 
literati shared an interest in ‘what sort of common good [could be] creat[ed] in human 
society’.8 This focus led Scots to question the moral qualities of sociable interaction as an 
improving activity. Susan Manning and Thomas Ahnert have shown the Scottish 
moralists as linking empirical notions of identity and ‘character’ as ways to understand 
and foster sociability.9 This pursuit took place in the institutional spheres of the Church 
and University as well as the conventional forums of philosophical and literary societies. 
Membership of these Scottish institutions affected how Scots interpreted and modified 
‘polite’ sociability to the unique contexts in which they lived.10 Manning and Ahnert 
argue: 
During the 1760s and 1770s, the debate about sociability moved beyond academic 
moral philosophy, further into literature and into the periodical press, generating a 
coherent polite culture that would extend the reach of Scotland’s philosophical 
Enlightenment from all-male clubs to mixed salons and into the domains of novels, 
sermons, historical works, polite essays, and legal discourse. This philosophical 
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notions of ‘politeness’. Lawrence Klein has shown that the earlier writings of Lord Shaftesbury 
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and literary world was also deeply entwined with religious and ecclesiastical 
affairs.11  
 
The ‘Moderates’ of Edinburgh were centrally involved in Scotland’s development of 
‘polite’ culture. As Edinburgh professors and ministers, the ‘Moderates’ harmonised the 
sociability of ‘polite’ culture with the Enlightenment ambition to improve the state of 
society. Richard Sher argues that their ‘chief objective was the production of well-
rounded gentlemen, imbued with Christian humanist values and familiar with all 
branches of polite learning’.12 In a significant sense the Moderates’ diffusion of these 
beliefs from the pulpit, University lecture halls, within the General Assembly, Edinburgh 
clubs and societies, and in print created what would later be known as the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  
 As the professor of rhetoric and belles-lettres at Edinburgh University (1759-
1783) and minister of the High or New Kirk at St. Giles’s Church (1758-1800), Hugh 
Blair exemplified the ‘Moderate’ ideals of his contemporaries. Blair advocated that 
refinements of eloquence, ‘polite’ manners, and ‘polite taste’ were compatible with 
Calvinist principles as well as necessary practises for the improvement of society. He 
taught that ‘we refer to the sentiments of mankind in polished and flourishing nations; 
when arts are cultivated and manners refined; when works of genius are subjected to free 
discussion, and Taste is improved by Science and Philosophy’.13 In doing so, he 
illustrated how the ‘Moderate’ values of free expression, ‘polite’ notions of ‘taste’ and 
Enlightenment science were central to the ‘Moderates’ understanding of an enlightened 
state of society. The popularity of Blair’s course amongst students and men of letters 
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alike suggests that the upper and middling ranks of Edinburgh society actively sought the 
‘Moderates’ version of ‘polite’ instruction. Blair remarked:  
In an age when works of genius and literature are so frequently the subjects of 
discourse, when every one erects himself into a judge, and when we can hardly 
mingle in polite society without bearing some share in such discussions; studies of 
this kind, it is not to be doubted, will appear to derive part of their importance from 
the use to which they may be applied in furnishing materials for those fashionable 
topics of discourse, and thereby enabling us to support a proper rank in social life.14 
 
His depiction of Edinburgh society denotes that the refinement of ‘polite’ manners and 
knowledge of literature and philosophy were necessary for success in public life. 
Meanwhile, there was a sense that Edinburgh’s ‘polite’ sophistication also responded to 
English criticisms of Scottish culture. Scottish men of letters were led to believe that 
Scotticisms, for example, blemished their attempts of ‘polite’ literature and ‘sublime’ 
oration as inferior to English standards.15 In the words of Dugald Stewart ‘the Scotch 
accent is surely in itself as good as the English; and with a few exceptions, is as agreeable 
to the ear: and yet how offensive does it appear, even to us, who have been accustomed to 
hear it from our infancy, when compared with that which is used by our southern 
neighbours!’16 Blair and his ‘Moderate’ contemporaries sought to remove this stigma 
whilst modifying ‘polite’ culture toward their ideas of moral and religious improvement. 
While the Church had a traditional investment in the moral improvement of society, the 
‘Moderates’ redefined the content and pathway of this end purpose. Ahnert argues: 
Blair’s sermons were indeed intended for moral edification of their audience and 
readers, but they were more than a kind of “Calvinism lite,” a watered-down version 
of traditional theological beliefs, packaged as pleasing moral precepts for polite and 
fashionable audiences. Rather, their moral purpose reflected a very specific 
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theological outlook that distinguished Blair and other Moderates from their more 
orthodox Calvinist critics, such as the clergymen John Witherspoon.17 
 
Blair (as Ahnert argues) entwined Calvinist principles with ‘polite’ discourse and morals 
whilst maintaining Scripture as the primary source of moral conduct. Blair’s ‘Moderate’ 
contemporaries largely upheld this belief. The Moderates’ endorsement of Scottish 
‘polite’ culture went beyond their role in the Church and the University to include British 
print culture and literary and philosophical societies. The range of literary topics 
discussed at these social gatherings demonstrated their ‘commitment to such polite, 
enlightened values as genteel manners’.18 Moreover, the political overtones and shared 
ideological beliefs expressed within these societies (such as the ‘Select Society’) offer an 
explanation of how the ‘Moderates’ as so-called ‘polite’ philosophers understood 
‘politeness’.19 Ahnert suggests that ‘a “polite” philosopher was one who allowed himself 
to be guided by the fashionable, refined passions or sentiments typical of his age’.20 
According to Kathleen Holcomb, this union of ‘polite’ interests and sophisticated 
philosophical and literary debate within the contexts of clubs and societies created a 
distinctive feature of the Scottish Enlightenment.21 Did this culture survive the counter-
Enlightenment censorship of the public sphere in the years that followed the French 
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Revolution? Moreover, did Dugald Stewart’s system of moral education strictly follow 
the ‘Moderates’ use of ‘polite’ culture in his response to counter-Enlightenment interests? 
 Dugald Stewart had been one of Blair’s students, and his particular use of ‘polite’ 
idioms in his programme of moral education certainly appealed to ‘Moderate’ examples 
as well as the writings of George Campbell who defended Reid’s philosophy.22 Blair’s 
belief that the faculty of ‘reason would be a solitary, and, in some measure, an 
unavailable principle’ without the cultivated abilities of communication had a profound 
impact on Stewart’s applied ethics.23 Contrary to Stewart’s defence of instinctive 
principles of the mind, Blair believed (as Ahnert argues) moral improvement heavily 
relied upon revealed religion.24 This belief was communicated in both his lectures and 
sermons. Celebrated as ‘one of the greatest didactic orators’, Stewart’s applied ethics 
reflected a different pedagogical purpose than what Blair and Reid sought to achieve 
from the classroom.25 While Reid’s lectures conveyed the import of his philosophical 
system without embellishing the performance of its transmission, Stewart, on the other 
hand, believed that an eloquent delivery of morals greatly assisted in its adoption. Stewart 
reminisced that ‘in [Reid’s] elocution and mode of instruction, there was nothing 
peculiarly attractive…he seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore 
discourse; nor was his manner of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had 
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committed to writing’.26 Similar to the object of his publications, Reid’s lectures ridiculed 
the ‘Ideal Theory’ as a way to vindicate his ‘principles of common sense’. By accepting 
Reidian principles as true, Stewart had more space than Reid to discuss the application of 
applied ethics in society. In doing so, Stewart’s lecturing style provided an example for 
his audience of the eloquence and ethics that could be achieved through the exercise of 
his system. As an earlier student, Henry Cockburn wrote: 
To me his lectures were like the opening of the heavens. I felt that I had a soul. His 
noble views, unfolded in glorious sentences, elevated me into a higher world. I was 
as much excited and charmed as any man of cultivated taste would be…had he lived 
in ancient times, his memory would have descended to us as that of one of the finest 
of the old eloquent sages. 27 
 
James Mill commented that ‘I have heard Pitt and Fox deliver some of their most admired 
speeches, but I have never heard anything so eloquent as some of the lectures of 
Professor Stewart’.28 Unsurprisingly given Cockburn’s and Mill’s reverent remarks, 
Stewart’s reputation as a moralist was inextricably linked to his eloquence as a 
pedagogue.29 How Stewart explained and composed his ideas, which were meant to 
primarily instruct, contributed to his impact in diffusing Scottish philosophy; his purpose 
in creating a system of moral education and its application in Scottish ‘polite’ culture, 
however, deserves further examination. 
 While Blair’s lectures primarily attended to ‘polite’ manners as human 
constructions with deep philosophical and religious undertones, Stewart’s programme 
was concerned with exercising universal and timeless principles of the mind as a way to 
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cultivate benevolence, Enlightenment, and civil manners (most notably through the 
exercise of the ‘moral faculty’).30 He cautioned that fluctuating ‘polite’ fashions could 
impede benevolence in society by masking sincere intentions of agents and detract from 
universal attachments to humanity. Moreover, he thought that ‘polite’ manners and 
‘polite taste’ sometimes led to prejudicial impressions of foreign cultures as inferior 
particularly during periods of political distress. Elements of British cultural intolerance of 
this sort were heightened in the years that followed the French Revolution. National 
prejudices toward foreign cultural beliefs undermined Stewart’s conviction that everyone 
shared universal connections through the divinely inspired faculties of the mind and as 
participants in the universal human experience. From its allegedly divisive consequences 
to universal benevolence, Stewart taught that cultural prejudices obstructed the progress 
of human reason and ethics. According to Stewart, ‘there are two classes of men who 
have more particularly been charged with this weakness; those who are placed at the 
bottom, and those who have reached the summit of the scale of refinement; the former 
from ignorance, and the latter from national vanity’.31 As shown in the previous chapter, 
the circulation of radical philosophical writings in the years that followed the French 
Revolution convinced Stewart of the moral and social imperative to educate the lower 
ranks in society.32 Stewart’s inclusion of British gentlemen, who were often influential in 
politics, as equally prejudicial to universal benevolence certainly targeted the Henry 
Dundas interests of the counter-Enlightenment. Edinburgh Whigs at the time also held 
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pejorative views toward other cultures but these Whig beliefs, for Stewart, did not impede 
‘justice’ to the degree that the Dundas led Scottish Sedition Trials had shown. Stewart’s 
teaching of this belief appealed to Blair’s earlier attention to distortions of language in 
securing power over others.33 According to Donald Winch, Stewart’s response to counter-
Enlightenment policies ‘was to rely upon the diffusion of enlightened opinion as a 
substitute for public virtue; it was valuable precisely because of its self-fulfilling 
properties: belief in it enjoined “patriotic exertion” on behalf of the common good’.34 
Stewart’s appeal to ‘Moderate’ values, as his prescribed source of ‘enlightened opinion’, 
was indeed a prominent feature of his system of moral education, but were these beliefs 
on their own meant to revive or substitute the supposed decline in public virtue? His 
fostering of a new generation of virtuous men (whose sense of ‘right and wrong’ derived 
from the ‘moral faculty’ not the constructions of ‘polite’ fashion) redefined the role of 
patriotism in various states of society with Enlightenment as its most advanced stage.  
 Stewart’s belief that counter-Enlightenment policies threatened his system of 
moral education was inextricably linked to conflicting notions and exertions of 
patriotism. While his Whiggish political opinions factored into this belief, Stewart, like 
the earlier ‘Moderates’, sought to improve the human condition in society toward their 
type of Enlightenment. His discussion on the progressive stages of patriotism advanced 
this ambition with a particular attention to the influences of reason, experience and 
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education.35 As part of the ‘imagination’ as an ‘intellectual power of the mind’, Stewart 
identified that ‘instinctive patriotism [had] no connection with our moral or natural 
powers [and] they imply neither reflection nor a sense of duty’.36 At the same time, he 
considered that membership of a community bred a natural inclination for its promotion 
and security. Stewart suggested that as a society became more advanced ‘instinctive 
patriotism’ decayed from reasonable reflection and was replaced with a ‘rational 
patriotism’ that restrained prejudices from infecting a society’s political policies. 
Stewart’s proposed transition from ‘instinctive patriotism’ toward the more advanced 
practise of ‘rational patriotism’ was certainly relevant to Edinburgh politics and the wider 
British public discourse during the 1790s. Furthermore, his encouragement of ‘rational 
patriotism’ sheds new light on what he hoped to achieve in his system of moral 
education. Through his lectures, publications, and membership of literary and 
philosophical societies, Stewart encouraged ‘rational patriotism’ as it applied in both 
private and ‘polite’ forums. 
 In the years following his 1772 return to Edinburgh, Stewart joined the 
‘Moderates’ at literary and philosophical societies. He was, for example, a member of the 
‘Speculative Society’, Freemasons, Philosophical Society (which became the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh in 1783), ‘Oyster Club’, ‘Poker Club’ (a short-lived attempt to 
revive this previously disbanded club took place in 1786), and the ‘Friday Club’.37 Within 
the ‘Speculative Society’, Stewart debated the consequences of ‘instinctive patriotism’ on 
universal benevolence amongst a diverse group of Whig and politically conservative 
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35 See Rosalind Mitchison, ‘Patriotism and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in 
Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence, edited by T.W. Moody, (London: Appletree 
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University students. While members of this society who met every Tuesday evening also 
discussed a range of ‘polite’ subjects such as poetry and literature, the politically and 
ideologically charged debates defied the censorship policies of the counter-
Enlightenment. Henry Dundas and George Hill’s new Moderate party certainly found 
offence in Stewart’s proposed discussions: ‘Is a religious establishment advantageous to a 
community?’ ‘Should representatives in Parliament consider themselves bound to follow 
the instructions of their Constituents?’ ‘Would the diffusion of knowledge amongst the 
lower ranks be attended with advantage to the Community?’ ‘Can any circumstances 
justify the suspension of Habeas Corpus?’38 These deliberately pointed topics for 
discussion on religious and secular governmental authority questioned counter-
Enlightenment interests of censoring political and philosophical discourse in the public 
sphere. In reference to these particular debates, Henry Cockburn wrote that ‘the political 
sensitiveness of the day at one time obtruded itself rather violently into this hall of 
philosophical orators…while it lasted, it only animated their debates, and, by connecting 
them with public principles and parties, gave a practical interest to their proceedings’.39 
Stewart’s willingness to challenge the counter-Enlightenment in public forums from his 
convictions of ‘right and wrong’ and of ‘justice’ coincided with his purpose in teaching 
the exercise of the ‘moral faculty’ as the best means to combat the intellectual and moral 
repression of the counter-Enlightenment. Yet his mingling of philosophy, politics, and 
‘Moderate’ ideology extended to other practical uses in the contexts of Scottish ‘polite’ 
culture.   
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Fostering Virtuous Habits: Stewart on ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’  
 At a time when counter-Enlightenment policies limited free expression in the 
public sphere, Stewart continued the earlier Moderates’ use of ‘polite’ culture and their 
commitment to social improvement. By teaching practical methods for fostering virtuous 
habits in ‘real life’ situations, Stewart prepared young men to flourish in public life.40 
Stewart’s programme did not entirely conform to how the earlier ‘Moderates’ of 
Edinburgh achieved this task. The principal difference was his emphasis of perfecting the 
principles of the mind as the best way to navigate and thrive within ‘polite’ culture. 
Through the exercise of the ‘moral faculty’ (in addition to fulfilling the instinctive 
branches of duty) agents gradually developed virtuous sociability whilst improving 
‘polite’ manners. Stewart suggested that other principles assisted the ‘moral faculty’ in 
achieving this objective. He wrote:   
An attention to the moral faculty alone, without regard to the principles 
which were intended to operate as its auxiliaries, and which contribute, in 
fact, so powerfully to the good order of society, has led a few Philosophers 
into an opposite extreme;--less dangerous, undoubtedly, in its practical 
tendency, but less calculated, perhaps, to recommend ethical disquisitions to 
the notice of those who are engrossed with active concerns of life.41  
 
Stewart’s teaching of the ‘auxiliary principles’ demonstrated how applied ethics 
improved virtuous sociability and, in turn, encouraged the practise of universal 
benevolence and modernity. Rather than influencing society through delineating 
fashionable rules of ‘polite’ conduct,42 Stewart taught ways to exercise the principles of 
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40 See Nicholas Phillipson, ‘The pursuit of virtue in Scottish university education: Dugald Stewart and 
Scottish moral philosophy in the Enlightenment’, Universities, Society and the Future, edited by Idem, 
(EUP, 1983), 82-101; Richard Sher, ‘Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral 
Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century’, in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish 
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41 Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, 325.  
 
42 Throughout the eighteenth century the British interest in ‘polite’ instruction mingled politics and 
morals. This appeared in a number of publications most notably London’s Gentleman’s Magazine 
(whose earlier contributors had included Samuel Johnson) and the Spectator. For coverage of the early 
eighteenth-century uses of ‘politeness’ see Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Politics and Politeness in the Reigns 
of Anne and the Early Hanoverians’, in The Varieties of British Political Thought, edited by J.G.A. 
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the mind through sociable exchanges. Although the principles of ‘sensing decency’, 
‘sensing the ridiculous’, ‘sympathy’, and ‘moral taste’ overlapped in many respects, they 
each offered distinct ways to perfect an agent’s ethical disposition whilst justifying the 
social application of Stewart’s system of moral education.  
 
Sensing Decent Conduct: Stewart on ‘a regard to character’ 
 The philosophical theme of ‘character’ received rich treatment in Scottish 
Enlightenment moral philosophy. Scottish moral discussions of ‘character’ often revolved 
around aspects of sociality.43 Furthermore, treatment of ‘national character’, ‘moral 
character’, and ‘intellectual character’ offered more precise definitions of specific kinds 
of ‘character’. As Jennifer Tannoch-Bland has shown, Stewart illustrated reasons for the 
variations of ‘intellectual character’ and its proper exercise with a particular objective of 
justifying the use of the science of mind in the improvement of man.44 He taught that ‘the 
varieties of intellectual character among men, result from the various possible 
combinations and modifications of faculties, which, in greater or less degrees, are 
common to the whole species’.45 Moreover, Stewart taught that the perfectibility of the 
different types of ‘character’ could be achieved in properly applying his moral system. 
He argued that ‘there can be no doubt that the study of the mind improves us in every 
aspect [and] particularly prepares us for the more successful application to common 
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Pocock, (CUP, 1993), 211-245. Lord Chesterfield’s letters to his son were an excellent example of the 
eighteenth-century British enthusiasm of ‘polite’ instruction manuals. See David Roberts (ed.), Lord 
Chesterfield’s Letters, (OUP, 2008).  
 
43 See Manning and Ahnert (eds.), Character, Self, and Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment, 1-26. 
 
44 See Jennifer Tannoch-Bland, ‘Dugald Stewart on intellectual character’, British Journal for the 
History of Science, 30:3, (1997): 307-320. 
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concerns of life’.46 His system of moral education, therefore, offered ways to cultivate an 
enlightened ‘intellectual character’ as well as other types of ‘character’.  
In the context of Stewart’s exchanges with Francis Jeffrey over the merit of 
teaching metaphysics, Tannoch-Bland suggests that Stewart’s attention to the 
methodology of moral philosophy furthered reasons why metaphysics should be treated 
as an experimental science and, if properly examined, had authority over other branches 
of knowledge.47 Supporting a view on the primacy of the mind, Stewart taught that ‘all 
sciences concenter [sic] in that of the philosophy of the mind…for the principles of them 
all are situated in it…all knowledge therefore of Morals, is the only solid foundation of a 
thorough skill in the sciences of Logic, Politic, grammar, & etcetera’.48 As was often the 
case in Stewart’s writings and lectures, he linked mental faculties and their operations to 
corresponding roles in morals. Consistent with this practise, Stewart believed that agents 
who properly developed ‘intellectual character’ often possessed ‘moral character’.49 
While ‘intellectual character’ was shown through the originality of thought and the 
‘magnificence’ of its contribution, ‘moral character’ was closely aligned to a cultivated 
‘moral faculty’.50 By maintaining that metaphysicians best served the instruction and 
advancement of knowledge, Stewart delineated how pursuits in this field revealed moral 
qualities and powers commonly observed yet not always properly understood or 
exercised. His treatment of the principle ‘decency or a regard to character’ illustrated how 
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the mind actively sensed refinements and deficiencies in ‘moral and intellectual 
character’ and its value to civil and ‘polite’ society.   
Stewart’s system, particularly in treating the ‘auxiliary principles’, informed the 
creation of a new notion of modernity within Scottish moral philosophy and ‘polite’ 
culture. In doing so, he harmonised Enlightenment science (based on Reid’s philosophy), 
‘Moderate’ values, and the social concerns of a new age wrought with political, 
ideological and intellectual tensions. The functions of the ‘auxiliary principles’ that 
Stewart endorsed departed from David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s earlier treatment of 
‘character’, ‘moral judgment’ and the origin of morals whilst expanding upon Reid’s 
applied ethics.51 Contrary to Hume’s theory, Stewart taught that moral judgments, largely 
informed by ‘auxiliary principles’, examined the purpose of a particular action and the 
disposition of the agent. Stewart’s programme of moral education, therefore, emphasised 
the intentions and causes of human agency of action and relation of a particular action to 
virtue and vice. The principle of ‘decency or a regard to character’ judged ‘moral and 
intellectual character’ based on the ethical disposition of the agent. In practise, the active 
and moral power to distinguish performances of ‘polite’ manners that emulated perceived 
virtues out of self-interest from actions of ‘moral character’ proved useful in navigating a 
complex ‘polite’ society. According to Stewart, ‘where a rational and settled Benevolence 
forms a part of a character, it will render the conduct perfectly uniform, and will exclude 
the possibility of those inconsistencies that are frequently observable in individuals, who 
give themselves up to the guidance of particular affections, whether private or public’.52 
‘Regarding character’ was vital in determining various moral qualities in performances of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 For a more in-depth discussion of Reid’s and Hume’s treatment of ‘character’ see James Harris, 
‘Reid and Hume on the Possibility of Character’, in Character, Self, and Sociability in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, 31-45. 
 
52 Stewart, Outlines, 3:251. 
 
The Science of Applied Ethics in Scottish ‘Polite’ Society *%!
civility, kindness, humanity, patriotism, and universal benevolence. Meanwhile, an 
agent’s ethical disposition affected others as a member of society and, by extension, 
influenced the moral welfare of that society. In this respect, Stewart’s purpose in treating 
this principle certainly surpassed the interests of individual agents.  
The function of ‘a regard to character’ hinged on the belief that virtuous sociability 
stemmed from the ‘moral faculty’ not a prudent regard for self-interest or the utility of 
virtuous conduct. Stewart considered three reasons why the practise of this principle was 
independent of social motivations or self-interest. First, people with cultivated ‘character’ 
could sense insincere acts of civility or gestures of kindness. These artificial acts would 
not garner the approval of enlightened agents and would consequently be regarded as 
‘ridiculous’. Second, virtuous actions are most appreciated and valued by others when the 
agent was unaware of its approval. Yet again a ‘regard of character’ naturally acted from 
the best interests of others without the motivations of rewards or public approval. Finally, 
if an agent’s regard to public opinion surpasses his innate sense of moral duty then the 
agent would be filled with self-condemnation, ‘whereas a steady adherence to the Right 
never fails to be its own reward, even when it exposes us to calumny and 
misrepresentation’.53 Since the branches of moral duty that supported the exercise of 
‘moral character’ and ‘intellectual character’ sometimes conflicted with social norms (or 
in Stewart’s experience the counter-Enlightenment policies of the Dundas interest), a 
steadfast commitment to improving ‘moral and intellectual character’ pursued virtuous 
conduct rather than public esteem. For Stewart, the cultivation of this principle 
strengthened the pursuit of virtue and safeguarded his students from adopting morally 
corrupt fashions or policies.    
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Stewart’s conviction that exercising the moral powers of the mind gradually 
fostered an enlightened and benevolent society did not imply that he believed Edinburgh 
had already achieved this ideal in the earlier age of ‘Moderatism’. From the interest of 
practical knowledge, his programme of moral education suggested that at a young age 
public regard and ‘all those rules of conduct which profess to out the proper ends of 
human pursuit [such as literature or poetry], and the most effectual means of attaining 
them’ were useful in early moral development.54 Since the perfection of the mind 
required a lifetime of continuous exercise, a regard to public opinion greatly assisted in 
forming early associations as part of this gradual development. Stewart remarked: 
There can be no doubt that a regard to the good opinion of our fellow-creatures has 
great influence in promoting our exertions to cultivate both the one and the other, 
[and] the effect which this principle has in strengthening our virtuous habits, and in 
restraining those passions which a sense of duty alone would not be sufficient to 
regulate.55  
 
Despite not qualifying as virtuous, esteem for public approbation assisted ‘by training us 
early to exertions of self-command and self-denial’ as a useful tool in early education.56 
Whilst practical at young ages when the ‘moral faculty’ was unrefined, Stewart stipulated 
that mature minds pursued the attainment of ‘moral character’ from imposed moral 
obligations to God, others, and themselves. Closely affiliated with ‘a regard to character’, 
the principle of ‘a sense of the ridiculous’ identified trivial and in certain circumstances 
more nefarious attempts to emulate virtuous conduct. In cases when these improperly 
directed activities fell short in their intended execution, he suggested they should be 
considered as ‘ridiculous’ from not only unfavourable public reactions but also because 
of its destructive effects on benevolence in society.      
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Not Quite Immoral: Stewart on the ‘sense of the ridiculous’ 
In the congress of ‘polite’ interactions, unsuccessful attempts at refined manners 
or social awkwardness occurred frequently enough to merit space in Stewart’s system. 
For Stewart, the exercise of the principle of ‘sensing ridiculous behaviour’ assisted in 
identifying social and moral shortcomings. As a lesser degree of immorality or 
impropriety in particular social situations, Stewart remarked ‘that nothing is ridiculous 
but what falls short, some way or other, of our ideas of excellence’.57 Contrary to 
subjective notions of ‘polite’ manners that fluctuated with passing fashions, Stewart’s 
idea of intellectual and moral excellence was timeless in referring to the perfection of the 
mind where agents possessed cultivated ‘moral and intellectual characters’. Yet 
ridiculous behaviour enveloped both failures in ‘moral character’ and ‘polite’ manners. 
He taught that ‘the natural and proper object of Ridicule, is those smaller improprieties in 
character and manners which do not rouse our feeling of moral indignation, nor impress 
us with a melancholy view of human depravity’.58 Ridiculous behaviour was offensive to 
virtue insofar as it distracted and, in certain circumstances, derailed pursuits of virtuous 
sociability. For example, the spectacles of inappropriate manners or inebriation created 
scenes of ‘ridiculousness’ rendering virtuous sociability impossible for those unprepared 
to properly respond to such displays.  
From its potential to entertain, Stewart suggested that ridiculous behaviour should 
be observed with extra caution for as he noted this principle often detracted from the 
pursuit of virtue as well as its potential to corrupt. Despite these possible consequences, 
ridiculous acts served enlightened educated men as examples of how not to behave. 
According to Stewart, ‘while this part of our constitution enlarges the fund of our 
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enjoyment, by rendering the more trifling imperfections of our fellow-creatures a source 
of amusement to their neighbors, it excites the exertions of every individual to correct 
those imperfections by which the ridicule of others is likely to be provoked’.59 Although 
receiving enjoyment from ridiculous acts at the expense of others was vicious, sensing 
the erroneous purpose behind ridiculous behaviour and the disposition of the actor 
revealed possible deficient areas in ‘character’ that the observer could correct in his or 
her behaviour through introspective reflection and future sociable interactions. This 
corrective process was not merely a means to avoid ridiculous behaviour. It reaffirmed 
the agents’ duty to furnish examples of virtuous sociability as a way to improve the moral 
experience of others. Sensing ridiculous conduct, therefore, strengthened an agent’s 
instinctive obligation to the moral improvement of his neighbors that derived from the 
‘moral faculty’. 
Meanwhile, the ‘sense of the ridiculous’ shed light on the follies of an improperly 
regulated education. Yet interpreting proper responses to ridiculous behaviour was 
complicated by the diverse ways in which it appeared. In more pernicious forms, 
ridiculous behaviour did not incite amusement but rather deceived the public. For 
Stewart, the concealment of intellectual and ethical deficiencies with veils of affection, 
hypocrisy, vanity, and pride were particularly contemptible. According to Stewart, those 
born into privilege were ‘liable to be perverted by education and fashion’ and knew how 
to mask their ethical and intellectual shortcomings.60 This too had a bearing on Stewart’s 
on-going tension with the counter-Enlightenment policies. For instance, Stewart’s 
warning against imbalances of power reflected his Whiggish disdain for Henry Dundas 
and underpinned his interests in public welfare by ridiculing what he saw as contrary 
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conservative policies. In doing so, Stewart certainly targeted the Scottish Sedition Trials 
in claiming that ‘the legislator has it more in his power to influence national manners, 
than by watching over those public exhibitions which avail themselves of this principle of 
human nature’.61 Counter-Enlightenment policies could be seen as ‘ridiculous’ insofar as 
they proposed to protect British liberties by suspending the primary source of those 
liberties, namely Habeas Corpus and relatively free expression. Furthermore, Stewart 
argued that properly educated agents recognised these counter-Enlightenment policies as 
conflicting to the universal ‘moral laws’ and the branches of duty. He suggested: 
This is surely the language of nature; and which could not fail to occur to every man 
capable of serious thought, were not the understanding and the moral feelings in 
some instances miserably perverted by religious and political prejudices, and in 
others by the false refinements of metaphysical theories.62 
 
While the principles of ‘a regard to character’ and ‘sensing ridiculous behaviour’ 
improved the development of moral judgments whilst supporting the exercise of the 
‘moral faculty’, Stewart’s belief in humanity’s natural inclination toward benevolence 
was best shown in treating the principle of ‘sympathy’. 
 
‘Grafted on Benevolence’: Stewart on ‘sympathy’    
 The philosophical theme of ‘sympathy’ attracted a range of opinions amongst 
eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers. Often overlapping with modern notions of 
empathy, a comprehensive analysis of discussions of ‘sympathy’ would far exceed the 
scope of this chapter; a brief review of how earlier Scottish theorists treated this theme, 
however, will help to clarify this part of Stewart’s thought and its place in his system of 
moral education. Given its prominence in seminal Scottish philosophical works, 
Stewart’s treatment of ‘sympathy’ as an ‘auxiliary principle of the moral faculty’ must be 
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examined in relation to the earlier writings of David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas 
Reid.63 As Knud Haakonssen has shown, ‘Hume had begun and Smith continued the 
speculation that the only basis in human nature for moral judgements is provided by a set 
of simple emotional responses in others through sympathy’.64 For Hume and Smith, the 
shared moral judgments among a collective group that consisted of acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour explained how individuals practised virtues from affections and, 
at the same time, offered a reason for the formation of societies. As an ‘impartial 
observer’ of human nature and historian, Smith suggested that moralists could trace this 
development over time through the stages of societal development.65 Similar to Hume’s 
notion that ‘sympathy’ functioned as communication between agents, Smith added that 
agents could imagine passions that were not observed or present in another agent.66 The 
operation of imagining how an unobserved agent would feel in a particular situation and 
the fact that agents found virtue pleasurable because of its utility marked a key difference 
between Smith and Hume. Smith wrote that in judging others ‘our sentiments of this kind 
have always some secret reference either to what are, or to what we imagine ought to be 
the sentiments of others [and] we examine it as we imagine an impartial spectator would 
examine it’.67 Alexander Broadie has shown that Thomas Reid criticised Smith’s moral 
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theory as ‘selfish’ for his belief that the ‘impartial spectator’ imagined how he or she 
would feel in an imagined situation rather than how the observed agent felt.68 Contrary to 
Smith, Reid remarked that ‘it appears to be impossible that there can be sympathy 
without benevolent affection’.69 For Reid, considering the feelings of those where 
benevolent affections were not present involved pity not ‘sympathy’. Like Smith’s 
previous expansion of Hume’s treatment of ‘sympathy’, Stewart’s writings built upon 
Reid’s earlier ideas with interesting adaptations. Whilst Stewart and Reid agreed that the 
origin of applied ethics derived from the ‘moral faculty’, Stewart expanded upon this 
concept by saying that ‘sympathy’ as an ‘auxiliary principle’ strengthened benevolent 
attachments and improved moral judgments. Reid did not, however, provide an in-depth 
explanation of how ‘sympathy’ as a ‘moral power of the mind’ functioned in this way. 
Stewart filled this gap in Reid’s applied ethics. In addition to ‘obtaining a fair and just 
view of the circumstances’, Stewart believed ‘there is an exquisite pleasure annexed to 
the sympathy or fellow-feeling of other men, with our joys and sorrows, and even with 
our opinions, tastes and humours, is a fact obvious to vulgar observation’.70 His 
encouragement of these natural bonds within society also included other exercises that he 
believed improved ‘national character’ and ‘moral character’. This too appealed to Reid’s 
earlier thought.   
  Similar to Reid’s style of vindicating his ideas through ridiculing theorists 
associated with the ‘Ideal Theory’, Stewart advanced his ideas on ‘sympathy’ against 
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Smith’s treatment of moral sentiments.71 In doing so, Stewart identified two areas of 
Smith’s moral thought as particularly problematic: the concept that ‘sympathy’ was the 
origin of moral sentiments and the extent of its practise in sociable interactions. 
According to Stewart, ‘it may be objected to Mr. Smith’s theory, that it confounds the 
means or expedients by which nature enables us to correct our moral judgements, with the 
principles in our constitution to which our moral judgements owe their origin’.72 Despite 
praising Smith’s attempt to shed new light on applied ethics in ‘real life’ situations, 
Stewart sought to correct Smith’s supposed errors without sacrificing the practical 
application of this science in social and pedagogical contexts.  
 In treating the origin of ethics, Smith reduced perceived sources of moral 
sentiments to the effects of direct and indirect sympathy. While ‘direct sympathy’ 
connected agents with the ‘affections and motives of the person who acts’, ‘indirect 
sympathy’ determined if the reception of a particular action had merit.73 The agents’ 
observation of this cause and effect relationship in human interactions as an ‘impartial 
spectator’ influenced how they determined the ‘propriety of conduct’. This process, 
therefore, depended upon social interactions, a regard to public opinion, and a prudent 
regard to self-interest. The activity of observing useful virtues in others (i.e. qualities that 
excite pleasure) and then applying those qualities in future actions from the self-interest 
of social or moral advancement resonated with the ‘polite’ culture’s interest in self-
improvement. Contrary to Smith, Stewart argued that ‘the necessity of social intercourse 
as an indispensable condition implied in the generation and growth of our moral 
sentiments, does not arise merely from its effect in holding up a mirror for the 
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examination of our own character; but from the impossibility of finding, in a solitary 
state, any field for the exercise of our most important moral duties’.74 For Stewart, moral 
conduct stemmed from the ‘moral faculty’, which was improved through social 
exchanges, rather than the product of a prudent regard to observed acts. This fundamental 
difference between Smith’s and Stewart’s moral philosophy did not exist in the abstract 
but affected how applied ethics were used in ‘real life’ situations.  
 Stewart suggested that Smith’s ‘obscure’ reduction of all moral perceptions under 
‘sympathy’ failed to account for moral obligations when it did not immediately benefit 
agents to act morally.75 For Stewart, Smith’s theory neglected the branches of duty that 
‘recurs on us constantly in all our ethical disquisitions, as an ultimate fact in the nature of 
man’.76 Furthermore, self-interested actions that benefited others were a by-product of the 
agent’s intentions of self-improvement and Smith did not fully explain how agents should 
act when self-interest and the interests of others conflict. For example, if an agent was 
presented with the opportunity to advance in society but this advancement came at the 
expense of denying others the same opportunity does the agent proceed with this 
exclusive privilege or forfeit this opportunity from a moral obligation to others. In 
addressing this question, Stewart remarked:  
From recollecting my own judgments in similar cases in which I was concerned, I 
infer in what light my conduct will appear to society; that there is an exquisite 
satisfaction annexed to mutual sympathy; and that, in order to obtain this 
satisfaction, I accommodate my conduct, not to my own feelings, but to those of 
my fellow creatures’.77  
 
‘Mutual sympathy’ therefore depended upon agents giving priority to the feelings of 
others. The exercise of ‘sympathy’ and its reciprocation from others, in turn, influenced 
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the development of both ‘moral character’ and ‘national character’. While Stewart 
believed that ‘man’s assuming the appearance of virtue [formed] the real foundation of 
the rules of good breeding in polished society’, he taught that humankind was created for 
something more substantial through imposed duties that fulfilled God’s design.78 In 
explaining how this principle functioned in practise, Stewart wrote: 
For when I have once satisfied myself with respect to the conduct which an impartial 
judge would approve of, I feel that this conduct is right for me, and that I am under a 
moral obligation to put it in practice. If I had had recourse to no expedient for 
correcting my first judgment, I would, nevertheless, have formed some judgment or 
other of a particular conduct as right, wrong, or indifferent, and the only difference 
would have been, that I should probably have decided improperly, from an erroneous 
or partial view of the case.79  
  
Supported by moral obligations to God, others, and themselves, agents required 
knowledge of how others felt and how particular situations affected their conduct in order 
to develop virtuous sociability. Similar to Reid, Stewart taught that the power to 
‘sympathise’ with others was strengthened through strong affections; he did not, 
however, suggest that benevolent affections among agents were necessary for the practise 
of ‘sympathy’. In doing so, Stewart encouraged the ethical conduct amongst the wider 
public not merely between loved ones. Thus, the application of Stewart’s system involved 
a grander stage than Reid had envisioned. This slight divergence between Reid and 
Stewart in treating ‘affections’ as the ‘beauty of virtue’ had a part in Stewart’s discussion 
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Discovering Moral Qualities in ‘Polite’ Culture: Stewart on ‘moral taste’ 
 Few philosophical themes captured ‘polite’ interests more than concepts of 
‘taste’.80 On this theme, Stewart praised Archibald Alison’s Essays on the Nature and 
Principles of Taste (1790), which appeared in four editions by 1815, for its ‘ingenuity 
and elegance’.81 While Stewart was satisfied with Alison’s treatment and, therefore, 
refrained from its discussion in his Elements, he returned to the subject in 1810 after 
retiring from teaching. In the third and fourth essays of his Philosophical Essays (1810), 
Stewart examined the nature, development and improvement of ‘taste’.82 Stewart wrote: 
  That Taste is not a simple and original faculty, but a power gradually formed by 
experience and observation. It implies, indeed, as its ground-work, a certain degree 
of natural sensibility; but it implies also the exercise of the judgement; and is the 
slow result of an attentive examination and comparison of the agreeable or 
disagreeable effects produced on the mind by external objects.83 
 
Moreover, ‘taste’ and corresponding notions of ‘arbitrary beauty’ were formed through 
associations of ideas: ‘classical associations’, ‘national or local associations’, and 
‘personal associations’.84 For Stewart, ‘Classical associations’ developed from ‘a 
learned education’ of Greek and Roman poetry and sculptures.85 Stewart cautioned that 
‘it must not, however, be imagined, that, in any instance, they furnish us with principles 
from which there lies no appeal; nor should it be forgotten, that their influence does not 
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reach to the most numerous class of the people’.86 Since at that time the diffusion of a 
‘classical’ education was not standard in Parish school curriculum whilst its practise in 
Scottish public schools depended upon respective teachers, Stewart stipulated the social 
limitations of this association.87 In contrast, ‘National associations’ of beauty ‘exert 
over the heart a power greater, perhaps, than that of any other associations whatsoever’ 
due to its availability across social ranks.88 These parochial associations of ‘beauty’ 
contributed to the rise of ‘instinctive patriotism’. Despite not being an original principle, 
‘instinctive patriotism’ and ‘national associations’ shaped the formation of early habits 
and judgments of ‘beauty’. Similar to ‘national associations’, ‘personal associations’ 
developed from early experiences most often from distinct perceptions of natural beauty 
from childhood surroundings. Stewart wrote that these associations formed ‘from the 
peculiarities in the features of those whom we have loved; and other circumstances 
connected with our own individual feelings’.89 As Stewart warned, early habits rarely 
exercised the innate faculties of the mind to their proper purposes. For example, Stewart 
suggested that agents who did not guard against prejudicial judgments of ‘beauty’ 
concerning belongings or property were more susceptible to misjudging the ‘beauty’ or 
imperfections of their neighbour’s property or of foreign national cultures. This too 
implied the social need to cultivate the instinctive branches of duty. While ‘taste’ was 
‘alive only to such impressions as fashion recognises and sanctions’, Stewart taught that 
God created humankind’s moral powers for a higher purpose.90  
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 Stewart, therefore, identified a categorical difference between ‘polite’ concepts of 
‘taste’ and the moral qualities sensed from ‘moral taste’.91 The latter had an important 
place in Stewart’s system of moral education. Distinct from ‘taste’, the principle of 
‘moral taste’ sensed ‘moral beauty’ in nature, manners, and in creations of the fine arts. 
He wrote:  
Considered as a principle of action, a cultivated moral taste, while it provides an 
effectual security against the grossness necessarily connected with many vices, 
cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is amiable, or generous, or elevated in 
our nature…when separated, however, as it sometimes is, from a strong sense of 
duty, it can scarcely fail to prove a fallacious guide; the influence of fashion, and of 
other casual associations, tending perpetually to lead it astray.92  
 
Like the other ‘auxiliary principles’, ‘moral taste’ required ‘much exercise for its 
development and culture’, however, its refinement faced obstacles of exaggerated 
imaginations of ‘beauty’ and ‘moral beauty’.93 Consequently, false ideals of ‘moral 
beauty’ threatened the exercise of ‘moral taste’ with unachievable standards.94 This 
dissatisfaction could result in agents removing themselves from active pursuits in public 
life and thereby withdrawing useful talents that would benefit society.95 On this 
consequence, Stewart wrote: 
The great nurse and cherisher of this species of misanthropy is solitary 
contemplation; and the only effectual remedy is society and business, together with a 
habit of directing the attention rather to the correction of our own faults than to a 
jealous and suspicious examination of the motives which influence the conduct of 
our neighbours’.96  
 
The exercise of ‘moral taste’ therefore required social intercourse with a realistic 
perception of human nature and ‘moral beauty’. Yet this practise in the public sphere did 
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not follow Hutcheson’s and Shaftesbury’s earlier treatment of aesthetics that, in different 
ways, understood concepts of ‘right and wrong’ as a sense of the beautiful.97 For Stewart, 
these theorists conflated the proper functions of the ‘moral faculty’ and consequently 
rendered audiences vulnerable to the false perceptions of ‘moral beauty’ in ‘polite’ 
productions. For example, ‘polite’ rules for judging refined ‘taste’ were often compatible 
with virtue, however, ‘moral beauty’ was encountered differently than those forms of 
beauty commonly produced by ‘polite’ activities.  A refined ‘moral taste’ sensed 
excellence of ‘moral character’ and the fulfillment of moral duties by agents who 
exercised virtuous sociability. Thus, Stewart’s teaching of ‘moral taste’ required exercise 
in ‘real life’ governed by the ‘fixed principles’ of his programme of moral education. In 
teaching how to exercise the ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’, Stewart showed 
how applied ethics, drawn from natural religion and metaphysics, encouraged universal 
benevolence and informed modernity. This practical process of developing virtuous 
habits in Scottish ‘polite’ society testified to the utility of his programme of moral 
education and its role in the public domain.  
 
Conclusion 
In concluding his final lecture of 1802, Stewart remarked that ‘I shall look back to 
this time with satisfaction, in having discharged a duty of as great importance to the 
public, as most men in a private station can be called on to fulfil [sic]’.98 Amidst powerful 
counter-Enlightenment interests between 1790 and 1805, Dugald Stewart’s programme of 
moral education sought to revive the ‘Moderate’ Scottish Enlightenment through the 
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diffusing applied ethics as a way to inform modernity. In advancing this objective, 
Stewart appealed to earlier ‘Moderate’ values of free expression, promotion of 
Enlightenment science, and embrace of Scottish ‘polite’ culture. Contrary to ‘polite’ rules 
of conduct that largely entailed constructed notions of fashionable manners, Stewart 
taught that humankind was instinctively ethical and inclined toward universal 
benevolence. The realisation of this natural ideal required the guidance of a properly 
regulated education that instructed us how to exercise the faculties and operations of the 
mind. Of these faculties, the ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’ assisted the 
cultivation of ethical dispositions in unique ways. As active and moral powers of the 
mind, the principles of ‘a regard to character’, ‘sense of the ridiculous’, ‘sympathy’, and 
‘moral taste’ were highly useful in the ‘real life’ situations of Scottish ‘polite’ culture. 
According to Stewart, ‘where they all maintain their due place, in subordination to the 
moral faculty, they tend at once to fortify virtuous habits, and to recommend them, by the 
influence of amiable example, to the imitation of others’.99 Whilst practical for securing 
refined manners in ‘polite’ society, the ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’ 
strengthened attachments to the branches of moral duty as a central purpose of his 
system. Through reinforcing humanity’s obligations to God, others, and themselves, 
Stewart sought to encourage the practise of universal benevolence at a time when the 
counter-Enlightenment policies bred ‘instinctive patriotism’, censorship of the public 
sphere, and prejudices toward the science of the mind.    
 The counter-Enlightenment policies of the 1790s led to a campaign to remove 
secularism in the Faculty of Arts at Edinburgh University. Of the groups associated with 
the counter-Enlightenment, the new leadership of the so-called Moderate party in the 
Church of Scotland believed impressionable young men required the guidance of 
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enlightened ministers. In league with this belief, they opposed professors who were seen 
as corrupting Christian principles and thus endangering the moral development of future 
generations. The tensions between late eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment moral 
philosophy and counter-Enlightenment censorship policies since the early 1790s unfolded 
in the context of 1805 John Leslie case. The following chapter will examine how this 
episode exemplified Stewart’s campaign against counter-Enlightenment interests and his 
efforts to secure a place for his modern version of the Scottish Enlightenment that 









  In the first decade of the nineteenth century the persistence of counter-
Enlightenment policies did not prevent Dugald Stewart’s programme of moral education 
from flourishing through the success of his students. ‘His disciples’, as James Mackintosh 
commented, ‘he lived to see among the lights and ornaments of the Council and the 
Senate; and without derogation from his writings it may be said, that his disciples were 
among his best works’.1 Thomas Brown, Sydney Smith, Francis Horner, Thomas Carlyle, 
Henry Brougham, and Henry Cockburn amongst others demonstrated their unwavering 
support and application of his moral thought by advancing its ideals in the influential 
Edinburgh Review. As Biancamaria Fontana has shown, ‘the reviewers thought, with 
Stewart, that all scientific disciplines ultimately had their foundation in the philosophy of 
the mind’.2 Contributors to the Edinburgh Review (established in 1802) revitalised the 
‘Moderate’ values of the Scottish literati whose papers appeared in the journal’s 
namesake in 1755. These emerging leaders of the Scottish Whig party, like their 
predecessors in the earlier Review, promoted ‘Moderate’ values such as tolerance for 
controversial scientific, literary, and philosophic innovations. At the heart of the 
magazine’s diverse essays was the realisation of Stewart’s educational system that 
groomed virtuous citizens who in turn would gradually elevate the moral and intellectual 
standards of their community. In league with the broader ambitions of Stewart’s 
programme, the Edinburgh Review supported his campaign against counter-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Quoted in Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, edited by William Hamilton, (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1877), ix. 
 
2 Biancamaria Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-
1832, (CUP, 1985), 96. In addition, Gordon Macintyre has shown that ‘Stewart’s reputation as a 
teacher also survived for many years [and] as late as 1872 the Edinburgh Review claimed that “as a 
public lecturer he was, and has remained, without a rival”’ (Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 243). 
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Enlightenment policies as they encroached upon practises of ‘Moderatism’ at Edinburgh 
University.       
 The new Moderate party of the Church of Scotland (led by George Hill) 
jeopardised the continuation of Stewart’s system of moral education and secularism in the 
Faculty of Arts at Edinburgh University by conspiring to monopolise those chairs and 
censor theories, which they believed encouraged dangerous philosophical scepticism and 
irreligion. In an 1806 issue of the Edinburgh Review, Francis Horner wrote: 
For some years past, it has been perfectly well known, to those who take an 
interest in the prosperity of our University, that certain Ministers of Edinburgh 
entertained a systematic design of distributing as many of the Professorships as 
possible among themselves; and that, besides the professional chairs [and] 
Theology, those of several profane sciences were allotted as very convenient 
appendages to the benefices of the city.3  
 
While plural appointments within the Kirk and the Faculty of Divinity existed without 
opposition, the clergymen of Edinburgh sought to expand their influence beyond divinity 
studies.4 By demanding that their candidate for a chair must retain his ministerial office if 
elected, the so-called “Moderates” ensured their ecclesiastical interests and theological 
views would be represented in the University curriculum and in determining University 
affairs as members of the Senatus Academicus. On this practise, Stewart wrote ‘that our 
Theological Professorships should be held by Ministers of Edinburgh, has been always 
my opinion and my wish…but in no other case whatever, am I able to conceive an 
argument which can be urged in favour of such a measure’.5 Contrary to Stewart’s 
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3 Francis Horner, ‘A Review of Dugald Stewart’s A Short Statement of Some Important Facts’, in The 
Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal, vol. VII, (Edinburgh, 1806): 113. 
 
4 As Stewart’s contemporary, Andrew Dalzel, then professor of Greek, illustrated in writing the history 
of Edinburgh University that professorial and ecclesiastical pluralism was an established practise in the 
Faculty of Divinity (Andrew Dalzel, History of the University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Edmonston 
and Douglas, 1862), 334-335).  
 
5 Stewart to William Fettes, Lord Provost 12 February 1805, in Dugald Stewart, A Short Statement of 
Some Important Facts, Relative to the Late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the University of 
Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Creech and Archibald Constable & Co., 1805), 9. John Playfair expressed a 
similar opinion to the Lord Provost in claiming that if the practise of pluralism was permitted in the 
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opinion on the extent of pluralism, the clergymen of Edinburgh exercised this practise in 
their 1805 endorsement of Thomas McKnight’s candidacy for the Chair of Mathematics 
at Edinburgh University.  
 The circumstances of the chair canvass turned controversial when Edinburgh 
clergymen attacked John Leslie, a well-respected mathematician and natural philosopher 
with no affiliation to the Church of Scotland, for his questionable religious convictions. 
They were offended by Leslie’s Whiggish ideas of liberal scientific progress and 
promotion of Humean thought expressed in Note Sixteen attached to his Inquiry into the 
Nature and Propagation of Heat (1804).6 The clergymen of Edinburgh, therefore, 
attempted to secure McKnight’s appointment by tarnishing Leslie’s academic reputation 
and circulating their concerns regarding his character and religious principles. As J.B. 
Morrell has shown, the so-called ‘Hill junto’, led by George Hill at St Andrews 
University had previously obstructed Leslie’s earlier ambitions for professorships on 
similar grounds.7 The 1805 philosophical debate over ‘causation’, which stemmed from 
Leslie’s praise of Hume, furnished the new Moderates with what they saw as evidence of 
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Faculty of Arts ‘the competition for vacancies in the University would thus be greatly narrowed; and 
instead of extending, as it does at present, to all the men of letters in the kingdom, would be in effect 
confined to the Ministers of Edinburgh’ (John Playfair to William Fettes, Lord Provost of Edinburgh 
on 23 February 1805, in Stewart, A Short Statement, 22). Playfair’s criticism of pluralism, in particular, 
stirred a backlash from Scottish ministers.  For example, Thomas Chalmers, before receiving fame as a 
Church reformer and philosopher, criticised Playfair’s remarks on pluralism in his first publication 
Observations on a Passage in Mr. Playfair’s Letter to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, relative to the 
Mathematical Pretentions of the Scottish Clergy, (Cuper-Fife: R. Tullis, 1805). Chalmers privately 
revealed to his brother John that this work came in an attempt to ‘enliven [his] situation a little by other 
employments’, which partly explained why he did not slavishly adhere to these views in his later work 
(Thomas Chalmers to John Chalmers on 3 September 1805, in Memoirs of Thomas Chalmers, D.D 
LL.D, edited by William Hanna, vol. one, (Edinburgh: Constable, 1854), 65). Unlike many of his 
students, Chalmers did not hold Stewart’s moral philosophy in a high regard. He remarked that ‘[h]is 
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6 Drummond and Bulloch suggest that ‘Leslie’s qualifications were higher than those of McKnight, but 
he was regarded as a Whig’ (Andrew Drummond and James Bulloch, The Scottish Church, 1688-1843: 
The Age of the Moderates, (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1973), 155). 
 
7 J.B. Morrell, ‘The Leslie affair: careers, kirk and politics in Edinburgh in 1805’, Scottish Historical 
Review, 54:1, (1975): 68-71. 
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Leslie’s philosophical scepticism. But, as Ian Clark argues, ‘what was really at stake was 
“moderatism” as a theological and ecclesiological system’.8 John Burke and John Wright 
have discussed the philosophical debate over ‘causation’.9 Stewart’s central role in these 
controversies, however, has yet to be fully explored. This chapter will examine Stewart’s 
opposition to counter-Enlightenment censorship policies in the context of his defence of 
Leslie and his system of moral education.   
The 1805 Leslie affair was inextricably linked with earlier conservative policies in 
the 1790s and as such should not be treated as an isolated episode. Stewart and his former 
students recognised that if they permitted the Moderates to manipulate this election to a 
chair as they had in past competitions the new Moderates would undermine secularism in 
the Faculty of Arts at Edinburgh University. For this reason, Stewart argued that 
‘interests of a higher nature than those of any individual were now at stake’.10 The 
elections at St Andrews University during the 1790s exemplified the political nature of 
“Moderate” candidates. As shown in chapter one, George Hill, who emerged as the leader 
of the Moderate party in the early 1790s, followed the conservative policies of his chief 
patron, Henry Dundas.11 Considering that Hill’s Moderates criticised Leslie for a central 
theory that Stewart had publically endorsed, he believed his system of moral education 
was under attack too. He remarked that ‘insult after insult had been offered to the 
University…concerning the foundations of those essential principles which it is my 
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professional duty to illustrate, and which it has been the great object of my life to 
defend’.12 If the Moderates acquired the majority of University professorships, Stewart 
believed they would overturn the intellectual environment that Principal William 
Robertson had laboured to establish between 1762 and 1793. In opposition to the 
Moderates’ campaign, Stewart rallied his former students to join him in defending 
secularism of the arts at Edinburgh University. According to Stewart, ‘the ruin of the 
University was threatened by the measures which were avowedly in contemplation 
among a party of the Edinburgh clergy…I enjoy the comfort in reflecting that I did all in 
my power to avert them’.13 In doing so, Stewart’s defence of Leslie embodied his broader 
support for his system of moral education as a way to sustain the Scottish Enlightenment 
and his pedagogical commitment to developing a benevolent society. Furthermore, his 
treatment of ‘causation’ (which the Moderates opposed) appealed to Reidian philosophy 
amongst other Scottish philosophers in an effort to justify the social necessity of properly 
understanding the science of the mind. Evidence in support of this argument will be 
shown in three sections: the new Moderates’ ambitions to seize more influence within 
Edinburgh University through plural appointments; Stewart’s defence of his system of 
moral education and his treatment of ‘causation’; and finally, Leslie’s trial in the General 
Assembly. My discussion of Stewart’s prominent role in the Leslie affair builds upon the 
scholarship of Ian Clark, John Burke, J.B. Morrell, and John Wright by arguing that in 
addition to philosophical, ecclesiastical, theological and political interests the fate of 




12 Stewart, A Short Statement, 97. 
 
13 Ibid., 7.  
 
14 For an overview of these earlier works on the Leslie case see the introduction, fn76. 
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A Moderate Campaign for Dominance in the Faculty of Arts 
 The death of John Robison, professor of natural philosophy at Edinburgh 
University (1773-1805), on 30th January 1805, provided the professor of mathematics 
John Playfair with an opportunity to fill the vacant chair. The Lord Provost, with the 
approval of the Town Council and Edinburgh Magistrates, wasted little time offering 
Playfair the Chair of Natural Philosophy on 6th February.15 Thus, Playfair’s former 
professorship, held jointly with Adam Ferguson, became available for election.16 Henry 
Cockburn believed that ‘the Moderate clergy, who had long encouraged pluralities and 
wished to multiply clerical professorships, allotted the place to one of themselves’.17 
Thomas McKnight, a former assistant of John Robison and a Moderate minister at Trinity 
Church in South Leith, was the first candidate to enter the chair canvass two days after 
Playfair’s new appointment.  
 The Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh, led by John Inglis, James Finlayson, 
David Ritchie, and Henry Grieve, supported McKnight’s candidacy on the condition that, 
if elected, he retain his clerical charge in South Leith.18 Roger Emerson suggested that 
such an election ‘would benefit his political friends and was quite in keeping with 
Moderate views on pluralism, but it was greedy and showed a willingness to monopolise 
power’.19 McKnight recognised that his candidacy would benefit from the endorsement 
of Dugald Stewart and John Playfair, who had both formerly held the desired chair. This 
proved a difficult obstacle, however, since McKnight maintained connections with 
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Andrews Universities, (EUP, 2007), 331. 
 
Chapter Three  ,-'!
Scottish conservatives—particularly those in the Dundas interest—while Stewart and 
Playfair were well-known Foxite Whigs.20  
 Upon learning that McKnight sought to retain his ministerial office as an absolute 
condition of his candidacy, Stewart and Playfair warned the Lord Provost, Sir William 
Fettes, of this perceived conflict of interests.21 Stewart noted that if the Moderates 
succeeded, it would result in ‘the ruin of an establishment from which this city has 
derived, for more than two centuries, much solid emolument, as well as literary 
distinction’.22 Although Stewart and Playfair assured the Lord Provost that they did not 
currently support another candidate, they both undoubtedly had in mind John Leslie 
whom they had endorsed in his previous four attempts at a university chair.23 The Lord 
Provost heeded their complaints and extended the chair canvass to other potential 
candidates. John Leslie, at the age of thirty-nine, entered the competition as an 
established scientist. With the patronage of Thomas Wedgwood, Leslie had published six 
papers and a book concerning the nature of heat. These received international attention 
and his Inquiry (1804) was awarded the 1804 Royal Society of London’s Count Rumford 
prize for scientific achievement.24 As an Edinburgh divinity student in 1787, Leslie 
attended Stewart’s lectures on moral philosophy and impressed Stewart with his scientific 
curiosity and intellectual aptitude.25  
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23 Morrell, ‘The Leslie affair,’ 80; Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 126.  
 
24 Stewart, A Short Statement, 27; Morrell, ‘The Leslie affair’, 72-73; Macintyre, Dugald Stewart, 126.  
 
25 During his studies at Edinburgh, Leslie’s excellence in natural science motivated his shift from 
divinity studies to natural philosophy. Stewart later remarked that ‘Leslie received numerous letters 
promoting his intelligence and character from the leaders in academia and the intellectual world of 
letters [such as] Sir Joseph Banks, Dr. Maskelyne, Astronomer Royal; Dr. Hutton, Professor of 
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 John Leslie’s prestigious Rumford prize and his support from esteemed men of 
letters made him the obvious choice for the chair since McKnight lacked an international 
reputation as a scientist. Despite their glaring differences in qualifications, the Moderates 
did not admit defeat. They circulated rumours and hinted at concerns regarding Leslie’s 
religious principles.26 For instance, James Finlayson’s Fast Day Sermon on 20th February 
questioned if a scholar of uncertain religious convictions should hold an office that 
allowed him to influence young men. As a minister at St. Giles and professor of logic at 
Edinburgh University, Finlayson exemplified the Moderates’ model for pluralism, which 
would, in their opinion, safeguard impressionable young men from sceptical theories by 
entrusting their education to enlightened ministers.27 On behalf of the Edinburgh 
ministers, John Inglis remarked that ‘the education of youth, if not universally in the 
hands of the Clergy, has been universally placed under their superintendency’.28 He 
furthered this point by asking: ‘Whether it be safe and prudent, in times like the present, 
to deprive Religion of this security, by the adoption of a system which shall, in any 
measure, exclude its Ministers from that share in the education of youth?’29 The 
Moderates therefore justified the necessity of pluralism as a perceived civic duty to 
protect the survival of religion and safeguard the moral development of young men. On 
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Mathematics in the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich; late Professor Robison of Edinburgh; Mr. 
Baron Maseres, a man known in the Republic of Letters, for more than half a century. Furthermore, 
Leslie received references from his circle of friends who included; Sir William Erskine of Torry, 
Baronet, Mr. Dempster of Dunichen, Mr. Josias and Mr. Thomas Wedgewood, Dr. Hunter of St. 
Andrew’s, and Mr. Playfair of Edinburgh’ (Stewart, A Short Statement, 27-30). 
 
26 Stewart, A Short Statement, 28-39; Morrell, ‘The Leslie affair’, 76; Emerson, Academic Patronage, 
331; Clark, ‘The Leslie Controversy’, 180.    
 
27 As a previous student of Finlayson’s Lectures on Logic, Henry Cockburn characterised him as ‘a 
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black, piercing, Jesuitical eyes’ (Cockburn, Memorials, 27).  
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Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Peter Hill, 1805), 52.  
 
29 Ibid., 53-4.  
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the other hand, Stewart interpreted the Moderates’ attack against Leslie and secular 
education as an underhanded tactic to acquire more influence within Edinburgh 
University. He remarked:  
When the Clergy of Edinburgh, by aspiring at every University office which 
becomes vacant beyond the circles of Medicine and of Law, [opposed] the 
pretensions of whatever lay candidates shall presume to interfere with the monopoly 
at which they are aiming [and] no better illustration of this remark can ever occur, 
than what has actually happened in the case of Mr. Leslie.30  
 
The Moderate party owed their previous success in securing plural appointments, 
particularly at St Andrews University, to the influence of Henry Dundas.31 Dundas, 
however, did not impose his influence on the election as he had in past competitions. The 
fatigue from years in the political sphere, the heightened hostilities with Napoleonic 
France, and an impending impeachment rendered Dundas detached from the Leslie 
affair.32 Furthermore, he personally reassured Leslie that this election would be decided 
on scholarly merit not political strength.33 Without the political guidance and support 
from Dundas, the Presbytery of Edinburgh and the Moderate party could not avoid the 
forthcoming conflict.34  
 
A Cause for Controversy: Stewart on the theme of ‘causation’ 
 Several days before the Town Council’s potential election of Leslie, the 
clergymen of Edinburgh discovered Leslie’s Note Sixteen attached to his book on heat, 
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‘which, it was said, involved all the Atheistical principles of Mr Hume’s philosophy’.35 In 
his Note, Leslie remarked that ‘Mr. Hume is the first, as far as I know, who has treated of 
causation in a truly philosophic manner [and] his Essay on Necessary Connexion seems a 
model of clear and accurate reasoning’.36 This opportune find appeared suspicious 
considering no one had mentioned the Note the previous year during its circulation or 
during its examination by the Royal Society of London. After hearing that Leslie’s Note 
harboured atheistic principles, Stewart commented:  
I accordingly sent for the book, which till then I had never opened, and was not a 
little astonished, when I found that the passage objected to contained nothing 
(nothing at least connected with the alleged charge) but what I myself, and many 
others much better and wiser than me, had openly avowed as our opinions.37 
  
Although Leslie’s unguarded praise of Hume might suggest his alignment with Humean 
philosophy, Stewart appealed to Reid’s philosophy in assessing Leslie’s implied 
distinction between Hume’s treatment of physics and metaphysics. In the science of the 
mind, Hume believed that impressions of human nature from innate senses and reflexes, 
in most cases, preceded their corresponding ideas. By denying that neither reasoning nor 
experience provided conclusive evidence of a supreme design, Hume rejected the idea 
that efficient causes could be traced from their perceived effects. Thus, Hume rejected 
that intuitive notions offered evidence for inferences on efficient causes. Since orthodox 
Calvinists attributed God with efficient causal power in all earthly effects, Hume’s 
philosophy was widely regarded as sceptical and challenging to revealed and natural 
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religion. As previously discussed, Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
Principles of Common Sense (1764) challenged the foundation of modern scepticism, 
with particular attention to Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), and 
provided a ‘realist’ alternative in Common Sense philosophy that drew from the thought 
of Francis Bacon, Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, and George Turnbull amongst 
others.38 Reid’s opposition to Hume’s mitigated scepticism, however, did not include his 
treatment of the necessary sequential conjunctions in nature. According to Hume, ‘if 
there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, ‘tis that of 
cause and effect’.39 Reid noted that Hume ‘seems to me to reason justly from his 
definition of a cause, when he maintains, that anything may be the cause of anything; 
since priority and constant conjunction is all that can be conceived in the notion of a 
cause’.40 While both men agreed on the existence of necessary conjunctions of causes and 
effects in nature, they arrived at different conclusions on its metaphysical implications. 
Reid’s position in this debate had a profound influence on Stewart’s moral philosophy 
and his understanding of this philosophical theme. As shown in chapter one, Stewart 
created a modern and accessible version of Reid’s Common Sense philosophy in his 
programme of moral education.  
 In teaching the ‘active and moral powers of the mind’ with particular attention to 
the operations of the ‘moral faculty’, Stewart drew a clear distinction between 
humankind’s limited powers to cause an effect, such as determining to act morally or 
immorally, and God’s unrestrained power as the creator of everything. This principle 
accepted that only God possessed causal power in nature since inert matter necessarily 
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followed the laws of nature as part of His creation. Although Hume remained sceptical of 
God’s existence, Reid and Stewart agreed with his premise that necessarily constant and 
invariable sequences of events existed in nature. In his Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind (1792), Stewart wrote: 
In consequence of the inferences which Mr Hume has deduced from his doctrine 
concerning Cause and Effect, some later writers have been led to dispute its truth; 
not perceiving, that the fallacy of this part of his system does not lie in his 
premises, but in the conclusion which he draws from them.41         
 
According to Stewart, Hume’s premise, that we do not observe the connexion between 
cause and effect, only its constant sequential conjunctions, was not original or incorrect. 
He argued that Hume’s notion of the conjunctions between physical events coincided 
exactly with the earlier thought of Isaac Barrow, Joseph Butler, John Locke, Nicolas 
Malbranche, Thomas Hobbes, and George Berkeley.42 These theorists of unquestioned 
religious convictions supported Hume’s belief that the link among causes and effects in 
nature remained invisible and an efficient cause could not be traced from observed effects 
by a priori reasoning. In a 1796 lecture, Stewart remarked that ‘there is no instance in 
which we perceive such a necessary connexion between two successive events as might 
enable us to infer the one from the other by reasoning a priori [and] knowledge of 
efficient causes is beyond our reach’.43 This premise on its own did not deny that a deity 
existed or a supreme power caused effects in nature, but that humankind could not 
conclusively understand this connexion. When Hume applied this premise to metaphysics 
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he questioned God’s link as the first cause in earthly effects, which demonstrated the 
danger in an unqualified adoption of Humean philosophy. The Moderate clergymen of 
Edinburgh claimed that 
If the language of Mr. Leslie’s Note, cannot be otherwise understood than as a 
denial of an efficient or operating principle in any cause, no reasoning can be 
necessary to show, that this doctrine, were it admitted, would at once put an end to 
all possibility of arguing, from what we have been accustomed to call the works of 
God. But, in fact, the doctrine strikes more directly at the foundation of religion.44 
 
The Moderates’ argument against Leslie’s Note hinged on connecting it to Hume’s 
metaphysical conclusions regarding ‘causation’, which challenged the existence of God’s 
efficient power. If successful, they could label him an atheist and easily engineer his 
removal from the competition. According to Stewart, if Leslie ‘had qualified the first 
sentence by saying, that Mr Hume’s Essay on Necessary Connexion, (so far as it relates 
to physical causes and effects merely), is a model of clear and accurate reasoning, I do 
not think it possible that the slightest objection could have been made’.45 In advancing 
this point, he ridiculed the Moderates’ belief that Leslie’s wording in Note Sixteen made 
it ‘impossible to avoid applying to everything under the name of cause, whether ascribed 
to matter or to mind’.46 Stewart suggested that this reasoning conflated the intended 
purpose of Leslie’s discussion. In the proper context, Leslie argued ‘against the 
unphilosophical supposition of the agency of invisible intermedia to account for the 
phenomena of gravitation [which] has been considered one of the most dangerous 
weapons of the Atheist’.47 By considering that the concept of invisible intermedia was not 
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necessarily limited to a supreme agent, atheists reasoned that infinite agents of causation 
could exist. In turn, the possibility of infinite agents of cause in nature would undermine 
arguments of God’s omnipotence. In support of this point, Stewart reminded the 
Moderates that the late John Robison advanced a closely similar argument against 
attributing inert matter with causal power in his ‘Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the 
Religions and Governments of Europe’.48     
 John Wright considered the possibility that Leslie had misunderstood which parts 
of Humean philosophy Reid had rejected or accepted.49 A review of Leslie’s Note in the 
context of his book and the fact that Stewart discussed this theme at length in the first 
lecture of his moral philosophy course, which Leslie had attended, suggests otherwise. 
While Leslie did not clearly differentiate between Humean physics and metaphysics, the 
subject matter of his book implied an exclusively physical treatment of ‘causation’. In its 
preface, Leslie commented ‘I have no desire to shrink from liberal criticism; but I request 
my book to be perused and examined with the same temper it was written’.50 In the 
context of discussing the etymology of causality and how its ambiguity impeded 
scientific progress, Leslie suggested that ‘the unsophisticated sentiments of mankind are 
in perfect unison with the deductions of logic, and imply nothing more at bottom, in 
relation of cause and effect, than a constant and invariable sequence’.51 Despite briefly 
alluding to metaphysical applications of ‘causation’, Leslie qualified that ‘it would be 
foreign to my present object to engage in such discussions’.52 The wording in his Note 
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could be applied to metaphysics, as shown by the Moderate ministers of Edinburgh, but 
such an interpretation would be alien to the ‘temper’ of his book. 
The discussion of ‘causation’ in the Leslie case directly related to the 
permissibility of teaching controversial theories to impressionable young men. The 
Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh claimed:  
Their duty to the public and to the rising generation does not, in their opinion, admit 
of their overlooking, on this account, what may appear dangerous or subversive of 
religion, in the doctrine of those to whom the education of youth is committed…It is 
for this reason that the education of youth, and their instructors in every department 
of literature, have, in the Christian world, been placed under the superintendency of 
the Ministers of Religion.53 
  
If the Moderates’ campaign for pluralism prevailed, Stewart’s system of moral education 
would also be viewed as inappropriate since he openly advocated the same sentiments as 
Leslie’s Note Sixteen in his classroom. Stewart professed ‘that the doctrine which has 
been so strongly objected to in Mr Leslie’s Note, coincides exactly, as far as I am able to 
judge of it, with what I have myself advanced in a work which has been not for many 
years in the hands of the public’.54 Since Stewart followed the Scottish philosophical 
tradition of combining pedagogy and philosophical inquiry, his publications closely 
replicated themes in his lectures. Thus, Stewart’s defence of Leslie by extension 
represented a defence of his programme of moral education. Stewart also addressed the 
Moderates’ concerns that the wider public’s religious convictions would be threatened by 
Leslie’s allegedly sceptical theories. By referencing his Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind (first published in 1792 with an 1802 second edition), he implied that the 
public found merit in his treatment of ‘causation’, which complemented Leslie’s Note, 
without a hint of controversy on this theme.55 Contrary to the belief of these clergymen, 
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Stewart promoted the idea that philosophers should explore causality in nature and the 
mind. In a 1796 lecture, Stewart remarked: 
We find from experience that certain events are invariably conjoined, so that when 
we see the one we expect the other; but our knowledge in such cases extends no 
farther than to the fact. To ascertain those established conjunctions of successive 
events which constitute the order of the universe; to record the phenomena which 
exhibit to our observation and to refer them to their general laws, is the great 
business of philosophy. 56 
  
Stewart clearly believed that philosophers, not theologians, should investigate the 
necessary conjunctions between causes and effects. According to Stewart, theologians as 
authorities in revelation often err in treating a philosophical theme without confident 
knowledge of its consequences. This belief did not imply that philosophers could not also 
entertain theological views or serve as clergymen, but that moralists and metaphysicians, 
for Stewart, should investigate philosophical truths not divinity. Although these different 
approaches often overlapped, particularly in natural theology, the purposes of their 
methods set them apart. He demonstrated this point by referencing his opponents’ initial 
claim that Reid opposed all of Hume’s premises.57 The fact that Reid challenged Hume in 
his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) surely motivated the Presbytery of Edinburgh to 
interpret his opposition to Humean philosophy in absolute terms. Stewart remarked that 
‘the truth probably was that, in [their] zeal to convict Mr. Leslie of atheism, [the 
Moderates] neglected to weigh very accurately the import of [their] own confident 
assertions’.58 In doing so, the Moderates interpreted Leslie’s Note as supporting Hume’s 
conclusions in metaphysics without drawing a distinction between metaphysics and 
physics whilst implying that God determined human actions. This misinterpretation of 
Leslie’s Note served the Moderates’ campaign to discredit his reputation as McKnight’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 1796-9, taken by J.M. Lee, EUL Dc.8.143, 5.  
 
57 Anonymous letter to Hill, in Stewart, A Short Statement, 115.  
 
58 Stewart, A Short Statement, 107.  
 
Chapter Three  ,,'!
competition. Meanwhile, their counter-Enlightenment beliefs towards education placed 
them at odds with Stewart and Reid whose theories were increasingly taught throughout 
the Atlantic World. Stewart suggested that a firm understanding of the wider arguments 
concerning ‘causation’ must precede a proper understanding of this philosophical debate. 
He maintained that his system of moral education facilitated this prerequisite.  
 Thomas Brown, a disciple of Stewart who attended his moral philosophy course 
in 1792 and contributed to the Edinburgh Review, exemplified the application of 
Stewart’s programme in defending Leslie.59 Brown noted in the ‘science of analysis, that 
the philosophy of the mind must be considered’.60 In doing so, Brown supported Hume’s 
premises and critiqued Reid’s treatment of ‘causation’ and the ‘active powers of the 
human mind’. He suggested that in exertions people merely feel a desire for action 
instead of a sense of power as Reid and Stewart argued.61 This desire of action, coupled 
with the belief that a sequence of events or motions will follow, provided confidence in 
the reoccurrence of desired effects. Brown remarked:  
the phenomena of mind succeed each other in a certain order; the phenomena of 
matter also have their peculiar order: but, were we to judge, by the language of 
each, from which of the two sequences our idea of power is derived, the probability 
would seem on the side of the latter.62  
 
He did not ascribe to matter self-sustaining power, but merely suggested that we 
improperly label notions of power in metaphysics with analogies of power in the material 
world. While developing his interpretation of ‘causation’, Brown supported Leslie’s 
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conclusion that ambiguous language impeded scientific progress. Thomas Chalmers later 
remarked that Brown’s Observations provided an excellent insight into this complex 
theme and ‘to stamp endurance upon it, it had to be dilated into a volume’.63 His Inquiry 
into the Relation of Cause and Effect (1818) extended his earlier argument and from 
popular demand received three editions within the same year of its first publication.64 
Brown’s treatment of ‘causation’ demonstrated the application of Stewart’s system of 
moral education by investigating a controversial philosophical theme, as a philosopher, 
without falling victim to scepticism or sacrificing high intellectual standards. 
 The Moderates’ emerging concerns regarding Leslie’s Note appeared a 
formidable obstacle in his election. For this reason, Leslie sought to clarify his remarks 
for the consideration of the Presbytery of Edinburgh’s upcoming meeting on 12th 
March.65 In a letter to Andrew Hunter, professor of divinity at Edinburgh, Leslie 
explained that ‘it did not fall under my plan to point out in a treatise entirely confined to 
physical discussions’ concerning Hume’s misapplication of his premises since this has 
been done by Dr. Reid and various other writers in a manner which I conceive to be 
completely satisfactory to every reader who understands the argument’.66 In order to 
address their complaint with a compromise, Leslie pledged to change the controversial 
wording in subsequent editions (as Stewart had done with his second edition of 
Elements).67 His explanation satisfied Hunter’s reservations and though he was too ill to 
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attend the meeting, he supplied Henry Grieve with a copy of Leslie’s letter.68 The 
Presbytery of Edinburgh curiously did not record the details of the meeting as normally 
practised, but ultimately determined that Leslie’s explanation did not remove their 
concerns.69 During this meeting, they drafted a formal complaint against Leslie’s 
potential election. Stewart remarked that ‘a long paper (which must have been previously 
prepared, for it takes no notice of Mr. Leslie’s letter to Dr. Hunter) was accordingly 
presented to the Patrons of the University’ by Henry Grieve.70 They claimed 
avisamentum, the ancient legal right enacted by James VI that required the Town Council 
to consider the advice of Edinburgh ministers in deciding University appointments.71 
Since the establishment of the Chair of Mathematics in 1674, this legal right had never 
been enforced in an election of a professor of mathematics.72 Furthermore, this right had 
been exercised only twice, with the elections of Andrew Dalzel (professorship of Greek) 
in 1772 and Andrew Hunter (professorship of Divinity) in 1779, during William 
Robertson’s administration, which held canvases for every chair.73 The chairs of Divinity 
and Greek contributed to preparing ministers, for which the input from Church officials 
proved relevant. According to James Ferguson, the clergymen’s written complaint on 12th 
March exercised the extent of their right to avisamentum and afterwards they should have 
ceased any further actions.74  
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 The Town Council informed the Presbytery of Edinburgh that the election would 
be held on 13th March; to the dismay of the Moderates, however, they convened on 12th 
March.75 By misinforming the Moderates about the date of the election, the Town 
Council deprived them of an opportunity to rally further support for McKnight and 
strengthen their argument against Leslie. The Edinburgh Magistrates and Town Council 
consisted primarily of Pittites and supporters of Dundas with only a small pocket of 
Foxite Whigs. The blatant deception of the Moderates regarding the election date 
signified that the Moderate clergymen did not enjoy the full support of Scottish “Tories” 
in this election. After learning about the Town Council’s meeting, the Moderates hastily 
supplied them with a draft of their complaint. In defiance of the Moderates’ threat ‘to 
prosecute [Leslie’s] ejection from office in any competent court, civil or ecclesiastical’, 
the Town Council proceeded with Leslie’s election the following day.76 Due to the 
technicality that Adam Ferguson still jointly held the chair, the Town Council formally 
re-elected Leslie on 29th March, only after he supplied proof of his Rumford prize.77 
 After exhausting a failed legal suspension of Leslie’s election in civil court, the 
Presbytery of Edinburgh fulfilled their threat and advanced their complaint against Leslie 
in ecclesiastical courts. Their meeting on 22nd March marked the first clear division 
concerning Leslie’s election between the so-called Popular party (also known as the 
Evangelical party) and the Moderate party within the Presbytery of Edinburgh. On 3rd 
April 1805, the Aberdeen Journal reported:  
On one side by Doctors Grieve and Inglis, who maintained that the Presbytery 
should concur with the ministers of Edinburgh in going on with an investigation 
into Mr. Leslie’s conduct; while, on the other hand, it was contended by Sir Harry 
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Moncrieff, Dr. Hunter, and others, that the matter should go no further and the 
representation dismissed.78 
 
As the narrow minority within the Presbytery, the Popular ministers could not prevent the 
Moderates from continuing their complaint against Leslie to the higher ecclesiastical 
court of the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale. In opposition, the members of the Popular 
party aligned themselves with Leslie’s supporters and did not attend the Synod meeting 
that unanimously approved the complaint against Leslie for the consideration of the 
General Assembly.79 The Moderates claimed they would ‘cease their proceeding, so far 
as it concerns Mr. Leslie individually, in the event of his consenting to withdraw the 
offensive part of his publication, either by cancelling the leaves of the book which 
contain the note referred to, or by any other means equally effectual’.80 In this request, 
the Moderates clearly wanted Leslie to resign from his chair. Cancelling the circulation of 
his book would be admitting his dangerous treatment of ‘causation’, which would equally 
fuel their argument for his removal. While this proposed concession, if accepted, 
suggested an end to their complaint regarding Leslie, the Moderates did not indicate that 
they would stop their claim for avisamentum in future University elections. The 
Moderates, therefore, maintained their counter-Enlightenment objective of expanding the 
Church’s influence, particularly Moderate ministers, within all the eligible faculties of the 
University.  
The reversal of traditional ideological beliefs on education between the Moderate 
and Popular parties implied a significant change within the Kirk. The tolerance for 
secular thought by the earlier ‘Moderate’ ministers during the height of the Scottish 
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Enlightenment, therefore, was not consistent with the actions of the “Moderate” party 
under George Hill’s leadership. In these respects, the Popular party’s support of Leslie 
reflected ecclesiastical rivalry more than political or educational concerns. They 
prudently protected their interests within the Kirk by opposing the Moderates’ attempt to 
gain more power within Edinburgh. Apart from ecclesiastical politics, the determination 
of the General Assembly rendered real consequences to Leslie, Stewart’s system of moral 
education, and secularism in the Faculty of Arts at Edinburgh University. Although 
Leslie succeeded in his election, he could potentially lose his chair if the General 
Assembly determined him unfit to teach young men. In addition, if the General Assembly 
supported the Moderates’ justification for pluralism as means to prevent the spread of 
philosophical scepticism and atheism, they could appeal to this ruling in future University 
elections.   
 The controversy concerning Leslie’s election entered the public sphere with the 
publication of an anonymous letter addressed to George Hill on 20th April and a memorial 
of the Moderates’ complaint sent to members of the General Assembly on 1st May which 
was published in the Edinburgh Evening Courant the following day. Although the letter’s 
author remained a mystery, John Inglis claimed that the Moderate clergymen of 
Edinburgh ‘held themselves responsible for its doctrine and argument’.81 In this letter, the 
Moderates suggested that Leslie’s explanation was ‘an unqualified defence of both 
himself and his doctrine’.82 By combining Leslie’s character and his Note, the Moderates 
framed an argument that, if successful, could only result in Leslie’s removal from the 
Chair of Mathematics. By publishing their concerns, the Presbytery of Edinburgh 
reintroduced a potentially dangerous philosophical theme to the attention of the public, 
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which could potentially result in the denial of God’s existence. Blind to this possibility, 
the Moderates warned that 
the publication of this doctrine [Leslie’s book], in connexion with the 
circumstances of the times, when there appears an infidel party arraying itself, with 
increasing confidence, against the religion of the country, they cannot but consider 
the appointment of Mr. Leslie to be a Professor and teacher of youth, as a measure 
of very unfriendly aspect to our Christian Faith, and our Church establishment for 
its support.83  
  
By drawing attention to the dangers of discussing controversial theories, they 
unintentionally contradicted their claimed purpose and the counter-Enlightenment 
policies, established during the Scottish Sedition trials, which censored philosophical 
discourse and controversial publications. In an intimate letter to Leslie, Joseph Banks 
wrote:  
They would surely have acted more properly & in a manner better becoming their 
Station in the community, by suffering your Book to remain quietly on the 
Philosopher’s shelf without dragging forward into the public notice a few 
passages, which, at best, can only lead to a controversy in which Orthodoxy will 
be put to the hazard, & more of it probably lost than gain’d.84     
 
The Moderate clergymen’s attack against Leslie’s Note consequently stirred concerns 
over the theological and philosophical implications of ‘causation’. This reaction was 
certainly unintentional. Inglis believed their opposition to Leslie’s Note would cause ‘a 
greater degree of caution in the discussion of those philosophical questions which are 
connected with the principles and the vitals of religion’.85 Although Inglis’s comment 
was directed at censoring education, the Moderates received harsh criticism for their 
conduct and misinterpretations of philosophy from Stewart and his former students.     
 The University of Edinburgh’s Senatus Academicus, an internal council of 
professors, appointed Stewart to defend Leslie and the interests of the University during 
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his trial. He countered the Moderates’ publications with A Short Statement of Some 
Important Facts (1805). Stewart’s short pamphlet, published a week before the 
convention of the General Assembly, revealed evidence of the Presbytery of Edinburgh’s 
attempt at pluralism and why their complaint against Leslie’s Note Sixteen was ill-
conceived.86 His alignment with theorists of unquestionable religious convictions, many 
of who were also mathematicians, revealed how he embraced the tradition of engaging 
rather than avoiding controversial themes in the pursuit of philosophical truths.87 In doing 
so, Stewart justified the purpose of his system of moral education. The circulation of 
these conflicting publications contributed to the public’s anxiety over the future direction 
of the University and Church as the General Assembly approached. 
 
Defending Scottish Enlightenment Moral Education in Leslie’s Trial 
 The 1805 General Assembly convened in Edinburgh on 22nd May under a cloud 
of controversy generated by the recent publications. A large crowd attempting to gain 
access to the proceedings suggested that laymen were aware of the import that Leslie’s 
trial would have on the direction of the Church of Scotland and Edinburgh University. 
The ideologically divided Assembly considered two distinct proposals: a ‘reference’ 
against Leslie’s election to the chair of mathematics, and a ‘complaint’ against the so-
called Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh’s conduct regarding Leslie. Robert Lundie, who 
reported the proceedings, observed that the laymen in attendance overwhelmingly sided 
in favour of Leslie and, at several points during the two-day debate, gave vocal 
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87 In addition to referencing Reid, Stewart cited the works of Bacon, Barrow, Clarke, Butler, Berkeley, 
and Robison in support of his philosophy and Leslie’s Note Sixteen (Ibid., 48-64). 
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expression to their desire for justice.88 This ideologically charged crowd created a tense 
atmosphere for the Moderates as they attempted to persuade the Assembly on the merits 
of the ‘reference’. 
 Leslie’s trial centred on the question of secularism in the Faculty of Arts at 
Edinburgh University and the extent of the Church’s relationship with the University. The 
Moderate ministers advanced the counter-Enlightenment’s well-worn argument that 
British institutions as well as young men were in danger from sceptical or atheistic 
philosophy. They felt obligated, as clergymen, to prevent the election of a professor who 
they believed advanced theories that would subvert religious convictions and civil order. 
Grieve claimed their protest against the diffusion of sceptical theories to be ‘most 
agreeable to the civil and religious institutions of this part of the united kingdom, and best 
suited to promote the good of the public’.89 As shown in the previous section, Stewart 
advocated the same principles in his moral philosophy course as those found in Leslie’s 
controversial Note. His pamphlet illustrated this connection in unmistakable terms, which 
the Moderates, as evinced by their references to his pamphlet, had read prior to the 
General Assembly. Thus, the Moderates’ complaint against Leslie’s election revealed 
their concerns about Stewart’s programme of moral education and their overarching 
campaign for dominance at Edinburgh University.  
 Stewart’s pamphlet depicted Leslie as an unwarranted victim of the Moderates’ 
campaign for plural offices and their opposition to secular education. His argument 
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88 Robert Lundie, observed that ‘the assembly, after experiencing some disruption from the crowd of 
strangers, who, not finding accommodation in the galleries, pressed into the body of the house, to the 
temporary exclusion of some members’ (Lundie, Report, 1, in Tracts, Historical and Philosophical, 
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the Presbytery of Edinburgh, respecting the election of Mr. Leslie to the professorship of mathematics 
in that university, vol. one, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1806)). According to Lundie, those in attendance 
observed the clear divisions within the assembly of clergymen and Ruling Elders with the Moderates 
advancing the complaint against Leslie seated on the right side of the assembly and the Popular party 
coupled with Leslie’s defenders, including Stewart, positioned on the left side (Ibid., 1-13). 
 
89 Grieve’s speech in the General Assembly 22 May 1805, in Ibid., 8. 
 
In Defence of the Scottish Enlightenment  ,$&!
resonated with the Ruling Elders of the General Assembly and consequently motivated 
the Moderates to separate their opinion of Leslie’s character from their argument against 
his Note. In contradiction to their earlier statements, David Ritchie clarified that ‘I do not 
judge Mr. Leslie, but I judge his book’.90 Although the Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh 
spoke as if they were exclusively concerned with the religious implications of Leslie’s 
Note, their ‘reference’ enveloped larger social concerns whilst justifying the practise of 
ecclesiastical and professorial pluralism. This attempted misdirection did not deter 
discussions regarding pluralism, ‘moderation’, and secular education. Stewart, who 
attended the trial, watched as members of the Popular party and Ruling Elders borrowed 
evidence from his pamphlet in their defence of Leslie. 
 The Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh who struggled under cross examination 
appeared to be the ones on trial with their motivations and character repeatedly 
questioned by Leslie’s defenders. Henry Moncreiff, a jurist and friend of Stewart, argued 
that ‘while the only point to be tried before the competent court, relates, not to Mr. Leslie, 
but to the general powers vested in the ministers of Edinburgh, and which they are to 
exercise in future times’.91 At the Bar of the General Assembly, Moncreiff suggested that 
the Moderates’ actions against Leslie surpassed their limited association with the Faculty 
of Arts at Edinburgh University and they should be held accountable for this 
transgression. Like Stewart, Moncreiff believed that the outcome of the Leslie case would 
determine the fate of the Scottish Enlightenment. He cautioned that the ‘character of our 
country and of our age [is at stake and] we shall be judged by the decision of this day, not 
merely at home by the people of Scotland, but by the inhabitants of countries from which 
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91 Moncreiff’s speech in the General Assembly 22 May 1805, in Ibid., 45. 
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we are far removed; in England, through Europe, in Asia, and in America’.92 In response 
to Moncreiff, Grieve supplied justification for their influence on university affairs in the 
form of two previous Acts of the General Assembly: ‘Act concerning the inspection of 
Universities and Colleges’ (Act 14, session 13, 23rd May 1711) and ‘Act for promoting 
Religion and Learning in Universities and Colleges’ (Act 12, session 9, 23rd May 1719).93 
Of course, these earlier ecclesiastical Acts appeared almost half a century before 
Robertson and his contemporaries established the practise of ‘Moderatism’ in the Kirk 
and University. Similar to the earlier 12th March Presbytery of Edinburgh meeting where 
they reintroduced the ancient right of avisamentum, the Moderates clearly anticipated 
questions regarding the Kirk’s role in university affairs and justified their involvement 
accordingly through legal and ecclesiastical acts passed during pre-Enlightenment times. 
This well-researched justification for Scottish divines to significantly influence university 
appointments had farther implications than Leslie’s future as a professor. If the Assembly 
vindicated the ‘reference’ against Leslie, the Kirk would dominate in deciding future 
university appointments in the Faculty of Arts.   
 The nature of the Presbytery of Edinburgh’s conduct toward Leslie in advancing 
their campaign to establish pluralism in the Faculty of Arts led dissenting ministers to 
question their understanding of ‘Moderatism’ as an operating ideology. John Muckersey, 
who supported the ‘complaint’ against the Moderates, remarked that ‘I was much 
surprised, when I first heard of this reference; and my surprise was not lessened, when I 
heard from what quarter it had arisen’.94 While he supported the Moderates’ initial 
reservations concerning Leslie’s Note, he believed the Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh 
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failed to limit their involvement to examining Leslie’s doctrine in an appropriate 
‘Moderate’ fashion. In doing so, he suggested that ‘moderation’ involved two categorical 
approaches: ‘active moderation’ and ‘passive moderation’. While ‘active moderation’ 
considered the middle ground opinion between infidelity and religious fanaticism, 
‘passive moderation’ was the middle point between the extreme views of a particular 
question.95 In Leslie’s case, the question on the origin and nature of ‘causation’ received 
extreme opinions between the religious orthodox notion of the ‘operative principle’ and 
Hume’s ‘invariable sequence’. Since the initial objection against Leslie’s election 
involved his treatment of this philosophical question, Muckersey believed it should be 
examined with ‘passive moderation’. He remarked that ‘the objection I had to them was, 
that they proceeded on the grounds of passive moderation, but conducted themselves in 
an active manner’.96 For Muckersey, the Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh transformed 
Leslie’s treatment of ‘causation’ into an active campaign to prevent the spread of 
dangerous philosophical ideas diffused through secular education. The Moderates, 
therefore, sought to establish new policies where the Kirk held considerable power over 
every branch of Scottish universities.  
 Despite combining both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ types of ‘moderation’ in the 
‘reference’, the Moderates developed their agenda to safeguard impressionable young 
men with more force than adequately addressing the question of ‘causation’. 
Consequently, the Moderates clearly did not guard their treatment of ‘causation’ against 
close scrutiny. After stirring commotion from calling the ‘reference’ ‘false, cowardly, and 
calumnious’, John A. Murray, an Edinburgh Whig and close friend of Jeffrey, Horner, 
and Brougham, furthered Stewart’s earlier claim that the Moderates’ attributed inert 
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matter with causal power in their public criticism of Leslie’s Note.97 Murray boldly 
argued:  
In direct opposition to these reverend gentlemen, I must state it as my conviction, 
that their opinions, and not the opinions of Mr Leslie, are atheistical; nay, that the 
very language which they employ, is the ordinary language of atheists. The language 
of the ministers of Edinburgh plainly implies, that, in considering the relation of 
cause and effect subsisting among the phenomena of nature, there is a necessary 
connection between the effect which we behold, and the cause with which it is 
immediately conjoined; and that the former processes in itself an operating power 
over the latter.98  
 
In their campaign to secure more influence within Edinburgh University and tarnish 
Leslie’s reputation, the Moderates neglected the implications of their treatment of 
causality when applied to physics. In doing so, the clergymen of Edinburgh 
unintentionally supported the concept of invisible intermedia often used by atheists to 
disprove the existence of God. Inglis later wrote that their unguarded wording exclusively 
treated the metaphysical discussion of ‘causation’ as it related to their interpretation of 
Leslie’s Note.99 This miscalculation surely assisted Stewart’s view that a properly 
regulated programme of moral education based on metaphysical philosophy was the best 
way to prevent the ignorant acceptance of sceptical theories. Furthermore, Stewart 
believed clergymen who misinterpreted fundamental philosophical themes were 
inappropriate, if not dangerous, to direct curious young minds towards discovering 
philosophical truths. Shortly after Murray’s speech, George Hill must have recognised the 
potential danger for the Moderates if this line of questioning continued and motioned that 
the Assembly adjourn until the next day.100  
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97 Murray’s speech in the General Assembly on 22 May 1805, in Ibid., 107.  
 
98 Ibid., 109-110. 
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100 Lundie, Report, 114-115. Henry Erskine too recognised the gravity of this debate in stating that 
‘inconvenient as attendance might be, he would agree to no such proposal as that which was now 
made; he must insist upon the renewal of the debate, to the exclusion of every other cause’ (Idem, 115).   
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 The events of the debate quickly circulated throughout Edinburgh by the 
following morning. A correspondent for the Scots Magazine observed that large crowds, 
eager to gain admittance, gathered around the assembly building as early as eight and 
nine o’clock despite the ten o’clock start time.101 After several speeches examining the 
dangers of ‘causation’ when applied to metaphysics, Malcolm Laing, an Edinburgh jurist, 
returned to unravelling the Moderates’ motives for their relentless protest against Leslie’s 
election. Laing stated that after the Town Council favoured Leslie for the chair  
the clergy of Edinburgh took alarm, and immediately had recourse to that system of 
intrigue and misrepresentation, which they have too long and too successfully 
pursued, and by which they seem to have resolved to appropriate the enjoyment of 
academical honours and advantages exclusively to themselves.102  
 
Laing suggested that such practises of pluralism impaired the intellectual vivacity of 
Scottish institutions where Scots acquired so much of their national pride as well as their 
claim of Enlightenment. In particular, he targeted the practises of pluralism at St Andrews 
supported by George Hill and Henry Dundas.103 Laing predicted that Edinburgh 
University’s fame, as an important Scottish Enlightenment institution, would decay with 
the establishment of elections based on professorial and ecclesiastical pluralism rather 
than scholarly merit. Henry Erskine, the leader of the Scottish Whig party during the 
1790s, furthered Laing’s warning by noting that if the Moderates’ use of pluralism 
succeeded at Edinburgh the intellectual degradation would soon follow. Erskine stated 
that ‘if I had fifty sons, I would send none of them to the university, while it is placed in a 
situation so degrading…and were I applied to by my friends at a distance to place their 
sons at the university, I should feel it my duty to dissuade them from the design…“send 
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your sons anywhere, but to this university”’.104 Erskine’s involvement in the case 
demonstrated the political importance of the trial. Furthermore, the continuity on the 
issue of secular education between the older leaders of the Scottish Whigs, Erskine and 
the Earl of Lauderdale, and the emerging figures, Horner and Jeffery, against their 
political opponents implied a cross-generational solidarity to Scottish Whigs. The fact 
that Erskine and Lauderdale were significant figures in the national Whig party also 
implies a wider British concern rather than a parochial issue over an elected mathematics 
professor. Their collective support for Leslie and defence of secular education 
represented their wider battle against “Tory” counter-Enlightenment policies. Erskine 
concluded:  
[Hill] is sensible that his friends are stumbling, and he wishes to make their fall as 
soft and gentle as possible. But I cannot consent to allow justice, candour, 
liberality, and common sense, to be stuffed into a pillow, that they may fall in 
perfect safety, and repose upon it in peace.105  
 
In defence of his party, Hill maintained that Leslie should have supplied the Moderate 
ministers of Edinburgh with another explanation as requested before it reached the 
Church’s supreme court. He argued that Leslie’s silence after his election suggested some 
form of guilt on his part. Lauderdale, however, interrupted Hill’s speech by mentioning 
that Lord Kelly and Mr. Durham of Largo advised Leslie that it would be in his interest 
not to furnish a second explanation.106 Hill’s failed attempt to deflect the blame onto 
Leslie exhausted the Moderates’ argument in the General Assembly. Shortly after Hill’s 
speech, loud cries across the auditorium demanded an immediate vote.107 The result 
dismissed the ‘reference’ against Leslie and sustained the ‘complaint’ against the 
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Moderates with ninety-six votes in favour and eighty-four votes opposed.108 At least a 
third of the Assembly, however, abstained from casting a vote, which suggested a 
division or loss of influence within the Moderate party. Lundie observed that ‘upon the 
vote being announced, a shout of applause resounded from the galleries’.109 Despite 
Leslie’s and Stewart’s victory at that moment, the verdict of the General Assembly did 
not conclude the Leslie affair.  
 Afterwards numerous pamphlets defending and ridiculing the Moderates’ conduct 
towards Leslie flooded British print culture.110 In addition to Stewart’s pamphlet 
receiving three editions between May and December 1805, his pamphlet, together with 
other prominent writings on the Leslie affair, was collected for publication in two 
volumes of Tracts, Historical and Philosophical (1806).111 Meanwhile, Scottish Whigs 
drew strength from their victory in the 1805 General Assembly to advance their 
opposition to the Moderates and counter-Enlightenment interests. In the Edinburgh 
Review, Francis Jeffrey wrote:  
The evils which the [Moderates’] mistaken and suspicious conduct had produced, 
demanded the atonement; and far more advisable would it have been for their own 
interests, to seek shelter in the retreats of oblivion, than venture their cause against 
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110 Here are two prominent examples of this continued interest in the Leslie case: John Playfair, Letter to 
the Author of the Examination of Professor Stewart’s Short Statement of Facts, (Edinburgh: Creech and 
Archibald Constable & Co., 1806); David Brewster, An Examination of the Letter addressed to the 
Principal Hill on the Case of Mr. Leslie, In a Letter to its Anonymous Author. With remarks on Mr. 
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the tribunal of the public…Neither pardon nor pity is due to a wanton and 
unprovoked attempt to injure the reputation of an unoffending individual. We may 
smile at the instrument, but we startle at the motives of so unaccountable a design: 
while the deliberate vindication of such conduct cannot but be considered as the 
signal even of popular indignation.112  
 
In contrast, the Anti-Jacobin Review suggested that ‘the Presbytery of Edinburgh very 
laudably fulfilled the duty of their office’.113 Responding to charges of religious 
fanaticism and misconduct, the Presbytery of Edinburgh appointed John Inglis to defend 
and vindicate their previous conduct in the Leslie affair. The timing of this reply to 
Stewart’s Short Statement, published seven months after his first edition, demonstrated a 
cunning attempt to out-manoeuvre Stewart, Playfair, and Leslie who were preoccupied 
with teaching. Stewart later remarked that ‘none of them could well be ignorant, that their 
attack was to find me occupied completely and indispensably with my Academical 
labours’.114 While expanding upon their earlier arguments to safeguard the institution of 
religion and the adoption of religious principles, Inglis blamed William Robertson’s 
earlier failure to enforce the Confession of Faith and his promotion of secular education 
as a chief reason for the Moderates’ troubles in the Leslie case.115 In this view, the 
Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh fulfilled a previously neglected obligation to the 
public and the institution of religion. This admission demarcated how Hill’s Moderate 
party fundamentally diverged from the earlier ‘Moderate’ values. Despite not sharing the 
Edinburgh Review’s interest in prolonging the debate, Stewart responded to Inglis with a 
short (nine pages) Postscript to his earlier pamphlet. He remarked: 
I promised to remain at the bar of the public, till they should receive their doom. 
That doom I had the satisfaction to hear pronounced (not many hours after these 
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words were written) in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland; and the 
ratification, which it has since received from that more awful tribunal, whose 
unbiased and paramount sanction the justice of my cause emboldened me to invite 
and to solicit, has now fixed and sealed their destiny for ever.—IN THE PLACE 
WHERE THE TREE HATH FALLEN, THERE MUST IT LIE.116 
 
The public vilification of the Moderates by Stewart and his former students coupled with 
the 1805 impeachment of Dundas enabled the continuation of Stewart’s programme of 
moral education and the practise of secularism in the Faculty of Arts. After learning of 
Dundas’s 1805 impeachment, Stewart rejoiced that his removal from office was 
‘synonymous with the emancipation and salvation of Scotland’.117 The Moderate party’s 
counter-Enlightenment efforts to acquire power through deception and misrepresentation, 
however, continued in the wake of Leslie’s case.118 Furthermore, Leslie’s opponents, 
particularly in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, persisted in publically questioning his 
character and religious principles until Edinburgh’s civil court ordered them to stop on 
22nd July 1822.119    
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117 Stewart to Francis Horner 8 June 1805, in Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, 
edited by William Hamilton, vol. ten, (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co., 1860), cxxxvii. 
 
118 In the 1807 General Assembly, George Hill once again distorted the words of another, this time the 
King’s letter to the Kirk, in order to further the interests of the Moderate party. In relaying the King’s 
words, Hill strongly implied that the King supported the Moderates’ interests (George Cook, Life of the 
Late George Hill, D.D. Principal of St. Mary’s College, St. Andrews, (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable 
and Co., 1820), 195-200). Afterwards, Hill published these ideas in a pamphlet. This deception of the 
public motivated Henry Moncreiff, who was outspoken in Leslie’s defence, to oppose his 
misrepresentation in Remarks on A Pamphlet Entitled, “Substance of Principal Hill’s Speech in the 
General Assembly, May 23, 1807, Upon the Motion for Thanking His Majesty for His Support of the 
Protestant Establishment, (Edinburgh: Creech and Constable, 1807). This controversy in the shadow of 
the earlier 1805 Leslie case has yet to be fully unravelled and should receive further examination.  
 
119 Between 1820 and 1822, four articles appeared in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine that targeted 
Leslie’s criticism of the Hebrew language as an attack upon the Old Testament in his book on 
arithmetic. In this work, Leslie wrote that ‘the oriental nations appear generally to have represented the 
numbers as far as on thousand, by dividing their alphabet into three distinct classes. But the Hebrew, 
the rudest and poorest of all written languages, having only twenty-two letters, could advance no 
farther than 400; and to exhibit 500, 600, 700, 800, and 900, it had recourse to the clumsy expedient of 
addition, by joining 400 and 100, 400 and 200, 400 and 300, 400 and 400, and 400 with 400 and 100’ 
(John Leslie, The Philosophy of Arithmetic; exhibiting a progressive view of the theory and practice of 
calculation, (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1817), 218). Like his earlier Note Sixteen, 
Leslie’s opponents believed he was challenging Christianity. In the forty-forth issue (November 1820) 
of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, published a letter from ‘O.B.’ (who was never fully identified) 
wrote that ‘in a work of his [Leslie], treating on arithmetic, that ‘celebrated’ man thought proper to go 
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Conclusion 
 The 1805 John Leslie case represented the culmination of political, ecclesiastical, 
philosophical, and educational disputes between Scottish Enlightenment thought and 
values and counter-Enlightenment interests since the French Revolution. Although the 
controversy emerged from John Leslie’s election to the Chair of Mathematics and the 
religious implications of his Note Sixteen, Dugald Stewart interpreted the Moderate 
party’s campaign to censor secular education at Edinburgh University as part of the 
counter-Enlightenment movement. Stewart’s former students joined him in combating the 
Moderates with a superior philosophical argument where they exposed the dangers of 
expanding ecclesiastical and professorial pluralism beyond divinity studies. Although a 
faction of the Moderate party defended the Presbytery of Edinburgh’s conduct, other 
Moderates, such as Sir David Brewster (a natural philosopher) distanced themselves from 
their conduct whilst supporting the merits of pluralism. According to Brewster, Stewart’s 
circle, particularly John Playfair, failed to make a convincing argument for the 
‘incompatibility between the habits of clergymen and professors’.120 The defeat of the 
Moderate clergymen of Edinburgh’s campaign for pluralism did not end its practise 
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out of his way to revile, in a dogmatic and insulting manner, the Hebrew language…A man who would 
go out of his path, on an inquiry on the nature of heat, to recommend an impious work—and in a 
treatise on arithmetic, to cast an ignorant sarcasm on the language of the Bible, or to sneer at the 
fancies of one of the Apostles, must ever be an object of suspicion to those who hold the Scriptures in 
honour, and impiety in detestation’ O.B., Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 44 (November 1820): 
230. Francis Jefferey, Henry Cockburn and James Moncrieff defended Leslie in his libel case against 
William Blackwood on 22 July 1822 seeking £5000 in damages for ‘a series of libels, touching at once 
his character as a man of principle and honesty—his qualifications as a Professor—and his reputation 
as a man of science—which hold out all his studies and all his labours to the contempt of the world, 
whatever this magazine may find its way; and by which, at last, he is falsely accused of the infamous 
and disgraceful offence of corrupting the principles of the youth committed to his charge’. (Sir Walter 
Scott, ‘Professor John Leslie against William Blackwood, for a libel in “Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine”, The Edinburgh Annual Register, 15, (1823): 78-79). The jury found Blackwood guilty of 
libel and awarded Leslie £100 in damages. The circumstances surrounding Leslie vs Blackwood has 
yet to be fully explored. But evidence suggests that this case shared many similarities with Leslie’s 
earlier trial in the 1805 General Assembly.   
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within the party, but it certainly prevented its use as a condition of future appointments in 
the Faculty of Arts at Edinburgh University.  
 Stewart’s role in the Leslie case represented larger concerns than his defence of 
one individual who happened to be a former student. In justifying the intellectual and 
moral benefits of his programme of moral education, Stewart upheld central ‘Moderate’ 
values for fostering an enlightened and benevolent state of society. The considerable 
support for this ambition from men of letters and clergymen associated with the Popular 
party testified to a rekindled commitment to enlightened thought and promotion of the 
circumstances where it could thrive. In the year following the Leslie affair, an anonymous 
author wrote that ‘the voice of the enlightened and generous nation hath been lifted up to 
give to their names all the attractions by which wickedness can be distinguished; and that 
voice should be regarded as the voice of justice’.121 At the birth of a new century, 
Stewart’s victory in the Leslie affair symbolised a resurgence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment in defiance of counter-Enlightenment policies.   
 Tensions between late eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment thought and 
counter-Enlightenment policies existed in other parts of the Atlantic World. Since many 
of the circumstances that gave rise to Enlightenment and its counter-Enlightenment in 
Scotland—namely the diffusion of ‘Moderate’ values, Scottish philosophy, and the 
reception of the French Revolution—reverberated throughout the Atlantic World, did a 
version of the Scottish Enlightenment and its counter-Enlightenment exist in America’s 
early republic? Samuel Stanhope Smith, who taught contemporaneously with Stewart as 
professor of moral philosophy and seventh president of the College of New Jersey (1795-
1812), drew from ‘Moderate’ values and adapted Scottish philosophy in creating a 
distinct system of moral education at Princeton. His programme encountered a different 
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type of counter-Enlightenment whilst sharing many of the same objectives. Smith’s 
creation of the Princeton Enlightenment, his applied ethics, and the circumstances 
surrounding his tension with what he saw as two converging counter-Enlightenment 

































Creating Enlightenment at Princeton: Samuel Stanhope Smith’s programme of 





 The tensions between Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy and counter-
Enlightenment interests existed at institutions of higher education on either side of the 
Atlantic. As the professor of moral philosophy and president at the College of New Jersey 
(which later became Princeton University) from 1795 through 1812, Samuel Stanhope 
Smith shared Dugald Stewart’s enthusiasm for Scottish philosophy and Scottish 
‘Moderate’ values whilst combating counter-Enlightenment interests. Advising his step-
grandson on where best to further his education in 1797, George Washington wrote that 
‘no college has turned out better scholars or more estimable characters than Nassau [and] 
not is there any one whose president is thought more capable to direct a proper education 
than Dr. Smith’.1 In league with Stewart’s attempts to sustain the Scottish Enlightenment 
by entwining the cultivation of the mind and ‘Moderatism’ as a way to inform modernity, 
Smith fostered a new type of Enlightenment at Princeton that owed tribute to prominent 
Scottish Enlightenment thought and values. The second part of this thesis will focus 
primarily on Smith’s creation of a Princeton Enlightenment based on his system of moral 
education, his use of Scottish philosophy (particularly his treatment of the ‘moral 
faculty’), and finally, his perspective of alleged counter-Enlightenment activities at 
Princeton and its effect on his system of moral education. 
 In the decades that followed the birth of America’s new republic, Smith 
envisioned the dawn of an American didactic Enlightenment led by Princeton graduates. 
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1 At this time and afterwards, early Americans often referred to the College of New Jersey as Princeton 
after its location or ‘Nassau’ from its primary teaching building Nassau Hall. George Washington to 
George Washington Parke Custis, 23 July 1797, quoted in John Maclean Jr., History of the College of 
New Jersey from its Origin in 1746 to the Commencement of 1854, vol. two, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 
1877), 146.  
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He believed that the ‘diffusion of knowledge is the diffusion of virtue and of freedom’.2 
This ambition built upon John Witherspoon’s earlier reforms of the curriculum between 
1768 and 1776 that established the use of Scottish moral philosophy at Princeton. During 
this time, Witherspoon introduced Smith to the writings of Scottish moralists such as 
Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, James Beattie, and, of course, his own moral 
philosophy. Smith’s devotion to Witherspoon, however, did not imply that his moral 
philosophy drew primarily from Witherspoon’s philosophy (which will be examined in 
the following chapter) or that Smith’s administration furthered Witherspoon’s concept of 
a so-called ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’. Mark Noll suggests that ‘on a formal 
level, Witherspoon was not a distinguished thinker [and] he made his reputation by 
linking up republicanism, Enlightenment science, and Calvinistic Christianity’.3 Contrary 
to Witherspoon, the diffusion of Christian principles and republican ideals did not register 
as Smith’s paramount ambition for Princeton. Rather, he sought to rival Scottish and 
continental Enlightenments at Princeton through cultivating the mind and advancing 
‘liberal science’.  
 Stanhope Smith’s commitment toward fulfilling these overlapping objectives 
demarcated a change in Princeton’s purpose from educating enlightened ministers toward 
preparing future statesmen for public service. According to Smith, ‘the sons of 
America…are not inferior in genius [and] the same advantages of cultivation for them to 
be capable of equal perfection [require] fortunate circumstances of their grooming up less 
shackled with the prejudices of antiquity to lead the array in the investigation of truth’.4 
For Smith, America’s future legislators, judges, clergymen, and educators who graduated 
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2 Samuel Stanhope Smith to Benjamin Rush, 20 July 1783, Princeton University Library MS14429. 
 
3 Noll, Princeton, 294. 
 
4 Samuel Stanhope Smith to Benjamin Rush, 19 August 1787, PUL MS14428. 
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from Princeton would create an American Enlightenment through ‘moderate’ laws, 
enlightened policies, and as examples within their respective communities. To this 
desired effect, Smith suggested that an enlightened state of society developed when 
genius, prompted by virtuous zeal and blessed with subservience, matures the 
system and recommends it to justice. To such studies and efforts the public owes 
more obligations than it is sensible by gradual advances and innumerable small 
impressions frequently repeated the public mind is brought to admit improvement. 
Civility of manners thus grows by degrees out of liberalism, knowledge out of 
ignorance; its just systems out of error…these rays of intellectual light tend at 
length to form the moral world, and approximate it towards perfection.5  
 
Achieving this ambition, however, proved difficult for a variety of reasons: an increased 
religious hostility toward the teaching of metaphysics following the French Revolution, 
divisive party politics between Federalists and Republicans, and, above all, a religious 
campaign to revive Princeton’s tradition of training future clergymen. These factors 
contributed to Smith’s belief that counter-Enlightenment factions consisting of unruly 
students (identified by Smith as so-called ‘Jacobins’ who were distinct from French 
‘Jacobins’) and religious revivalists existed. The extremist or radical principles of these 
separate groups convinced Smith that they opposed the ‘Moderate’ purpose of the 
Princeton Enlightenment. Despite Smith’s interpretation of these different factions, 
neither religious revivalists nor Princeton’s unruly students identified their actions as 
being part of a counter-Enlightenment movement. Before these later tensions, Smith 
invested considerable care in creating his programme of moral education as an engine for 
Enlightenment.   
 At this time, the aims of Princeton’s education were defined largely by the ideas 
taught in Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy. In doing so, Smith shared Witherspoon’s 
enthusiasm for Scottish moral philosophy and its tradition of advancing philosophical 
inquiries in a pedagogical context. Similar to the reasons why Dugald Stewart supported 
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5 Samuel Stanhope Smith to Benjamin Rush, 27 August 1787, PUL MS14429. 
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the secular study of the arts and sciences, Smith believed that a properly regulated system 
of moral education refined manners, improved civility, and assisted in cultivating the 
‘intellectual, active and moral powers of the mind’. In support of these possible results, 
Smith wrote shortly after being elected president that ‘the time is, I believe, now come or 
nearly so…that three entire years be employed in the different branches of art and 
science’.6 Yet the circumstances in which Smith and Stewart taught demanded different 
considerations in preparing young men for public life. The different political, 
institutional, and religious contexts at Edinburgh and Princeton greatly affected how 
Stewart and Smith encouraged Enlightenment through their respective systems of moral 
education. How and why Smith created Enlightenment at Princeton is the focus of this 
chapter. 
 I first discuss how Smith, as the son of a religious revivalist, would later advocate 
Scottish ‘Moderate’ values, the significant role of religious revivalism at Princeton, and 
the importance of Witherspoon’s administration. Then I examine how Smith justified 
expanding ‘liberal science’ whilst Princeton’s seminary training declined. Finally, I 
explore how Smith’s reforms of the curriculum appealed to Scottish Enlightenment ideas 
and values in creating the Princeton Enlightenment. In the course of addressing these 
questions, this chapter argues that Smith’s system of moral education, as the basis for his 
wider reforms of the curriculum, testified to the existence of a new type of a Princeton 
Enlightenment.   
 
From Revivalism to Common Sense: Smith’s connections to Princeton 
 
 An explanation of the tensions between Samuel Stanhope Smith’s system of 
moral education and counter-Enlightenment factions must first consider Smith’s and 
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6 Smith to Benjamin Rush, 1796, quoted in Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, Princeton, 1746-1896, 
(PUP, 1946), 123.  
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Princeton’s relationship with religious revivalism. From what little is known of Smith’s 
life (born on 15th March 1751 at Pequea, Pennsylvania and died 19th March 1819 at 
Princeton, New Jersey), he displayed an intellectual curiosity that often caused conflict as 
he pursued philosophical truths. His biographer Fredrick Beasley wrote that even at a 
young age ‘Smith made the best of his opportunities, and was distinguished for his 
improvement in every branch to which he directed his attention’.7 His diverse interests in 
morals, theology, mathematics, history, poetry, metaphysics, political economy, Belles 
Lettres and natural sciences were useful for an administrator of liberal education. While 
his contributions to many of these fields remained amateur, Smith received the reputation 
‘as the most eloquent and learned divine among his contemporaries’ by excelling in 
metaphysical philosophy and reforming Princeton’s curriculum.8 Yet Smith did not 
benefit from the same effects of an enlightened culture as Dugald Stewart’s childhood 
education in Edinburgh. Smith’s formative years between 1751 and 1766 were heavily 
influenced by the on-going religious controversy over the ‘Great Awakening’.9 Since 
these persistent religious tensions affected the founding and purpose of the College of 
New Jersey (which Smith’s family and friends were centrally associated), a brief survey 
of these concerns suggests why his later adoption of Scottish ‘Moderate’ values (most 
notably his promotion of ‘enlightened learning’) and his use of Scottish philosophy was 
peculiar in light of his upbringing.  
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7 Fredrick Beasley, ‘An Account of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith’, 
Analectic Magazine, n.s., 1, (June 1820): 443. 
 
8 Philip Lindsley to Rev Dr Sprague, 2 February 1818, quoted in Maclean, HCNJ, 144. 
 
9 See Douglas Sweeney, ‘Evangelical tradition in America’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan 
Edwards, edited by Stephen Stein, (CUP, 2007), 227-228.  
 
Creating Enlightenment at Princeton ,&$!
 In response to unprecedented crowds who gathered in a ‘revival of religion’ (later 
known as the ‘Great Awakening’) during the early 1740s,10 the Synod of Philadelphia 
supporting orthodox Calvinistic views (Old Side) and the Synod of New York endorsing 
religious revivalism (New Side) effectively split American Presbyterianism.11 Despite 
differing commercial and Protestant denominational divisions, Frank Lambert suggests 
that the thirteen American colonies ‘witnessed the same Spirit at work, the same sudden 
outburst of awakening, the same rapid spread of the revival, and the same effects on 
people’.12 Of its leaders, George Whitefield’s ‘emotional’ sermons and interpretation of 
revelation resonated with the prominent American revivalists Jonathan Edwards, William 
Tennent Sr., Gilbert Tennent, Samuel Blair and later Robert Smith.13 Their ‘emotional’ 
sermons emphasised a re-birth after accepting the ‘Spirit’ of Christ. For American 
revivalists, the ‘new birth’ signified the conversion experience of shedding a former life 
with the acceptance of ‘God’s Grace’ as an emotional and spiritual transformation.14 
Jonathan Edwards remarked that ‘natural men have not the Spirit; and Christ teaches the 
necessity of a new birth, or of being born of the Spirit, from this, that he that is born of 
the flesh, has only flesh, and no spirit’.15 New Light ministers, consequently, maintained 
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10 See Thomas Kidd, The Great Awakening: The roots of evangelical Christianity in colonial America, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 43-47. Joseph Tracy among others popularised the 
characterization of the 1730-1740 American religious revivals as the ‘Great Awakening’ in the early 
1840s. For information on the coining of this description see Joseph Tracy, The Great Awakening: A 
history of the revival of religion in the time of Edwards and Whitefield, (Boston: Charles Tappan, 
1845). For the purpose of this chapter, I shall reference the 1730-1740s American religious revivals as 
the ‘Great Awakening’. 
 
11 See Marliyn Westerkamp, Triumph of the Laity: Scots-Irish piety and the Great Awakening, 1625-
1760, (OUP, 1988), 15-30; Mark Noll, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The age of Edwards, Whitefield 
and the Wesleys, (Westmont, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004). 
 
12 Frank Lambert, Inventing the “Great Awakening”, (PUP, 1999), 4.  
 
13Ibid., 93-125. The English Methodist preacher George Whitefield had a significant influence in 
creating the ‘Great Awakening’ during his seven tours of the thirteen colonies between 1739 and 1741. 
 
14 See Donald Harvey Meyer, The Democratic Enlightenment, (New York: Putnam, 1976), 23-38. 
 
15 Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, (Boston: Kneeland and Green, 
1746), 114. For further reading on Edwards see Mark Noll, America’s God: from Jonathan Edwards to 
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that only ‘reborn’ ministers understood this ‘conversion experience’ and could properly 
guide a congregation toward their ‘new birth’.16 In contrast, Old Light ministers were 
sceptical that the ‘conversion experience’ best conveyed the complexities of the Calvinist 
path toward salvation and (apart from their success in attracting new converts) New Light 
ministers were seen by them as lacking the necessary training to fulfil other important 
responsibilities of the ministry.17 Meanwhile, the surge of religious revivals across British 
North America created a demand for more New Light ministers. From this demand, 
numerous Presbyterian academies (located mostly in the middle colonies) flourished in 
the wake of the 1740s ‘Great Awakening’.18  
 The emergence of Presbyterian academies modelled after William Tennent Sr.’s 
‘Log College’ became a point of tension between the Old Side and New Side.19 John 
Maclean Jr. later wrote that the ‘Log College’ focused more on  
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Abraham Lincoln, (OUP, 2005); Wilson Kimnach, ‘Edwards as preacher,’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Jonathan Edwards, edited by Stephen Stein, (CUP, 2007), 103-123; Harry Stout, 
‘Edwards as revivalist’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards, edited by Stephen Stein, 
(CUP, 2007), 125-143. 
   
16 For further reading on how the Old Light and New Light theology differed see Amy Schrager Lang, 
“‘A Flood of Errors”: Chauncy and Edwards in the Great Awakening’, in Jonathan Edwards and the 
American Experience, edited by Nathan Hatch and Harry Stout, (OUP, 1988), 160-177. The revivalist 
John Blair remarked that ‘[i]n this New Birth, a man can only perceive the exercises of divine life in 
his heart, and by scriptural observations on these, infer what sort of life he lives, or form conclusions 
about its nature and principle’ (John Blair, ‘Observations on Regeneration,’ in Sermons and Essays by 
the Tennents and their Contemporaries, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1856), 192). 
For further reading on how the ‘Great Awakening’ reshaped the structure of religion in America see 
Timothy Hall, Contested Boundaries: itinerancy and the reshaping of the Colonial American religious 
world, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994).    
 
17 Ned Landsman, From Colonials to Provincials: American thought and culture, 1680-1760, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 120. 
 
18 Douglas Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal, (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1971), 36-72.  
 
19 The ‘Log College,’ established between 1726 and 1728 by William Tennent Sr. in Neshaminy, 
Pennsylvania, advanced American revivalist beliefs within Irish/Scottish Presbyterian academic models 
(Ibid., 41).  In describing the ‘Log College’, Whitefield remarked that ‘Mr. Tennent and his brethren in 
presbytery, intend breeding up gracious youths for our Lord’s vineyard. This place wherein the young men 
now study, is a log house, about twenty feet long, and nearly as many broad. From this despised place, 
seven or eight worthy ministers of Jesus have been sent forth, and a foundation is now laying for the 
instruction of many others’ (George Whitefield, Journals, 22 November 1739, in Memoirs of Rev. George 
Whitefield, edited by John Gillies, (New Haven: Joseph Barber, 1834), n43). Despite objections from Old 
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personal piety and religious experience, in candidates for the ministry, than of a 
complete knowledge of both their preparatory and their professional studies, [and] it 
is equally true that at this school the great benefits of mental discipline and of a 
familiar acquaintance with the several branches of philosophy and of polite learning 
were not estimated at their full value.20  
 
In addition to conflicting opinions of the ‘conversion experience’, the absence of in-depth 
literary and philosophical training caused the Old Light ministers to devalue the curricula 
at these academies. This opinion was consistent with the belief that ministers should also 
serve as intellectual leaders of their respective congregation. As Henry May has shown 
‘the minister was not only the best-educated man but the most in touch with the outside 
world’.21 This Old Side and New Side controversy served as the backdrop of Stanhope 
Smith’s youthful years and the catalyst for the establishment of the College of New 
Jersey.   
 In response to the Old Light ministers’ opposition to ordaining graduates of 
Presbyterian academies, Gilbert Tennent and Jonathan Dickinson established the College 
of New Jersey from the foundations of the ‘Log College’. With New Jersey governor 
John Hamilton’s and King George II’s stamp of approval, the chartered College 
legitimised the training and ordination of New Light ministers.22 William Armstrong Dod 
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Light ministers, a number of academies followed the ‘Log College’ example: Samuel Blair’s Fagg’s Manor 
(established 1739), Samuel Finley’s Nottingham Academy (established 1744), and Robert Smith’s Pequea 
Academy (established 1750). Aaron Burr Sr. and Jonathan Dickinson also established lesser-known 
Presbyterian academies in New Jersey circa 1740 (Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American 
College Ideal, 281-282). 
 
20 Maclean, HCNJ, 30-1. 
  
21 Henry May, The Enlightenment in America, (OUP, 1976), 51. 
 
22 The College of New Jersey, chartered in 1746 from the approval of John Hamilton, marked the first 
instance of establishing an institution of higher education from the approval of a governor. The General 
Court of Massachusetts Bay with the consent of Massachusetts’ governor approved Harvard’s charter, 
Yale received approval from the General Assembly of Connecticut, and William and Mary’s charter 
was granted by King William (Maclean, HCNJ, 44; College of New Jersey Charter found at PUA 
MSAC120). Early accounts of the College illustrate how religion, particularly the tenets of revivalism, 
shaped its initial educational purpose. During a fund raising tour of Britain in 1754, Gilbert Tennent 
and Samuel Davies reported to potential patrons that their students exhibited ‘promising genius, 
Calvinistic principles, and in the judgement of charity, experimentally acquainted with the work of 
saving grace, and to have a distinguished zeal for the glory of God, and salvation of men’ (Gilbert 
Tennent and Samuel Davies to the Synod of New York, 25 October 1754, in Records of the 
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later wrote that ‘it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the College of New Jersey is 
not only religious in its principles, but was the necessary and only possible product of 
religion’.23 As a further testament to the College’s New Side attachments, its first five 
presidents [Jonathan Dickinson (1747), Aaron Burr, Sr. (1748-1757), Jonathan Edwards 
(1758), Samuel Davies (1759-1761), and Samuel Finley (1761-1766)] first made their 
reputations as revivalists. Samuel Monk suggests that ‘the homogeneity of the 
Presbyterian community into which he [Smith] was born accounts for the apparent 
inbreeding which connected him by blood or by association with the men who founded 
the college or who guided it throughout its first half-century’.24 For example, Smith’s 
maternal grandfather Samuel Blair Sr. served as one of the College’s founding trustees. 
His father, Robert Smith (the son of a Presbyterian minister who emigrated from Ireland), 
married Blair’s daughter Elizabeth and later established the Pequea Academy (1750).25 
Afterwards, Robert Smith and his youngest son (John) served on Princeton’s Board of 
Trustees. In addition to his family’s service as trustees, his father was a close friend of 
Samuel Davies (College president 1759-1761) who was taught by his maternal 
grandfather at Fagg’s Manor; Samuel Finley (College president 1761-1766) baptised 
Stanhope Smith; his maternal uncle Samuel Blair Jr. was the interim College president 
(1766-1768); and John Witherspoon (College president 1768-1794) would later become 
his father in-law in 1775. These connections certainly influenced Smith’s decision to 
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Presbyterian Church, 264). As Bryan LeBeau has shown ‘approximately 63 percent of the Presbyterian 
ministers who entered the Synod of Philadelphia had been educated abroad [and] another 28 percent 
had graduated from New England colleges’ (Bryan LeBeau, Jonathan Dickinson and the Formative 
Years of American Presbyterianism, (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 165). The 
College of New Jersey was meant to offer seminary training for future American clergymen.  
 
23 William Armstrong Dod, History of the College of New Jersey: from is commencement, A.D., 1746 
to 1783, (PUP, 1844), 2. 
 
24 Samuel Holt Monk, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith (1751-1812): Friend of Rational Liberty’, in The Lives 
of Eighteen from Princeton, edited by William Thorp, (PUP, 1946), 86.  
 
25 See Jacob Beam, ‘Dr. Robert Smith’s Academy at Pequea, Pennsylvania’, Journal of the 
Presbyterian Historical Society, 8, (1915): 145-161.   
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continue his seminary preparation at the College of New Jersey after graduating from 
Pequea Academy in 1766 and later provided significant advantages in his academic 
career as a student (1766-1769), tutor (1771-1773), professor (1779-1812), vice-president 
(1786-1794), and president (1795-1812) at Princeton.26  
 Despite the gradual reunification of the Synods of Philadelphia and New York 
between 1752 and 1758, lingering divisions persisted concerning the religious purpose of 
the College of New Jersey. After the death of President Samuel Finley in 1766, the 
Princeton trustees sought to bridge the gap between the New Side and Old Side divisions 
with the appointment of a new president.27 The decision to elect John Witherspoon on 
19th November 1766 (who as an Evangelical minister achieved earlier fame in the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland) appeared agreeable to both Old and New 
Light ministers since he did not participate in the earlier ecclesiastical schism and valued 
enlightened education.28 The trustees’ persistence persuaded Witherspoon and, more 
importantly Rush implied, his wife to accept this opportunity.29 Witherspoon’s election 
dawned a new age of learning at Princeton that included Scottish Enlightenment ideas 
and values.  
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26 Smith’s mastery of Latin and Greek under his training at his father’s Pequea Academy permitted him 
to enter Princeton’s junior class at the age of sixteen. After the graduating class of 1769, entering 
students were required to complete all four years of study at Princeton (Princeton’s Board of Trustees 
Minutes, vol. 1, PUA AC120, College mandate on 30 September 1767, 134-40). Henceforth the Board 
of Trustee Minutes will be referred to as TM.  
 
27 See Jonathan Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750-
1790, (OUP, 2011), 468. 
 
28 TM, 128. The Board were probably made aware of Witherspoon’s accomplishments from the 
Scottish connections that Davies and Tennent established during their earlier fund raising tour of 
Britain in 1754.   
 
29 Despite the best efforts of Benjamin Rush (Princeton class of 1760 and then Edinburgh University 
medical student from 1766 to 1769), Witherspoon declined Princeton’s offer (Rush to Witherspoon, 15 
December 1767, PUL Witherspoon Collection C0274). Instead of appointing Francis Alison (an Old 
Light minister and vice-president of the College of Philadelphia) who desired the office, the Trustees 
offered the presidency to Stanhope Smith’s maternal uncle Samuel Blair on 30th September 1767 who 
was at the time Princeton’s interim president (TM, 141). But the 26 year-old Princeton graduate (class 
of 1760) and minister of Old South Boston Church also declined the permanent office. Upon the urging 
of the Trustees, Rush once again met with Witherspoon and his wife in December 1767 and convinced 
them to reconsider Princeton.  
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 On 17th August 1768, Witherspoon arrived at Princeton and established what 
would become the tone of his administration with a ‘Latin inaugural address on the union 
of Piety and Science’.30 Witherspoon reformed Princeton’s curriculum to reflect his value 
of practical knowledge that strengthened the union of reason and revealed religion. He 
claimed that ‘if the Scripture is true, the discoveries of reason cannot be contrary to it’.31 
Upon his arrival at Princeton Witherspoon observed colonial hostility toward British 
imperial policies, particularly mounting concerns over taxation.32 In the decades that 
followed, this dissatisfaction with British rule developed into revolutionary principles, 
which considerably influenced the experience of a Princeton education. For example, 
Witherspoon’s lectures of moral philosophy, sermons at Princeton, and political 
pamphlets leading up to and during the American Revolution advanced his commitment 
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30 The Trustee Minutes did not record a ceremony that welcomed Witherspoon, but Ashbel Green’s 
later research on Witherspoon’s manuscripts found evidence of the subject of Witherspoon’s address 
that he delivered during his first meeting with the Board of Trustees and students (Maclean, HCNJ, 
300).  
 
31 John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, edited by Ashbel Green, (Philadelphia: William 
Woodward, 1822), 21. This revised edition of Witherspoon’s lectures denoted areas that Green 
emphasised during his later presidency of Princeton. Green’s interpretation of Witherspoon’s moral 
thought had a central role in Smith’s tensions with religious revivalists. At the heart of this conflict was 
Green’s belief that Smith perverted Witherspoon’s legacy and misinterpreted his moral philosophy. 
Since this context has a bearing on the scope of this examination (which will be discussed in the 
following chapters), I shall reference this edition in discussing Witherspoon’s lectures of moral 
philosophy.   
 
32 Upon Witherspoon’s 1768 arrival, colonial Americans resisted British taxes, the continued presence 
of British troops (mostly in Boston), and reasserted their perceived identity and rights within the British 
Empire (Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic 1763-89, revised edition, (University of Chicago 
Press, 1977), 14-41). The College of New Jersey’s previous connections with the ‘Great Awakening,’ 
which challenged the authority of established religious institutions, contributed to the Princetonians’ 
defiance against British authority (Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, (HUP, 1992), 249). The Battle of Princeton on 3 January 1777 wrought havoc on 
Princeton’s campus and the decline in students during the war jeopardised the survival of College 
(Ford Henry Jones, The Scotch-Irish in America, (PUP, 1915), 447-8). During the battle, Nassau Hall, 
Princeton’s edifice, served as barracks for British soldiers, which received a direct assault by the 
Continental army led by Hugh Mercer. As a result, ‘the inside of the church, as well as of the College 
edifice, was destroyed by the British and American armies’ (Maclean, HCNJ, 265). Of the four courses 
Witherspoon taught, only his notes on moral philosophy and eloquence survived the pillaging of 
British soldiers and the burning of his manuscripts by his second wife (Gordon Tait, The Piety of John 
Witherspoon: Pew, Pulpit and Public Forum, (Louisville: Geneva Press, 2001), xvii).      
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toward realising American political independence.33 In addition to these political 
concerns, Witherspoon reformed the curriculum after his earlier experiences as a graduate 
of Edinburgh University where he counted prominent ‘Moderates’ (William Robertson 
and Hugh Blair) as classmates.34 Despite his earlier opposition to the Moderate party in 
the Church of Scotland and in print, he endorsed central ‘Moderate’ beliefs at Princeton.35 
In this selective appeal to Scottish ‘Moderate’ values, Witherspoon remarked to the 1775 
graduating class that  
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33 Two months before signing the American Declaration of Independence, Witherspoon preached to his 
students ‘that all the disorderly passions of men, whether exposing the innocent to private injury or whether 
they are the arrows of divine judgment in public calamity, shall in the end, be to the praise of God: Or, to 
apply it more particularly to the present state of the American Colonies, and the plague of war,--The 
ambition of mistaken princes, the cunning and cruelty of oppressive and corrupt ministers, and even the 
inhumanity of brutal soldiers, however dreadful, shall finally promote the glory of God, and in the mean-
time, while the storm continues, his mercy and kindness shall appear in prescribing bounds to their rage and 
fury…I leave this as a matter of conjecture than certainty; but observe, that if your cause is just,--if your 
principles are pure,--and if your conduct is prudent, you need not fear the multitude of opposing hosts’ 
(John Witherspoon, ‘The dominion of Providence over the passions of men,’ sermon at Princeton on 17 
May 1776, second edition, (Philadelphia and Glasgow, 1777), 9, 28). His political sermons also assisted in 
claiming Providence on the side of the American revolutionary cause and in redirecting the American 
resistance to Imperial economic encroachment, exemplified in the Stamp Act (1765), Townshend Acts 
(1767), and the Intolerable or Coercive Acts (1774), to a question of rightful sovereignty. For further 
reading on the Stamp Act, Townshend Acts, and Coercive Acts see Francis Cogliano, Revolutionary 
America, 1763-1815: A political history, (London: Routledge, 2000), chapters one and two. For further 
reading on Witherspoon’s politics see Jeffrey Morrison, John Witherspoon and the Founding of the 
American Republic, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Scott Segrest, America and the 
Political Philosophy of Common Sense, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2010). 
 
34 Witherspoon’s curriculum was as follows. The first year of study involved studying Greek 
Testament, Sallust, Lucian, Cicero, and Mair’s Introduction to Latin Syntax. In the second year, 
students studied Xenophon, Cicero, Homer, Horace, Roman Antiquities, Geography, Arithmetic, 
English Grammar and Composition. The third year students studied algebra, geometry, trigonometry, 
practical geometry, conic sections, natural philosophy, and English grammar and composition. In the 
final year, students studied natural and moral philosophy, criticism, chronology (history), logic, and the 
classics (Maclean, History, 367). In addition to teaching moral philosophy, Witherspoon lectured on 
Chronology (history), Eloquence, and Divinity. He also established a preparatory school attached to 
Princeton that taught the rudiments of composition, Latin, Greek, and mathematics. This school 
permitted Witherspoon to instruct more advanced lessons as students commenced their studies at 
Princeton. In reference to Princeton’s preparatory school, Witherspoon remarked that ‘in the College 
the Trustees chuse [sic] the Teachers and make the Laws and the faculty execute them. In the School I 
have the Sole Right of chusing [sic] the Teachers and directing everything that is done in it. We are 
obliged to contend against the Prejudices of the Times which are much against the ancient Languages 
menacing particularly the Latin and Greek. Yet these are plainly the fountains both of Science and 
History as well as they furnish us with the Standard of Taste’ (Witherspoon to George Tucker, 1 May 
1787, PUL MS 2001-49). 
 
35 See Thomas Ahnert, ‘Clergymen as polite philosophers: Douglas and the conflict between 
Moderates and Orthodox in the Scottish Enlightenment’, Intellectual History Review, 18:3, (2008): 
375-383. For further reading on Witherspoon’s satirical attack against Moderate clergymen see John 
Witherspoon, Ecclesiastical Characteristics: of, the Arcana of Church Policy, (Edinburgh, 1753).! 
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It hath been generally a favourite point with me, to recommend the union of piety 
and literature, and to guard young persons against the opposite extremes. We see 
sometimes the pride of unsanctified knowledge do great injury to religion; and on the 
other hand, we find some persons of real piety, despising human learning, and 
disgracing the most glorious truths, by a meanness and indecency hardly sufferable 
in their manner of handling them. On this account, industry and application to study 
is of the utmost importance to those who are intended for the office of the ministry.36 
 
Witherspoon’s use of ‘Moderate’ values in reforming Princeton’s curriculum did not 
imply he attempted to replicate the ‘Moderates’ of Edinburgh’s example or that he 
adopted every ‘Moderate’ belief. As he indicated, only some ‘Moderate’ beliefs were 
applicable in ‘the office of the ministry’.37 While the Revolution wrought havoc on the 
campus, reduced the student population, and for a brief period between 1777 and 1779 
suspended classes, his paramount concern at Princeton was educating enlightened 
ministers, albeit interrupted by the circumstances of war and the interests of nation 
building. Princeton’s institutional purpose under Witherspoon would later prove 
important to how Smith’s system was received amongst conservative Evangelicals.   
 As Witherspoon’s first presidential order, he removed George Berkeley’s 
philosophy from the curriculum and reformed the College with an emphasis on modern 
Scottish philosophical writings. According to Philip Lindsley, ‘when Dr. Witherspoon 
arrived from Scotland, he brought with him the works of several distinguished Scottish 
philosophical writers, particularly Reid and Beattie’.38 Joseph Periam, then professor of 
mathematics and natural philosophy, was said to be ‘one of the zealous adherents that 
Bishop Berkeley’s idealism had found in America, and under his influence [Stanhope] 
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36 John Witherspoon, ‘An Address to the Students of the Senior Class at the 23 September 1775 
Princeton Commencement’, in The Works of Rev. John Witherspoon, edited by Samuel Stanhope 
Smith, second edition, vol. three, (Philadelphia: Woodward, 1802), 105. 
 
37 On how Witherspoon’s administration (particularly during the American Revolution) selectively 
drew from Scottish influences see Gideon Mailer, ‘Anglo-Scottish Union and John Witherspoon’s 
American Revolution’, WMQ, 67:4, (Oct., 2010): 709-746. 
   
38 Phillip Lindsley, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith, D.D., LLD’, in Annals of the American Pulpit from the 
early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five, edited by 
William Sprague, (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1859), 3:336. 
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Smith adopted Berkeley’s philosophy’.39 Berkeley’s ‘immaterialism’ was believed to 
support natural religion by suggesting that God implanted ideas of the external world in 
the mind and the external world existed as a reflection (albeit often accurate) of the 
mind.40 In theory, this permitted avoiding the distractions of the external world as a way 
to better understand God’s revealed truths and avoid material vices. Witherspoon 
commented that ‘the immaterial system is a wild and ridiculous attempt to unsettle the 
principles of common sense by metaphysical reasoning, which can hardly produce 
anything but contempt in the generality of persons who hear it’.41 In the short period 
between 1768 and 1769, Witherspoon convinced Smith of the merits of Scottish moralists 
and introduced him to selective Scottish ‘Moderate’ values whilst not completely 
overturning his earlier opposition to the ‘Moderates’ of Edinburgh.42 In doing so, he drew 
heavily from theorists associated with the so-called Scottish School of Common Sense. 
Witherspoon taught: 
Some late writers have advanced with great apparent reason, that there are certain 
first principles of dictates of common sense, which are either simple perceptions, or 
seen with intuitive evidence. These are the foundation of all reasoning, and without 
them, to reason is a word without a meaning.43 
 
Like James Beattie (professor of moral philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen 
University from 1760 to 1803), Witherspoon’s support of Reid’s ‘principles of common 
sense’ traced a closer link between Scripture and faculties of the mind than Reid had 
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39 Monk, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith’, 89. 
 
40 Berkeley wrote ‘that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, 
inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense’ (George Berkeley, The Works of 
George Berkeley, vol. one, (London: Richard Priestly, 1820), 31). 
 
41 Witherspoon, Lectures, 21. 
 
42 Despite Smith’s earlier acceptance of Berkley’s system, ‘under the more practical view of things 
presented by Dr. Witherspoon in his lectures on Moral Philosophy, he embraced the opinions of his 
new preceptor’ (Maclean, HCNJ, 404). 
 
43 Witherspoon, Lectures, 50. 
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intended in his lectures and Inquiry (1764).44 Furthermore, Noll has alluded to a rivalry 
between Witherspoon and Reid regarding who conceived this philosophical approach.45 
Witherspoon taught ‘that the whole of Scripture is perfectly agreeable to sound 
philosophy; yet certainly it was never intended to teach us everything’.46 He was certainly 
conscious of Princeton’s religious tradition and recognised that the teaching of morals 
independent of revelation would likely generate controversy at a New Light seminary. 
Without committing to Reid’s views on natural religion, he taught Francis Hutcheson’s 
theory that ‘the moral sense implies also a sense of obligation, that such things are right 
and others wrong; that we are bound in duty to the one, and that our conduct is hateful, 
blameable, and deserving of punishment, if we do the contrary’.47 While he praised the 
earlier ideas of his countrymen, he guarded against tension with religious orthodoxy by 
not offering new insights or detailed discussions of controversial metaphysical themes. 
He warned his students that ‘it is easy to raise metaphysical subtleties, and confound the 
understanding on such subjects’.48 Witherspoon, therefore, implied an agreement with 
particular philosophical themes in Scottish philosophy and its methodology whilst not 
confining his opinion to these ideas. His moral philosophy did not vacillate between the 
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44 James Beattie joined Reid as a member of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society also known as the 
‘Wise Club’ in 1760. He was best known for his writings in support of the abolition of human slavery. 
As a Presbyterian divine, his moral thought incorporated a closer link with Scripture than Reid had 
attempted at that time. Beattie wrote that ‘it is indeed impossible to understand the doctrines of our 
religion, and not to wish at least that they may be true: for they exhibit the most comfortable views of 
God and his providence; they recommend the purest and most perfect morality; and they breathe 
nothing throughout, but benevolence, equity, and peace. And one may venture to affirm, that no man 
ever wished the gospel to be true, who did not find it so’ (James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 
vol. one, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1790), 1:402-403).  
 
45 Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 189. Yet no evidence has surfaced that Reid defended his ideas 
against Witherspoon’s claim that his ideas on this system predated Reid’s Inquiry. See John 
Witherspoon, ‘Remarked on an Essay on Human Liberty’, The Scots Magazine, 15, (1753): 165-170. 
 
46 Witherspoon, Lectures, 7.  
 
47 Ibid., 28.  
 
48 Ibid., 50.  
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merit and demerit of metaphysics but rather did not engage in its treatment as his Scottish 
contemporaries, such as Reid, attempted. He justified his brief discussion of 
metaphysicians by claiming that ‘I do not know anything that serves more for the support 
of religion than to see, from the different and opposite systems of philosophers, that there 
is nothing certain in their schemes, but what is coincident with the word of God’.49 
Stanhope Smith, however, was far less guarded than Witherspoon in his later use of 
Scottish philosophy.  
 Smith excelled in his studies at Princeton and graduated valedictorian in 1769 at 
the first commencement of Witherspoon’s presidency.50 After graduation Smith 
continued his seminary training with his father at Pequea Academy. At that time, Smith 
continued his interest in ‘polite’ literature through the writings of Addison, Pope, and 
Swift as well as expanding his knowledge of philosophy and divinity with a particular 
interest in Locke, Butler and Edwards. Smith returned to Princeton the following year to 
complete his divinity studies with Witherspoon where he remained as a tutor of Belles-
Lettres until 1773. Shortly after receiving a license to preach by the presbytery of New 
Castel in Pennsylvania, Smith contracted tuberculosis, which he struggled with until his 
death in 1819.51 Consequently, Smith relocated to Virginia as a missionary where the 
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49 Ibid., 6. 
 
50 James Madison, then a Princeton student, commented that ‘the head oration, which is always given 
to the greatest scholar by the President and Tutors, was pronounced in Latin by Mr. Samuel Smith’ 
(James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol. one, (Philadelphia: Lippencott, 
1865), 2). See Ralph Ketcham, ‘James Madison at Princeton’, PULC, 28, (1966): 24-54.  
 
51 Smith was known to carry a bloodletting kit with him to use when he felt the symptoms of his 
tuberculosis worsening and the passage of the symptoms persuaded him of its medical merit as a form 
of treatment. On one occasion, Smith informed Rush that he drained ‘20 oz of blood’ from a student 
who suffered from a high fever and delirium caused by yellow fever. He reported that the student’s 
high pulse rate lessened as a result of the bloodletting, which certainly resulted from the loss of blood 
(Smith to Rush on 7 November (year unknown). PUL MS14429). This episode probably occurred 
around the yellow fever epidemic between 1793 and 1794. Smith’s interest in treating yellow fever 
became more personal when he lost his wife to the disease on 19 October 1793. Furthermore, Rush 
shared Smith’s reaction to the loss of his wife as an example of grieving in his treatise on yellow fever 
(Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquires and Observations, vol. three, second edition, (Philadelphia: Conrad 
and Co., 1805), 307).   
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climate was thought more agreeable to his condition.52 In Virginia, Smith followed his 
father’s and maternal grandfather’s earlier example by establishing the ‘Prince Edward 
Academy’ in 1774. After receiving a favourable response in its first year the Academy 
expanded the following year under the name Hampden-Sydney College.53 But this 
institution did not conform to the Presbyterian academy paradigm. As Hampden-
Sydney’s founding president, Smith encouraged the refinement of ‘polite’ taste and 
philosophy and modelled the curriculum after Witherspoon’s Princeton.54 He also 
promoted a student militia (led by his younger brother John who graduated from 
Princeton in 1773) whose members joined many Princeton students as officers and 
soldiers in the Continental army.55 In his final year as president of Hampden-Sydney in 
1778, Smith pondered the powers of the mind and, in particular, expressed an interest in 
the theme of ‘causation’. In a letter to James Madison, Smith wrote: 
 You have frequently attacked me on that knotty question of liberty and necessity 
that has so much embarrassed philosophers, and has raised such furious war among 
divines. I have lately had occasion to write on philosophical subjects, and among 
others, on this question. I have read over your objections against the doctrine of 
moral liberty, for practically you seem to be one of its disciples. I remember the 
manner in which you have formerly expressed yourself upon that intricate subject; 
and, indeed, that express the difficulties that occurred to me in attempting to solve 
it.56  
 
Smith’s previous letter that he referenced has yet to surface, but his response indicates 
that he held similar ideas as Reid on the theme of ‘causation’ more than a decade before 
the publication of Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). Over the 
following decades, Smith developed these ideas and later applied them as central to his 
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52 Noll, Princeton, 68.  
 
53 Ibid.  
 
54 See E.T. Crowson, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith: A Founder of Hampden-Sydney College’, Virginia 
Cavalcade, 24, (Autumn 1974): 53-60. 
 
55 Noll, Princeton, 68. 
 
56 Madison, Life, 187-188. 
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moral philosophy. His pursuits of the mind did not retreat from the realities of war that 
nearly ruined his alma mater in the Battle of Princeton (1777). Upon the urging of 
Witherspoon, Smith left Hampden-Sydney to the care of his brother and returned to 
salvage a decimated Princeton in 1779.  
 As a signer of the Declaration of Independence and member of the Second 
Continental Congress (1776-1782), Witherspoon could not regularly attend to the College 
repairs and lectures for fear of British arrest. In turn, he required someone to conduct 
College affairs in his absence. With his sons serving in the Continental army, 
Witherspoon entrusted these responsibilities to Smith (whose struggle with tuberculosis 
prevented him from military service). On 29th September 1779, the Board of Trustees 
(including Robert Smith) elected Stanhope Smith as professor of ‘Moral Philosophy and 
Metaphysics’.57 Since this appointment greatly reduced Witherspoon’s teaching 
responsibilities, he offered ‘at the same time to resign to him one half of his own 
salary’.58 For the remainder of Witherspoon’s administration, Smith absorbed more and 
more of his administrative and teaching responsibilities as Witherspoon’s eyesight 
worsened until he finally succumbed to blindness. For example, Smith took an active role 
in circulating letters to alumni soliciting funds for College repairs and a replacement for 
the damaged scientific apparatus (the Rittenhouse orrery).59 Furthermore, the trustees 
enlarged Smith’s responsibilities on 22nd October 1783 by appointing him as the 
professor of the divinity and later officially electing him vice-president on 27th September 
1786 (though he performed the tasks of this office since his 1779 return).60   
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57 TM, 29 September 1779, 222.  
 
58 Ibid., 222-3. 
 
59 Smith to Rev Dr. Sproat in 1790, PUL MS9626. It was said that British and Continental soldiers 
absconded with pieces of the Rittenhouse orrery after the Battle of Princeton.     
 
60 Trustee meeting on 22 October 1783, 240-242. By 1784, Smith’s lectures on divinity replaced Albert 
Schultens’ publications on Hebrew grammar with Rev Robertson’s texts (Smith to Robertson on 24 
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 During the decline of the Articles of Confederation, Smith and Witherspoon 
joined the Federalist cause in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates between 1787 
and 1788. Once again, national politics were central to the thought and ideals at 
Princeton. The demands of lecturing and to a significant degree the administration of the 
College during the final decade of the Witherspoon administration did not prevent Smith 
from furthering his philosophical interests. Philadelphia’s American Philosophical 
Society served as an ideal forum for Smith to test his ideas amongst prominent members 
of America’s scientific community. As Nina Reid-Maroney suggests, the ‘Philadelphia 
circle’ explored how modern philosophy could serve the interests of religion and social 
improvement.61 On 28th January 1787, Smith joined the American Philosophical Society 
and read An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human 
Species at his first meeting. In this essay, Smith defended biblical monogenesis (the belief 
that everyone descended from Adam and Eve); he advanced this defence, however, with a 
union of metaphysics and ‘true religion’ (which he described as the reading of the 
Gospels free of secondary interpretations). This philosophical discussion on the origin of 
the human species and reasons for the diversity of races received much attention in the 
international Republic of Letters.62 Smith’s treatment of this controversial subject 
addressed earlier ideas of eminent philosophers such as George-Louis Comte de Buffon 
and Henry Home Lord Kames and later had a place in his system of moral education. A 
review of his ideas on this subject therefore reveals an abolitionist agenda attached to his 
moral programme.    
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November 1784, PUL C0028). In the same meeting that appointed Smith as vice-president, the Board 
conferred an honorary doctorate in divinity to Robert Smith (TM, 27 September 1786, 258-60).  
 
61 Nina Reid-Maroney, Philadelphia’s Enlightenment, 1740-1800: Kingdom of Christ, Empire of 
Reason, (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2001), 161-182.  
 
62 For further reading on the monogenist and polygenist debate see Colin Kidd, Forging of Races: Race 
and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000, (CUP, 2006), 104-105.  
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 Like Witherspoon in his earlier criticism of Lord Kames, Smith addressed 
Kames’s defence of polygenesis expressed in Sketches (1774). According to Kames, ‘the 
colour of the Negroes…affords a strong presumption of their being a different species 
from the Whites [but] who can say how far they might improve in a state of freedom, 
were they obliged like Europeans, to procure bread with the sweat of their brows?’63 Yet 
he noted that slaves in Jamaica, who could use Sundays for acquiring means of 
sustenance, lived on a par ‘if not better’ than free ‘Negroes’.64 Kames offered examples 
of the industriousness and civility exhibited by ‘Negroes’ who lived in the Gold Coast of 
Africa; he attributed this success, however, to the influence of the ‘Hindows’, a mixed 
race of European and African descent, who, he implied, were a superior species to 
‘Negroes’.65 While he received £1,000 for this work (his publisher William Creech also 
published Dugald Stewart’s writings) and sold enough copies for subsequent editions, his 
pro-slavery remarks received criticism from abolitionists.66 Of these critics, James Beattie 
remarked that ‘all history proves, and every rational philosopher admits, that, as liberty 
promotes virtue and genius, slavery debases the understanding, and corrupts the heart, of 
both the slave, and the master’.67 Despite this later backlash, Kames and his friends 
appeared optimistic of its philosophical reception.68  
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63 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Sketches of the History of Man, vol. two, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1778), 64-
65. 
 
64 Ibid., 64. 
 
65 Ibid, 65. 
 
66 Richard Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors & Their Publishers in Eighteenth-
century Britain, Ireland, & America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 82-83.  
 
67 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, second edition, vol. two, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1807), 44.  
 
68 William Smellie, a natural philosopher and friend of Lord Kames, wrote on that ‘I hope your 
Lordships example will give an effectual check to those mystical, I might say, those nonsensical 
writers on human nature, who involve themselves in clouds of obscurity, and expect their readers to 
understand what they themselves cannot explain’ (William Smellie to Kames, 23 April 1774, in 
Memoirs of the Life, Writings and Correspondence of W. Smellie, edited by Robert Kerr, (Edinburgh: 
John Anderson, 1811), 354).   
Chapter Four  ,')!
 Across the Atlantic, contrary views on either side of this philosophical debate 
assumed a different meaning as Americans considered the future of their infant nation. 
Since America’s chief source of economic prosperity relied heavily upon the slave labour 
of the plantation system, the monogenesis-polygenesis debate raised serious questions 
about America’s continued practise of slavery and its moral and economic consequences. 
As an ardent slavery abolitionist and Presbyterian divine, Smith challenged the belief that 
the Bible justified the institution of slavery.69 Instead of conforming to the post-
revolutionary Edwardsean tradition of opposing slavery through Evangelical conversion, 
Smith’s stance mingled natural and moral philosophy with theology.70 In his APS essay 
Smith appealed to the writings of Buffon by accounting for the diversity within the 
human race as the product of diverse climates.71 For Smith, climates affected the human 
complexion and figure gradually over time. Smith argued: 
In every position suffering the influences of the climate, of the sterility or richness of 
the soil, of the elevation or depression of the face of their country, of the vicinity of 
seas or deserts, of their insular, or continental situation: or the modifications of all 
these, resulting from their occupations, and their habits of living. Hence they now 
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69 As Mark Noll has shown, a prominent pro-slavery argument drew evidence from selective Biblical 
quotes (Mark Noll, America’s God, (OUP, 2002), 17). By debunking these arguments with a contrary 
interpretation of the Bible, Smith advanced why human ‘bondage’ was inconsistent with the word of 
God.    
 
70 See Kenneth Minkema and Harry Stout, ‘The Edwardsean Tradition and the Antislavery Debate, 
1740-1865’, The Journal of American History, 92:1, (June 2005): 61-72. 
 
71 Buffon, a French naturalist, mathematician, and encyclopaedist, explored the diversity of the natural 
world and human nature. In Histoirie Naturelle, Buffon discussed the reasons for the physical 
differences of various animal specifies and often categorised them in relation to humankind as one 
distinctive species. Buffon argued that ‘man constitutes but one and the same species, and, though this 
species is perhaps more numerous, inconstant and irregular in all its actions, yet the prodigious 
diversity of nourishment, climate, and so many other combinations as may be supposed, have not 
produced beings different enough from each other to constitute new species, and at the same time so 
like ourselves, that we are not able to deny but that we are of the same race’ (Georges Louis Buffon, 
Barr’s Buffon: Buffon’s Natural History, translated into English by James Smith Barr, (London, 1792), 
191). Buffon justified this point with the observation that ‘Whites’ and ‘Negros’ were able to procreate 
and possessed the universal ability of communication between ‘all’ varieties of man (Ibid). Smith 
agreed with Buffon’s criterion of procreation as an acceptable qualification for categorising species, 
however, he devised a metaphysical explanation for the diversity within the human species (Samuel 
Stanhope Smith, An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human 
Species, (New Brunswick: J. Simpson and Co., 1810), 13). 
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present to the eye an almost infinite variety in their complexion, their form and 
features, and their whole personal aspect.72 
 
By suggesting that everyone originated from one source (Adam and Eve) and that 
different climates, education, and living conditions were the cause of the diversity among 
races, Smith’s theory challenged the institution of slavery. Moreover, he argued that God 
implanted humankind with powers of the mind to advance from savage states of society, 
and the continued practise of ‘human bondage’ impeded God’s design.73 Smith’s theory, 
therefore, supported the creation of a republic that would not be economically dependent 
upon slave labour. This idea proved somewhat controversial at Princeton. While slavery 
was being abolished across the North at this time and was under siege with the passing of 
Manumission laws (as a legal way to free slaves who could prove their self-sufficiency), 
proponents of slavery persisted amongst the student population as well as from prominent 
men in New Jersey.74 Yet Smith measured the success of his Essay from its Edinburgh 
reception, in particular, its praise from Dugald Stewart.75 Despite his later 
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72 Smith, Essay, 32-33.  
 
73 Smith suggested that ‘manners, education, habits of living, and all those causes comprehended under 
the general head of the state of society, have a powerful operation in preserving, and augmenting, or in 
guarding against the impressions of climate, and in modifying the whole appearance of the human 
person and countenance (Ibid., 240-241). This argument was later supported by the case of Henry 
Moss. Benjamin Rush, a contributing member of the American Philosophical Society, also investigated 
racial connections within the monogenesis-polygenesis debate. Rush advanced his ideas on race within 
his 1805 publication of Medical Inquiries and Observations where he concluded that blackness of skin 
was not an innate phenomena but a form of enduring leprosy (Rush, Medical Inquiries and 
Observations, 1-59; also see Kidd, The Forging of Race, 109). Rush’s theory gained some levels of 
credit with the emergence of the curious case of Henry Moss. In 1792 at the age of 38, Henry Moss’s 
complexion changed from black to white. During a visit to Philadelphia, Moss met with a mystified 
George Washington and members of the APS, including Smith, who pondered the implications of this 
transformation. Smith later remarked ‘that, in his appearance, he could not be distinguished from a 
native Anglo-American’ (Smith, Essay, n94).  
 
74 See Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A history of African-American slaves, (HUP, 2003), 82; 
Benjamin J. Klebaner, ‘American Manumission Laws and the Responsibility for Supporting Slaves’, 
The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 63:4, (Oct., 1955): 443-453.    
 
75 In a letter to William Robertson on 24 November 1784, Smith commented ‘I should be happy to 
correspond with any of the gentlemen of distinguished literary reputation of your acquaintance in 
Edinburgh’ (Smith to Reverend Dr. William Robertson, 24 November 1784, PUL C0028). It is unclear 
if Robertson was in fact Principal Robertson of Edinburgh University, but Witherspoon who personally 
knew Principal Robertson had facilitated Smith’s connection with the Rev Robertson of this letter who 
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accomplishments at Princeton, Smith wrote to Ashbel Green in 1818 that he was most 
proud of Stewart’s approval of his Essay.76 Not only did Stewart read the 1788 Edinburgh 
edition of Smith’s Essay, but he also applied Smith’s theory in his lectures on moral 
philosophy the following year.77 This anecdotal connection between Smith’s and 
Stewart’s moral thought was not their strongest link. Like Stewart, Smith drew heavily 
from Reid’s philosophy in creating a programme of moral education. Their efforts to 
diffuse and later defend these respective systems of moral education against counter-
Enlightenment interests demonstrated their shared purpose in the Atlantic World.  
 
Creating Enlightenment at Princeton: Smith’s system of moral education 
  In creating his system of moral education, Stanhope Smith established the 
foundations of what would become a new type of Princeton Enlightenment. The death of 
John Witherspoon on 15th November 1794 who introduced Scottish Enlightenment moral 
philosophy to Princeton did not mean that these ideas declined after his passing. As 
Witherspoon’s successor appointed on 6th May 1795, Smith ushered in an age of 
scientific and literary advancement previously unknown at Princeton.78 Within his first 
year as president, Smith illustrated his vision for Princeton in petitioning support from the 
New Jersey Legislature. In this 1796 ‘memorial’, Smith wrote that ‘in the present age, 
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was believed to have connections with Edinburgh’s literati. Nevertheless, Smith actively sought 
connections with Edinburgh theorists whom he held in a high regard.  
  
76 Smith to Green, February 1818, PUL C0028.  
 
77 In 1789, Stewart appealed to Smith’s theory in teaching that ‘the effects which Climate and situation 
have upon the human body are produced but very slowly. They are scarcely observable the first generation 
and even the next race they are not much observable. Dr Smith mentions an Indian who was placed as a 
student at the university, where the Dr was, at the same age of 15 & who gradually as he advanced with his 
studies became more like even influence to his fellow students, tho [sic] not so much so, as he would have 
done had he been placed there at an earlier period of Life’ (Dugald Stewart, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 
1789-1790, taken by an unknown student, EUL MS Gen. 1987-9, 12). 
 
78 Smith’s governance of College affairs during Witherspoon’s final years and service as interim 
president during the 1794-1795 academic year unanimously convinced the Board of Trustees of his 
competence as president. 
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Edinburgh, by her celebrated University, lays both Europe and America under 
contribution for students’.79 The reason for Edinburgh’s success and its attraction at the 
time was its excellence in the branches of natural science, moral philosophy, and 
medicine. Smith argued that if Princeton were to rival Edinburgh’s Enlightenment it too 
must ‘maintain an adequate number of Professors in the liberal arts’.80 By enlarging 
Princeton’s commitment to liberal education, Princeton could, therefore, claim American 
youth who would otherwise travel abroad for an ‘enlightened education’. Moreover, these 
students who had the means to cultivate ‘liberal’ interests in higher education often 
returned to become prominent statesmen. Smith remarked: 
It would be in the interest, and would certainly be no inconsiderable glory to New 
Jersey, to be the fountain of education to so large a portion of America, and to 
furnish those States with their Legislators and their Judges, and be able to infuse her 
spirit into politics and councils of our country. We have a claim upon the wisdom 
and policy of the State, which requires it to provide the most effectual means for 
enlightening its own citizens, and to embrace the opportunity of acquiring influence 
and an ascendency in the councils of the Union, which it can not otherwise obtain 
than by attracting their youth and educating their statesmen.81 
 
This appeal to furthering the interests of New Jersey and its College through elevating the 
thought and manners of the next generation of American statesmen explains why New 
Jersey legislators granted Princeton $500 per annum. Within a month after establishing 
this patronage, the Board of Trustees amended the College charter to reflect its reformed 
purpose. The 19th February 1796 amendment to the Charter of the College of New Jersey, 
claimed an institutional pursuit to ‘patronize and promote the interest of science and 
literature, as the surest basis of their liberty, property and prosperity’.82 Meanwhile, 
Smith began a non-denominational treatment of Christian principles at Princeton. This 
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79 ‘Memorial’ of the College of New Jersey petitioned to the New Jersey Legislature, January 1796, in 
Maclean, HCNJ, 15.  
 
80 Ibid.  
 
81 Ibid.  
 
82 Princeton 1796 Charter amendments, PUA AC120.  
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reduced role of Calvinist seminary training motivated a number of conservative 
Presbyterian clergymen, particularly Evangelicals, to question Princeton’s reformed 
purpose. Before this line of questioning found traction in the new century, Smith 
advanced measures toward realising his vision of Enlightenment at Princeton.  
 Smith’s first substantial initiative toward achieving this objective was establishing 
a professorship of Chemistry with the appointment of John Maclean Sr., an emigrated 
Scottish chemist and physician educated at Glasgow University, on 1st October 1795.83 
This marked the first time that an American college offered a course on chemistry 
separate from natural philosophy.84 On 11th November 1795, Smith was quoted in the 
Woods Newark Gazette and New Jersey Adviser that Maclean’s chemistry and 
comparative anatomy lectures has ‘application to agriculture and manufactures, so useful 
in every country, but especially in a new one’.85 James Delbourgo suggests that this 
interest in the practical uses of scientific innovations demarcated the wider American 
intellectual pursuits around the turn of the century.86 According to Archibald Alexander, 
Maclean ‘became one of the most popular professors who ever graced the College [and] 
he was at home almost equally in all branches of science’.87 Maclean also strengthened 
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84 See Theodore Hornberger, Scientific Thought in the American Colleges, 1638-1800, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1945), 73. Maclean was solely responsible for lectures on chemistry and 
anatomy until the 1796 death of Walter Minto who previously taught mathematics and natural 
philosophy. Afterwards, Maclean taught natural philosophy in addition to his chemistry course whilst 
Smith temporarily took charge of lectures on mathematics (TM, 422-3). On 11 April 1797, Maclean 
was elected professor of natural philosophy and mathematics of which included his earlier lectures on 
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Princeton’s Scottish connections through corresponding with Scots on modern 
innovations in science.88 
 The growing popularity of natural philosophy among Princeton students assisted 
Smith’s campaign to establish a degree-awarding programme on this subject. On 26th 
September 1799, the trustees ‘resolved, that students may be admitted to read in College 
on such subjects of science as they or their parents may select, and shall receive 
certificates of their proficiency in said sciences’.89 This programme involved coursework 
in the fields of geography, logic, mathematics, natural and moral philosophy (both 
speculative and practical), chemistry, astronomy and Belles Lettres.90 Despite the 
College’s limited treasury, Smith was active in supplying this new programme with 
modern scientific equipment.91 Furthermore, the inclusion of belles lettres and moral 
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regard to discoveries in all departments of scientific research and when it was at all practicable he 
repeated the experiments of the most distinguished philosophers of the day’ (Maclean Jr, A Memoir of 
John Maclean, M.D.,43).  
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philosophy as course requirements in Smith’s programme revealed a telling feature of its 
design for Enlightenment in knowledge of the mind and physics.  
 In addition to Smith’s support for expanding and enhancing the sciences taught at 
Princeton, he appealed to the ‘Moderate’ belief that ‘polite’ culture (practised in 
moderation) did not conflict with Christian principles. Yet fundamentalist Evangelicals 
did not share this conviction. Although these differences of opinion became evident 
between 1804 and 1812, earlier Evangelical responses to Smith’s practise of ‘polite’ 
activities suggested their disapproval. During their encounter at the 1791 American 
General Assembly, Archibald Alexander noticed that Smith’s ‘polite’ manners and dress 
were peculiar for an American clergymen at that time. Alexander observed: 
When he entered the house I did not observe him, but happening to turn my head I 
saw a person whom I must still consider the most elegant I ever saw. The beauty of his 
countenance, the clear and vivid complexion, the symmetry of his form and the 
exquisite finish of his dress, were such as to strike the beholder at first sight. The 
thought never occurred to me that he was a clergyman, and I supposed him to be some 
gentleman of Philadelphia, who had dropped in to hear the debate. I ought to have 
mentioned that Dr. Witherspoon was as plain an old man as ever I saw, and as free 
from any assumption of dignity.92  
 
Alexander’s comments on Smith’s ‘polite’ appearance alone did not give an impression 
that he disapproved. His contrasting comparison between Smith and Witherspoon (who 
many Evangelical clergymen revered) implied that Smith did not conform to 
Witherspoon’s austere example as an enlightened minister. The 1791 American General 
Assembly also witnessed a clear distancing on the part of Smith from Evangelical 
revivalists. After returning from the General Association of Connecticut, Ashbel Green 
(an earlier divinity student of Witherspoon) proposed that the Presbyterian Church join 
Connecticut’s efforts to revive America’s religious principles. Although Smith was not as 
outspoken against this proposition as Dr. Francis Alison, he still boldly opposed the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Archibald Alexander, The Life Archibald Alexander, edited by James Alexander, (New York: 
Charles Scribner, 1854), 99. 
 
Creating Enlightenment at Princeton ,(&!
spread of unrestrained Christian revivalism.93 This revealing debate occurred in the wake 
of earlier suspicions that Smith had an inappropriate relationship with his aunt by 
marriage, Susan (Shippen) Blair. Between 1786 and August 1791, Smith and Blair 
developed an affectionate and flirtatious relationship through regularly exchanged letters 
and poems amounting to seventy in all.94 Although a relationship of this sort was widely 
practised in ‘polite’ culture (evinced by Helen Stewart’s correspondence with her former 
boarder Lord Dudley), Evangelicals disapproved of it.95 It remains unclear how and to 
what extent their correspondence became known. But Smith’s marriage to Witherspoon’s 
daughter, Anne, and his prominent role at Princeton rendered this ‘polite’ activity 
potentially scandalous.96 After rumours of their relationship stirred in 1787 (with no 
public charges of impropriety), they averted scandal by temporarily ending and later 
guarding their written displays of affection. Nevertheless, this episode left lingering 
questions for some Evangelical fundamentalists (such as Green and Alexander) about 
Smith’s character and religious principles.  
 Smith’s embrace of ‘polite’ culture and esteem for the writings of Scottish 
‘Moderates’ was later reflected in his reforms of the curriculum. For example, Smith 
replaced Witherspoon’s lectures on eloquence with Hugh Blair’s lectures on belles lettres 
in teaching the course.97 As previously shown in chapter two, Blair’s lectures instructed 
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Lectures instead of Witherspoon’s Criticism’ (Reade to his father, 6 December 1795, PUL C1272). He 
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how to refine eloquence and ‘polite’ manners as central elements for success in public 
life.98 Contrary to Smith, Ashbel Green argued that Blair in his lectures ‘cautiously 
avoids everything which would offend a polite ear’.99 Meanwhile, Smith’s interest in 
‘polite’ culture was closely linked to preparing future enlightened statesmen of the 
republic. In support of this objective, the teaching of French (which was discontinued by 
most American colleges following the French Revolution) proved relevant for diplomatic 
reasons as the French Republic remained central on the world stage and French was the 
language of diplomacy.100 In 1802, Smith influenced the election of William Thompson 
as professor of language whom he described ‘as a young gentleman of very polite 
accomplishments from Paris’.101 Although Thompson’s primary teaching responsibility 
was French, he also taught first year courses in Latin and Greek with the assistance of a 
tutor, Mr. Bradford.102 The inclusion of Latin, in particular, directly served the 
programme in science. According to Smith, ‘we have lately seen the Latin language 
retained as a vehicle of science, by the learned men of modern Europe, long after the 
cultivation of their vernacular dialects, had provided them with a more convenient 
instrument of instruction’.103 While the popularity of ‘liberal science’ courses fuelled this 
demand for French and Latin, the small number of theology students (amounting to only 
four in 1804) explained the diminished prominence of Greek at this time.104 Beyond 
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99 Ashbel Green 14 June 1790; 21 February 1800 diary; and 11 February 1791 diary entry, PUL 
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Princeton’s curriculum, Smith encouraged students to pursue ‘polite’ refinement in 
literary and philosophical societies. Edward Thomas, then a Princeton student in 1802, 
observed that ‘the advantages of the [Princeton] Societies and their libraries together with 
the convenience for study will prove greater to the students than can be derived at any 
other place’.105 
 Smith had a grander design that connected the teaching of natural sciences and 
‘polite’ activities as auxiliary ways to improve the human condition and advance society 
toward Enlightenment. His moral philosophy taught the way in which these 
Enlightenment activities shared the same purpose of moral and intellectual improvement 
at Princeton. Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy certainly resembled Witherspoon’s 
earlier lectures insofar as they both appealed to Scottish philosophy, but Smith’s moral 
thought centered on natural religion and methods of exercising the ‘active and moral 
powers of the mind’. While Smith’s moral thought drew inspiration from a raft of 
prominent theorists across the international Republic of Letters, he ‘made especially 
careful use’ of Thomas Reid’s philosophical system.106 But did Smith actually treat his 
lectures of moral philosophy as a continuation of Witherspoon’s earlier thought (as Noll 
argues), and how significant was Smith’s use of Reid’s philosophical system? 107 Instead 
of Witherspoon’s influence, this work suggests that Smith’s creativity stemmed from the 
ways in which he adapted Reidian themes. According to Smith, ‘in this field no writer has 
distinguished himself with greater zeal, ability, and success than Dr Reid of Glasgow 
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[and] to no author is this branch of science, not to Locke himself, more indebted for its 
approaches towards perfection’.108 Examining Smith as an intellectual disciple of Reid 
offers a new insight into the type of Enlightenment Smith sought to establish at Princeton.    
 In an appeal to Thomas Reid’s philosophy, Smith taught that ‘moral philosophy is 
an investigation of the Constitution and the laws of mind, particularly as it is capable of 
voluntary action and as susceptible of the sentiment of obligation [and] its great object is 
to ascertain duty and to regulate conduct’.109 Similar to Reid, Smith believed that God 
implanted the ‘active and moral powers of the mind’ as the primary source for moral 
conduct.110 Furthermore, the perfection of the divinely inspired faculties of the mind 
fulfilled God’s intended purpose for humankind. In alignment with Reid’s philosophy, 
Smith claimed that ‘our nature is then only perfect when it is conformed to the evident 
design of the creator’.111   
 This central belief heavily influenced Smith’s reforms of the curriculum, sermons 
at Princeton, and lectures to the ‘Junior and Senior Classes in the branches of Belles 
Lettres, Criticism & Composition, Moral Philosophy including the Principles of 
Metaphysics, Natural Theology, the philosophy of Civil government, the Laws of Nature 
and Nations Logic’.112 He treated all of these branches of knowledge as mutually 
dependent upon the mind, and its exploration shed light on God’s intention for humanity, 
independent of revealed religion. Consequently, Smith’s Princeton Enlightenment 
diverged from its former seminary conventions. Smith believed ‘that although the Author 
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of our being has planted within the human breast the seeds of moral discernment, they 
require, in order to arrive at full maturity, to be carefully cultivated’.113 In teaching 
methods of exercising the ‘active and moral powers of the mind’, Smith drew on Reid’s 
philosophy adapted to his situation at Princeton. Like Stewart at this time, Smith’s 
teaching of natural religion, metaphysics, and promotion of the moral improvement found 
in the liberal arts caused tensions with conservative Presbyterian ministers. The following 
chapter will discuss how Smith justified his system of moral education as a Presbyterian 
minister and examine his moral thought with particular attention to his treatment of the 
‘moral faculty’ and its affiliated ‘rules of duty’ as central in developing ‘moral and 
national character’ at Princeton. 
 
Conclusion 
 From Stanhope Smith’s various positions across a lifetime at Princeton, he 
witnessed and participated in early America’s most defining moments. Born into the 
Great Awakening’s legacy of religious revivalism and Presbyterian academies Smith had 
intimate knowledge of America’s dominant religious principles. Yet his path as an 
ordained minister collided with a greater interest in pursuing philosophical truths. 
Thereafter Smith’s passion for exploring the inner workings of the mind became 
interlocked with his religious convictions. At a pivotal time for both America’s political 
future and Smith’s direction in life, Witherspoon introduced Smith to prominent ideas 
and values of the Scottish Enlightenment. Through the writings of Thomas Reid, Smith 
found clarity in his treatment of metaphysics and education as a necessary part of 
cultivating virtue. Like Witherspoon, Smith, too, was reactive to the tense political and 
religious circumstances of his time. But these trials steadied his conviction in natural 
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religion and the perfection of the mind exercised through ‘liberal science’. In support of 
this belief, Smith created a system of moral education that reformed Princeton’s purpose 
from educating enlightened ministers to preparing future statesmen for public service. 
The next chapter will demonstrate that his commitment to creating innovative methods of 
exercising the ‘moral faculty’ as the primary source of moral conduct resulted in new 
ways Reidian thought could be applied in American society. From Smith’s system of 
moral education, the Princeton Enlightenment was born.            
 The success of Smith’s programme is best shown in the prosperity of the College 
during his administration and through the later careers of his students. During the first 
decade of Smith’s administration, the student population expanded from 87 in 1794 to 
153 in 1804.114 Although this estimate does not account for students (particularly those 
who assisted in the autumn harvest) who arrived after the start of the term, it clearly 
demonstrated a favourable response to Smith’s reforms of the curriculum. Of those 
students who praised Smith’s system, Edward Thomas, then Princeton student in 1802, 
suggested that ‘there is no place in my opinion where more improvement can be derived 
than Princeton’.115 This high regard for Princeton’s reformed purpose under Smith’s 
system largely derived from fulfilling the demands for ‘enlightened learning’ that met the 
practical needs of the republic. As John Maclean Jr. suggested ‘the course instruction for 
that day-1804-was a very liberal one, and in many respects would compare favourably 
with the College curriculums of later times’.116 As Smith had intended, the effect of his 
system of moral education produced statesmen and intellectuals. Of the five hundred and 
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thirty-one graduates during Smith’s presidency, he educated one future vice-president of 
the United States, George Miffin Dallas (class of 1810); two presidents of the United 
States Senate, Samuel Southard (class of 1804) and James Iredell (class of 1805); nine 
Senators representing six different states; twenty-five members of the House of 
Representatives representing nine different states; four members of the President’s 
cabinet; six United States ministers to foreign courts and congresses (Spain, Britain, 
Holland, Sweden, Russia, and Panama); thirteen supreme court and district court judges; 
eight state governors; four State Attorney-Generals (Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Mississippi); and one president of the United States Bank, Nicholas Biddle (class of 
1801).117 In addition to producing statesmen, Smith taught twenty-one future college 
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presidents and professors.118 Philip Lindsley (Princeton class of 1804) remarked that ‘the 
government of the College at this period of its greatest prosperity, under President Smith, 
I can hardly use language too favourable’.119 His overwhelming success in educating 
intellectual and political statesmen of the republic, however, did not convince 
fundamental Evangelicals of its merit. Despite their counter-Enlightenment campaign to 
remove Smith as president and dissolve his system of moral education (which will be 
discussed in chapter six), Smith at Princeton created an Enlightenment although it was 
short lived and riddled with controversy.    
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 At the turn of the nineteenth century, Princetonians celebrated Samuel Stanhope 
Smith as ‘the pride and ornament of the institution’ whilst an influential group of 
fundamentalist Evangelicals challenged his vision of Enlightenment.1 This counter-
Enlightenment faction of clergymen opposed Princeton’s transformation from a New 
Light seminary to its focus on teaching modern innovations in the arts and natural 
sciences. Contrary to Witherspoon’s so-called ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’, 
Smith believed that the preparation of future enlightened and virtuous statesmen should 
be Princeton’s paramount concern. As an intellectual disciple of Thomas Reid’s 
philosophy and an advocate of ‘moderation’, Smith believed that ‘the state of society, the 
manners and customs which distinguish an age, a nation, or even a sect of philosophy or 
religion [are affected by] the constitutional character and habits of education’.2 While 
Smith’s considerable connections with religious revivalists suggested he would not 
venture too far from the religious conventions and beliefs of this base, his reforms of the 
curriculum did so in significantly changing Princeton’s purpose.3 The circumstances of 
the 1790s offer an explanation for why Smith appealed to Scottish ‘Moderate’ values and 
Thomas Reid’s philosophy in creating a system of moral education as the foundation for 
a new type of Enlightenment at Princeton.  
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  The birth of American political parties in the years that followed the French 
Revolution made it particularly difficult to unite citizens who had different beliefs and 
values. Meanwhile, religious factions in Connecticut and in the Middle Atlantic states of 
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania advanced the revival of Christian principles. 
These ‘emotion-laden revivals’ replaced the ‘Great Awakening’ of the 1740s in a 
transitional period with what became the so-called ‘Second Great Awakening’ between 
1805 and 1820.4 Jon Butler has shown that post-revolutionary religious revivalism spread 
‘with a breadth, swiftness, and persistence that make it difficult to separate them from the 
so-called Second Great Awakening’.5 Similar to the counter-Enlightenment movement in 
Scotland, American religious revivalism endorsed anti-intellectual views and, in 
particular, revivalists opposed the diffusion of metaphysical philosophy and natural 
religion at institutions of higher education. Rev. Ashbel Green as a prominent Princeton 
trustee led a faction of revivalist clergymen who sought to renew Princeton’s seminary 
training as its primary objective. The different purposes of Smith’s Princeton 
Enlightenment and Green’s ambition to revive Christian principles caused tensions at 
Princeton. Before this counter-Enlightenment campaign took form within Princeton’s 
Board of Trustees (which will be discussed in the following chapter), Smith’s reforms of 
the curriculum from 1795 to 1799 achieved its objective in attracting students who 
formerly had gone abroad for a modern and enlightened education.  
 In an appeal to the earlier writings of Thomas Reid and ‘Moderate’ values, Smith 
countered American extremism in politics, philosophy, and religion. In doing so, he 
justified the usefulness of his system of moral education as the best way to address the 
challenges that divided the early republic. Smith claimed that ‘the dignity and happiness 
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of individuals, the prosperity of states, and the order and happiness of the world, are 
intimately connected with the practical knowledge of those truths at the cultivation and 
improvement of which this science [moral philosophy] aims’.6 While this ambition and 
purpose closely resembled Dugald Stewart’s programme of moral education, the situation 
at Princeton demanded different considerations than those Stewart addressed at 
Edinburgh. Robert Ferguson suggests that ‘since creativity takes place in this exchange 
from European models to American requisites, the important questions address the 
transmission of ideas, style, tone, and rhetorical emphasis’.7 With this point in mind, this 
chapter will examine how Smith adapted the Reidian themes of the ‘moral faculty’ and its 
so-called rules of duty as the best source for fostering a Princeton Enlightenment that 
would influence enlightened thought and values, through its graduates, across the nation. 
In illustrating the purpose and import of his moral philosophy, Smith remarked that its 
objective ‘is not so much a minute and extensive detail of particular duties [but rather] to 
investigate the laws of morality and duty in the various relations of life, and to cultivate 
the heart to virtue, which gives supreme value to this, and to every science’.8 The 
application and exercise of these innate ‘moral laws’ assisted in enhancing the other 
branches of knowledge taught in his system of moral education. Furthermore, his lectures 
on the rules of duty and the ‘moral faculty’ offered original adaptations of Reidian 
themes that differed from Stewart’s programme in significant ways. These adaptations 
reflected his ambition to restrain immoral ‘passions’ (which he linked to idleness) and 
civil disobedience from so-called ‘Jacobins’ whilst developing virtuous habits and 
‘Moderate’ values of cultural and religious tolerance. For Smith, the ‘moral faculty’ was 
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the instinctive ‘guide, the director and censor of our moral conduct…it indicates to us, on 
each action we are going to perform, what is permitted, what lawful, what forbidden by 
the voice of nature; and on reflection, what has been praiseworthy or guilty’.9 His 
teaching of this principle and its affiliated branches of duty or rules of duty as he 
preferred to call them allegedly created Enlightenment, but he also directed its use in 
combating radical counter-Enlightenment factions at Princeton.  
 Smith’s particular use and adaptation of Scottish philosophy sheds new light on 
his response to the prominent tensions of the early republic. I shall first discuss how the 
emergence of political parties coupled with a renewed religious revivalism movement 
between 1794 and 1799 affected Princeton interests. Then I explore the early reasons why 
Ashbel Green believed Smith’s programme perverted Witherspoon’s legacy at Princeton. 
Finally, I examine how Smith’s system of moral education addressed issues at Princeton 
as well as across the republic by developing virtuous habits and strengthening obligations 
to the welfare of civil society through his use of the ‘moral faculty’ and its rules of duty. 
In the course of addressing these areas, this chapter shows that Smith’s programme of 
moral education advanced Scottish ‘Moderate’ values of cultural and religious tolerance 
whilst adapting Reidian themes in preparing Princeton graduates for future careers in 
public life. These philosophical principles and ideological beliefs illustrated the type of 
virtuous and enlightened graduates Smith’s Enlightenment aimed to produce. At the same 
time, this institutional purpose was a catalyst for later tensions with counter-
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A Decade of American Extremism: radical politics, religion, and philosophy  
 Samuel Stanhope Smith’s establishment of a Princeton Enlightenment did not occur 
in an intellectual vacuum. American debates over political and religious policies in the 
years that followed the French Revolution had a significant impact at Princeton and the 
emergence of counter-Enlightenment policies. As American political party tensions 
began to dominate public discourse, Witherspoon’s declining health and blindness 
rendered him unable to govern and forced his early retirement from Princeton affairs.10 
Smith assumed Witherspoon’s responsibilities of the College as vice-president and later 
continued these duties as Witherspoon’s successor. Like Witherspoon’s earlier 
experience, the spirit of revolution influenced Smith’s administration. After its initial 
widespread support in America, the French Revolution received varied reactions from 
political, religious, and intellectual interest groups. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick 
suggest that the French Revolution affected America in two ways: it supported the 
legitimacy of the Constitution and it served ‘as a major point of reference for domestic 
political partisanship’.11 Meanwhile, many conservative American Protestants interpreted 
French Revolutionary principles as an attack upon Christianity.  
 The belief that the French Revolution threatened Christianity increased after 
Thomas Paine (who had illustrated French Revolutionary principles in The Rights of 
Man) ridiculed the institution of religion, and especially Christianity in The Age of 
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10 On his return from a 1783-1784 fund raising tour of Britain, Witherspoon lost the sight of one eye 
during an accident aboard the ship. In the final years of his life, he lost the use of his other eye after 
falling from his horse (Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, ‘John Witherspoon, Father of American 
Presbyterianism; Maker of Statesmen’, in The Lives of Eighteen from Princeton, edited by William 
Thorp, (PUP, 1946), 83).  
 
11 Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-
1800, (OUP, 1993), 309-310. 
   
The Primacy of the Mind at Princeton ,))!
Reason (1794).12 Afterwards, Princetonians campaigned against so-called ‘French 
impiety’ and radical political activism. The former president of Congress and prominent 
Princeton trustee Elias Boudinot regarded Paine’s argument as particularly dangerous, 
because of his popularity in America.13 He even entertained the possibility that Paine did 
not write The Age of Reason since no one actually witnessed him doing so in prison.14 
Boudinot wrote that ‘many young and uninformed people, wholly unacquainted with the 
genuine principles of our holy religion, and the subtle and dishonest practises of her 
apostate adversaries, had with avidity engaged in reading it’.15 The notion that 
Enlightenment ideals were contrary to Christian principles created an opening for 
American counter-Enlightenment policies to flourish.  
 This fear of allegedly corrupting ideas was represented in political rhetoric as well 
as affecting the curriculum at institutions of higher education. According to Luciana 
Herman, American political rhetoric at this time differentiated Federalist and Republican 
systems of government (as representative of the popular interests of the ‘people’) from 
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12 America’s support for the French Revolution was amplified after Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man 
(1791) illustrated that many of the French revolutionary principles drew from America’s example 
(Joyce Appleby, ‘America as a Model for the Radical French Reformers of 1789’, WMQ,  
28:2, (April 1971): 267-286; Edward Larkin, Thomas Paine and the Literature of Revolution, (CUP, 
2005), 78). On the French appeal to the American Revolution see Elise Marienstras and Naomi Wulf, 
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republicanism (May, The Enlightenment in America, 223-225). Robin Blackburn has shown that the 
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the next’ (Robin Blackburn, ‘Haiti, Slavery, and the Age of the Democratic Revolution’, WMQ, 63:4, 
(October 2006): 643). See T.H. Dickinson, ‘Thomas Paine and his American Critics’, Enlightenment 
and Dissent, 27, (2011): 174-185.  
 
13 Robert Ferguson argues that ‘no other text [Common Sense] by a single author can claim to have 
instantly captured and then so permanently held the national imagination’ (Robert Ferguson, ‘The 
Commonalities of Common Sense’, WMQ, 57:3, (July 2000): 465-466).  
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(Philadelphia: Asbury Dickins, 1801), 66. 
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the objectives of so-called ‘Jacobins’ who were known by some as ‘Democrats’.16 As a 
firm advocate of Federalism, Noah Webster defined ‘Jacobin’ as a member of ‘a private 
club to overturn or manage government, one who opposes government in a secret or 
unlawful manner or from an unreasonable spirit of discontent’.17 Federalists extended the 
label of ‘Jacobin’ to their Republican political opponents.18 During Smith’s 
administration, Federalist ideology dominated Princeton’s faculty and the Board of 
Trustees. Princeton students however were not united under Federalism, as became 
apparent in the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
 In an important sense Princeton’s internal political and ideological struggle 
reflected national political party divisions. The argumentative lines drawn during the 
earlier Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates of 1787 through 1788 were realigned over 
the reception of the French Revolution.19 Smith later wrote that ‘the people were 
unfortunately divided into two parties; one evidently partial to the French [Republicans], 
the other to the British [Federalists]’.20 According to Gordon Wood, ‘their extreme 
partisanship divided the country more deeply than at any time since 1776’.21 This 
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16 See Peter Porcupine (aka William Cobbett), History of the American Jacobins, Commonly 
Denominated Democrats, (Philadelphia: J.G. Henderson, 1796), 18; Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith, 
220. 
 
17 In quoting Noah Webster’s Compendious Dictionary, Luciana Louise Herman, 1794: American 
Race, Republicanism and Transnational Revolution, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of 
California, Berkeley (Fall 2007), 20. For further reading on Webster see Richard Rollins, The Long 
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18 See J. Wendell Knox, Conspiracy in American politics, 1787-1815, (North Hampshire, NH: Ayer 
Publishing, 1972), 113. This monograph was converted from Knox’s doctoral dissertation at the 
University of North Carolina.  
 
19 See Herbert Storing, What the anti-Federalists were for: The Political Thought of the Opponents of 
the Constitution, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
 
20 Samuel Stanhope Smith, History of the United States, revised edition, vol. three, (Philadelphia: M. 
Carey, 1818), 109. For further reading on the Jay Treaty see Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public 
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political division was sealed after George Washington approved treaty negotiations with 
Britain (the Jay Treaty) whilst ignoring America’s previous alliance with France.22 
Consequently, this arrangement situated the United States in an uncomfortable position 
between treaties with France and Britain. Faced with the extreme opinions within his 
administration, namely from Alexander Hamilton (a Federalist) and Thomas Jefferson (a 
Republican), Washington decided on a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs.23  
 The United States’ neutrality in France’s war with Britain for a short time pacified 
the mounting tensions between Federalists and Republicans. But Wood suggests that ‘by 
1798 the Federalists were convinced that they had to do something to suppress what they 
believed were the sources of Jacobin influence in America’ with the passing of the Alien 
Friends Act and the Naturalization Act.24 These measures ignited existing tensions 
between the political parties as the so-called 1798 ‘Quasi-War’ with France became a 
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22 In a diplomatic effort to prevent further British naval attacks upon American merchant ships, 
Washington sent John Jay, then Chief Justice from 1789 through 1795, to London in 1794 for 
discussions on terms of a treaty. This treaty known as ‘the Jay Treaty’, designed by the Secretary of 
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(Marshall Smelser, ‘The Jacobin Phrenzy: Federalism and the Menace of Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity’, Review of Politics, 13, (1951): 457-482). While the Jay Treaty centred on the British-
American commercial trade, it effectively prevented the United States and Britain from engaging each 
other in naval warfare (John Jay, The Life of John Jay: with selections from his correspondence and 
miscellaneous papers, edited by William Jay, vol. one, (New York: J & J Harper, 1833), 329). The 
American debt to French aid in the American Revolution whilst unofficially recognised as legitimate 
after the Old Regime dissolved, had some part in America’s alignment with British interests. As shown 
in a series of letters between Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State (1789-1797), and Edmund 
Charles Genet (also known as Citizen Genet), Minister of the French Republic, the French Republic 
pursued repayment of America’s debt both in funds and military support. Washington remarked to 
Congress that France attempted to ‘involve us in war abroad, and discord and anarchy at home’ 
(George Washington, ‘A message of the President of the United States to Congress relative to France 
and Great-Britain: delivered December 5, 1793, wither papers therein referred, to which added the 
French originals’, (Philadelphia, 1793), 3). 
 
23 See Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, 354-363.  
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reality.25 Thomas Jefferson’s sympathy toward French interests in this war did not escape 
the attention of his Federalist opponents at Princeton.26 Samuel Miller (who was later 
appointed to Princeton’s Board of Trustees in 1805) suggested that ‘Mr Jefferson had 
resided in Paris more than five years…and returned to the United States in the Autumn of 
1789, blindly enamoured of Jacobinism, his head full of the worst French Revolutionary 
ideas’.27 Like Miller, other Princeton Federalists including Smith believed Jefferson was 
an ‘apologist for insurrection and rebellion…in the vulgar shape of sedition and riot’, and 
these ‘Jacobin’ policies threatened civil and moral order.28 The Federalists’ interpretation 
of ‘Jacobins’ influenced how they responded to emerging student disruptions across the 
republic. Although in governing Princeton Smith attempted to remain withdrawn from 
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25 See J.R. Pole, ‘Jeffersonian Democracy and the Federalist Dilemma in New Jersey, 1798-1812’, 
Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society, 74, (1956): 260-292. As the United States president 
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Randolph, second edition, (Charlottesville: Carr and Co., 1830), 347. In a failed attempt at uniting 
opposing views, Jefferson served as vice-president after losing to Adams in the 1797 presidential 
election. Jefferson’s remarks were directed toward John Adams’s policies that led to the 1798 Franco-
American War also known as the ‘Quasi-War’. 
 
27 Samuel Miller, The Life of Samuel Miller, D.D., LL.D., (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and 
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these political disputes, his vote for John Adams as a member of the Electoral College 
further evinced his support of Federalist values.29 
 In association with these Federalist beliefs, emerging religious revivalists believed 
these so-called ‘Jacobin’ conspirators used philosophy to mask their alleged radical 
politics and atheist agenda. As a prominent member of this group, Ashbel Green 
suggested that ‘[“Jacobins”] talked, indeed, of morality, but they openly professed to 
abhor religion; unless, after the extermination of every semblance of Christianity, the 
worship of a harlot, in the guise of the goddess of reason, might be called their religion’.30 
This form of anti-intellectualism threatened the acceptability of Smith’s system of moral 
education. Despite believing that his system combated ‘false philosophy [that led] the 
mind to universal scepticism’, Smith’s lectures were interpreted by fundamentalist 
Evangelicals, such as Green, as advancing interests contrary to Christianity.31 Meanwhile, 
Smith believed that ‘Jacobinism’ and the anti-intellectualism of religious revivalists were 
just two different forms of extremism. His system challenged these types of counter-
Enlightenment (amidst fierce resistance) with an appeal to Scottish philosophy and 
‘Moderate’ values as a way to secure order and virtue at Princeton.  
 Restraining radical political sentiments among Princeton students appeared to be 
difficult for Smith around the turn of the nineteenth century. Princeton’s local tavern was 
a haven for students to discuss politics in the company of those who supported French 
revolutionary principles. For example, Smith remarked that in 1794 a Princeton student 
(Mr. Perry) ‘does not seem very well pleased with any person who does not advocate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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with zeal all the measures of the French Republic’. Smith added that Perry absconded 
from campus and has ‘taken his board in a tavern where some French gentlemen whose 
political sentiments accord with his’.32 Smith implied a causal relationship between 
Perry’s neglect of his studies and his enthusiastic support for extreme French 
revolutionary principles.33 Impressionable young men such as Perry, Smith believed, 
were particularly vulnerable to adopting these sentiments. He cautioned his students that  
those scenes of horrible barbarity which are sometimes witnessed at the stake of 
superstition, or the guillotine of revolution, are the effect of artificial excitement, in 
which, in the delirium of false religion or false patriotism, the mistaken zealots are 
made to conceive themselves the avengers of God, or their country.34  
   
As a central part of his system of moral education, Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy 
sought to prevent these radical activities through the proper exercise of the mind and 
reasonable moderation. For Smith, ‘Jacobins’ failed to realise the moral and social 
consequences that their radical actions caused. Smith’s inclusion of religious enthusiasm 
as equally dangerous to civil and moral order demonstrated his continued resistance to 
religious revivalism, which he had previously voiced in the 1791 American General 
Assembly.35 
 In addition to combating political and philosophical radicalism with enlightened 
morals, Smith’s administration conformed to traditional College rules. Princeton students, 
for example, were expected to show their respect for faculty members by removing their 
hats within ten ‘rods’ of the president and five ‘rods’ of the tutors.36 The jurist and 
statesman William Paterson (Princeton class of 1766) noted that ‘something of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




34 Smith, Lectures, n264.  
 
35 See chapter four, 159. 
 
36 William Paterson quoted in Glimpses of Colonial Society and the Life at Princeton College, 1766-
1773, edited by W. Jay Mills, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1903), 16. 
 
The Primacy of the Mind at Princeton ,*%!
formal, old-time collegiate manners can be learned from the fact that Samuel Stanhope 
Smith, when president, refused to speak to his own nephew for a period of six months, 
owing to the unfortunate young man’s breach of etiquette in calling him “Doctor,” 
instead of “Doctor Smith”’.37 The 1798 emergence of a faction of unruly students (who 
Smith saw as ‘Jacobins’) challenged these formal edicts that demanded displays of 
student obedience and conformity to Princeton’s rules.38 In cases when his attempts at 
encouraging moderation failed, Smith appealed to parental intervention.39 Despite these 
measures, increasing episodes of student defiance toward these conventions alarmed 
Smith who sensed his control of the College weakening. In a letter to Jonathan Baynard, 
Smith wrote that ‘this College seems to be the last bulwark of old principles to the south 
of your states…but what my good friend…will the new principles at last overturn?’40 
Smith’s adaptation of Reidian themes and promotion of ‘Moderate’ beliefs in his system 
of moral education combated these allegedly divisive ‘new principles’. At the same time, 
the disruptive influence of emerging student ‘Jacobin’ activities and the subsequent rise 
of religious revivalism amongst the trustees threatened Smith’s enlightened ambition for 
Princeton.  
 Smith did not believe these challenges to Enlightenment would arrest his plans for 
Princeton. On the contrary, he saw the political and religious conflicts of this age as an 
opportunity for moral, intellectual, and scientific improvement. While Smith granted that 
‘good men have declaimed against the vices and miseries of war and have connected its 
existence so much with absolute depravity of heart’, he believed that the absence of war 
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39 In a circular letter to parents, 3 September 1799, PUL MS9976.    
 
40 Smith to Baynard, 10 March 1802, PUL MS2164. 
 
Chapter Five ,*&!
and conflict could only exist after the second coming of Christ.41 In the meantime, ‘while 
human nature continues as it is indeed, if man does not actually transmigrate into a higher 
order of being, wars will [inevitably] spring out of the relative interests of states and the 
passions of mankind’.42 For Smith, war and conflict was an inherent feature of human 
nature and as such should be treated as part of God’s intention for humankind. He 
observed ‘a vigour of mind, a fervour and enterprise of genius among…martial people’.43 
During prolonged periods of ‘peaceful luxury’ this martial spirit of innovation 
degenerated. These beneficial effects of conflict had a bearing on the purpose of Smith’s 
system of moral education and the circumstances during his administration.  
 In the years that followed the end of the American War of Independence, Smith 
believed that the relative tranquillity caused many incoming students to treat education as 
‘nothing more than a subordinate way to getting money’.44 He believed that this 
particular objective for higher education resulted in ‘not one idea of honour annexed to 
scholarship nor one spark of ambition to improve [which] commonly gives [students] up 
to habits of idleness [in the study of] liberal science’.45 As political and intellectual 
conflict arose in the new republic, Smith sought to channel these tensions as motivation 
for ‘improving activities’ at Princeton. The degenerative effects of idleness, unrestrained 
passions, and ‘false’ or sceptical philosophy were concerns that Smith addressed in his 
lectures of moral philosophy. His system of moral education, therefore, served a dual 
purpose: it prepared enlightened statesmen for future public service and restrained 
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immoral ‘passions’ as graduates entered public life. These purposes offer an explanation 
why Smith’s system of moral education placed so much emphasis on ‘liberal science’ at 
Princeton. According to Smith, ‘idleness degenerates everything; and mere amusement, 
where it occupies a large portion of our time, evaporated the greatest and most 
respectable qualities of human nature’.46 Moral reform required constant attention, 
leaving little time for amusements or distractions. Joseph Reade, then a third year 
Princeton student in 1795, remarked that ‘Dr Smith has informed us that we have more 
information to study than any preceding class and shale [sic] be obliged to employ every 
moment of our time’.47  
 While instinctive ‘passions’ could motivate ‘noble principles of action’ (as 
evinced by the glorified memory of previous American patriots), Smith taught that 
‘passions’ were also ‘prone to excess, and by incautious indulgence, are so apt to acquire 
a dangerous dominion over the heart’.48 Consequently, he suggested ‘that one of the most 
important purposes of a wise and virtuous education is to mark out the legitimate objects 
of their pursuit, and to impose upon them prudent restraints’.49 Upon his 1795 
appointment as Princeton’s president, Smith believed student idleness and immoral 
passions threatened the College’s security and virtue amongst its students.50 While 
Princeton offered conventional rules that discouraged misconduct, Smith’s lectures of 
moral philosophy prepared young men to govern their own actions independently. Smith 
argued:  
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It is the sincere aim, and the gradual tendency of true philosophy to correct the errors 
of prejudice, and to dissipate the mists that shed themselves over the mind, in 
consequence of the prevalence of any dominant affection or passion [and] in our 
philosophical enquiries, we have as much reason to avoid the dangers of a weak and 
suspicious scepticism, as of a bold and positive dogmatism.51 
 
Smith therefore addressed the political, moral and intellectual trials of his time by 
teaching how to develop virtuous habits in practical situations through perfecting the 
instinctive principles of the mind. Smith claimed that ‘in the present state of things, I 
conceive that [wars and domestic conflicts] are even necessary to the improvement of 
human nature’.52 
 
Counter-Enlightenment Interests: Ashbel Green’s reception of Smith’s philosophy 
 Stanhope Smith’s lectures and sermons at Princeton offered evidence of a 
supreme being and His design for implanting humankind with ‘intellectual, active and 
moral powers of the mind’. In doing so, Smith drew heavily on Thomas Reid’s ‘Common 
Sense’ philosophy. Smith remarked that ‘in this field no writer has distinguished himself 
with greater zeal, ability, and success than Dr Reid of Glasgow’.53 As shown in the 
introduction, Reid presented his ‘principles of common sense’ as self-evident maxims 
that governed the examination of innate faculties and operations of the mind.54 At the 
heart of this philosophical system, Reid suggested:  
Common sense and reason have both one author; that almighty Author, in all whose 
other works we observe consistency, uniformity, and beauty, which charm and 
delight the understanding; there must, therefore, be some order and consistency in 
the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship.55 
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In agreement with Reid, Smith remarked that ‘the basis of all true science rests on the 
uniformity of nature in all her operations’.56 In addition, Smith promoted introspective 
reflection as a method to evaluate moral progress and detect vicious habits born from 
immoral passions that followed idleness.57 Smith’s use of Reid’s philosophy to counter 
‘false’ philosophy was not new to Princeton. Witherspoon had previously endorsed 
Reid’s efforts in challenging David Hume’s mitigated scepticism. Witherspoon 
commented that Hume’s attempt to ‘shake the certainty of our belief, upon cause and 
effect, upon personal identity and the idea of power [was countered with] dictates of 
common sense [by] authors of Scotland’.58 Witherspoon did not however share Reid’s 
enthusiasm for metaphysics in sermons or teaching moral philosophy—unlike Smith. 
Like Reid, Smith argued that man controls ‘his own will and over the actions of his mind, 
as well as of his body’.59 While he admitted that ‘the mind seldom or never acts without 
some motive, that is, without some end in view at the time, [Smith taught that] Dr Reid 
has rendered it probable that, on many occasions, it forms determinations without motive, 
by the immediate energy of its own self-control’.60 The mind’s active power to determine 
an intended action or refrain from action enabled a degree of self-determination 
independent of God’s intervention. On this belief, Smith taught that ‘the volitions of the 
mind are the effect of its own internal energy, not by a previous volition, but by an 
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original, innate power over its own actions, of which every man who reflects upon 
himself is conscious’.61 This belief that the human mind, if properly cultivated, possessed 
powers to act independent of God was problematic for orthodox Calvinists. For example, 
Ashbel Green wrote that ‘Dr Smith of Princeton preached at Arch St [Philadelphia] in the 
morning an alarming sermon, but somewhat Arminianish’.62 Beyond his sermons, Smith 
received similar criticisms for teaching Reidian ‘active powers of the mind’. William 
Weeks, then a Princeton student, complained that ‘Reid is grossly Arminian and 
advocates a self-determining power, which if it means anything, means that the creature 
is independent of the Creator’.63 In agreement with Weeks’s evaluation of Reid and, by 
extension Smith, Green believed Smith’s moral philosophy was contrary to Calvinistic 
principles and therefore posed a threat to Princeton’s religious purpose.   
 In a transitional moment between the first and second ‘Great Awakenings’, an 
increasing number of Evangelicals (including Green) appealed to the thought of previous 
revivalists such as Jonathan Edwards (who for a short time had served as Princeton’s 
president).64 In discussing the importance of the conversion experience and the ‘rebirth’ 
that followed, Green claimed that ‘President Edwards has illustrated this idea with great 
ingenuity in his treatise on Original Sin’.65 Contrary to the later teachings of Smith and 
Reid, Edwards advocated that people act from ‘moral necessity’.66 He suggested that ‘if 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Smith, Lectures, 283. 
 
62 Green’s diary entry, 14 April 1799, PUL C0257 MS16045.   
 
63 William Weeks to Ebenezer Weeks, 11 April 1808, PUL, AM 11456.  
 
64 See Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989); Edwin Gaustad, Neither King Nor Prelate: Religion and the new nation, 1776-1826, 
(London, Eerdmans, 1993). 
 
65 Green, Lectures, 245.  
 
66 See Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of History: The reenchantment of the world in the 
age of Enlightenment, (PUP, 2003), 97; Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought and Its 
British Context, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 122, 140, 351, 356; 
The Primacy of the Mind at Princeton ,*+!
the acts of the will are excited by motives, those motives are the causes of those acts of 
the will; which makes the acts of the will necessary; as effects necessarily follow the 
efficiency of the cause’.67 This argument that humankind necessarily acts according to the 
strongest motive resulted in prioritising revelation as the primary cause of moral agency 
and the source for developing ‘a strong habit of virtue’.68 In support of Edwards’s ‘moral 
necessity’, Green maintained that ‘to the eye of contemplative and sober reason, willing 
to discern its Creator, a present God is recognised in all that we behold’.69 This concept 
of a ‘present God’ limited the power for agents to cause an intended effect without the 
previous presence of divine intervention. Furthermore, Green preached that God’s will ‘is 
indicated by the connexion between his volition and the effects produced…this 
connexion according to the sure testimony of divine revelation, is illimitably certain’.70 
Smith rejected that people were victims of motives and slaves of ‘inclination, appétit, or 
passion, as it arises’.71 Beyond these fundamental differences, Smith and Green differed 
in their interpretation of Witherspoon and the purpose of a Princeton education. 
 The reasons for Ashbel Green’s early opposition to Smith’s moral thought, that 
later evolved into a counter-Enlightenment campaign for his removal from Princeton, 
merit further discussion. For Green, Witherspoon was an ideal example of ‘enlightened 
piety’ and his influence greatly affected Green’s vision of Princeton as a theological 
seminary. Upon Green’s 1781 arrival at Princeton, Smith governed Princeton’s greatly 
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reduced student population (fifty students) with the assistance of one tutor, James 
Riddle.72 Green remarked that after more than six weeks into the academic year ‘Dr 
Witherspoon left congress finally, in the autumn of that year [1781] and in the following 
winter heard the recitations of the senior class on his own lectures’.73 Witherspoon 
remained at Princeton the following year after Congress withdrew from Philadelphia’s 
State House and assembled at Princeton.74 Congress held meetings at the Nassau Hall 
library room and many congressmen lodged in vacant student rooms within the same 
building.75 The presence of Congress at Princeton certainly strengthened the 
revolutionary spirit amongst the students and influenced the successful ‘petition to the 
legislature to exempt the whole of the college estate from taxation’.76 Afterwards, 
Princeton’s 1783 graduation was exceptional with prominent statesmen in attendance. 
Green recalled that ‘we accordingly had on the stage, with the trustees and the graduating 
class, the whole of the congress, the ministers of France and Holland, and commander-in-
chief of the American army’.77 He addressed this influential group as Princeton’s 
valedictorian and Washington followed with concluding remarks. Washington’s and 
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Congress’s favourable impression of Green certainly contributed to his later appointment 
as Congress’s chaplain from 1792 to 1800.78  
 After graduating, Green remained at Princeton for two years to study divinity with 
Witherspoon and as a tutor and later professor of mathematics and natural philosophy. 
Green revealed that ‘it was my happiness, while tutor and professor in the college, to 
possess the friendship and confidence both of Dr Witherspoon and Dr Smith’.79 From 
their guidance, Green chose to pursue a career in the ministry instead of law. In a 
revealing statement, Green claimed:  
To Dr Witherspoon, more than to any other human being, I am indebted for 
whatever of influence or success has attended me in life. His useful instructions, 
wise counsels, kind monitions, and friendly aid, were of incalculable advantage 
during the whole period of fourteen years that he lived after my first acquaintance 
with him.80  
             
At the start of his career, Witherspoon convinced Green to join Rev James Sprout at the 
Second Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia.81 Green wrote:  
the congregation I served, was originally composed, almost exclusively, of the 
friends and followers of the celebrated Mr. Whitfield; and the church was, at first, 
constituted, I think wholly, of converts made under his ministry, and that of his 
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His congregation’s tradition of supporting religious revivalism certainly strengthened his 
attachment to his part in this purpose. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding 
Green’s 1786 ordination and later appointment suggested that he intended to continue 
Witherspoon’s efforts to bridge lingering Old and New Light divisions. Green remarked: 
The arrangements for my ordination had been made with a view to mingle, and if 
possible to harmonize the old side and the new side members of the Presbytery. For 
although nearly seventy-nine years had elapsed, since in 1752 the rival Synods had 
become united; two Presbyteries of Philadelphia had existed, composed severally 
of the litigant parties; and the aged members of both sides had retained something 
of the old bitter feelings towards each other.83  
 
This desire for ecclesiastical unity continued through the first meeting of the General 
Assembly of Presbyterian ministers in 1789 which Witherspoon had organised. 
According to Green, ‘the first two years of my ministry were arduous in the extreme; but 
I look back to them with pleasure and with gratitude to Dr Witherspoon’.84 Yet Green did 
not extend the same high regard for Smith at this time or in the years that followed.  
 After Smith’s eulogy of Benjamin Franklin on 1st March 1791 at the German 
Lutheran Church in Philadelphia, Green cautioned Smith regarding his use of 
metaphysics. Green noted that ‘I endeavoured to state to him as fully as I can the danger 
of his fervent labels to warn to fly from the wrath to come’.85 Green continued: 
I was fearful that the letter I wrote might offend him, but I found it had not. This is 
encouragement to do duty and leave events with God. The letter was as stinging as I 
could make it. But I told him it was because I was convinced it to be necessary, and 
conscience seems to have witnessed the truth. He is not however as much affected as 
I wish he was.86  
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Green was correct in believing that Smith dismissed his ‘stinging’ remarks against the use 
of metaphysics as evinced by its continued use in his lectures of moral philosophy and 
sermons at Princeton. Beyond Smith’s particular use of metaphysics Green was not 
convinced that he was a capable orator and scholar. He described Smith’s eulogy of 
Franklin ‘as lame and very imperfect and that the desire was but miserably executed’. 
Moreover, he believed ‘there was want of taste, want of judgement or skill and want of 
strength [and] the character of this performance is the character of all the performances 
which I have heard from this man’.87 For these reasons he questioned why Smith was 
celebrated by so many and concluded that ‘it is a kind of fashion to esteem him a very 
sensible and able writer’.88 Smith’s students, however, did not share Green’s negative 
evaluation. For example, Joseph Reade, then a junior at Princeton in 1795, declared that 
‘I am very much pleased with Dr Smith as he appears to be both a man of wit and 
sense’.89 Green’s private thoughts of Smith (expressed in an encrypted diary written in a 
mixture of Greek, Latin, and English) revealed reasons for his later organisation of a 
campaign to remove Smith as Princeton’s president at the turn of the century.90 The 
members of this counter-Enlightenment campaign objected to the concepts and values 
taught in Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy (most notably the themes of duty and of 
the ‘moral faculty). Green believed that Smith perverted Witherspoon’s moral philosophy 
and his legacy at Princeton. From a devotion to the memory of Witherspoon and duty to 
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the ‘distinguishing doctrines of evangelical truth, as exhibited in the Calvinistick [sic] 
system’, he later sought to revive Princeton’s traditional religious purpose.91      
  Green’s central criticisms of Smith’s use of metaphysics implied that Smith 
extended this practise in all of his sermons. While this observation was indeed verified in 
many of Smith’s Sunday addresses at Princeton, his treatment of revealed and natural 
religion was far more guarded against controversy than Green suggested. As a 
Presbyterian minister whose sermons were celebrated as ‘enlightened and eloquent’ 
across the middle and southern states, Smith preached ‘pure and rational piety’ found in 
‘true religion’. Smith agreed with revivalists insofar that ‘we ought to make a grand effort 
to obtain more qualified men in the ministry and to quicken the zeal of individual pastors 
in the discharge of their parochial duties’.92 While Smith agreed that irreligion was a 
dangerous product of the French Revolution and should be combated from the pulpit, he 
argued that the cultivation of the instinctive faculties of the mind prevented the adoption 
of philosophical scepticism and political radicalism associated with ‘Jacobinism’. On this 
difference, Smith distinguished between compatible yet different roles of revealed and 
natural religion. Smith taught: 
On the subject of our holy religion, most certainly, we are indebted to revelation 
exclusively for the peculiar, and distinguishing doctrines of the Christian system. But 
the powers of reason which God hath bestowed on human nature, are competent to 
enlighten the mind on the general and practical duties of morality and virtue. The 
spirit of inspiration does, unquestionably, illustrate them more clearly, and confer 
additional evidence and authority on the prescriptions of conscience, and on all the 
motives of duty.93 
 
In this appeal to Reid’s notion of natural religion, Smith taught that the divinely inspired 
faculty of reason identified evidence of the existence of and natural obligation to God. In 
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contrast, Green followed Witherspoon’s notion that God implanted humankind’s earthly 
moral duties in their hearts and revealed His laws of pious conduct in the Scriptures. For 
Green, humankind’s fall from Grace in the Garden of Eden forever corrupted God’s 
original design of the human constitution. Afterwards, humankind depended upon 
revelation to ascertain God’s moral law. Green claimed: 
The moral law of God—or the rule of moral action for his creature man—was, no 
doubt, clearly written on man’ heart, at his first creation—That is, he was so formed 
that he had a clear perception of his duty, and felt as he ought, his obligations to 
perform it perfectly. After the fall, this original law of moral duty, was greatly 
defaced and obliterated by sin. Some faint traces of it, however, seem yet to remain, 
in the dictates of natural conscience. But as the restoration of man was intended by 
God, he was graciously pleased to reveal anew his moral law, in all its extent, to his 
fallen creature.94  
 
While Smith agreed with evangelicals (including Witherspoon and Green) that revelation 
was indispensible for the salvation of the soul and understanding the ‘essence of God’, he 
believed these theological concerns involved religious faith not moral conduct.95 
Consequently, the tone and substance of his sermons and lectures reflected these 
distinctly different purposes and the needs of his intended audience. To a degree these 
separate purposes (religious faith and restraining ‘passions’) overlapped in Smith’s 
treatment of natural religion. For instance, Smith taught: 
An enlightened conscience [interchangeable with the ‘moral faculty’] imposes the 
most effectual restraints upon passions, which are the principles of evil in man. It 
unfolds the law on each case of conduct as it arises, and adds to the prescriptions of 
duty, the most powerful motives of obedience. Hence it is that faith, not, as the 
enemies of religion assert, a blind belief of uncertain facts, and unintelligent 
mysteries, but a clear understanding, and firm persuasion of the truths of the gospel, 
is laid, by the apostles, at the foundation of a good life, and thereby made the 
condition of our salvation.96  
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For Smith, the perfection of all the faculties of the mind, particularly the ‘moral faculty’, 
realised God’s design, and, therefore, strengthened religious faith in Biblical Christianity. 
But his lectures of moral philosophy did not attempt to prove the truthfulness of 
revelation or support its use as the primary vehicle of morals. Instead, Smith appealed to 
Reid’s belief that ‘revelation was not intended to supersede, but to aid the use of our 
natural faculties’.97 In doing so, Smith claimed that ‘there is no doubt that these principles 
of our nature are liable to great imperfections and sometimes to gross mistakes, in 
judging both truth and duty; but they are the best means of directing our conduct and 
opinions which our Creator hath placed in our power’.98 Therefore, as a minister, Smith’s 
sermons guided his congregation toward Christian conversion and, by extension, 
salvation; as a moral philosopher, he taught methods of exercising innate faculties of the 
mind as the best way to prepare future virtuous statesmen for public service. As shown in 
the previous chapter, Smith’s system of moral education sought to create a Princeton 
Enlightenment rather than preparing young men to guide congregations toward heavenly 
salvation. This difference between revealed religion and metaphysics accompanied by 
Princeton’s reformed purpose under Smith’s administration did not escape the attention 
of Green and like-minded religious revivalists. Before this counter-Enlightenment faction 
of ministers rallied against his programme, Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy 
strengthened the ‘Moderate’ interests of tolerance and commitment whilst developing 
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The ‘Moral Faculty’ and its Rules of Duty in Smith’s System of Moral Education 
 The instinctive rules of duty attached to the ‘moral faculty’ occupied the vast 
majority of Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy. Their practical applications in public 
life and central role in creating Enlightenment offer an explanation for the little space 
afforded to the ‘intellectual powers of the mind’ that appeared in his introductory lecture 
outlining his philosophical system. Like Dugald Stewart, Smith adapted Reidian themes 
to the circumstances of his time and the institution in which he taught. For Smith, this 
entailed strengthening scientific innovation and natural religion as a way to foster an 
American Enlightenment. Achieving this ambition, however, required facing challenges 
from an emerging religious revivalist movement, led by Ashbel Green, and the increased 
activity from unruly students who Smith saw as ‘Jacobins’. Smith believed both factions 
were extreme representations of their affiliated groups: Presbyterian clergymen and 
Princeton students. Before exploring how these factions advanced counter-Enlightenment 
policies at Princeton in the following chapter, this final section will examine how Smith’s 
applied ethics encouraged cultural and religious tolerance whilst exercising the ‘moral 
faculty’ as the source of virtue. 
 The understanding and exercise of virtue in public life occupied a central place in 
Smith’s moral thought. Of the faculties that supported this aim, the ‘moral faculty’ 
included the branches of moral duty and the power to judge and exercise virtue. Like 
Stewart, Smith treated the ‘moral faculty’ as the source of conceptions of duty and 
obligation, notions of right and wrong, and judgments of merit and demerit.99 Smith 
added that ‘besides the conformity of an action to a rule or prescription of law, right 
implies its intrinsic and essential rectitude, as seen and approved by the heart, or moral 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 See chapter one, 57-59. 
 
Chapter Five ,+*!
faculty, when no idea of the control, or authority of law is taken into view at the time’.100 
While he treated this faculty as universal amongst humankind, he suggested, like Stewart, 
that the criterion for notions of ‘right and wrong’ were not universal.101 The exercise of 
the ‘moral faculty’ therefore enabled agents to be virtuous through fulfilling universal 
‘moral laws’ and rules of duty implanted by God.102 For Smith, the judgement of these 
instinctive obligations or ‘moral laws’ was improved through ‘experience and reflection, 
and especially by profoundly observing the course of human conduct, and tracing its 
causes, motives, disguises, and consequences’.103 Central objects of the ‘moral faculty’ 
were therefore the judgment and exercise of virtue, particularly of fortitude, patience, 
temperance, and the moderation of passions, as vital parts of civil society.104 While these 
qualities of the ‘moral faculty’ closely resembled those taught in Stewart’s philosophy, 
Smith expanded upon its application in response to his situation and enlightened ambition 
for Princeton. 
 In examining the ‘moral faculty’, Smith afforded more space to the different ways 
in which people in particular situations and cultural norms (affected by systems of 
education and national manners) exercised and judged morals than Stewart had 
attempted. Smith’s tolerance for differing notions of ‘right and wrong’ opposed 
‘prejudices [that] have been assiduously fostered, and passions artfully inflamed’.105 
Smith believed that the ‘Moderate’ value of cultural tolerance was relevant for 
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Princeton’s mixture of regional customs amongst its student population and his design for 
preparing enlightened statesmen whose future concerns would extend to American 
foreign policies. Despite different cultural beliefs and manners, Smith taught that 
everyone possessed the same unrefined morals at birth that could be cultivated to 
‘disentangle’ cultural prejudices and vicious behaviour through refining the ‘moral 
faculty’. Since the ‘moral faculty’ required exercise for its perfection, differing standards 
of living and values naturally conditioned this faculty in different ways. At the same time, 
everyone was united through the influence of universal ‘moral laws’ on the dispositions 
of virtuous and reflective agents. According to Smith, ‘the perception which accompanies 
these dictates of the moral faculty is that of an intrinsic, essential, and unchangeable 
rectitude, and excellence in virtue, and of guilt and depravity of vice’.106 These ‘moral 
laws’ affected how virtuous and enlightened men judged the intension of a particular act 
as evidence of the agent’s disposition.107 In cases where actions did not uniformly 
coincide with perceptions of ‘right and wrong’, the faculty of reason corrected false 
judgments. Smith demonstrated this concept of a moral quasi-relativism by contrasting 
how some national cultures believe certain religious beliefs to be pious whilst others 
interpret them as promoting ‘meanness and grovelling hypocrisy’.108 He illustrated this 
point further in suggesting 
The vivacity and excessive complaisance of France, is apt to impress an Englishman 
with an opinion of frivolity of the nation, which is retaliated by French imputing to 
the English a savage surliness of character. Nothing can eradicate from the mind of 
[the] Turk a persuasion of the licentiousness of the manners of Christians, on 
account of the free intercourse permitted among them between sexes; because in the 
east, where women are, in a great measure, secluded from public view, such liberties 
are never seen to take place except among the most profligate part of society; and 
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they are ignorant of the influence of those civil, social, and religious ideas which 
combine to impress a totally different character on European manners.109    
 
Moreover, diversity in manners and culture was displayed across different states of 
society. Smith’s promotion of cultural tolerance did not imply he agreed with beliefs 
contrary to Christian principles or American ‘polite’ manners that drew heavily from 
British standards. Yet he believed that ‘we may frequently discern unexpected virtues in 
the midst of unfavourable appearances; and, often, vice is found to shelter itself under the 
imposing aspect of virtue’.110 National cultures that promoted different moral values, 
therefore, should not prejudice judgments of its citizenry as immoral. Thus, he taught that 
‘the justice, or benevolence of an act ought to be judged of differently, according to the 
mutual dependence of men, and their natural expectations from one another, arising out 
of their social condition, and the habits of their education’.111 If a particular act adheres to 
the moral norms of its culture, Smith believed it did not violate an intrinsic ‘moral law’ if 
the agent’s intensions were moral. He suggested that ‘we err in measuring the acts of 
other men, or the regulations of other nations, by the customs of our own country’.112 
Rather than succumbing to religious and cultural prejudices Smith taught that from 
cultivating the ‘moral faculty’ ‘we find a solution of that unreasonable bigotry and 
inheritableness which mark the sentiments of various religious sects towards one another, 
and of the mutual contempt and aversion of foreign nations’.113 This certainly reflected 
the interests of future statesmen not ministers.   
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 Like Reid and Stewart, Smith taught that the ‘moral faculty’ directed humankind 
towards their instinctive obligations to God, others, and themselves. While his 
interpretation of these obligations largely coincided with Reid’s philosophy, his situation 
at Princeton led him to make certain modifications and additions. For instance, Smith’s 
active service in the American Presbyterian Church as the elected moderator of its 
General Assembly in 1799 and as Princeton’s president affected his interpretation of 
these duties. Beyond examining man’s various duties to God at length in sermons at 
Princeton, Smith taught that everyone had internal and external obligations to a supreme 
being. Like Reid, Smith taught that the internal duties entailed ‘love, reverence, and 
resignation’ to God’s authority, will, and design. In addition to these, Smith believed that 
an outward expression of these sentiments was equally important for a Christian. By 
worshipping God in public, agents demonstrated ‘adoration, thanksgiving, confession, 
and prayer’ which he considered to be universal amongst all Christian sects. He believed 
that ‘all rites deserve to be regarded with respect which custom has sanctified among any 
people, and has so associated with their religious ideas as to be to them the most serious 
and affecting expression of their devotional exercises’.114 This too demarcated Smith’s 
promotion of religious tolerance and the diffusion of Christian principles at Princeton. 
For Smith, fulfilling these duties ‘embrace[d] the whole compass of piety and virtue; 
because, as they constitute the moral law of the universe prescribed by God, conformity 
to their dictates is justly regarded as obedience to him’.115 Within his discussion of these 
internal and external duties to God, Smith noted that the state of society often reflected its 
religious practises. In this view, Smith’s system that promoted a union of internal 
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(private) and external (public) demonstrations of religious devotion exemplified the 
function of ‘rational’ Christianity in Princeton’s Enlightenment.  
 Smith’s teaching of the branches of duty or the ‘rules of duty’ as he preferred to 
call them, surpassed Reid’s applied ethics in terms of the range and extent of their 
application. The improving elements of a properly governed education appeared 
throughout his treatment of these instinctive rules as particularly important. For instance, 
in teaching the duties of parents Smith stressed that parental affections that gratified the 
desires of their children resulted in idleness and pleasure and, afterwards, ‘only links 
them into insignificance and contempt’.116 Instead, he taught the maxim 
It is education chiefly which makes man what he is; whether it be well, or ill 
conducted. By education, skilfully applied, the manners, habits, and sentiments of 
youth may be formed to almost any standard.117  
 
This belief complemented his teaching of the ‘imitative faculty’ and why young men 
required virtuous and pious examples for instruction.118 Beyond his immediate purposes 
for instilling a high value of enlightened education at Princeton, Smith infused politics 
with the treatment of moral duties. From an abolitionist perspective, Smith questioned if 
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the institution of slavery was moral. According to Smith, ‘men deceive themselves 
continually by false pretences, in order to justify the slavery which is convenient for 
them’.119 Smith’s lecture on this subject drew largely from themes in his earlier Essay on 
the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure (1786).120 While he believed slavery 
should be condemned and forbidden on moral grounds, he suggested that only a gradual 
emancipation of slaves would prevent idleness and the vicious consequences that 
necessarily followed inactivity. For this reason, he argued, 
the laws ought, perhaps, to hold out the hope, and the means of freedom to all, yet so 
as, if possible, to admit those only to a participation of its privileges who shall have 
previously qualified themselves by good moral and industrious habits, to enjoy it in 
such a manner as to be beneficial to themselves, and to the state…It is of high public 
concern that slavery should be gradually corrected, and, at length, if possible, 
entirely extinguished: for wherever it is incorporated with the institutions of a 
republic, it will be productive of many moral and political evils.121 
 
Until 1804, New Jersey permitted slavery and a large number of Princeton students were 
from southern plantation states.122 In this situation, his support for the abolition of slavery 
was certainly controversial.123 Contrary to Smith, Jefferson (whose thought greatly 
influenced Republican beliefs) did not ‘imagine a racially or even an ethnically pluralistic 
America’ whilst at the same time believing that the inequalities of slavery were not 
morally justifiable.124 Smith’s unique adaptation of Reid’s practical ethics did not garner 
much attention presumably due to his earlier work on the subject. Of his more 
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controversial lectures at the time, Smith’s promotion of cultural tolerance in treating the 
rules or obligations of marriage heightened Green’s scrutiny of Smith’s philosophy in 
1804. The circumstances of this tension and its consequences will receive further 
attention in the following chapter.   
 
Conclusion 
 American political and religious tensions in the years that followed the French 
Revolution rendered American colleges vulnerable to radicalism. Consequently, 
Evangelical clergymen feared that young men would adopt atheistic principles in their 
pursuit of further liberties. The next chapter will show that these separate interests 
assumed radical forms at Princeton. Smith identified times of conflict as particularly 
conducive toward enterprising activities of moral and scientific innovation. Yet, to Smith, 
the advancements that improved the human condition through perfecting the mind and 
society should be governed by practises of enlightened moderation.  
 Smith’s system of moral education was the vehicle for this Princeton 
Enlightenment. At the centre of this programme, Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy 
taught methods of developing virtuous habits, and they strengthened obligations to 
diffuse the ‘Moderate’ values of cultural and religious tolerance. In responding to, as he 
saw it, student idleness and overindulged passions, Smith taught that the cultivation of the 
‘moral faculty’ would create future virtuous and enlightened statesmen. In this process, 
Smith advanced original adaptations of Reid’s treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ and the 
rules of duty that sprung from its source. These adaptations reflected the circumstances 
and situation at Princeton.  
 At the turn of the nineteenth century, Smith encountered an unprecedented 
number of student disruptions that threatened the security of the College and the 
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continued practise of his system of moral education. Smith believed these student 
outbursts of radical disobedience, violence, and destruction was the result of a small 
faction of ‘Jacobins’. Ashbel Green and like-minded religious revivalists such as Samuel 
Miller and Archibald Alexander believed this faction was the result of Smith’s failure 
properly to diffuse Christian principles. The struggle between these two interpretations of 
student disruptions and how best to prevent future acts of youthful defiance exemplified 
tensions between Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy and counter-Enlightenment 






Princeton’s War of 1812: Student riots, religious revivalism, and the end of 





 In the years following the end of the American Revolution, Samuel Stanhope 
Smith wrote that ‘our freedom certainly takes away the distinctions of rank that are so 
visible in Europe; and of consequence takes away, in the same proportion, those 
submissive forms of politeness that exist here’.1 At Princeton, this social change 
emerged with an unwelcomed contribution to Princeton’s history of fostering 
religious and political revolutionary spirit from its students. On several occasions, an 
influential faction of Princeton students challenged College rules with unprecedented 
displays of vandalism, riotous protests, physical and verbal assaults of tutors, and 
protests against traditional Princeton conventions. As Steven Novak has shown, 
student disruptions such as these were not exclusive to Princeton at this time with 
similar incidents occurring at William and Mary, Dartmouth, Dickinson, and Yale.2 
Novak suggests:  
Though long-range trends contributed to student unrest, the rise of campus revolt 
itself came not gradually but quite suddenly, during the national crisis of 1798. The 
crisis both mobilized the young and altered the meaning of youthful disorders. After 
the turn of the century student unrest was no longer calmly attributed to the 
“influence of the first lapse” but was perceived as “the product of vice and 
irreligion”.3  
 
While this kind of youthful uprising and its perceived meaning were largely shared 
throughout the republic, Princeton produced two different responses to this phenomenon: 
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1 Smith to Charles Nisbet, 4 February 1785, quoted in Michael Kraus, ‘Charles Nisbet and Samuel 
Stanhope Smith—Two Eighteenth Century Educators’, Princeton University Library Chronicle, 6, 
(Nov., 1944), 26.  
 
2 Steven Novak, The Rights of Youth: American Colleges and Student Revolt, 1798-1815, (HUP, 1977), 
95-156. Pauline Maier has shown that American popular uprisings also happened earlier in the 
eighteenth century, however, these earlier episodes were not dominated by America’s youth as it was 
around the turn of the nineteenth century (Pauline Maier, ‘Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in 
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one being radical and the other moderate. Ashbel Green and like-minded religious 
revivalists credited this prolonged surge of youthful revolt at Princeton as the result of 
Stanhope Smith’s system of moral education. Smith’s reforms of the curriculum in 
creating the Princeton Enlightenment (which was based on natural religion and 
metaphysics) rendered his system vulnerable to objections that it did not properly address 
irreligion. As shown in the previous chapter, Smith’s system of moral education sought to 
restrain immoral ‘passions’ and cultivate virtuous habits by exercising the ‘moral and 
active powers of the mind’, with particular attention to the ‘moral faculty’ and its rules of 
duty. The rise of student misconduct at Princeton did not shake this conviction but rather 
reaffirmed Smith’s belief that his system of moral education should be enhanced with 
expanded course offerings in branches of ‘liberal science’. Contrary to Smith’s system, 
Green believed unruly young men required proper instruction in the Gospels. Attentive 
studies of divine revelation, in turn, would allegedly strengthen the attachment to morals 
and civil society. Green’s efforts to renew Princeton’s diffusion of Christian principles 
exemplified the beginning of wider American efforts to revive the Christian faith. This 
chapter examines the tension between these Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment 
approaches of addressing youthful rebellion: a revival of Christian religious principles led 
by Green and, in contrast, an expansion of Smith’s system of moral education.  
 Gordon Wood suggests that ‘between 1798 and 1808 American colleges were 
racked by mounting incidents of student defiance and outright rebellion—on a scale 
never seen before or since in American history’.4 While this wave of student disruptions 
was not reducible to one cause, student adoption of ‘Jacobin’ principles (as Smith saw it) 
and notions of patriotism (associated with Jeffersonian-Republican beliefs) were central 
factors to its emergence at Princeton. The ideological wars of their fathers (particularly 
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the War of Independence and the Federalist debates) rendered this generation of young 
men in search of a purpose and cause of their own to champion. This desire, coupled with 
the circumstances of the time and their situation at Princeton, resulted in a vacuum for 
radical activism. For a faction of bold students, the ideals of liberty, insofar as student 
rights were concerned, were greatly limited by Princeton rules and traditions. 
Consequently, this faction of ‘Jacobins’ waged war against Princeton’s authority between 
1800 and 1807. While a small faction of students started these uprisings, their cause 
proved contagious amongst the student population. According to Thomas Edwards (then 
a Princeton student), the ‘senior class [of 1802] is the most disorderly one ever in 
College: they are denominate [sic] by the doctor [Smith], the Jacobins’.5 In the months 
and years that followed this assessment, Princeton ‘Jacobins’ became increasingly radical 
in their pursuit for expanded student liberties. Smith credited ‘Jacobin’ factions with the 
1802 destruction of the College edifice (Nassau Hall) and the 1807 ‘Great Rebellion’, in 
which, for a brief time, students (who appealed to Jeffersonian-Republican ideals) 
assumed control of the College. These episodes weakened the trustees’ confidence in 
Smith’s system of moral education and its purpose of Enlightenment. Princeton’s Board 
of Trustees gradually favoured Ashbel Green’s belief that Princeton under Smith’s 
Enlightenment suffered from irreligion. This threat provided the necessary traction for 
Green to advance his resolution of reviving Witherspoon’s so-called ‘republican 
Christian Enlightenment’ with a renewed focus on training future ministers and diffusing 
Evangelical principles. 
 Attention to Smith’s and Green’s different approaches of discouraging student 
uprisings suggests that this issue was a catalyst for underlying tensions between Scottish 
Enlightenment thought and American religious revivalism. While religious revivalism 
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and student rebellions harboured contrary agendas, they converged in challenging 
Smith’s system of moral education. The intended and unintended effects from these 
movements against the purpose of the Princeton Enlightenment will be discussed in two 
sections. The first examines Smith’s response to student disruptions between 1800 and 
1807. The final section explores the reasons why Ashbel Green led a campaign to remove 
Smith’s system of moral education. In addressing these areas, this chapter suggests 
reasons why Green’s campaign was successful and how he measured this victory by 
Smith’s 1812 resignation, the 1812 establishment of Princeton’s Theological Seminary, 
and, most revealing, his adaptation of Witherspoon’s ‘republican Christian 
Enlightenment’ in creating Princeton’s second age of religious revivalism from 1812 to 
1822.   
 
‘Jacobins’ at Princeton: Student disruptions and rebellion, 1800-1807 
 
 From its 1746 establishment, the College of New Jersey maintained control of the 
student body with a hierarchical system of authority. While the College president 
governed on-campus affairs, his power and the curriculum required approval by the 
Board of Trustees.6 Of the twenty-four elected members of this Board, the Charter 
stipulated that they represent an equal mixture of alumni from secular (twelve) and 
ecclesiastical professions (twelve).7 Yet the composition and interests of the Board 
drastically changed between 1805 and 1807 with the appointment of six new trustees who 
sympathised with religious revivalism. This change had a bearing on Smith’s system of 
moral education and how Princeton officials responded to so-called ‘Jacobin’ activities.  
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 Before these new appointments, the Board (which included Smith’s father and 
younger brother) overwhelmingly supported Smith’s system of moral education. The 
Board’s support for creating the Princeton Enlightenment did not imply, however, that 
they neglected the religious interests of the College. Instead, it reflected their confidence 
in Smith who drew heavily from the Scottish Enlightenment’s example of mixing 
philosophical truths with Calvinism. In a letter to Rush, Smith wrote that ‘you and I are 
continually mingling religious with philosophical inquiries and as you have dared to 
depart so far from the orthodoxy of public opinion, forgive me if my mind should also 
revolve in an exocentric orbit’.8 His ‘mingling’ of philosophy and religion did not alarm 
Princeton’s trustees (apart from Green) during the first five years of his administration. 
Thus, Princeton’s faculty and trustees were united under Smith’s leadership when a 
faction of ‘Jacobins’ first emerged in the winter of 1800. While student unrest often 
followed the end of a long winter season, the increase of the student population added 
another element of stress to this season of confinement.9    
 During the winter of 1800, three seniors (who were considered influential 
amongst their peers) protested against the required assembly for morning prayer. As 
shown in chapter five, Smith taught that group prayer was an instinctive duty to God as 
part of humankind’s external obligation to God, expressed through public worship.10 
Students justified this protest by complaining that the College chapel was too cold during 
the winter months and, as such, the faculty should not require students to endure this 
discomfort.11 While this objection appeared reasonable enough, their style of unyielding 
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protest, the fact they were opposing an aspect of Christianity as well as Smith’s system, 
and their reactions to the punishment that followed all proved significant. Smith 
submitted the student demands to the trustees. After that, all three seniors were 
suspended. In response to this punishment, there were unspecified disturbances in Nassau 
Hall; students also refused to follow the College’s digest. After several days, Smith 
managed to suppress these disruptions with the threat of expulsion. Of the seniors who 
were originally suspended, one returned early from suspension only to spur further 
insurrection. Agden Edwards, a senior from Connecticut, ‘returned and violently 
assaulted one of the tutors’.12 While the circumstances that motivated this assault were 
unclear, the use of violence coupled with their earlier protests against an aspect of 
organised religion led Smith to brand Edwards and his associates as ‘Jacobins’.13 The 
nature of Edwards’s actions resulted in his immediate expulsion. But his loyal confidants 
who banded together in the earlier protest remained at Princeton. In an 1802 letter to a 
trustee (Jonathan Baynard), Smith wrote: 
You have heard me speak of a young man who about two years ago, attempted to 
excite an insurrection on jacobistic and anti-religious principles. Since his expulsion, 
a small sect has still been left in the College, which has lately obtained some 
augmentation of numbers from the progress of passions very natural to the human 
heart, and from the encouragement given such opinions by the state of public morals. 
I am told that hostility to religion and moral order has been among their chief 
characteristics, but covered with great secrecy till very lately.14   
 
Edwards’s expulsion from Princeton did not end his radical activities as a student. In 
1802, he was active in a student rebellion at the College of William and Mary. According 
to Smith, ‘the same young man of whom I have spoken is now finishing his law studies at 
the College of William and Mary and has lately been principally concerned in an 




13 See Noah Webster’s definition of a ‘Jacobin’ in chapter five, 183-184. 
 
14 Smith to Jonathan Baynard, 10 March 1802, PUL MS2164.  
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in accommodation to general manners and opinions’.15 William and Mary’s leniency 
toward their government of young men, in comparison to Princeton’s more rigid rules, 
suggests that particular rules meant little to the alleged ‘Jacobin’ agenda of opposing 
anyone who claimed authority over their perceived liberties. Smith wrote that ‘the 
insurgents obliged the faculty to re-nounce the right of interrogating a student on any part 
of his conduct or his studies; in the exultation of their victory over old prejudices it is said 
they broke into the church, and took out the bible and burnt it’.16 While this unverified act 
of burning a bible was believed to be symbolic of the ‘Jacobins’ association with 
irreligion, it paled in comparison to the later destruction at Princeton. The faction of 
‘Jacobins’ that Edwards left in his wake at Princeton would later use more extreme means 
to accomplish their demands for further student liberties. 
 The looming threat of student insurrection cast a dark shadow over Princeton at 
the start of the new academic year. On 22nd November 1801, Edward Thomas wrote that 
‘I fear very much for the order of the College this session…the spirit of idleness seemed 
very general during the last and mischief is always a necessary consequence of 
nonattendance to studies’.17 The requisite time spent in class, study, at chapel, and the 
elective participation in the literary societies functioned as an indispensible part of 
Smith’s system to cultivate virtuous habits whilst removing opportunities for idleness as a 
gateway for immoral passions.18 Moreover, Smith drew a correlation between ‘Jacobin’ 
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17 Edward Thomas to Nicholas Biddle, 22 November 1801, PUL C1289. 
  
18 Life at Princeton offered some permissible diversions in the public sphere from the strenuous course 
work. Smith permitted students to attend the theatre in Philadelphia and encouraged participation in the 
two literary societies. Shortly after Witherspoon’s 1768 arrival, students reformed the ‘Well-Meaning’ 
and ‘Plain-Dealing’ social clubs, which were suspended by the trustees after the 1766 death of Samuel 
Finley (Maclean, HCNJ, vol. 1, 364). The foundation of the American Whig and Cliosophic literary 
societies, that replaced the former clubs, served as forums for debate and socialising. As a student in 
1769, Smith contributed to transforming the former Plain-Dealing Club into the American Whig 
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activities and students who did not adopt his system of moral education. ‘Jacobins’ were 
therefore believed by Smith to be a part of a radicalised type of counter-Enlightenment in 
the context of the Princeton Enlightenment. Yet Thomas’s premonition of an imminent 
student rebellion would prove correct in the months that followed.  
 During the 1801 College recess for Christmas, five students (who were believed 
to harbour ‘Jacobin’ beliefs) were reported to be drunk and the cause of unspecified 
forms of disruptive conduct at Princeton.19 When classes resumed after the break, Smith 
suspended them.20 Six students petitioned Smith to reconsider the suspension of four of 
the students. Smith and the trustees denied this petition, which they considered to be an 
example of ‘disrespectful’ defiance of their judgement. Following this decision, these 
students submitted a second petition in which they denied any affiliation with 
‘Jacobinism’.21 In light of earlier events, this added disclaimer suggests that Princeton 
officials believed a faction of ‘Jacobins’ still existed, and, moreover, that the students had 
knowledge of this belief. Unwilling to overturn their decision, the second petition was 
also dismissed. The following day, an unspecified number of students rioted and vowed 
not to fulfil their College duties until the suspended students were readmitted. This 
marked the second time within two years that students rebelled against College authority 
as a means to achieve their demands. Moreover, this form of radical protest was a 
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and their libraries together with the convenience for study will prove greater to the students than can be 
derived at any other place’ (Edward Thomas to Nicholas Biddle, 27 February 1802, PUL C1289). 
During the Revolution, both societies advanced support for American independence. In post-
revolutionary America, the American Whig and Cliosophic societies provided members with a forum 
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defining characteristic of so-called ‘Jacobins’. In revealing their demands, these 
Princeton ‘Jacobins’ delivered a third petition requesting ‘mildness in administrating the 
Laws’, and, if fulfilled, they would re-establish order to the College.22 On 29th January 
1802, Thomas Edwards remarked: 
I cannot say I was much surprised in being informed by it, of the rebellion at 
College. The disposition to disorder was very evident, before our departure and I am 
very happy to hear it has not broken out in a more violent manner. If the faculty had 
not in some measure yielded to them much greater lengths would have been taken.23   
           
The threat of preventable violence convinced Smith not to uphold his principled stance 
against ‘Jacobin’ activities. Of these activities, the rigorous defence of those punished 
became an expected practise at Princeton. Smith later wrote that ‘one of their [Jacobin] 
principles, I am confidently assured has been that no falsehood is criminal or to be 
declined that will protect a companion from discovery or punishment’.24 For Smith, these 
so-called ‘falsehoods’ were misdirected values that contradicted the maxims advanced in 
his lectures of moral philosophy. While ‘Jacobins’ utilised the terror of violent 
insurrection as a means to secure their demands, they remained defensive in their 
opposition to Princeton’s authority until March 1802. Two months after this student 
rebellion, a faction of ‘Jacobins’ orchestrated the most damaging act of Princeton’s 
history.  
 On 6th March 1802, a fire rapidly consumed the College edifice (Nassau Hall) at 
one o’clock in the afternoon whilst most students ate in the dinning hall. This fire claimed 
over three thousand books in the library, destroyed the majority of the philosophical 
apparatuses, and reduced Nassau to a burnt frame.25 According to Smith, the ruin of 
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Princeton’s edifice ‘may only be construed into a triumph of [Jacobin] principle’. He 
continued: 
Circumstances strongly lead to the belief that the fire was communicated by design, 
although no direct proof of the fact can be obtained. It is not doubted however by 
those who are best acquainted with the whole state of opinions here that it is one 
effect of those irreligious and demoralling [sic] principles which are tearing the 
bands of society asunder, and threatening in the end to overturn our country. It is 
thought highly probable that they have depraved the mind of some young lad 
connected with them or even more than one, 10 as, at length, to become capable of 
the dreadful act of setting fire to the college without being sensible of its enormity.26  
 
Afterwards, the Board of Trustees commissioned internal committees that oversaw the 
immediate repair of Nassau (led by Smith) and an investigative committee to determine 
the cause of the fire, which despite the recent student disruptions, was not conclusively 
linked to nefarious agents.27 Richard Stockton and John Beatty reported that ‘those who 
were first at the place where it made its appearance they are of opinion that the edifice of 
the College was intentionally set on fire’.28 Students and servants reported smelling a 
strong scent of turpentine before they witnessed smoke escaping from inside the roof’s 
trapdoor.29 The flames (which swiftly engulfed the roof) would not have progressed so 
swiftly in such powerful winds without the use of an accelerant fuel.30 Despite the 
evidence that suggested arson, the investigation did not discover the guilty party. 
Although the Board could not prove that ‘Jacobins’ had a part in the fire, they prevented 
the return of five students (William Cooper, Ushum [first name unknown], William 
Burhenm, Willey Jones, and Pratt Wilson) whom they believed had encouraged the 
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‘immoralities, disorders and combinations which prevailed among some of the 
students’.31 The expulsion of this suspected faction of ‘Jacobins’ suggests that Smith and 
the Board were convinced that ‘Jacobins’ had caused the destruction of Nassau Hall. 
Without a building for classes and a place for student accommodation, the trustees were 
forced to close the College temporarily. Apart from expelling alleged ‘Jacobins’, the 
Trustees and Smith used this time to create policies that were intended to safeguard the 
College against future attacks. When classes resumed the following autumn students were 
required to pledge: ‘I will not enter into any combination, classically or generally, to 
oppose the authority of the College’.32 In addition, students were not permitted to enter 
the tavern or places where ‘groceries of any kind [particularly alcohol] are sold’.33 
Interestingly, this pledge sought to remove the elements of ‘Jacobinism’ by strengthening 
the source of their complaints: restrictions of student liberties.  
 The Board recognised that the 1802 fire weakened the public’s confidence in a 
Princeton education. In the weeks that followed the fire, trustees circulated letters 
describing Princeton’s commitment to teaching enlightened and religious principles.34 In 
doing so, they stressed that the emergence of ‘Jacobins’ was not exclusive to Princeton, 
but rather Princeton ‘Jacobins’ (who had been expelled) represented an example of wider 
youthful uprisings across all American institutions of higher education.35 Sharing this 
belief, Smith wrote that ‘these, my friend, are some signs of the days which are coming 
upon us’.36 The trustees vowed ‘hereafter to correct the ill consequences’ that spring from 
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34 Joseph Bloomfield to the General Assembly, 19 March 1802, quoted in TM, 69. 
  
35 Circular letter to parents and trustees, 19 March 1802, in TM, 69-71. 
  
36 Smith to Baynard, 10 March 1802, PUL MS2164.  
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overindulged ‘passions’ by enhancing Smith’s system of moral education with further 
support.37 Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy and his Sunday sermons were central in 
fulfilling this objective. 
 As previously shown, Smith excelled in times of adversity and conflict. Similar to 
his earlier efforts during and after the American Revolution, he rallied support from 
alumni.38 By describing the destruction of Nassau Hall as an attack against religion and 
enlightened education, he suggested that Princetonians needed to take an ideological 
stance against this threat. At the same time, he believed this conflict with ‘Jacobins’ was 
an opportunity for improvement.39 Four days after Nassau had burnt, and whilst its 
remains were still smoking, Smith wrote: 
The College of Princeton will be immediately rebuilt, probably in a better state than 
it was, its discipline rendered still more strenuous and exact to meet the spirit of the 
times. Subscriptions are already opened for the purpose, with uncommon zeal and 
liberality. The friends of religion and of old principles seem to be touched and 
engaged as far as the cities of Phil. and N. York.40   
 
Through the following autumn, Smith solicited support for the repairs and further 
improvements to the College. In support of this cause, he joined Reverend Henry Kollock 
on a fundraising tour that covered the ‘southern states in various directions’.41 Despite 
being robbed of $300 along with his trunk outside of Richmond, his trip raised 
considerable donations.42 Meanwhile, Princeton alumni such as Congressman Jonathan 
Dayton and Vice-President Aaron Burr contributed and solicited funds from 
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Washington.43 Across the Atlantic, John Erskine (a prominent Scottish Whig) donated 
thirty books to Princeton and persuaded his Edinburgh network of friends to do the 
same.44 Dugald Stewart responded by sending Princeton his Elements of the Philosophy 
of the Human Mind, Life of Thomas Reid, and a copy of Reid’s Inquiry.45 On 27th 
September 1804, Smith announced ‘the perfect restoration of the College Edifice lately 
destroyed by fire, with many improvements in its structure calculated to guard against a 
like calamity in future’.46 In addition to repairing and improving Nassau, Smith oversaw 
the building of new teaching halls that surrounded Nassau. Smith’s decisive actions to 
reaffirm moral discipline and reform Princeton’s public image appeared successful if 
measured by the $44,317.86 in donations that resulted from this campaign.47 
 From Nassau’s ashes and burnt remains, Smith furthered his ambition for 
Enlightenment at Princeton. Smith wrote that ‘in comparing the circumstances of the 
College at the period when they lately solicited the public liberality in its favor, with its 
present state, they cannot but be deeply affected by the contrast which they witness’.48 
When classes resumed only ninety-one students (half of the 1802 student population) 
returned to continue their studies.49 While Smith’s tensions with ‘Jacobins’ for a time 
threatened Princeton’s security and reputation, Smith successfully channelled this conflict 
as a cause to expand his system of moral education. Afterwards, Princeton once again 
became known as an institution of moral improvement, ‘liberal science’, and a beacon for 
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American Enlightenment with just shy of 200 students by the following academic year. 
But this success would not last. William Hudnut suggests that ‘from this moment on, the 
trustees began meddling in the affairs of the college and enacting a long series of petty 
disciplinary regulations that served only to exacerbate the hostility between the governors 
and the governed, with President Smith caught helplessly in the middle’.50   
 In the years that followed, the Princeton Enlightenment caused the student 
population to swell to the unprecedented number of two hundred in 1806.51 Similar to 
years past, the expansion of Smith’s system of moral education (particularly in the natural 
sciences), attracted new students who sought a practical and enlightened education. In an 
1805 letter to David Ramsey, Smith wrote:  
When I was in Carolina in several conversations you urged the importance of 
overturning our attention in this institution more extensively to Natural Science in 
general, than has been usual in this country. Our present Faculty are all men of 
ardent minds, of no inconsiderable knowledge & of liberal taste. Professors Maclean, 
Kollock, Hunter, & Thompson concur with me in every exertion of which our 
finances will admit, for the advancement of every science, & of natural science 
particularly, in this institution.52 
 
Yet as Princeton’s student population increased, concerns over ‘Jacobin’ factions 
resurfaced. On this possibility, the professor of language William Thompson wrote that 
‘the increase of these classes more and more convinces me that the public opinion is in 
favour of their confinement during a certain portion of the day’.53  
 As Princeton’s Enlightenment attracted young men from across the union a 
significant number of these incoming and continuing students mirrored the political and 
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ideological positions of Jeffersonian-Republicans.54 For Federalists (including Smith), 
Jeffersonian-Republicans were often associated with ‘Jacobins’ and ‘French impiety’.55 
In an 1802 letter to Jonathan Dayton discussing Jeffersonian-Republicans, Smith wrote: 
I am afraid the present [Jefferson] administration is preparing the way to deliver us 
over from one hot headed & furious faction to another, till we are torn asunder, or, 
like France, sink under the power of one despot who will come to save us from the 
more dreadful will of a million. Good men will be obliged to retire from public 
affairs and blockheads & villains will soon hold the rein & scourge over us. May the 
patricians yet be able to save the republic when the tribunes shall have urged it to the 
brink of ruin!56  
 
Princeton Federalists feared that the diffusion of Jeffersonian-Republican principles 
(believed to be misled by ‘false’ philosophy and radicalism) would cause civil and moral 
disorder at Princeton and throughout the republic.57 While Smith endorsed Federalist 
sentiments in the classroom and from the pulpit, he did not ban Republican discussions 
amongst students. This political party tension festered from the mid-1790s only to surface 
in 1807 at Princeton. 
 The increased student population of over two hundred young men brought 
overcrowded classrooms and additional pressure on the professors and tutors to maintain 
control. The disparity between the number of faculty and students once again resulted in 
discipline problems. In response, Smith decreed ‘that all the tutors be not absent from the 
building at the same time, that disorders be not invited by the entire dereliction of the 
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house’.58 The close proximity of students to each other (particularly during the winter 
months) assisted the circulation of radical political ideas. Thomas Jefferson’s principles 
of government found an eager audience amongst Princeton students as well as opposition 
from Federalists who viewed him as a deist and ‘Jacobin’.59 In his 1801 Inaugural 
Address, Jefferson declared an ‘absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, 
the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle 
and immediate parent of despotism’.60 William Meade, then a Junior from Virginia who 
shared a room with several other students, claimed Jefferson’s ‘poetic’ public addresses 
furthered his support for the Republican principles of his administration.61 Many students 
who shared this belief viewed Princeton’s government as anti-republican. Meanwhile, the 
constant presence of professors and tutors did not prevent student disobedience. From 
September 1806 to March 1807, the faculty deliberated over seventeen cases of student 
misconduct.62 According to John Maclean Sr., the students ‘behaved very badly all this 
session and…in consequence several have been suspended’.63 The recent memory of the 
Princeton ‘Jacobins’ certainly played a part in Maclean’s conviction that student 
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suspensions were ‘not being found sufficient’ and requested the trustees to ‘purge the 
College of its unruly members’.64 Yet this measure came too late. 
 In the last week of March 1807, three students (Francis Cummins [a senior], 
Henry Hyde [a junior], and Francis Matteus [a sophomore]) were suspended for separate 
transgressions of Princeton rules. On 24th March, Cummins was discovered intoxicated 
and belligerent towards Princeton citizens.65 Later that week, Hyde received suspension 
for verbally assaulting a tutor (Alexander Monteith) after he intervened in a dorm room 
disturbance.66 On the same day, Maclean encountered ‘insolent’ behaviour from Matteus 
after he discovered alcohol in his room.67 He too was suspended. The following day on 
31st March the student body rallied in support of these suspended students. Maclean 
remarked: 
Soon after three young men were suspended and that justly if ever were conscious to 
themselves they would be sent away to raise a commotion and the consequence was 
a petition or remonstrance couched in the most impertinent terms was presented to 
the faculty demanding the immediate reinstatement of these young men, with an 
intimation that the future conduct of the students would be regulated by what we 
should resolve--we were unanimously of opinion that by the fundamental laws of the 
institution we could not suffer the students to interfere in the government.68    
    
Similar to the student petitions of 1800 and 1802, students challenged the faculty’s 
judgment in executing punishments. Yet this demonstration was no mere faction of the 
student population, upwards of 160 students signed the petition. This staggering majority 
of students presented different considerations than the earlier handful of alleged 
‘Jacobins’. Although a number of rebelling students included young men of Federalist 
families, the petition reflected Jeffersonian-Republican notions of liberty, republicanism, 
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and honour. The students claimed ‘a right to resist or even overthrow’ an unjust 
government that did not adhere to the demands of its citizens.69 This belief challenged 
Smith’s moral philosophy. He encouraged that students defend their liberties, if 
threatened, within the established tribunal system of a civil society.70 Since Princeton’s 
Board of Trustees and its faculty members enforced its own rules of government, 
rebelling students treated the institution as a sovereign nation within which student 
liberties were greatly limited. Unwilling to permit the undermining of his system of moral 
education, Smith taught that ‘the prevention of crimes may generally be attempted with 
the most favourable hopes of success by providing for the good education of the citizens, 
by protecting and encouraging religion, and by the salutary example of the public 
justice’.71 This task required punishing the obstruction of justice and, ultimately, denying 
the students’ 1807 petition. 
 The trustee Richard Stockton, who was visiting at the time, addressed the student 
body at the evening prayer with the threat that anyone who defied College authority in the 
form of petitions or otherwise would be suspended.72 Following this speech, Smith 
requested that students individually withdraw their complaints as he called their names. 
Instead, he was interrupted with ‘shouting and yelling’ as he witnessed 126 students turn 
their backs to him as they walked toward the chapel exit.73 In response, Smith declared 
‘to the students that those who were going out in this riotous manner were now suspended 
from the College’.74 Of those who assembled, only thirty-five students remained to 
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withdraw their names from the petition.75 One of those who rebelled (William Meade) 
later reflected: 
At the end of four or five months an unfortunate difference between the Faculty and 
some of the students arose, which produced a general petition from the latter to the 
former. Myself and many others, through want of experience, were imposed on, and 
signed, without consideration, an offensive document, which led to the suspension of 
one hundred and fifty out of two hundred students, because they did not on the spot 
withdraw their names, when suddenly and in a very unhappy manner required to do 
so.76 
 
Meade implied that his resistance to Smith’s request derived more from the manner of its 
delivery than the demand itself. Nevertheless, Republican principles of liberty were 
central to how rebelling students justified their defiance to Princeton authority.  
 This considerable number of rebellious students did not end their protest upon 
exiting the chapel. While the rebellious students broke windows and doors, the faculty 
escaped Nassau Hall. The Princeton militia were mustered to surround the Hall and 
protect the town in case the riotous mob turned its sights outward. Maclean remarked that 
‘the young men kept guard themselves on Tuesday and Wednesday evening but the 
reports to burn the house becoming so alarming it was thought prudent to take possession 
of it and accordingly a guard of thirty of the inhabitants watched it last night’.77 After the 
fire of 1802, the threat of burning Nassau was not taken lightly. On 9th April 1807, the 
trustees met with a representative of the student rebellion (Abel Upshur a sophomore 
from Virginia)78 to discuss terms of reconciliation.79 The trustees concluded that the 
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faculty’s judgment in suspending Cummins, Hyde, and Matteaus ‘was not only just but 
indispensible and is therefore sustained and confirmed by the Board’.80 It was agreed that 
those who signed the petition and participated in the rebellion that followed would be 
allowed to return after serving a suspension only if they admitted guilt and pledged future 
obedience to the College laws.81 Of the 126 rebellious young men, eleven refused the 
offer and were consequently expelled. Later that year Princeton graduated thirty-five 
seniors with Bachelor of Arts degrees; the student rebellion, however, had cost twenty-
two seniors their degrees.82   
 Across the student disruptions between 1800 and 1807, the demand for expanded 
student liberties was central. The circumstances surrounding these youthful uprisings had 
mixed consequences for Smith’s system of moral education. With the Board’s support, 
Smith purged ‘Jacobin’ factions from Princeton in 1802 and later stood firm against 
Jeffersonian-Republican principles in 1807. Yet the Board of Trustees did not fully 
support Smith’s system after 1805 as it previously had. During this period of conflict, 
Smith responded differently to what he saw as two converging counter-Enlightenment 
attacks upon his programme of moral education: ‘Jacobin’ rebellions to further student 
liberties and a campaign to revive Christian religious principles led by Ashbel Green and 
like-minded trustees. 
  Counter-Enlightenment concerns over Smith’s religious orthodoxy were 
heightened during the rise of the Princeton ‘Jacobins’. In addressing student misconduct 
and unrestrained ‘passions’, Smith emphasised the instinctive duties of the ‘moral 
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faculty’. He suggested that ‘its dictates possess an authority that points it out as a power 
designed to control our appetites and passions, which, without such control, acting with 
violence according to their several impulses, would produce only disorder and misery’.83 
Thus, careful attention to the exercise of this faculty was of the utmost importance at 
Princeton, particularly amidst an increase in violent and destructive student disruptions 
between 1800 and 1807. This conviction heavily influenced the subjects and substance of 
his sermons at Princeton, particularly during periods of student unrest.84 Following the 
1802 fire, Smith addressed the students on the ‘Progress of Vice’. In this sermon, he 
remarked: 
Of the social connexions of youth, none are more dangerous to the virtue of youth 
than those which are formed with idle and dissolute companions & no temptations 
are so fatal to their innocence as those which assail them in society. Deceived by 
that face of innocent nicety which she wears in the eyes of those who have not yet 
severely suffered by their follies, they give themselves up to indulgences which, for 
a time, enchant the fancy & intoxicate the heart; & seldom are awakened from their 
dreams of false joy, to sober reason & reflection, till they are awakened by their 
shame & misery into which she has plunged them.85  
 
Smith’s lectures on the rules of duty, the consequences of immoral companions (which 
affected behaviour through the ‘imitative faculty’) and idleness continued with renewed 
purpose in responding to Princeton ‘Jacobins’. In an 13th November 1803 sermon at 
Princeton entitled ‘On the Fear of God,’ Smith taught: 
The knowledge of our duty as the practise of it is near past; but it is often considered 
obscure and difficult by the contrary bias of our passions. The elements of the moral 
law are originally written on the heart of man by the hand of his creator.86 
 
By urging the exercise of the ‘moral faculty’ and its rules of duty, Smith advanced natural 
religion as the best prevention of immoral ‘passions’. Smith’s sermons emphasised 
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moderation and commitment to cultivating the mind following Jefferson’s 1805 Inaugural 
Address that stressed concepts of patriotic principles and the need to safeguard the 
‘equality of rights’.87 As shown, these principles heavily influenced the student 
justification for defending liberties that College laws supposedly infringed upon. In a 
sermon on 25th September 1805, entitled ‘The Example of Jesus’, Smith argued that ‘it is 
by limiting the sphere of our active affections to our country, to our friends, to our 
immediate connections and dependents, that we can usually contribute our portion most 
conspicuously towards the general happiness of the human race’.88 Smith’s urgency to 
restrain radical counter-Enlightenment attachments to religious, political, and 
philosophical principles was a central object in his sermons at Princeton and his lectures 
of moral philosophy. His enthusiasm for the science of mind and the intrinsic ‘lights’ of 
natural religion received hostility from an influential faction of religious revivalists.  
 
Princeton’s Counter-Enlightenment: Green’s campaign for religious revivalism 
 
 At the turn of the nineteenth century, Smith’s ecclesiastical and professorial 
reputation peaked. The positive transnational reception of Smith’s Sermons (1799), his 
1799 election as moderator of the General Assembly, and his 1799 creation of the science 
programme at Princeton were reasons why he was regarded as an enlightened divine 
amongst his contemporaries. For some, these achievements rendered his ideas on moral 
education beyond reproach; Ashbel Green, however, continued to scrutinise the religious 
implications of Smith’s Princeton Enlightenment. On 22nd September 1799, Green was 
once again alarmed by Smith’s dominant use of metaphysics in addressing Princeton’s 
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graduating class and later took ‘comfort by reading Whitefield’s sermon on the 
originations of Christ’.89 His solace in Whitefield’s theology illustrates his attachment to 
religious revivalism whilst opposing Smith’s ‘sweet resolution of a well spent life’ 
exercising the mind as a primary source of ‘happiness’.90 Moreover, Smith’s declared 
objective ‘to edify and please--to give the grace of novelty to old and trite truths—and to 
add the decent and lawful embellishments of art to the simplicity of the gospel’ in his 
Sermons certainly did not conform to Green’s fundamental religious convictions.91 From 
Smith’s mixture of metaphysics and ‘true religion’ at Princeton, Green believed that, 
under Smith’s direction, the College lacked fundamental Christian religious principles.  
 Green was not alone in his criticism of Smith’s unorthodox sermons. Maclean 
noted that numerous newspapers in the Middle Atlantic circulated the story that Smith’s 
younger brother, John, had supposedly stated, ‘Brother Sam, you don’t preach Jesus 
Christ and him crucified, but Sam Smith and him dignified’.92 Maclean claimed that this 
criticism of Smith’s use of ‘polite’ rhetoric and philosophy did not originate from John 
Blair Smith, but probably derived from ‘a better judge of strong drink than of sound 
doctrine’.93 As discussed in the previous chapter, Green informed Smith throughout the 
early 1790s of his concerns with blurring theology and moral philosophy.94 Yet Green’s 
personality and religious convictions would not permit a passive disapproval of Smith’s 
Princeton Enlightenment. According to William Plumer, ‘Dr. Green has been, since my 
first knowledge of him, a firm, fearless, and successful opposer of certain new doctrines 
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and measures which have obtained in the American churches’.95 Around the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Green’s “crusade” was the removal of Smith’s system of moral 
education from Princeton. With little hope of altering Smith’s moral thought and its 
central role in his theology, Green planted the seed of reviving Princeton’s Christian 
religious principles that would grow into a counter-Enlightenment campaign that 
specifically opposed the Princeton Enlightenment. In doing so, he entertained the idea of 
renewing Princeton as a theological seminary. In January 1800, Green introduced this 
concept of educating ‘men for the ministry in an institution by themselves’ to fellow 
revivalists.96 As an alumnus and trustee, his personal investment in Princeton’s success 
and progress indicates that he probably did not wish to sever those connections. Thus, his 
attention centered on returning Princeton’s commitment to the training of ministers. 
Green’s ideas for reforming Princeton took shape and attracted disciples over the 
following decade. Meanwhile, this undercurrent of counter-Enlightenment opposition 
against Smith’s programme of moral education became bolder as Smith’s control of the 
student population began to crumble. 
 The aftermath of the 1802 Nassau Hall fire instigated a concerted effort by 
Princeton alumni to rally support for repairs. While the majority of the trustees agreed 
with Smith that unrestrained ‘passions’ were a central cause of radical ‘Jacobin’ 
activities, Green believed the fire was the result of Princeton’s irreligion not an isolated 
group of unruly students.97 In turn, Green believed the 1802 fire should awaken religious 
principles to counter the destructive forces of Princeton’s impiety. Weeks after the fire, 
the Board requested that Green draft an address to the public and the General Assembly 
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regarding Princeton’s commitment to diffusing Christian principles. Since Green served 
as the elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the General Assembly (1802-
1812), the Board understandably believed he could convince the Church to support 
Nassau’s repairs.98 In addition to achieving this task, Green illustrated what he believed 
Princeton should be, rather than discussing its objectives under Smith’s system of moral 
education. In doing so, Green suggested that Princeton’s purpose was ‘to make this 
institution an asylum for pious youth’.99 This objective of educating ‘pious youth’ was 
fundamentally different from Smith’s stated purpose of ‘forming the intellectual and 
moral habits of youth, on whom the future welfare of their country depends’.100 These 
contrasting opinions of Princeton’s purpose were ripe for tension particularly in the 
contexts of defending against radical ‘Jacobins’. In the following years, Green 
undermined Smith’s authority as a means to make space for the revival of Witherspoon’s 
‘republican Christian Enlightenment’.   
 While the Board of Trustees harnessed Smith’s fame and connections across the 
middle and southern states as a way to secure funds for the repair of Nassau, they 
requested that Green fulfil the duties of president in his absence.101 Despite his 
commitments as a minister in Philadelphia, Green accepted this offer. Shortly before 
Smith’s departure, the Board charged Green, Smith, and Boudinot with the task of 
reviewing the College laws and suggesting changes that would prevent future student 
disruptions.102 This joint committee was intended to submit their recommendations after 
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Smith’s return so he could offer input as well. Yet Green did not postpone this task. As 
Princeton’s acting president, Green’s suggested amendments involved an increase of 
Christianity and its study to Princeton life. That implied a reform of the curriculum rather 
than adjusting College rules of conduct. On 3rd April 1803, the Board agreed that 
the laws of the College requiring that certain religious exercises be performed by the 
students on the Sabbath, Dr. Green, as President, recommended the study of Paley’s 
‘Evidences of the Christian Religion’ as an exercise for the Senior class, Campbell 
on Miracles for the Junior, and the Catechism, connected with the reading of the 
Bible, as an exercise of the Sophomore and Freshman classes, each student being 
allowed to make choice of the Catechism of that denomination to which he 
belongs.103 
 
These new requirements, at the bequest of Green, expanded the role of revealed religion 
at Princeton. These activities (particularly the senior and junior assignments for the 
Sabbath) were clearly designed as practical exercises in preparing future ministers. The 
preparation in fulfilling these new mandates placed a greater stress on the students’ 
already demanding studies. Furthermore, students of the science programme were not 
excused from this new requirement. Since Green believed irreligion affected the whole of 
the student body, the consistent study of the Gospels across all ranks of students was 
deemed necessary.  
 Upon his return from the Carolinas, Smith discovered Green’s amendments to his 
system of moral education. Yet, rather than oppose the new laws, Smith (who had proven 
adept at adapting to adverse situations) used these newly imposed laws to serve his moral 
philosophy. The following academic year Smith taught lectures on the evidences of the 
Christian religion based on his moral thought rather than drawing from William Paley’s A 
View of the Evidences of Christianity (1796), which Green had highly recommended.104 
For example, Smith’s initial four lectures largely demonstrated how central themes of his 
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moral philosophy (such as the ‘moral faculty’ taught in his second lecture) offered 
evidence of God’s existence and supported the auxiliary study of His revealed ‘truths’.105 
No evidence has surfaced that suggests that Smith was aware of Green’s intentions to 
undermine his system of moral education at this time. He appeared to approve of Green’s 
temperament as conducive to governing young men. On Green’s personality, Plumer 
remarked that he ‘was earnest, but he was fair’.106 In contrast, Smith was not an effective 
disciplinarian.  
 Smith’s continued struggle with tuberculosis since 1773 coupled with the likely 
increase of students (which would require a strong authoritative presence) persuaded him 
to recruit Green as vice-president. In a 23rd March 1803 letter to Green, Smith wrote that 
‘I wish you could consult to transfer yourself to the College as theological professor and 
vice president…Professor Thompson is so entirely inadequate to any purposes of 
government and our perpetual changes of tutors render that duty too apprehensive to my 
declining strength’.107 In this request, Smith appealed to Green’s known interest in 
improving Princeton’s seminary training. He certainly attempted to entice Green too by 
suggesting, ‘I think the theological school by proper exertions might be in a short time 
considerably increased [and] some important alterations are absolutely necessary which 
will require time to arrange’.108 Did this offer imply a significant change of Smith’s 
system of moral education? Since Princeton’s divinity course was not a requirement of its 
science degree, an expansion of its programme would not affect the base of Princeton’s 
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‘enlightened learning’. Furthermore, Smith’s earlier experience as Witherspoon’s vice-
president, when he assumed many of his College responsibilities (particularly during his 
final years), probably influenced Smith’s request of Green’s assistance. Yet the dynamic 
of Smith’s and Green’s tense relationship prevented such an arrangement which had 
previously existed between Witherspoon and Smith. Green did not directly decline 
Smith’s offer, but he did not accept it either. Through inquiries amongst Green’s circle 
Smith was informed that Green thought ‘it improper to leave [his] church in its present 
state’.109 Green’s devotion to his congregation did not prevent his earlier service (just 
months prior to Smith’s offer) as Princeton’s temporary president. Furthermore, Green’s 
decision not to accept an opportunity to improve Princeton’s seminary training as the 
professor of theology and vice-president appeared peculiar considering the evidence that 
he actively promoted its reform. After Smith informed the Board of Green’s decision, 
they elected Henry Kollock as the professor of theology on 8th December 1803.110 This 
election occurred during a special meeting of the trustees who had gathered the required 
quorum of thirteen Board members to make this appointment. For religious revivalists on 
the Board (particularly Green and Boudinot) this appointment identified ‘that the Trustees 
think the study of Divinity, a subject of small Importance’.111   
 As Green advanced his counter-Enlightenment campaign to reform Princeton into 
a theological seminary, reasons why Green did not accept the professorship and vice-
presidency were evident: he opposed Smith’s system of moral education. He did not, 
however, express his objection to Smith’s moral philosophy openly.112 Instead, he 
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circulated reasons why other people questioned the substance of Smith’s moral thought. 
Green’s activities eventually caught Smith’s attention in June 1804. But when Smith 
questioned Green regarding his part in spreading these rumours, Green defensively 
claimed that such an accusation was a ‘disadvantage of my character’.113 Smith’s 
suspicions of Green would later prove well placed.  
 Before Smith learned of these complaints, Green received notice that a 
‘respectable clergyman in Virginia’ (William Hill) was led to believe that Smith’s 
lectures of moral philosophy endorsed polygamy and the practise of having 
concubines.114 In response, Green contacted one of Smith’s tutors (John Bradford) for 
assistance. He wrote, ‘if the Dr and I were on as good terms as we once were, I would 
write to him at once on the subject, but from [the] whole have been informed, he would 
consider my doing this as an insidious attempt to injure him’.115 Green requested from 
Bradford ‘in perfect confidence’ a copy of Smith’s lecture notes so he could determine if 
there was any merit in this complaint.116 After securing Smith’s lecture notes from 
Bradford, Green discovered that Smith did in fact discuss the practise of polygamy.117 In 
his nineteenth lecture of the course, Smith examined the instinctive duties of marriage 
and its role in society.118 For Smith, the obligations of marriage between man and wife 
were communicated by the ‘moral faculty’. Yet his tolerance for different cultural and 
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religious beliefs led him to question if polygamy was naturally immoral, or it was 
considered immoral only because of western cultural and religious norms. Smith taught: 
Marriage, according to the precepts of religion and the civil institutions of the 
Christian world, can take place only between one man, and one woman. But in 
consequence of the laws of Israel upon this subject, and the customs of patriarchal 
antiquity, it has become a question among Christian moralists, whether polygamy be 
contrary to the prescription of the law of nature, or only to the positive institutions of 
religion and the state?119 
 
He considered that the accepted practises of polygamy within Turkey, Persia, and Arabia 
did not lead citizens of those nations toward promiscuous or immoral conduct. For 
instance, Smith distinguished between polygamy and the taking of mistresses or having 
an extra-marital affair, which were considered the result of unrestrained ‘passions’. For 
these reasons, Smith concluded that ‘I cannot suppose that there is natural immorality 
attached to the law of Polygamy…and its immorality since the coming of Christ, the great 
moral legislator of the universe, rests chiefly upon his positive institution, supported by 
the law of the land’.120 While Smith believed polygamy was not wrong on the basis of 
natural law, he let it be known that ‘I have no hesitation to admit as a philosopher, and a 
Christian, that the law of one wife, as prescribed by our blessed Saviour, is most 
favourable to the interests of human nature, and of civil society’.121 Despite Smith’s overt 
agreement with God’s revealed law, Green did not share his cultural and religious 
tolerance.122 Green argued that ‘there can never be nothing improper in anyone being 
acquainted with what has been taught to youth as a part of public education’.123 Green’s 
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demands that the trustees censor Smith’s future lectures did not persuade the Board to 
take any form of action. The death or retirement of key trustees who supported Smith’s 
system of moral education created an opportunity for change with their replacements.  
 After Green revealed his thoughts of Smith to the Board, Green indicated that 
their cordial relationship was not sincere.124 Green’s opinion that Smith’s system of moral 
education perverted Witherspoon’s ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’ was, from this 
point forward, known. Green later claimed that his eldest son (Robert), who graduated 
from Princeton in 1805, ‘had at one time been on the brink of infidelity’ in the years 
following his graduation. He suggested that Robert’s careful reading of the Gospels years 
after leaving Princeton corrected his character. This implied Green’s belief that Robert’s 
moral and religious struggle stemmed from his time at Princeton. After Green’s 1804 
investigation of Smith’s moral philosophy, he sent his younger sons (Jacob and James) to 
the University of Pennsylvania and Dickinson College respectively.125 This decision 
reflected his profound opposition to Smith’s system of moral education.  
 Meanwhile, the unprecedented number of seniors (fifty-three young men) who 
graduated on 23rd September 1806 testified to the success of Smith’s programme.126 
Princeton’s seminary training under the guidance of Henry Kollock, however, did not 
contribute any students to this graduation. Kollock struggled with expanding the 
seminary and tendered his resignation after enduring four years of sparsely populated 
classrooms whilst observing Smith and Maclean’s classes overflow from their 
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popularity. With only four theology students in 1804, Kollock’s dissatisfaction was 
understandable.127 In resigning, Kollock wrote: 
I flattered myself when I came to Princeton that I might by instructing students of 
Divinity be of as much service to the Church of Christ as by officiating in any 
particular congregation—the number of my students however has been and probably 
will continue to be so small as to render my labours of little consequence.128 
 
Kollock’s resignation occurred at the beginning of an academic year that witnessed the 
largest student population (over 200) at Princeton. Afterwards, the Board delegated 
Kollock’s previous responsibilities to Smith.129 But the loss of another professor to 
govern this large student body proved most devastating. Kollock’s belief that his efforts 
to improve Princeton’s seminary had ‘little consequence’ subjected Smith’s system of 
moral education to further scrutiny and disapproval from orthodox evangelicals. The 
1807 student rebellion solidified these concerns that Smith did not properly address 
irreligion as president.  
 The Board of Trustees who judged Smith’s programme in the aftermath of the 
1807 ‘Great Rebellion’ did not support the interests of the Princeton Enlightenment as it 
had in earlier years. As previously mentioned the Board traditionally consisted of an 
equal mixture of laymen and divines, however, after the death or resignation of influential 
trustees from 1805 through 1807, newly appointed trustees joined Green’s enthusiasm for 
religious revivalism.130 According to Mark Noll, these revivalists dominated the Board 
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and gradually removed Smith’s influence in determining College affairs.131 The trustees’ 
decision to discontinue the language courses (particularly French) in the spring of 1808 
exemplified their reduction of Smith’s system of moral education.132 The termination of 
Thompson and resignation of Kollock forced Smith and Maclean to govern the students 
as the only remaining professors. Instead of expanding the faculty and course offerings as 
they had in 1803, the trustees reasoned that the severe reduction of the student population 
(ninety-two students) after the 1807 ‘Great Rebellion’, required fewer professors to teach 
in the College. This reduction of courses diminished Princeton’s reputation. Rush, for 
example, claimed in 1808 that ‘Princeton has lately lost popularity among us’.133 At this 
time, Smith undoubtedly suspected that Green’s counter-Enlightenment campaign would 
not be satisfied with the elimination of the language course alone. 
 Green’s considerable influence in the American Presbyterian Church and then as a 
leader of a group within the Board of Trustees permitted him to advance his design of 
establishing a theological seminary. After Kollock resigned and concerns of Smith as a 
minister, Princeton forfeited its claim that it offered seminary training. Meanwhile, the 
1808 General Assembly furthered Green’s interests by targeting Smith’s system of moral 
education as an impediment to founding a theological seminary at Princeton. As the 
previous moderator in 1807, Rev. Archibald Alexander addressed the 1808 General 
Assembly on the perceived problems of preparing future ministers. Alexander remarked: 
Our seminaries of learning, although increasing in literature and numbers, furnish 
us with few preachers. The great extension of the physical sciences, and the taste 
and fashion of the age, have given such a shape and direction to the academical 
course, that I confess, it appears to me to be little adapted to introduce a youth to 
the study of the sacred Scriptures.134 
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Alexander targeted Princeton in this plea for revived piety and theological training in 
American higher education. As the first and only American college at that time to offer a 
degree programme in the natural sciences, Smith’s system of moral education received 
heightened attention after Alexander’s speech. In league with Alexander’s proposed plan, 
Green claimed that ‘encouraged by this, I used all my influence in favour of the 
measure’.135 In 1809, he delivered on this promise by persuading the Board of Trustees to 
discontinue Princeton’s science programme. On 27th September 1809, the Board 
resolved: 
That the resolution passed in September, 1799, admitting students to read in the 
College on such subjects of science as they or their parents may select, and receive 
certificates of their proficiency in such sciences which shall be publically delivered 
to them on the day of Commencement, be repealed.136   
 
As discussed in chapter four, Smith invested considerable care in creating this 
programme in 1799 and in the following years it had attracted numerous students who 
desired an enlightened and modern education.137 The discontinuation of the science 
programme signified the end of a central facet of Smith’s system of moral education. This 
resolution removed any doubt that the Board wanted to overturn Smith’s reforms of the 
curriculum. During an 1811 special meeting of the trustees, Smith attempted to rekindle 
support for his system with an appointment of a professor of mathematics and 
astronomy.138 Although Green had once taught mathematics at Princeton, the Board 
refused Smith’s request.  
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 Despite Smith’s objections, the Board authorised a committee (Green, Miller, 
Clark, Woodhull, and Richards) to meet with the General Assembly to discuss plans of 
founding Princeton Theological Seminary.139 Green had previously designed these plans 
as the chairman of a General Assembly committee for a new seminary in 1810. At this 
time, Green began writing his lectures on a shorter catechism (which he completed in 
1811).140 These lectures would certainly have a place in a newly established theological 
seminary. Green’s success in winning the Board’s approval to establish a new theological 
seminary at Princeton must have devastated Smith who had staunchly resisted these plans 
throughout his presidency. Three days after the Board approved the establishment of 
Princeton’s Theological Seminary on 12th April 1812, Smith resigned from Princeton.141 
Green remarked that ‘Dr Smith offered to resign if we would comply with certain terms 
which we did not accept’.142 Smith was the first Princeton president to resign and not die 
whilst in office. The trustee’s refusal to accept Smith’s departing requests demonstrated 
how strained their relationship had become. Later that year, Smith wrote: 
Some of my opinions are too philosophical for several of my brethren who are so 
deadly orthodox, that they cannot find words in the English language to express 
their zeal and jealous upon the subject and therefore oblige their candidates to 
swear ex animo to all their doctrines.143  
 
Smith’s grim depiction of the ministers (which undoubtedly included Green) who 
opposed his moral thought touched upon a shift in the reception of Scottish 
Enlightenment moral philosophy from American evangelicals. In response to Princeton’s 
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reformed purpose, Maclean submitted his resignation on 13th August 1812 and accepted a 
professorship at the College of William and Mary.144  
 The removal of Smith and his system of moral education did not complete 
Green’s plans for Princeton. Samuel Miller, a trustee who shared Green’s vision of 
Princeton, petitioned the other trustees to elect Green as President, not vice-president as 
had been initially suggested. In the same year, Green returned the favour by nominating 
Samuel Miller as Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Princeton Theological Seminary, 
which Archibald Alexander governed as president after its 1812 establishment.145 During 
the founding of Princeton Theological Seminary, Green advanced the Seminary’s 
interests on Princeton’s Board with ‘a severity to which I am unaccustomed, which I am 
surprised did not keep them from giving me a unanimous vote to the president of the 
college’.146 Under Green’s guidance as president, Princeton and Princeton Theological 
Seminary shared largely the same purpose of diffusing Christian religious principles and 
preparing young men for the ministry.  
 The election of Green, Alexander, and Miller to influential offices within 
Princeton and its infant seminary demonstrated their triumph over Smith’s system of 
moral education. Smith noted years after his resignation that ‘Dr. Green has entirely 
disused my lectures on the Evidences of Religion and on Moral Philosophy, on the plea 
that they are not exactly conformed to his notions on the subject of divine grace’.147 The 
fact that Green did not use Smith’s moral philosophy lectures on the grounds of 
conflicting views of the powers of God and humankind provides further evidence of his 
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objection to Smith’s philosophical system. Not surprisingly, Green used Witherspoon’s 
lectures on moral philosophy (which he edited) as his course textbook.148 He also 
remained committed to promoting Christian religious principles by making his lectures 
on a shorter catechism required reading at Princeton.149 Miller later remarked that ‘we 
honour him (Green) as the first head of a college in the United States who introduced the 
study of the Bible as a regular part of the collegiate course’.150 The shift from Smith’s 
version of Enlightenment toward Green’s revival of Witherspoon’s ‘republican Christian 
Enlightenment’ with an emphasis on evangelicalism exemplified Princeton’s renewed 
religious purpose. But where Smith enhanced the existing elements of Enlightenment, 
Green guided the College toward a more fundamentalist interpretation of evangelical 
principles and aggressive methods of its adoption than Witherspoon had previously 
attempted. For example, he established Princeton’s Bible Society; Bible study became 
mandatory as an end of year field of examination; he sent parents reports of student 
conduct (an early version of the report card); and he required juniors and seniors to study 
Greek and Latin in preparation for further divinity studies.151 Green’s administration, 
therefore, did not resemble Smith’s earlier enthusiasm for modernity, moderation, 
metaphysics, and scientific innovation. Novak suggests that ‘throughout his 
administration he policed the campus with a pettiness bordering on the obsessive [and] all 
of Green’s efforts since taking office had been directed toward an awakening’.152 Green’s 
religious revival of Princeton demarcated a new era of learning in the early republic with 
similar religious sentiments shown at Yale, Harvard, Brown, Middlebury, and 
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 Samuel Stanhope Smith’s version of Enlightenment at Princeton preserved a few 
years of relative peace before it was ended by a counter-Enlightenment faction of 
clergymen. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, youthful revolts appeared on 
college campuses across the republic. At Princeton, Smith believed a small faction of so-
called ‘Jacobins’ led these disturbances. While Princeton ‘Jacobins’ did not consider 
themselves to be part of a counter-Enlightenment movement, Smith interpreted their 
radical policies as opposing the central ‘Moderate’ values of the Princeton 
Enlightenment. Furthermore, he believed ‘Jacobin’ inattention to their studies was 
correlated with their advancement of ‘false’ philosophy and radical politics. Of the 
central philosophical themes that he believed prevented ‘immoral passions’, Smith’s 
treatment of the ‘moral faculty’ exercised instinctive notions of ‘right and wrong’. From 
this moral principle, he advocated religious and cultural tolerance whilst promoting civil 
order. In doing so, he taught that students should not rebel against ‘just’ systems of 
government but rather appeal to reasonable arguments within its tribunals when liberties 
were threatened. Furthermore, Smith taught that the instinctive rules of duty obliged 
student deference to Princeton’s governing laws and his system of moral education. As a 
Federalist, Smith believed Jeffersonian-Republicans endorsed ‘Jacobin’ values of civil 
disobedience. Of these beliefs, concepts of patriotic resistance against powers that 
obstructed liberty influenced the student justification for the 1807 ‘Great Rebellion’. In 
response to these episodes of student unrest, Smith advanced his system of moral 
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education as the best defence against immoral ‘passions’, radical politics and extreme 
religious beliefs.  
 Meanwhile, religious revivalists interpreted Princeton’s student rebellions as a 
result of irreligion. A prominent evangelical and Princeton trustee, Ashbel Green led a 
counter-Enlightenment campaign to remove what he saw as the cause of student impiety: 
Smith’s system of moral education. Despite Smith’s opposition, Green gradually 
removed the elements of Smith’s programme with the assistance of newly appointed 
trustees. Green’s counter-Enlightenment campaign resulted in Smith’s resignation and a 
new purpose for a Princeton education. In doing so, Green appealed to Witherspoon’s 
earlier ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’ in creating a revival of Christian religious 
principles at Princeton. Princeton’s reformed purpose exemplified the rise of religious 
revivalism across the nation. As evidenced by the later use of Scottish moral philosophy 
and Scottish Enlightenment values at Princeton (particularly during James McCosh’s 
administration between 1868 and 1888), Green’s religious awakening of Princeton did 
not endure beyond the first half of nineteenth century. As the epilogue will show, 
McCosh’s administration did not attempt to recreate the Scottish Enlightenment nor did 
he appeal to Smith’s vision of Enlightenment. Smith’s programme of moral education 
was the last systematic effort to achieve a version of the Scottish Enlightenment at 








 This thesis has examined the different ways in which Dugald Stewart and Samuel 
Stanhope Smith used and adapted Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy and their 
conflict with counter-Enlightenment movements at Edinburgh University and the College 
of New Jersey respectively, between 1790 and 1812. These celebrated moralists drew 
heavily from Thomas Reid’s philosophy in creating unique systems of moral education. 
In doing so, Smith and Stewart shared the task of preparing enlightened and virtuous 
young men for public life at a time when the teaching of metaphysics and natural religion 
was the subject of controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. By comparing how Smith 
and Stewart responded to the different institutional and religious contexts in which they 
taught, this project has shed new light on how these prominent intellectual disciples of 
Scottish philosophy resisted the decline of the Scottish Enlightenment in its transatlantic 
contexts.  
 This project has not offered a comprehensive analysis of Smith’s and Stewart’s 
moral philosophy or their intellectual biographies. While the thesis incorporates aspects 
of these separate pursuits (as it consists of topical chapters that follow a chronological 
period of Smith’s and Stewart’s academic careers), each of them would require a single 
dedicated work. With the slight exceptions of Gordon MacIntyre’s biography of Stewart 
and Mark Noll’s thorough discussion of Smith in Princeton and the Republic, these 
projects remain largely unwritten. Instead, this project consists of two connected 
narratives that reveal the reasons why Smith and Stewart created their systems of moral 
education, their unique adaptations of Reid’s concept of the ‘moral faculty’, and the 
opposition that their systems received from counter-Enlightenment campaigns led by 
religious factions. Comparative case studies of this kind are particularly valuable for their 
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attention to national contexts whilst revealing how particular ideas and cultural threads 
existed in transnational contexts. This project, therefore, examines unexplored areas of 
two prominent pedagogues of moral philosophy within their own contexts, which, in turn, 
provides examples of the tensions between late eighteenth-century Scottish 
Enlightenment moral philosophy and counter-Enlightenment policies in the Atlantic 
World. 
 In the decades that followed the French Revolution, central ‘Moderate’ values and 
philosophy associated with the Scottish Enlightenment were met with hostility from 
political and ecclesiastical conservative interests. As Richard Sher has shown, the 
‘Moderate’ beliefs of religious tolerance, participation in ‘polite’ culture, and promotion 
of Enlightenment science did not encompass all of the Moderate literati’s values. But 
these select ideological beliefs had a significant place in Stewart’s and Smith’s systems of 
moral education. Of the original concepts born from this culture, Thomas Reid’s so-
called Common Sense philosophy (later known as Scottish philosophy) flourished as a 
sophisticated way to combat modern philosophical scepticism (the ‘Ideal Theory’) whilst 
at the same time advancing metaphysics as a legitimate science that supported the 
existence of God. As shown, Reid’s philosophical system left his intellectual disciples 
space for creativity. This creativity existed in the conclusions drawn from Reid’s 
‘principles of common sense’ when adapted to different situations and the concerns of 
other times. I have shown that national cultures and institutional contexts played a 
significant role in the use and adaptation of Scottish philosophy. Meanwhile, the 
transatlantic reaction to French revolutionary principles demarcated the transition of a 
new age where different ideologies struggled for dominance at Princeton and Edinburgh. 
The striking similarities between Stewart and Smith’s shared enthusiasm for Reid’s 





counter-Enlightenment policies shows the intellectual, religious, and ideological struggles 
during the final decades of the Scottish Enlightenment in the Atlantic World. 
 In the last decade of eighteenth-century Scotland, political and religious 
conservatives saw the circulation of French revolutionary principles (particularly ideas 
promoting political radicalism and atheism) as a threat to the established civil and moral 
order. Consequently, the teaching of metaphysics to impressionable young men (which an 
increasing number of clergymen and politicians interpreted as a gateway to radicalism) 
was targeted for censorship. In response to counter-Enlightenment reactions, such as the 
1792-1802 Scottish Sedition Trials, Dugald Stewart combated the adoption of 
philosophical scepticism and radicalism (both religious and political) by creating a 
programme of moral education at the University of Edinburgh. His programme 
modernised Reid’s so-called Common Sense philosophy for a new generation. As a 
testimonial to the success of his system, Stewart’s students, including Thomas Brown, 
Henry Brougham, Francis Horner and Henry Cockburn, became prominent figures in the 
Scottish Whig party and applied his thought in the Edinburgh Review. This raft of 
supporters celebrated Stewart’s eloquence in combining the exercise of the ‘intellectual, 
active and moral powers of the mind’ with the practical interests of the secular world. For 
example, his treatment of the ‘auxiliary principles of the moral faculty’ taught methods of 
developing virtuous habits and sociability whilst improving manners that were valued in 
Scottish ‘polite’ culture. Beyond his attention to modernity, this original part of Stewart’s 
programme contributed to strengthening the branches of duty and encouraged the 
foundations for universal benevolence. Stewart, therefore, believed that the primacy of 
the mind and the various practical ways in which it could be perfected was of paramount 
importance for advancing an enlightened and benevolent state of society.   
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 Across the Atlantic, Samuel Stanhope Smith also communicated the ideas and 
values of the Scottish Enlightenment through a programme of moral education. 
Following John Witherspoon as president of the College of New Jersey, Smith did not 
build directly upon Witherspoon’s ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’ as Mark Noll 
suggests. Beyond his dramatic reforms of the curriculum that expanded secular courses, 
Smith taught controversial metaphysical themes that were untouched or only marginally 
discussed by his predecessor. In creating a new version of Enlightenment at Princeton 
that he hoped would rival Edinburgh’s age of improvement, Smith concentrated on 
preparing future statesmen for service in public office. In achieving this ambition, 
Smith’s lectures of moral philosophy gave purpose to the Princeton Enlightenment by 
embedding virtuous habits and ‘Moderate’ values in graduates before they entered public 
life. For example, Smith’s emphasis on cultural and religious tolerance in treating the 
‘moral faculty’ were hallmarks of the Princeton Enlightenment that informed the thought 
of future statesmen and public intellectuals. It was hoped that Princeton graduates would 
later diffuse these enlightened views as leaders of a wider American Enlightenment. As 
an ordained minister, Smith’s promotion of metaphysics as the primary source of moral 
conduct was peculiar among his Evangelical contemporaries. Yet Smith had a talent for 
thriving during periods of adversity. This talent was reflected in his conviction that 
conflict or periods of hardship ripened the possibility for Enlightenment. Contrary to 
Witherspoon’s administration, Smith’s version of Enlightenment centered upon the 
perfection of the mind and, because of this, was the target of fierce criticism from 
fundamentalist ministers.  
 The ways in which Smith and Stewart addressed social, religious, philosophical, 
and political concerns on either side of the Atlantic was not limited to their treatment of 





system. As philosophers who drew from a wide range of earlier theorists as well as their 
contemporaries throughout the Republic of Letters, it would be wrong to suggest that 
Reid’s philosophy influenced every philosophical theme and all of the topics they taught. 
Furthermore, their rich treatment of natural religion, political economy, natural law, and 
their participation in literary culture deserve further attention., On the topic of moral 
education, however, the ‘moral faculty’ provides the best example of the creativity and 
practicality shown in Smith’s and Stewart’s applied ethics.         
 In the decades that followed the French Revolution, widespread fears on the 
fragility of civil society and the most effectual means of its protection affected the 
diffusion of ideas across the Atlantic World. While the products of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (particularly ‘Moderate’ values and Reid’s philosophy) received earlier 
application at institutions of higher education on either side of the Atlantic, its endurance 
incurred hostility from emerging counter-Enlightenment policies. Yet questions remain 
how far these counter-Enlightenment policies to safeguard impressionable youth and 
disseminate Christian principles extended.  
 This thesis has shown that the new “Moderate” clergymen of Edinburgh led by 
George Hill and the religious revivalists on Princeton’s Board of Trustees led by Ashbel 
Green had well defined ideas on the censorship of higher education. At Edinburgh, the 
1805 John Leslie case embodied on-going political, ecclesiastical, and ideological 
tensions between the sons of the Scottish Enlightenment and clergymen associated with 
the interests of Henry Dundas. In league with this struggle for influence, the Leslie affair 
pitted both interest groups in a battle over the future of secularism in the Faculty of Arts 
at Edinburgh University. Stewart’s system of moral education (which strongly advocated 
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the study of metaphysics and secularism in the arts) was pivotal in this debate. Stewart 
rallied his former students in a campaign to defend the ideals of his system in British 
print culture and in the 1805 General Assembly. From these concerted efforts, Leslie was 
acquitted and Stewart’s system as well as Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy 
thrived in the decade that followed. But did this victory safeguard the continuation of 
Stewart’s system after his retirement? After retiring as the active professor of moral 
philosophy in 1810, Stewart endorsed the election of Thomas Brown; Brown, however, 
did not strictly follow Stewart’s moral philosophy despite their joint holding of the 
professorship. Brown’s promising career at Edinburgh was cut short by his untimely 
death in 1820 at the age of forty-two.$ Despite the competition of a more qualified 
candidate in William Hamilton, John Wilson (also known by the pseudonym ‘Christopher 
North’ as a frequent contributor to Blackwood’s Magazine) secured the election of 
Stewart’s former chair through the support of powerful Tory allies including Walter 
Scott. During this politically controversial election, Wilson’s wife, Jane Penny, wrote: 
The Whigs hitherto have had everything their own way; and the late Professor was 
one, as well as the well known Dugald Stewart, who resigned the situation from bad 
health, and who has it in his power to resume lecturing if he chooses, and which I 
fear he will do from party spirit, if he thinks there is any chance of Mr. Wilson’s 
success…The report that Dugald Stewart meant to resume his lectures, came from 
such a good authority that Mr. Wilson set off immediately to Peebles to recover his 
fatigue. [T]he very next day Dugald Stewart sent in his resignation.% 
 
Following Stewart’s resignation, Wilson’s passion for Romantic literature ushered in the 
age of Romanticism in the teaching of moral philosophy at Edinburgh University 
between 1820 and 1851 and, consequently, sealed the fate of Stewart’s system.& 
Nineteenth-century Romanticism, therefore, was connected with the earlier counter-
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Enlightenment policies that opposed the science of the mind as well as a myriad of other 
factors. Following the 1828 death of Stewart, Thomas Carlyle claimed that ‘Dugald 
Stewart is dead, and British Philosophy with him’.' The later writings of nineteenth-
century Scottish moralists including Carlyle, William Hamilton, James Ferrier, and John 
Stuart Mill indicate that Scottish philosophy did not completely fade into obscurity.( But 
no one rivalled the heights of Stewart’s earlier system of moral education and its final 
service in attempting to sustain the Scottish Enlightenment.  
 At the turn of the nineteenth century, Smith believed two separate counter-
Enlightenment factions converged in opposition to his system of moral education and 
the Enlightenment that it created. Despite harbouring different objectives, unruly 
students (known by Federalists and Smith as ‘Jacobins’) and religious revivalists led by 
Ashbel Green wrought havoc on the Princeton Enlightenment. The radical nature of the 
‘Jacobin’ attempts to secure further student liberties by protesting, vandalising, and later 
rebelling against Princeton’s authority demonstrated a dismissal of Smith’s so-called 
rules of duty and his ‘Moderate’ beliefs. Meanwhile, Smith’s mingling of metaphysics 
and ‘true religion’ received hostility from fundamentalist Evangelicals. Green led a 
campaign within Princeton’s Board of Trustees to remove Smith’s system and revive 
Princeton’s Christian principles. The appointment of trustees who joined Green’s 
campaign between 1805 and 1807 shifted the Board’s interests that led to the slow death 
of Smith’s system of moral education and Enlightenment at Princeton. At the time of 
Smith’s 1812 retirement, the Princeton Enlightenment was entirely dismantled and in its 
place Green rekindled a more rigid Evangelical interpretation of Witherspoon’s 
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‘republican Christian Enlightenment’. Green’s use of Witherspoon’s lectures on moral 
philosophy, which he edited, suggests Scottish moral philosophy survived this upheaval. 
But Witherspoon’s sparse treatment of metaphysics did not resemble the sophistication 
of Smith’s later lectures. In light of Green’s opposition to the science of the mind and a 
radical commitment to religious revivalism, he eliminated the role of metaphysics in 
teaching Witherspoon’s lectures on moral philosophy. Yet Green never claimed to be a 
philosopher nor did he claim to foster Enlightenment. His reforms of the curriculum that 
renewed Princeton’s earlier religious purpose of preparing young men for the ministry 
reflected his unwavering attachment to Evangelicalism and its promotion. The 
subsequent administrations of James Carnahan (1823-1854) and John Maclean Jr. 
(1854-1868) did not follow in Green’s footsteps, and they also did not attempt to 
recreate the distant memory of Smith’s system of moral education. On the other hand, 
James McCosh’s later administration between 1868 and 1888 reintroduced a 
sophisticated teaching of Scottish philosophy. Did McCosh’s use of Scottish philosophy 
and his ambition for Princeton resemble Smith’s earlier Princeton Enlightenment? 
Moreover, could McCosh be seen as a representative of the bygone Scottish 
Enlightenment? These questions and more will be addressed in the epilogue.  
Epilogue 
 
Bridging Tradition and Modernity: James McCosh at Princeton, 1868-1888 
 
    
 The primacy of Scottish philosophy and Scottish ‘Moderate’ values at Edinburgh 
University and the College of New Jersey ended after Dugald Stewart and Samuel 
Stanhope Smith resigned. While Stewart and Smith’s successors did not rival their 
systems toward perfecting the mind, their enlightened objectives for moral education 
were not entirely lost amongst future pedagogues. In the aftermath of the American Civil 
War, Princeton’s Board of Trustees believed the centennial anniversary of John 
Witherspoon’s 1768 appointment offered an opportunity to rekindle his earlier success. 
They became convinced that James McCosh, professor of Logic and Metaphysics at 
Queen’s College in Belfast (which later became Queen’s University), would accomplish 
this ambition. Like Witherspoon, McCosh defended Evangelicalism within the Church of 
Scotland (and later as a minister of the Free Church of Scotland) and he drew heavily on 
Scottish philosophy as professor in Belfast. These activities as well as four philosophical 
and religious publications (with British and American editions) secured McCosh’s 
election as the eleventh president of the College of New Jersey.1 David Hoeveler suggests 
that McCosh was ‘the last major voice of the Scottish Enlightenment’.2 McCosh did 
attempt to harmonise his evangelical convictions with an enthusiasm for Scottish 
philosophy, but did his administration from 1868 through 1888 revive a version of the 
Scottish Enlightenment at Princeton? In many ways, McCosh’s restructuring of 
Princeton’s curriculum departed from the focus of Smith’s and Stewart’s earlier systems 
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of moral education, particularly the diffusion of ‘Moderate’ values and the exercise of the 
mind as the foundation for all branches of knowledge. This epilogue does not attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of McCosh’s ecclesiastical career, his moral philosophy, his 
ideas on education, or his connections to the earlier Scottish Enlightenment. Instead, it 
offers suggestive remarks on McCosh’s restructuring of Princeton’s curriculum as a 
future area of research.3  
 
‘A New Departure in College Education’: McCosh’s administration of Princeton 
 When Princeton’s Board of Trustees offered McCosh the presidency of the 
College of New Jersey in May 1868 he was already a well established moral philosopher 
and Evangelical minister.4 His international reputation as an Evangelical philosopher led 
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Consequently, McCosh joined the convocation of four hundred and fifty so-called ‘non-intrusion’ 
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Scotland (Richard Brown, Church and State in Modern Britain, 1700-1850, (London: Routledge, 
1991), 285-287). McCosh’s prominent role in this so-called Disruption of 1843 elevated his reputation 
as a staunch defender of Evangelicalism. In his first large-scale publication, McCosh classified the 
divisions and subdivisions between so-called ‘Moderates’ who remained and those who left the Church 
of Scotland and established the Free Church of Scotland during the so-called Disruption of 1843 
(James McCosh, The Wheat and the Chaff Gathered into Bundles; A Statistical Contribution Towards 
The History of the Recent Disruption of the Scottish Ecclesiastical Establishment, (Perth, Dundee, 





Princetonians to believe that he had the potential to recreate Witherspoon’s earlier union 
of reason and religion at Princeton.5 On behalf of the Princeton alumni, James Pollock 
stated: 
In the Republic of Letters there is no dwarfing selfishness, no partisanship, no 
sectionalism, no sectarianism. All is cosmopolitan, liberal, universal. In other years 
Scotland recognized this truth, and gave Witherspoon to America…Again America 
has asked, and McCosh is ours. We, with the blood of nations in our veins; as a 
nation, the epitome of the world’s nationalities, by the magic of our free institutions 
will give McCosh and freedom to the world.6  
 
Princetonians, therefore, had high expectations of McCosh and what his administration 
would mean to America and the wider world. To what extent did McCosh’s 
administration of Princeton fulfill these expectations?      
 Before crossing the Atlantic in October 1868, James McCosh contemplated the 
question: ‘what should I make of Princeton College’.7 With reverence to the Evangelical 
legacies of Jonathan Edwards and John Witherspoon, he later claimed that ‘my aim has 
been to advance with the times and to do a work in my day such as they did in theirs’.8 
Yet the circumstances at Princeton during McCosh’s administration were considerably 
different than earlier times. While the devastation of the recent Civil War (1861-1865) 
was still felt by Princetonians, a strong desire for intellectual improvement surrounded 
McCosh’s inauguration. This ambition for a new era of ‘enlightened learning’ was 
inextricably linked to Witherspoon’s legacy. William Alexander remarked: 
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There have been two remarkable eras in the history of the College. The first was one 
hundred years ago, in 1768. The second era in the history of this college is the 
present…the trustees, animated with the same feeling that governed their 
predecessors one hundred years ago, desirous to extend the fame and enlarge the 
influence of the College, again cast their eyes across the same Atlantic to summon to 
the presidency of the College one [whose] reputation is co-extensive with the 
scientific world.9 
 
Signifying the start of this ‘new era’ the resigning president John Maclean Jr. presented 
McCosh with the keys and Charter of the College. During this gesture, Maclean reminded 
the audience that above supporting the diffusion of knowledge ‘it is more especially 
incumbent upon him [McCosh] to have the oversight of the religious instruction, to guard 
the morals of the students and their faith in Christ’.10 These objectives demarcated the 
ambition of Maclean’s administration where the College and Princeton Theological 
Seminary shared largely the same purpose. According to Maclean, ‘it is a fact not to be 
denied [that] our two institutions [Princeton and Princeton Theological Seminary] have 
done more for the best interests of the Presbyterian Church than any other two colleges in 
the land’.11 While this institutional purpose prevailed in the decades that followed Samuel 
Stanhope Smith’s 1812 resignation, McCosh’s administration did not continue this 
tradition.  
   In addressing Princeton alumni, trustees, and students for the first time, McCosh 
reassured them that ‘I have no design, avowed or secret, to revolutionize your American 
colleges or reconstruct them after a European model…I have seen enough of the 
American colleges [during a 1866 visit] to become convinced that they are not rashly to 
be meddled with [and] whatever improvements they admit of must be built on the old 
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foundation’.12 McCosh kept his promise by blending Princeton’s traditional commitment 
to Calvinist principles whilst restructuring the curriculum to better address the modern 
needs of Princeton graduates. Its intended effect was the production of moral and pious 
men who possessed useful knowledge upon entering public life. McCosh believed that 
Princeton’s focus on educating future ministers impaired its ability to prepare graduates 
for secular professions. He therefore restructured the curriculum under the four branches 
of Language, Literature, Science, and Philosophy where ‘every department of true 
scholarship and knowledge [were taught], taking care to leave out all that was fictitious 
and pretentious’.13 At the end of his twenty years as president, McCosh remarked that 
‘we give instruction in a greater number of branches than are usually taught in the 
universities of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and nearly all the branches taught in 
Germany’.14 This progressive expansion of the curriculum changed Princeton’s 
institutional purpose whilst introducing a new type of Enlightenment. Scottish philosophy 
occupied a significant role in McCosh’s Enlightenment, albeit not in the same fashion as 
practised during earlier Scottish and Princeton Enlightenments. According to McCosh, 
Scottish philosophy furnished the ‘bones rather than the flesh or muscles’ of a theorist’s 
moral thought.15 At Princeton, McCosh revived a sophisticated use of Scottish philosophy 
not only in his lectures of the History of Philosophy, Psychology, Contemporary 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Metaphysics but also in print.16 His exploratory biography, 
Scottish Philosophy (1875), of leading Scottish Enlightenment moralists associated with 
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the Scottish School of Common Sense illustrated his interpretation of these earlier 
theorists as well as reconstructing the tradition of Scottish philosophy to his situation at 
Princeton.17  
 McCosh’s ideas on a properly regulated liberal and Christian education developed 
from his earlier studies at Edinburgh. Although McCosh attended Edinburgh shortly after 
Dugald Stewart’s 1828 death, the memory of his systematic use of Scottish philosophy 
remained, particularly through William Hamilton’s teachings, which he credited ‘as 
showing a knowledge far more extensive than that of Hutcheson, or Reid, or Stewart, or 
Brown’.18 Through Hamilton’s instruction McCosh drew from the ‘method, doctrine, and 
spirit’ of Scottish philosophy and later defended its use as the best way to examine 
intuitive knowledge and powers of the mind.19 While he praised Scottish theorists and 
recommended at Princeton that the theories of ‘Reid and Hamilton should be studied 
together’, McCosh revealed reasons why his philosophy was different.20 He wrote: 
I am represented as being of the Scottish school of philosophy. I adhere to it in one 
important principle: I believe that the truths of mental philosophy are to be 
discovered by a careful observation and induction of what passes in the mind. But in 
other respects I differ from the Scottish school. I profess to get my philosophy from 
the study of the human mind directly, and not from the teaching of others. The 
Scottish school maintains that we know only the qualities of things; I say we know 
the things themselves. So I call my philosophy Realism, and by help of a few 
obvious distinctions I hope to establish it. Hamilton makes our knowledge relative; I 
make it positive.21 
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Like Reid, McCosh’s moral philosophy supported ‘Scottish Realism’ whilst opposing the 
thought of ‘Scottish Idealists’ who were influenced by Kant. His use of Scottish 
philosophy was also linked to what he hoped to achieve in America. McCosh claimed 
that ‘my ambition to aid a little in the foundation of an American philosophy which, as a 
philosophy of facts, will be found to be consistent with a sound theology’.22 This 
ambition to unite philosophical truths and revealed religion certainly resembled 
Witherspoon’s legacy. 
 Despite a vested interest in fostering an American philosophy, his courses on 
mental science were not a graduation requirement for everyone (though he claimed to 
have taught over three thousand across his time at Princeton).23 Moreover, Professors 
Ormond and Patton taught the mandatory philosophy courses of Ethics and Logic.24 
McCosh believed that all branches of knowledge depended upon the exercise of the 
faculties and operations of the mind and that the careful study of these branches, in turn, 
exercised the mind. This pedagogical concept appealed to the earlier writings of Dugald 
Stewart. Similar to Stewart, McCosh argued that ‘the business of a college is to teach 
scientific principles capable of all sorts of practical application’.25 
 This expansion of Princeton’s curriculum under the four branches of knowledge 
necessitated changes in how Princeton degrees were earned and the importance of all 
faculty members in realising McCosh’s Enlightenment. In previous years, the limited 
course offerings permitted their mandatory attendance by most students (with few 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 McCosh, Twenty Years, 30.  
 
23 Ibid., 62. 
 
24 Ibid.  
 
25 McCosh, Twenty Years, 20. Dugald Stewart taught that ‘the system of education which is proper to 
be adopted in particular cases, ought, undoubtedly, to have some reference to [the particular] 
circumstances; and to be calculated, as much as possible, to develop and to cherish those intellectual 
and active principles, in which a natural deficiency is most to be apprehended’ (Stewart, Elements, 25).   
 
Bridging Tradition and Modernity $(-!
exceptions of students by-passing the first two years of study). At the time of McCosh’s 
appointment, Princeton’s faculty consisted of sixteen academics (ten professors, four 
tutors, and two teachers).26 Twenty years later the Princeton faculty was enlarged to forty 
(thirty-five professors, three tutors, and two lecturing assistants).27 The increased 
employment of professors and decrease of tutors was not circumstantial. Similar to 
Stewart’s earlier belief that young men should draw upon the example of accomplished 
men, McCosh instituted that freshmen (who had previously received instruction 
exclusively from tutors) now had at least one or more professors who taught first year 
courses. According to McCosh, ‘the strength of our college lies in its staff of 
professors’.28  
 Meanwhile, Princeton’s earlier practise of mandatory coursework could not 
sustain a student population of over 600 students or a diversified curriculum. 
McCosh, therefore, implemented an elective system where students, after completing 
the first two years of mandatory classes including ethics and the relation between 
science and religion which Witherspoon had established, then selected courses in their 
field of interest. This was intended to mould a Princeton education to the individual 
needs of its students whilst continuing Princeton’s traditional values. He remarked 
that ‘I adopt the new [and] retain what is good in the old’.29 By allowing students to 
focus the final years of study on their particular field of interest, McCosh believed 
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Princetonians would be better prepared to enter specialised or vocational training of a 
particular field. In practise, students ‘meaning to be a minister will probably elect 
some branch of philosophy; the intending doctor will probably take botany and 
zoology; and the lawyer history or social sciences’.30 In doing so, McCosh departed 
from the earlier Princeton and Scottish Enlightenment’s pedagogical convention of 
building an education toward understanding and adopting the ideas taught in the 
moral philosophy course. As W.B. Carnochan has shown, McCosh’s so-called 
‘Trinity of studies’ (humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences) appealed to the 
examples Cambridge and Oxford not the paradigms at Scottish universities, which 
were prominent Scottish Enlightenment institutions.31!
 McCosh’s restructured curriculum offered students limited freedom to choose the 
path of their studies not the purpose of Princeton’s Enlightenment. This differed from 
Harvard’s design that practised an elective system where students determined all the 
courses that formed their degree.32 The president of Harvard, Charles Eliot, claimed that 
‘in a university the student must choose his studies and govern himself’.33 The significant 
difference between McCosh’s curriculum and practises at Harvard centered on the extent 
of the relationship between the faculty and students.34 McCosh believed it incumbent 
upon the faculty to monitor closely how students interpreted the liberal branches of 
education and correct them when necessary toward their virtuous and religious qualities. 
McCosh remarked that ‘in every college the Faculty should look after, not only the 
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intellectual improvement, but the morals of those committed to their care’.35 For this 
reason, he appointed professors ‘of mature life, [and] of high ability and character [who 
were] likely to promote the moral and religious welfare of the students’.36 In this 
important respect, Princeton professors made McCosh’s Enlightenment possible.  
 McCosh’s administration surpassed Smith’s achievements in expanding the 
liberal branches of knowledge at Princeton. Similar to Smith, McCosh’s philosophy 
encountered controversy with religious fundamentalists at Princeton. For example, his 
support of Darwinian evolution received harsh criticism from the principal of Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Charles Hodge who argued that Darwinism was contrary to 
notions of divine design and thus atheistic.37 McCosh wrote that ‘I was not a week in 
Princeton till I let it be known to the upper classes of the college that I was in favor of 
evolution properly limited and explained; and I have proclaimed my views in lectures and 
papers in a number of cities and before various associations, literary and religious’.38 His 
promotion of evolution led conservative Presbyterians, such as Hodge, to question how 
Princeton’s Enlightenment under McCosh would affect American Protestantism. While 
these tensions did not result in a counter-Enlightenment agenda as it had during Smith’s 
administration, conservative Presbyterian ministers questioned if McCosh’s 
administration measured up to Witherspoon’s legacy. Although ample evidence suggests 
McCosh attempted to create Enlightenment at Princeton, perhaps he should be treated 
with more caution as a representative of the Scottish Enlightenment or as succeeding 
Witherspoon’s legacy at Princeton. He did, however, fulfill other expectations. McCosh’s 
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lectures at Princeton were later published and found an audience as far away as India, 
Japan, and Ceylon.39 In this regard, McCosh created a unique Enlightenment that united 
Princeton’s traditional values and modernity, and diffused these ideas to the wider world. 
   
Conclusion 
 The historiography of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment has turned 
its sight on its transnational reception. Investigating the diffusion of these ideas across 
national borders and time has shown the adaptability of Common Sense philosophy as 
well as their its historical significance in shaping notions of modernity. Comparative case 
studies of figures such as Reid, Witherspoon, Stewart, Smith, and McCosh reveals how 
the different circumstances and interests across generations and national cultures altered 
the prominent ideas and values of the Scottish Enlightenment. This thesis has shown an 
intellectual connection between Scotland and the United States as well as the existence of 
counter-Enlightenments that targeted these ideas on both sides of the Atlantic. While this 
project was not intended to trace comprehensively these connections, it provides an 
example of the tension that existed between eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment 
moral philosophy and counter-Enlightenment interests of the Atlantic World. The 
Scottish Enlightenment’s legacy in Scotland and early America existed in various ways, 
but none more revealing than its place in institutions of higher education. The myriad of 
reasons why Scottish Enlightenment thought and values flourished and declined in 
Scottish and early American pedagogical contexts have yet to be fully revealed. This 
thesis has taken an important step toward a better understanding the Scottish 
Enlightenment and its counter-Enlightenment in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-
century Atlantic World. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 McCosh, Twenty Years, 28-29, 66. 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources I: Dugald Stewart and the Edinburgh Context 
 
 
Note on the Sources 
 
 In examining Stewart’s system of moral education, the thesis drew primarily 
from Stewart’s published works and his unpublished lecture notes. These sources 
were found in the Dugald Stewart Collection (Dc.6.111) at the University of 
Edinburgh Library Special Collections and amongst its holdings. The thesis is not an 
exhaustive exploration of Stewart’s moral philosophy and as such a number of 
Stewart’s publications and unpublished manuscripts did not appear in this project. 
 
Published works of Dugald Stewart 
 
Stewart, Dugald, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. one, (Edinburgh: 
               William Creech, 1792). (second edition published by Creech in 1802). 
_____________, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, for the use of Students in the University of  
    Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1793). (second edition published  
   by Creech 1801). 
_____________, Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson (originally read before  
   the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1796), (Edinburgh: Creech, 1801). 
 _____________, Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, (originally in ‘Transactions’  
   of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1802), (Edinburgh: Creech, 1803). 
_____________, A Short Statement of some Important Facts, relative to the late election of a 
   mathematical professor in the University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Creech 
   and Archibald Constable and Co., 1805).  
_____________, Postscript to Mr. Stewart’s statement of facts relative to the election of   
   Professor Leslie, (Edinburgh: Creech and Archibald Constable and Co., 1805). 
_____________, Philosophical Essays, (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1810). 
_____________, Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith, LL.D., of William Robertson, D.D.,  
   and of Thomas Reid, D.D., (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1811). 
_____________, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, two vols,  
   (Edinburgh: Adam Black, 1828).   
_____________, Lectures on Political Economy, (first delivered in 1800), first published in  
   vols 8 and 9 of Collected Works, edited by Hamilton, (Edinburgh: Thomas 
  Constable and Co., 1856). Also referenced, Dugald Stewart, Lectures on 





Hamilton’s edition of Stewart’s works 
Hamilton, William (ed.), The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, vols 1-11, (Edinburgh: 
 Thomas Constable and Co., 1854-1860). For an introduction to Hamilton’s Collected 
 Works of Dugald Stewart reference Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Collected Works of 
 Dugald Stewart, (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994).  
 
Unpublished Student Lecture Notes (EUL) 
Dugald Stewart, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1787-1789, taken by an unknown student,  
   EUL Gen. 1987-9.  
_____________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1793-1794, taken by Archibald Bell, EUL 
   Dc.4.97. 
_____________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1796-1799, taken by J.M. Lee, EUL  
   Dc.8.143. 
_____________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1801-1802, taken by James Bridges, EUL  
     Dc.5.88. 
_____________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1806-1807, taken by John Borthwick, EUL  
   Gen. 843.  
_____________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1808-1809, taken by Archibald Alison,  
   EUL Gen. 1382.  
 
 
Primary Sources II: Samuel Stanhope Smith and the Princeton Context 
 
 
Note on the Sources 
 
 In examining Smith’s system of moral education, the thesis used his published 
works, unpublished lecture notes, and unpublished manuscripts of his contemporaries 
housed at Princeton University Library Special Collections (Smith Collection C0028; 
Witherspoon Collection C0274; Green Collection C0257; Reade Letters C1272; 
Lindsley Letters C1111; Biddle Letters C1013; and Rush Collection C0079) and 
unpublished lecture notes and Trustee and Faculty minutes housed at the Seeley 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. The thesis did not attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of Smith’s moral philosophy and theology, therefore, a 
number of Smith’s published and unpublished works did not appear in this project.  
 
Published works of Samuel Stanhope Smith 
 
Smith, Samuel Stanhope, An Essay on the Causes of Variety of the Complexion and Figure in 
    the Human Species. To which are added Strictures on Lord Kaim’s 
    Discourse, on the Original Diversity of Mankind, (Philadelphia: Robert 
   Aitken, 1787). 
___________________, Sermons, (Newark, NJ: Jacob Halsey and Co., 1799). 
! $((!
___________________, ‘An Account of the good Effects of copious Blood-letting in the 
     Cure of a Hemorrhage from the Lungs’, Medical Museum, 2,  
    (1806): 1-6. 
___________________, Lectures on the Evidences of the Christian Religion. Delivered to the 
    Senior Class, On Sundays, in the Afternoon, in the College of New  
   Jersey, (Philadelphia, 1809). 
___________________, An Essay on the Causes of Variety of the Complexion and Figure in 
    the Human Species. To which are added, Animadversions on certain 
   Remarks made on the first edition of this Essay, by Charles White, in 
    a series of Discourses delivered before the Literary and Philosophical 
    Society of Manchester England. Also, Strictures on Lord Kaim’s 
    Discourse on the Original Diversity of Mankind, And an Appendix, 
    second edition, enlarged, (New Brunswick: J. Simpson and Co., 1810). 
___________________, The Lectures, Corrected and Improved, which have been delivered 
    for a series of years, in the College of New Jersey; on the subjects of 
    Moral and Political Philosophy, two vols, (Trenton: James Wilson, 1812). 
___________________, A Comprehensive View of the Leading and Most Important 
    Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion: digested in such order 
    as to present to the pious and reflecting mind, a basis for the 
    superstructure of the entire system of the doctrines of the gospel,  
   (New Brunswick: Deare & Myer, 1815). 
___________________, History of the United States, From Their First Settlement As English 
    Colonies, in 1607, to the Year 1808, or The Thirty-Third of Their 
    Sovereignty and Independence, three vols, (Philadelphia: M. Carey,  
   1816). 
 
Unpublished Lecture Notes (PUA AC052; PUL C0028) 
 
Smith, Samuel Stanhope, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1794-1804, notes taken by unknown 
      students, PUA, Box 52, Folders 8-9.  
____________________, ‘Lectures on Evidences of the Christian Religion’, 1804, notes taken by 
      unknown student, PUA, Box 52, Folder 7.  
____________________, ‘Lectures on Theology’, 1804, notes taken by unknown student, PUA,  
      Box 53, Folders 3-4.  
____________________, ‘A System of Moral Philosophy for the Students of Nassau Hall’, circa 
       1805, Smith’s lecture notes, PUL, C0028. 
 
Bibliography $()!
_____________________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1806-1809, notes taken by J. H. 
     Reade, PUA, Box 53, Folders 1-2. 
Witherspoon, John, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1791, notes taken by Elljah Rosengrant,  
                     PUA, Box 70, Folders 6-7. 
_______________, ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, 1772-1794, notes taken by various  
         unknown students, PUA, Box 59, Folders 8-9. 
 
Smith’s Unpublished Sermons at Princeton (PUL C0028) 
 
Smith, Samuel Stanhope, ‘The Progress of Vice’, 1802, PUL MS8035. 
____________________, ‘On the Fear of God’, 13 November 1803, PUL MS12800. 
____________________, ‘The Example of Jesus’, 25 September 1805, PUL MS12800. 
 
Unpublished Trustee and Faculty Minutes (PUA AC120)  
Board of Trustees Minutes and Records, volume 1, 1748-1796  
Board of Trustees Minutes and Records, volume 2, 11 April 1797—25 September 1823 
John Bayard account of Princeton, 1803, Box 6, Folder 2 
Letters and Accounts of Princeton, 1803-1807, Box 6, Folder 3 
Printed, Post-fire Circular, 1804, Box 6, Folder 5 
 
Ashbel Green’s Unpublished Manuscripts (PUL C0257) 
Diary, 14 June 1790—21 February 1800, Box 1, Folder 1 
Diary, 21 February 1800—6 April 1822, Box 2, Folder 1 
Transcripts, 1790-1801, Box 4, Folders 1-12 
Transcripts, 1802-1816, Box 5, Folders 1-15 
Reports to the Faculty of the College of New Jersey, undated, Box 8, Folder 5 
Reports to the Trustees of the College of New Jersey, 1813-1817, Box 8, Folders 6-8 
 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Published Sources 
 
Adams, John, Correspondence of the Late President Adams, originally published in the  
 Boston Patriot, vol. one, (Boston: Everett and Munroe, 1809). 
Alexander, Archibald, The Life Archibald Alexander, edited by James Alexander, (New York: 
 Charles Scribner, 1854). 
 [Anonymous], Strictures on Mr. Duncan MacFarlan’s Short Vindication of the Minority in 
  the Last General Assembly of the Church of Scotland: In a Letter Addressed to its 
  Author, (Edinburgh: J. Johnstone, 1806). 
! $(*!
Banks, Joseph, The Letters of Sir Joseph Banks, edited by Neil Chambers, (London: Imperial  
 College Press, 2000). 
Beasley, Fredrick, ‘An account of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith’,  
 Analectic Magazine, n.s., I, (June 1820): 443-74. 
Beattie, James, Elements of Moral Science, two vols, (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1790). 
Berkeley, George, The Works of George Berkeley, three vols, (London: Richard Priestley, 1820). 
Blair, Hugh, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1783). 
Blair, John, ‘Observations on Regeneration,’ in Sermons and Essays by the Tennents and 
  their Contemporaries, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1856). 
Boudinot, Elias, The Age of Revelation: Or, The Age of Reason Shewn to be an Age of  
 Infidelity, (Philadelphia: Asbury Dickins, 1801). 
Brewster, David, An Examination of the Letter addressed to the Principal Hill on the Case of 
  Mr. Leslie, In a Letter to its Anonymous Author. With remarks on Mr. Stewart’s 
  Postscript and Mr. Playfair’s Pamphlet, by a Calm Observer, (Edinburgh: Mundell,  
 1806). 
Brougham, Henry, Discourse on the Objects, Advantages and Pleasures of Science, new 
 edition, (London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1828). 
Brown, Thomas, An Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, (Edinburgh: Archibald and 
 Company, 1818). 
_____________, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, 
  Concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect, (Edinburgh: Mundell and son, 1806).  
_____________, A Short Criticism of the Terms of Charge against Mr Leslie in the Protest 
 of the Ministers of Edinburgh, as explained by them in their late pamphlet,  
 (Edinburgh: Mundell and Son, 1806). 
Buffon, Georges Louis, Barr’s Buffon: Buffon’s Natural History, translated into English by 
  James Smith Barr, ten vols, (London: the Proprietor, 1792). 
Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain 
  Societies in London relative to that Event. In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent To 
 a Gentleman in Paris, (London: J. Dodsley, 1790). 
____________, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in consequence of some late 
  discussions in Parliament, relative to the Reflections on the French Revolution, 
  (London: J. Dodsley, 1790). 
Calvin, Andrew, The Ignoble Interruption of the Liberal and Tranquil Pursuits of Honest 
  Dug, (Edinburgh: J. Buchanan, 1806). 
Campbell, George, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1776). 
Carlyle, Alexander, Autobiography of the Rev. Dr Alexander Carlyle minister of Inveresk, 
  edited by Burton Hill, second edition, (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1861). 
Bibliography $(+!
Chalmers, Thomas, Memoirs of Thomas Chalmers, D.D LL.D, edited by William Hanna,  
 vol. one, (Edinburgh: Constable, 1854). 
_______________, Observations on a passage in Mr. Playfair’s letter to the Lord Provost of  
 Edinburgh relative to he mathematical pretensions of the Scottish clergy, (Cuper- 
 Fife: R. Tullis, 1805). 
Cockburn, Henry, An examination of the trials for sedition which have hitherto occurred in  
 Scotland, two vols, (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1888). 
______________, Memorials of His Time, two vols, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1856). 
______________, Life of Lord Jeffrey: with selection from his correspondence, two vols,  
 (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1852). 
Cook, George, The Life of the Late George Hill D.D., Principal of St. Mary’s College, St  
 Andrews University, (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Company, 1820). 
Cross, Maurice (ed.), Selections from the Edinburgh Review, four vols, (Paris: Baudry’s 
 European Library, 1835). 
Dalzel, Andrew, History of the University of Edinburgh from its foundation, two vols, 
  (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1862). 
Dove, Patrick E., The Duty of Excommunicating the “Moderate” Ministers of the Church of 
  Scotland, (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843). 
Edwards, Jonathan, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern and Prevailing Notions 
  Respecting that of Freedom of Will, (London: Thomas Field, 1762). 
_______________, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, (Boston: Kneeland and  
 Green, 1746). 
Glimpses of Colonial Society and the Life at Princeton College, 1766-1773, edited by W. Jay 
  Mills, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1903). 
Ferguson, Adam, Principles of Moral and Political Science: Being chiefly a retrospect of 
  lectures delivered in the College of Edinburgh, two vols, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1792). 
_____________, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1785). 
_____________, History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, 
  (Edinburgh: Creech, 1783). 
_____________, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, (Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell, 
 1767). 
Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, ‘Humours of the North: Recollections of Dugald  
 Stewart’, 19, (1838): 50-56. 
Gordon-Wilson, Mary, ‘Christopher North’: A Memoir of John Wilson, (Edinburgh: 




Green, Ashbel, The Life of Ashbel Green, V.D.M., Begun to be written by himself in his 
  eighty-second year and continued to his eighty-fourth. Prepared for press at the 
  author’s request by Joseph H. Jones, (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1849). 
___________, Lectures on the Shorter Catechism of the Presbyterian Church, in the United 
  States of America, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1829). 
Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James; and Jay, John, Selected Federalist Papers, edited by 
  Paul Negri and Bob Blaisdell, (Toronto: General Publishing Company, 2001). 
Hamilton, Elizabeth, Letters on the Elementary Principles of Education, vol. one, second 
 edition, (London: C. and J. Robinson, 1801). 
Hay, William, Non-Intrusion: A fundamental principles of the Church of Scotland from the 
  Statute Laws of the Realm, with the competency of the General Assembly’s Act Anent 
  the Admission of ministers, (Dundee: William Middleton, 1843). 
Hetherington, William, History of the Church of Scotland: From the introduction of 
  Christianity to the period of the disruption in 1843, (Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1844). 
Hill, George, Lectures in Divinity, edited by Rev. Alexander Hill, third edition, (Edinburgh: 
 Waugh and Innes, 1833).  
Hodge, Charles, What is Darwinism?, (New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Company, 1874). 
Horner, Francis, Memoirs of Francis Horner: with selections from his correspondence, 
  (Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1849). 
____________, ‘Review of Dugald Stewart’s Short Statement’, Edinburgh Review, 7:3,  
 (1806): 113-134. 
Hume, David, Essays and Treatise on Several Subjects, two vols, new edition, (Edinburgh: 
 Kincaid and Donaldson, 1764). 
___________, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Norton and Mary Norton, 
  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Hutcheson, Francis, A System of Moral Philosophy, vol. one, (London: Millar, 1755). 
Home, Henry, Lord Kames, Sketches of the History of Man, two vols, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1778). 
Inglis, John, An Examination of Mr. Dugald Stewart’s Pamphlet, Relative to the Late Election 
  of a Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Peter Hill, 
 1805). 
Jay, John, The Life of John Jay: with selections from his correspondence and miscellaneous 
  papers, edited by William Jay, two vols, (New York: J & J Harper, 1833). 
Jefferson, Thomas, Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, from the Papers of Thomas 
  Jefferson, edited by Thomas Jefferson Randolph, two vols, (Charlottesville: F. Carr  
 and Co., 1830).  
_______________, Jefferson: Political Writings, edited by Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball, 
  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
Bibliography $),!
Leslie, John, The Philosophy of Arithmetic; exhibiting a progressive view of the theory and  
 practice of calculation, (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1817). 
__________, An Experimental Inquiry into the Nature and Propagation of Heat, (Edinburgh: 
 Bell and Bradfute, 1804). 
Letters on the True Relations of Church and State to Schools and Colleges, edited by 
  Matthew Hope, (Princeton: John Robinson, 1853). 
Lindsley, Philip, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith, D.D., LLD’, in Annals of the American Pulpit 
  from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and 
  fifty-five, edited by William Sprague, vol. three, (New York: Robert Carter and 
  Brothers, 1859), 335-345. 
Lundie, Robert, Report of the Proceedings and Debate in the General Assembly of the Church 
  of Scotland, Respecting the Election of Mr. Leslie to the Mathematical Chair in the 
  University of Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Constable, 1806). 
MacFarlan, Duncan, A Short Vindication of the Minority in the Late General Assembly of the 
 Church of Scotland, (Glasgow: John Scrymgeour, 1806). 
Mackintosh, James, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy: Chiefly during the 
  seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1830). 
_______________, ‘Review of Dugald Stewart’s Introduction to the Encyclopedia  
 Britannica’, Edinburgh Review, 27, (1816): 180-244. 
Maclean Jr., John, History of the College of New Jersey from its Origin in 1746 to the 
  Commencement of 1854, two vols, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1877). 
______________, A Memoir of John Maclean, M.D., the first professor of chemistry in the 
  College of New Jersey, (Princeton: “Press” office, 1876). 
McCosh, James, The Life of James McCosh, a record chiefly autobiographical, edited by 
  William Milligan Sloane, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1896).   
_____________, Twenty Years of Princeton College: Being Farewell Address, (New York: 
 Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888). 
______________, The Religious Aspect of Evolution, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888). 
_____________, Syllabus of Lectures on Philosophy, (Princeton, 1882). 
_____________, The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical, from  
 Hutcheson to Hamilton, (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1875). 
____________, An Examination of Mr J.S. Mill’s Philosophy; being a defence of fundamental 
  truth, (London & New York, 1866). 
____________, ‘Memoir: the Life and Writings of the Author’ in Dugald Stewart, Outlines of  
 Moral Philosophy, with a Memoir, a Supplement, and Questions by James McCosh, 
 edited by James McCosh, (London: Sampson Low, 1864). 
 
! $)$!
____________, Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated, (London: Macmillan and Co.,  
 1860). 
____________, Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral, (London: Macmillan and 
 Co., 1851). 
____________, The Wheat and the Chaff Gathered into Bundles; A Statistical Contribution 
  towards The history of the Recent Disruption of the Scottish Ecclesiastical  
 Establishment, (Perth, Dundee, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Greenock,  
 1843). 
Madison, James, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol. one, (Philadelphia: 
 Lippincott and Co., 1865). 
Meade, William, Memoir of the Life of the Right Rev. William Meade, D.D., Bishop of the 
  Protestant Episcopal Church, (Baltimore: Innes and Co., 1867). 
Miller, Samuel, The Life of Samuel Miller, D.D., LL.D., (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and  
 Haffelfinger, 1869). 
Moncreiff, Henry, Remarks on A Pamphlet Entitled, “Substance of Principal Hill’s Speech in 
  the General Assembly, May 23, 1807, Upon the Motion for Thanking His Majesty for 
  His Support of the Protestant Establishment, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1807). 
Muir, Thomas, An Account of the Trial of Thomas Muir, ESq. Younger of Huntershill, before  
 the High Court of Justiciary, at Edinburgh, on the 30th and 31st days of August, 1793,  
 for Sedition, (New York: Samuel Campbell, 1794). 
Paine, Thomas, The Rights of Man, (London: J.S. Jordon, 1791). 
Paley, William, A View of the Evidences of Christianity, fifth edition, two vols, (Edinburgh: Adam 
 Black, 1796). 
The Parliamentary Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of  
 Lords, (London: J. Debrett, 1794).  
Playfair, John, Letter to the Author of the Examination of Professor Stewart’s Short Statement 
  of Facts, (Edinburgh: Creech and Archibald and Co., 1806). 
___________, ‘Account of Matthew Stewart,’ read at the Royal Society of Edinburgh on 3 
  April 1786, in Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1, (Edinburgh: J.    
  Dickson, 1788). 
Porcupine, Peter (aka William Cobbett), History of the American Jacobins, Commonly  
 Denominated Democrats, (Philadelphia: J.G. Henderson 1796). 
Priestley, Joseph, An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
  Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of  
 Truth, and Dr. Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, second  
 edition, (London: J. Johnson, 1775). 
 
Bibliography $)%!
[Princeton Trustees], Inauguration of James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., as President of the 
 College of New Jersey, Princeton, (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1868). 
The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, edited by K.M. Brown, (St Andrews,  
 2007-2010). 
Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788). 
___________, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1785). 
___________, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the principles of Common Sense, 
  (Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell, 1764). 
Rush, Benjamin, Medical Inquiries and Observations, second edition, (Philadelphia: J.  
 Conrad and Co., 1805). 
_____________, Letters of Rush, edited by Butterfield, vol. two, (Princeton: Princeton 
  University Press, 1951). 
Scott, Sir Walter, ‘Professor John Leslie against William Blackwood, for a libel in 
  “Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine”’, The Edinburgh Annual Register, 15, part 1, 
  (1824): 74-104. 
Smellie, William, Memoirs of the Life, Writings and Correspondence of W. Smellie, edited by 
  Robert Kerr, (Edinburgh: John Anderson, 1811), 354. 
Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Edinburgh: Millar, 1759). 
Smollett, Tobias, The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, vol. three, (London: W. Johnston and 
 B. Collins, 1771). 
Sprague, William, and Woods, Leonard (eds.), Lectures on Revivals of Religion, (Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd, Whyte & Co., Oliphant, 1832). 
Stephens, Alexander, Public Characters of 1800-1801, vol. three, (Edinburgh: Balfour, 1801). 
Stewart, Helen, and Dudley, Letters to ‘Ivy’ from the First Early of Dudley, edited by S.H. 
  Romilly, (London: Longmans and Green, 1905). 
Stewart, Mathew, ‘Memoir of the late Dugald Stewart, Esq.’, in Annual Biography and 
  Obituary for the year 1829, vol. seven, (London): 256-269.  
Stewart, Mathew, Some General Theorems of Considerable use in the Higher Parts of  
 Mathematics, (London: Sands, 1746). 
The Aberdeen Journal, issue 2986, 3 April 1805. 
The ‘Non-Intrusion Committee’ appointed by the General Assembly of the Church, Statement 
  respecting the Non-Intrusion principle of the Church of Scotland, and the modes of 
  its legislative recognition; respectively submitted to the members of her majesty’s 
  government, (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dublin, Belfast, and London, 1841). 
Thorne, R.G. (ed.), The House of Commons, 1790-1820, vol. one, (London: Haynes 
 Publishing, 1986). 
 
! $)&!
Tracts, Historical and Philosophical, relative to the important discussions which lately took 
  place between the members of the university and the Presbytery of Edinburgh, 
  respecting the election of Mr. Leslie to the professorship of mathematics in that 
  university, two vols, (Edinburgh: Creech, 1805-1806). 
Tracy, Joseph, The Great Awakening: A history of the revival of religion in the time of 
  Edwards and Whitefield, (Boston: Charles Tappan, 1845). 
Turnbull, George, The Principles of Moral Philosophy: An Enquiry into the Wise and Good  
 Government of the Moral World in Which the Continuance of Good Administration, 
  and of Due Care about Virtue, for ever, is inferred from present Order in all Things, 
  in that Part chiefly where Virtue is concerned, (London: John Noon, 1740). 
Veitch, John, Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1869). 
__________, ‘A Memoir of Dugald Stewart, with selections from his correspondence’, in  
 Stewart, Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by William Hamilton, vol. ten,  
 (Edinburgh, 1860), i-clxxvii. 
Washington, George, ‘A message of the President of the United States to Congress relative to  
 France and Great-Britain: delivered December 5, 1793, wither papers therein 
 referred, to which added the French originals’, (Philadelphia: Mathew Carey, 1793). 
Whitefield, George, Journals, in Memoirs of Rev. George Whitefield, edited by John Gillies,  
 (New Haven: Joseph Barber, 1812). 
Witherspoon, John, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, edited by Ashbel Green, (Philadelphia: 
 William Woodward, 1822). 
_______________, ‘An Address to the Students of the Senior Class at the 23 September 1775 
  Princeton Commencement’, in The Works of Rev. John Witherspoon, edited by 
  Samuel Stanhope Smith, second edition, third vol., (Philadelphia: Woodward, 1802). 
_______________, ‘The dominion of Providence over the passions of men,’ sermon at 
  Princeton on 17 May 1776, second edition, (Philadelphia and Glasgow, 1777). 
_______________, Ecclesiastical Characteristics: of the Arcana of Church Policy, Being an 
 Humble Attempt to Open up the Mystery of Moderation, (Edinburgh, 1753).  
_______________, ‘Remarked on an Essay on Human Liberty’, The Scots Magazine, 15,  











Ahnert, Thomas, and Manning, Susan (eds.), Character, Self, and Sociability in the Scottish 
  Enlightenment, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2011). 
Allan, David, Making British Culture: English readers and the Scottish Enlightenment, 1740-
 1830, (London: Routledge, 2008). 
__________, Adam Ferguson, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 
__________, Virtue, Learning, and the Scottish Enlightenment: ideas of scholarship in early  
 modern history, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993). 
Anderson, David, Education and the Scottish People, 1750-1918, (Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1995). 
Ashfield, Andrew and De Bolla, Peter (eds.), The Sublime: A reader in British eighteenth- 
 century aesthetic theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Barker-Benfield, G.J., The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
  Britain, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
Bailyn, Bernard, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press, 2005). 
_____________, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard University Press, 1992). 
Berlin, Ira, Generations of Captivity: A history of African-American slaves, (Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard University Press, 2003). 
Berlin, Isaiah and Hardy, Henry, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, 
  (London, New York, 1979). 
Berry, Christopher, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
 University Press, 1997). 
Brackenridge, Douglas, The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Foundation: A Bicentennial 
  History, 1799-1999, (Louisville, Kentucky: Geneva Press, 1999). 
Broadie, Alexander, A History of Scottish Philosophy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
 Press, 2009). 
________________, The Scottish Enlightenment: The historical age of the historical nation, 
  (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001). 
Brown, Richard, Church and State in Modern Britain 1700-1850, (London: Routledge, 1991).  
Buchan, James, Capital of the Mind: How Edinburgh Changed the World, (Edinburgh: 
 Birlinn, 2003). 
! $)(!
Butler, Jon, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People, (Cambridge, MA:  
 Harvard University Press, 1992). 
Camic, Charles, Experience and Enlightenment: Socialization for Cultural Change in 
  Eighteenth century Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983).  
Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S. (eds.), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish 
  Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1982).  
Carnochan, W.B., The Battleground of the Curriculum: Liberal education and American 
  experience, (Stanford University Press, 1993). 
Carter, Jennifer and Pittock, Joan (eds.), Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, (Aberdeen: 
 Aberdeen University Press, 1992). 
Carter, Philip, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, Britain 1600-1800, (London:  
 Pearson, 2001). 
Chitnis, Anand, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History, (London: Croom Helm, 1976). 
Clive, John, Scotch Reviewers: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1815, (London: Faber and 
 Faber, 1957). 
Clune, Frank, The Scottish Martyrs: Their trials and transportation to Botany Bay, (Sydney: Angus 
 and Robertson, 1969). 
Cogliano, Francis, and Manning, Susan (eds.), The Atlantic Enlightenment, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 
 2008). 
Cogliano, Francis, Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A Political History, (New York:  
 Routledge, 2000). 
Cotlar, Seth, Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the 
  Early Republic, (Charlottesville, AV: University of Virginia Press, 2011). 
Cuneo, Terence and Van Woudenberg, Rene (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas 
  Reid, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
Elkins, Stanley and McKitrick, Eric, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 
  1788-1800, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
Ferguson, Robert, The American Enlightenment, 1750-1820, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press, 1994). 
Fraser, Alexander Campbell, Thomas Reid, (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson &  
 Ferrier, 1898). 
Furber, Holden, Henry Dundas: First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811: Political Manager of 
  Scotland, Statesman, Administrator of India, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931). 
Daniels, Norman, Thomas Reid’s Inquiry: The geometry of visible and the case for realism, 
  (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1974).   
Davie, George, The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, The 
  Dow Lecture, (Dundee: University of Dundee, 1973). 
Bibliography $))!
___________, The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her universities in the nineteenth 
  century, reprinted edition, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
Dod, William Armstrong, History of the College of New Jersey: from is commencement, A.D., 
  1746 to 1783, (Princeton: J.T. Robinson, 1844). 
Drummond, Andrew and James Bulloch, James, The Scottish Church, 1688-1843: The Age of 
  the Moderates, (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1973). 
Durey, Michael, Transatlantic Radicals and the Early American Republic, (Kansas:  
 University Press of Kansas, 2007). 
Dwyer, John, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century 
  Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987). 
Emerson, Roger, Academic Patronage in the Scottish Enlightenment: Glasgow, Edinburgh  
 and St Andrews universities, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
Estes, Todd, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American 
  Political Culture, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006). 
Evans, Eric, The Great Reform Act of 1832, second edition, (London: Routledge, 1994). 
Ferguson, Robert, The American Enlightenment, 1750-1820, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
 University Press, 1994). 
Fiering, Norman, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought and Its British Context, (Chapel Hill, 
 NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). 
Fontana, Biancamaria, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh 
  Review, 1802-1832, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
France, Peter, Politeness and its Discontents: Problems in French Classical Culture, 
  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Fry, Michael, The Dundas Despotism, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1992). 
Garrard, Graeme, Counter-Enlightenments: from the eighteenth century to the present, (New 
  York and London: Routledge, 2006). 
Gaustad, Edwin, Neither King Nor Prelate: Religion and the new nation, 1776-1826, 
  (London: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993). 
Gaylord, Irving (ed.), Burr-Hamilton Duel: with correspondence, (New York, 1889). 
Gilge, Paul, Rioting in America, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
Gillett, Ezra, The History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, two 
 vols, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1864). 
Goodman, Dena, The Republic of Letters: A cultural history of the French Enlightenment,  
 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
Gould, Eliga, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American 
  Revolution, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
 
! $)*!
Graham, Gordon, Scottish philosophy: Selected readings, 1690-1960, (Charlottesville, VA: 
 Imprint Academic, 2004). 
Grave, Selwyn, The Philosophy of Common Sense, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
Greene, Jack and Morgan, Philip (eds.), Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, (Oxford: Oxford 
  University Press, 2009). 
Greene, Jack, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies 
 and the Formation of American Culture, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 
 1988). 
Haakonssen, Knud (ed.), Thomas Reid on Practical Ethics: Lectures and papers on natural 
  religion, self-government, natural jurisprudence and the law of nations, (Edinburgh: 
 Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
___________________, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish  
 Enlightenment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
Hall, Claude, Abel Parker Upshur: Conservative Virginian, 1790-1844, (Madison, WI: State 
 Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964). 
Hall, Timothy, Contested Boundaries: itinerancy and the reshaping of the Colonial American 
  religious world, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994). 
Harris, Bob, The Scottish People and the French Revolution, (London: Pickering and Chatto 
 Publishers, 2008). 
Harris, James, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British 
  Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Hatch, Nathan, The Democratization of American Christianity, (New Haven: Yale University 
 Press, 1989). 
Hawke, David Freeman, Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly, (Indianapolis and New York: 
  Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). 
Hodges, Graham Russell, Root & Branch: African Americans in New York & East Jersey, 
  1613-1863, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
Hoeveler, David, James McCosh and the Scottish Intellectual Tradition: From Glasgow to  
 Princeton, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
Hook, Andrew and Sher, Richard (eds.), The Glasgow Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Tuckwell 
 Press, 1995). 
Hornberger, Theodore, Scientific Thought in the American Colleges, 1638-1800, (Austin: 
 University of Texas Press, 1945). 
Israel, Jonathan, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 
  1750-1790, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
____________, Enlightenment Contested: philosophy, modernity and the emancipation of 
  man, 1670-1752, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Bibliography $)+!
____________, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750, 
  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
Jacyna, L.S. Philosophic Whigs: Medicine, Science, and Citizenship in Edinburgh, 1789- 
 1848, (London: Routledge, 1994). 
Jones, Ford Henry, The Scotch-Irish in America, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915). 
Kidd, Colin, Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600- 
 2000, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Kidd, Thomas, The Great Awakening: The roots of evangelical Christianity in colonial  
 America, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
Klein, Lawrence, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: moral discourse and cultural 
  politics in early eighteenth-century England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1994). 
Knox, J. Wendell, Conspiracy in American politics, 1787-1815, (North Hampshire, NH: Ayer 
 Publishing, 1972). 
LaCroix, Alison, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, (Cambridge, MA:  
 Harvard University Press, 2010).  
Lambert, Frank, Inventing the “Great Awakening”, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
Landsman, Ned, From Colonials to Provincials: American thought and culture, 1680-1760,  
 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
Langford, Paul, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783, (Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, 1989). 
Larkin, Edward, Thomas Paine and the Literature of Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2005). 
LeBeau, Bryan, Jonathan Dickinson and the Formative Years of American Presbyterianism, 
  (University Press of Kentucky, 1997). 
Lenman, Bruce, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization: Scotland 1746-1832, 
  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). 
McIntosh, Carey, The Evolution of English Prose 1700-1800: Style, Politeness, and Print 
  Culture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Macintyre, Gordon, Dugald Stewart: The Pride and Ornament of Scotland, (Brighton: Sussex 
 Academic Press, 2003). 
McElroy, Davis Dunbar, Scotland’s Age of Improvement: A survey of eighteenth-century 
  literary clubs and societies, (Pullman, WA: Washington State University, 1969). 
McMahon, Darrin, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and 
  the Making of Modernity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Manly, Susan, Language, Custom and Nation in the 1790s: Locke, Tooke, Wordsworth,  
 Edgeworth, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). 
! $*-!
Matthews, Richard (ed.), Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest: Political values in the 
  eighteenth century, (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1994). 
May, Henry, The Enlightenment in America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
Meikle, Henry, Scotland and the French Revolution, (Glasgow, 1912). 
Mercer, Philip, Sympathy and Ethics: A study of the relationship between sympathy and 
  morality with special reference to Hume’s Treatise, (Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1972). 
Meyer, Donald Harvey, The Democratic Enlightenment, (New York: Putnam, 1976). 
Michie, Michael, An Enlightenment Tory in Victorian Scotland: The Career of Sir Archibald 
  Alison, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997). 
Morgan, Edmund, The Birth of the Republic 1763-89, revised edition, (Chicago: University of  
 Chicago Press, 1977). 
Mori, Jennifer, William Pitt and the French Revolution, 1785-1795, (Keele: Keele University 
 Press, 1997). 
Morrison, Jeffrey, John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic, (Notre 
  Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). 
Mullan, John, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
Nash, Gary, First City: Philadelphia and the Forging of Historical Memory, (Pennsylvania: 
 University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
Noll, Mark, America’s God: from Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln, (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2005). 
_________, The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, Whitefield and the Wesleys, 
  (Westmont, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004). 
_________, Princeton and the Republic, 1768-1822: The Search for a Christian Enlightenment in  
 the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith, (Vancouver, B.C.: Regent College Publishing, 1989). 
Novak, Steven, The Rights of Youth: American Colleges and Student Revolt, 1798-1815, (Cambridge,  
 MA: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
Patton, William, James McCosh: The making of a Reputation. A study of the life and work of 
  Rev. Dr. James McCosh in Ireland, from his appointment as a Professor of Logic  
 and Metaphysics in Queen’s College Belfast 1851, to his appointment as President of 
  Princeton College, New Jersey, and Professor of Philosophy, in 1868, (Belfast: 
  Belfast University Press, 1993). 
Phillipson, Nicholas, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, (New York: Penguin, 2011). 
Phillipson, Nicholas, and Mitchison, Rosalind (eds.), Scotland in the Age of Improvement: 
  essays in Scottish history in the eighteenth century, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
  University Press, 1997). 
Bibliography $*,!
Prince, Carl, New Jersey’s Jeffersonian Republicans: the Genesis of an Early Party Machine, 
  1789-1817, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). 
Reid-Maroney, Nina, Philadelphia’s Enlightenment, 1740-1800: Kingdom of Christ, Empire 
  of Reason, (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2001). 
Rendall, Jane, The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment, (London: Macmillan, 1978). 
Rowe, William, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
Schmidt, Leigh Eric, Holy Fairs: Scottish Communions and American Revivals in the Early  
 Modern Period, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
Scott, William Robert, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the 
  history of Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900). 
Segrest, Scott, America and the Political Philosophy of Common Sense, (Missouri: University of  
 Missouri Press, 2010). 
Sher, Richard, The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors & their Publishers in 
  Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland & America, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press, 2006). 
___________, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of  
 Edinburgh, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985). 
Sher, Richard and Smitten, Jeffrey (eds.), Scotland and America in the Age of the 
  Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990).  
Shields, David, Civil Tongues & Polite Letters in British America, (Chapel Hill, NC: 
 University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
Sloan, Douglas, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal, (New York: 
 Teachers College Press, 1971). 
Storing, Herbert, What the anti-Federalists were for: The Political Thought of the Opponents 
  of the Constitution, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
Tait, Gordon, The Piety of John Witherspoon: Pew, Pulpit and Public Forum, (Louisville,  
 Kentucky: Geneva Press, 2001). 
Towsey, Mark, Reading the Scottish Enlightenment: Books and Their Readers in Provincial  
 Scotland, 1750-1820, (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2010). 
Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson, Princeton, 1746-1896, (Princeton: Princeton University 
 Press, 1974). 
Van Horn, James, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2001). 
Westerkamp, Marliyn, Triumph of the Laity: Scots-Irish piety and the Great Awakening, 
  1625-1760, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
Wilson, Stephen, Virtue Reformed: Rereading Jonathan Edwards’s ethics, (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 
 
! $*$!
Wood, Gordon, Empire of Liberty: A history of the early Republic, 1789-1815, (Oxford:  
 Oxford University Press, 2009).  
Wood, Paul, The Aberdeen Enlightenment, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1993). 
Wyatt-Brown, Bertram, The Shaping of Southern Culture: honor, grace, and war, 1760- 
 1890s, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
Zakai, Avihu, Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of History: The reenchantment of the world in 




Armitage, David, ‘Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707,’ 
  Past and Present, 155, (1997): 34-63. 
Ahlstrom, Sydney, ‘The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology’, Church History, 24:3, 
  (Sep., 1955): 257-272. 
Ahnert, Thomas, ‘Clergymen as polite philosophers: Douglas and the conflict between 
  Moderates and Orthodox in the Scottish Enlightenment’, Intellectual History Review, 
  18:3, (2008): 375-383. 
 ‘AHR Forum: Entangled Histories in the Atlantic World’, The American Historical Review, 
  112:3, (June 2007): 710-799. 
Aldridge, Owen, ‘An Early American Adaptation of French Pulpit Oratory’, Theory and 
  Interpretation, 28, (1987): 235-247. 
Altman, R.W., ‘Hume on Sympathy’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 18 (1980): 123-136. 
Anstey, Peter, ‘Thomas Reid and the justification of induction’, History of Philosophy 
  Quarterly, 12:1, (1995): 77-93. 
Appleby, Joyce, ‘America as a Model for the Radical French Reformers of 1789’, William 
 and Mary Quarterly, 28:2, (April 1971): 267-286. 
Bailyn, Bernard, ‘The Idea of Atlantic History’, Itinerario, 20, (1996): 14-44.  
Berlin, Isaiah, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 2, (1973), 
 100-112.  
Beam, Jacob, ‘Dr. Robert Smith’s Academy at Pequea, Pennsylvania’, Journal of the 
  Presbyterian Historical Society, 8, (1915): 145-161. 
Bernstein, John, ‘Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress’, Studies in Burke and His Time 
  (now The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation), 19, (1978): 99-118. 
Bevilacqua, Vincent, ‘Philosophical Assumptions underlying Hugh Blair’s Lectures on 
  Rhetoric and Belles Lettres’, Western Speech, 31, (1967): 150-164. 
Blackburn, Robin, ‘Haiti, Slavery, and the Age of the Democratic Revolution’, William and 
 Mary Quarterly, 63:4, (October 2006): 643-674. 
Bibliography $*%!
Bloch, Ruth, ‘Inside and outside the Public Sphere,’ William and Mary Quarterly, 62:1, 
 (January, 2005): 99-106. 
__________, ‘Changing Conceptions of Sexuality and Romance in Eighteenth-Century 
 America’, William and Mary Quarterly, 60:1, (January 2003): 13-42. 
Bouwsma, William, ‘From History of Ideas to History of Meaning’, Journal of  
 Interdisciplinary History, 12, (1981): 279-92. 
Bow, Charles Bradford, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith and Common Sense Philosophy at 
  Princeton,’ The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 8:2, (September 2010): 189-209. 
Bowers, David, ‘The Smith-Blair Correspondence, 1786-1791’, The Princeton University 
  Library Chronicle, 4:4, (June 1943): 123. 
Bradbury, Miles, ‘British Apologetics in Evangelical Garb: Samuel Stanhope Smith’s  
 “Lectures on the Evidences of the Christian Religion”’, Journal of the Early 
  Republic, 5:2, (Summer, 1985): 177-195. 
_____________, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith: Princeton’s Accommodation to Reason’, Journal 
  of Presbyterian History, 48, (1970): 189-202. 
Brown, Michael, ‘Dugald Stewart and the Problem of Teaching Politics in the 1790s’,  
 Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies, 1:1, (2007): 87-126. 
_____________, ‘Creating a Canon: Dugald Stewart’s Construction of the Scottish 
  Enlightenment,’ History of Universities, XVI, (2000), 135-154. 
Burke, John, ‘Kirk and Causality in Edinburgh, 1805’, Isis, 61:3, (1970): 340-354. 
Cant, R.G., ‘The Scottish Universities and Scottish Society in the Eighteenth Century’,  
 Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 58, (1967): 1953-6. 
Clark, Ian, ‘The Leslie Controversy, 1805’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society,  
 14, (1962): 179-197. 
Clive, John, and Bailyn, Bernard, ‘England’s Cultural Provinces: Scotland and America’,  
 William and Mary Quarterly, 11, (1954): 200-11. 
Crawford, John, ‘The Ideology of Mutual Improvement in Scottish Working Class Libraries’,  
 Library History, 12, (1996): 49-61. 
____________,‘Reading and Book Use in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, Bibliotheck, 19, 
  (1994): 23-43. 
Daston, Lorraine, ‘The ideal and reality of the Republic of Letters in the Enlightenment’,  
 Science in Context, 4:2, (1991): 367-86. 
Callergard, Robert, ‘Reid and the Newtonian Forces of Attraction’, The Journal of Scottish 
  Philosophy, 3:2, (2005): 139-155. 
Come, Donald, ‘The Influence of Princeton on Higher Education in the South before 1825’,  
 William and Mary Quarterly, 2:4 (Oct., 1946): 359-396. 
 
! $*&!
Crowson, E.T., ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith: A Founder of Hampden-Sydney College’, Virginia 
  Cavalcade, 24, (Autumn 1974): 53-60. 
Davidson, James, ‘Philip Lindsley: The Teacher as Prophet’, Peabody Journal of Education, 
  41:6, (May 1964): 327-331. 
Delbourgo, James, ‘Common Sense, Useful Knowledge, and Matters of Fact in the Late  
 Enlightenment: The Transatlantic Career of Perkins’s Tractors’, William and Mary 
 Quarterly, 62:4, (October 2004): 643-684. 
Dickinson, H.T., ‘Thomas Paine and his British Critics’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 27,  
 (2011): 19-82. 
_____________, ‘Thomas Paine and his American Critics’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 27,  
 (2011): 174-185. 
Dunn, Susan, ‘Revolutionary Men of Letters and the Pursuit of Radical Change: The Views  
 of Burke, Tocqueville, Adams, Madison, and Jefferson’, William and Mary 
 Quarterly, 53:4, (October 1996): 729-754. 
Dwyer, John, ‘The imperative of sociability: Moral culture in the later Scottish 
  Enlightenment’, British Journal of Eighteenth-Century Science, 13:2 (1990): 169-84. 
Emerson, Roger, ‘Did the Scottish Enlightenment Take Place in an English Cultural 
  Province?’, Lumen, 14, (1995): 1-24.  
_____________, ‘The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1768-1783’, The British Journal 
  for the History of Science, 18:3, (Nov., 1985): 255-303. 
_____________, ‘The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1737-1747’, The British Journal 
  for the History of Science, 12:2, (1979): 154-191. 
_____________, ‘The Social Composition of Enlightened Scotland: the “Select Society of  
 Edinburgh”’, 1754-1764’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 114, 
  (1973): 291-330. 
Ferguson, Robert, ‘The Commonalities of Common Sense’, William and Mary Quarterly, 57:3, 
 (July 2000): 465-504. 
Games, Alison, ‘Atlantic History and Interdisciplinary Approaches’, Early American 
  Literature, 43:1, (2008): 187-190. 
____________, ‘Atlantic history: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities’, American 
  Historical Review, 111:3. (2006): 741-757.  
Gibson, John, ‘How did the Enlightenment seem to the Edinburgh Enlightened?’, British 
  Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 1, (1978): 46-50. 
Govan, Thomas, ‘Nicholas Biddle at Princeton, 1799-1801’, Princeton University Library 
  Chronicles, 9, (1948): 49-63. 
Graham, Gordon, ‘The Ambition of Scottish philosophy’, The Monist, 90:2, (2007): 154-169. 
 
Bibliography $*'!
Grote, Simon, ‘Hutcheson’s Divergence from Shaftesbury’, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 
 4:2, (Sep. 2006): 159-172. 
Gundlach, Bradley, ‘McCosh and Hodge on Evolution: A Combined Legacy’, Journal of 
  Presbyterian History, 75:2, (1997): 85-102. 
Hatch, Nathan, ‘The Origins of Civil Millennialism in America: New England Clergymen, 
  War with France, and the Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly, 31:3, (July 
 1974): 407-430. 
Hayman, John, ‘The Evolution of “The Moralists”’, The Modern Language Review, 64:4,  
 (Oct., 1969): 728-733. 
Helo, Ari and Onuf, Peter, ‘Jefferson, Morality, and the Problem of Slavery’, William and 
 Mary Quarterly, 60:3, (July 2003): 583-614. 
Hemphill, C. Dallett, ‘Manners and Class in the Revolutionary Era: A Transatlantic 
  Comparison’, William and Mary Quarterly, 63:2, (April 2006): 345-372. 
Holcomb, Kathleen, ‘A Dance in the Mind: the Provincial Scottish Philosophical Societies’,  
 Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, 21, (1991): 89-100. 
Houston, R.A., ‘Literacy, Education and the Culture of Print in Enlightenment Edinburgh’,  
 History, 78, (1993): 373-92. 
Howe, John, ‘Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s’, American 
  Quarterly, 19, (1967): 147-165. 
Hudnut, William, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith: Enlightened Conservative’, Journal of the 
  History of Ideas, 17:4, (1956): 540-552. 
Ketcham, Ralph, ‘James Madison at Princeton’, Princeton University Library Chronicles, 28, 
  (1966): 24-54. 
Kidd, Colin, ‘North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms’,  
 Historical Journal, 39, (1996): 361-82. 
Klebaner, Benjamin J., ‘American Manumission Laws and the Responsibility for Supporting 
 Slaves’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 63:4, (Oct., 1955): 443- 
 453. 
Kraus, Michael, ‘Charles Nisbet and Samuel Stanhope Smith—Two Eighteenth Century  
 Educators’, Princeton University Library Chronicle, 6, (Nov., 1944), 17-36. 
Landsman, Ned, ‘Presbyterians, Evangelicals and the Educational Culture of the Middle  
 Colonies’, Pennsylvania History, 64, (Summer, 1997): 168-182. 
Macleod, Emma Vincent, ‘The responses of Scottish churchmen to the French Revolution,  
 1789-1802’, Scottish Historical Rreview, 73:196, part 2, (Oct., 1994): 191-215. 
Madden, Edward, ‘Stewart’s Enrichment of the Common sense Tradition’, History of  
 Philosophy Quarterly, 3:1, (1986): 45-63. 
 
! $*(!
______________, ‘Victor Cousin and the Commonsense Tradition’, History of Philosophy 
  Quarterly, 1:1, (1984): 93-109. 
Maier, Pauline, ‘Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America’, 
  William and Mary Quarterly, 27:1, (January 1970): 3-35. 
Mailer, Gideon, ‘Nehmeias (Scotus) Americanus: Enlightenment and Religion between 
  Scotland and America’, The Historical Journal, 54:1, (2011): 241-264. 
____________,‘Anglo-Scottish union and John Witherspoon’s American Revolution’, William 
 and Mary Quarterly, 67:4, (October 2010): 709-746. 
Marienstras, Elise and Wulf, Naomi, ‘French Translations and the Reception of the 
  Declaration of Independence’, The Journal of American History, 85:4, (March 
  1999): 1299-1324. 
Mason, Matthew, ‘The Battle of the Slaveholding Liberators: Great Britain, the United States, 
  and Slavery in the Early Nineteenth Century’, William and Mary Quarterly, 59:3,  
 (July 2002): 665-696. 
Masson, Marjorie, and Jameson, J.F., ‘The Odyssey of Thomas Muir’, The American 
  Historical Review, xxix, (1923): 49-72. 
Minkema, Kenneth P., and Stout, Harry, ‘The Edwardsean Tradition and the Antislavery  
 Debate, 1740-1865’, The Journal of American History, 92:1, (June 2005): 47-74. 
Morrell, J.B., ‘The Leslie affair: careers, kirk and politics in Edinburgh in 1805’, The Scottish  
 Historical Review, 54:1, (1975): 63-82. 
__________, ‘The University of Edinburgh in the Late Eighteenth Century: Its Scientific 
 Eminence and Academic Structure,’ Isis, 62:2, (Summer, 1971): 158-171. 
Mortera, Emanuele Levi, ‘Reid, Stewart and the Association of Ideas’, Journal of Scottish 
  Philosophy, 3:2, (Sep. 2005): 157-170. 
____________________,‘Dugald Stewart’s Theory of Language and Philosophy of Mind’,  
 Journal of Scottish Philosophy,1:1, (March 2003): 35-56. 
Noll, Mark, ‘Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical Thought’, American  
 Quarterly, 37:2, (Summer, 1985): 216-238. 
_________, ‘Before the Storm: Life at Princeton College, 1806-1807’, Princeton University 
 Library Chronicles, 42, (1981): 145-164. 
_________, ‘The Response of Elias Boudinot to the Student Rebellion of 1807: Visions of  
 Honor, Order, and Morality’, Princeton University Library Chronicles, 43, (1981): 1-22. 
_________, ‘The Princeton Trustees of 1807: New Men and New Directions’, Princeton 
 University Library Chronicles, 41, (1980): 208-230. 
Phillipson, Nicholas, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment and the science of man’, Theoretische 
  Gechiedenis, 8, (1981): 3-19. 
 
Bibliography $*)!
Pocock, J.G.A., ‘The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown 
  Subject’, American Historical Review, 87, (1982): 311-336. 
Pole, J.R., ‘Jeffersonian Democracy and the Federalist Dilemma in New Jersey, 1798-1812’,  
 Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society, 74, (1956): 260-292. 
Rendall, Jane, ‘Adaptations: History, Gender and Political Economy in the Work of Dugald 
  Stewart’, History of European Ideas, 38:1, (March 2012): 143-161. 
Robertson, J.C. Stewart and Norton, David, ‘Thomas Reid on Adam Smith’s Theory of 
  Morals’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 45 (1984): 309-321. 
Skinner, Quentin, ‘Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’, History and Theory, 
  8:1, (1969): 3-53. 
Smelser, Marshall, ‘The Jacobin Phrenzy: Federalism and the Menace of Liberty, Equality,  
 and Fraternity’, Review of Politics, 13, (1951): 457-482. 
Stout, Harry, ‘Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American  
 Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly, 34, (1977): 519-541. 
Tannoch-Bland, Jennifer, ‘Dugald Stewart on intellectual character’, British Journal for the 
  History of Science, 30:3, (1997): 307-320. 
‘The “Trade Gap” in Atlantic Studies: A Forum on Literary and Historical Scholarship’,  
 William and Mary Quarterly, 65:1, (January 2008): 135-186. 
Townsend, Dabney, ‘Dugald Stewart on Beauty and Taste’, The Monist, 90:2, (2007): 271- 
 286. 
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment,’ Blackwood’s Magazine, 322, (1977), 
  371-88. 
Vitz, Rico, ‘Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology’, Journal of the  
 History of Philosophy, 42 (2004): 261-275. 
Voges, Friedhelm, ‘Moderate and Evangelical Thinking in the Later Eighteenth Century: 
  Differences and Shared Attitudes’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 
  22, (1986): 141-158. 
Wood, Paul, ‘Thomas Reid and the Tree of the Sciences’, The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 
  2:2, (2004): 119-136. 
Woolverton, John, ‘Philip Lindsley and the Cause of Education in the Old Southwest’,  









Ahnert, Thomas, ‘The Moral Education of Mankind: Character and Religious Moderatism in 
  the Sermons of Hugh Blair’, in Character, Self, and Sociability in the Scottish 
  Enlightenment, edited by Thomas Ahnert and Susan Manning, (Hampshire: 
  Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2011), 67-83. 
Armitage, David, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History,’ in The British Atlantic World, 1500- 
 1800, edited by David Armitage and Michael Braddick,  (New York: Palgrave 
  Macmillan, 2002), 11-27. 
Basker, James, ‘Scotticisms and the Problem of Cultural Identity in Eighteenth-Century 
 Britain’, in Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, edited by Dwyer  
 and Sher, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993), 81-95.  
Berry, Christopher, ‘Sociality and socialisation’, in CCSE, 243-257. 
Brims, John, ‘The Scottish “Jacobins”, Scottish Nationalism and the British Union’, in  
 Scotland and England, 1286-1815, edited by Roger Mason, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
 University Press, 1987), 247-265. 
Broadie, Alexander, ‘Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
  Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 2006), 158-188. 
Clark, Ian, ‘From protest to reaction: the moderate regime in the church of Scotland, 1752- 
 1805’, in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, edited by Phillipson and Mitchison,  
 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 200-224. 
Clive, John, ‘The Social Background of the Scottish Renaissance’, in Scotland in the Age of 
  Improvement: Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century, edited by  
 Phillipson and Mitchison, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), 225-244. 
Devine, T.M. ‘The failure of radical reform in Scotland in the late eighteenth-century’, in 
  Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society 1700-1850, edited by Devine, (Edinburgh: 
  John Donald Publishers, 1990), 51-64. 
Fitzpatrick, Martin, ‘The Enlightenment, politics and providence: some Scottish and English 
  comparisons’, in Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth- 
 Century Britain, edited by Knud Haakonssen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1996), 64-98. 
Fleischacker, Samuel, ‘The impact on America: Scottish philosophy and the American  
 founding’, in CCSE, 316-337. 
Gerrish, B.A., ‘Natural and Revealed Religion’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth- 
 Century Philosophy, edited by Knud Haakonssen, vol. two, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2006), 641-665. 
Bibliography $*+!
Grabiner, J.V., ‘MacLaurin and Newton: The Newtonian Style and the Authority of  
 Mathematics’, in Science and Medicine in the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by  
 Withers and Wood, (Edinburgh: Tuckwell Press, 2002), 143-171. 
Haakonssen, Knud, ‘Introduction’ in reprint of 1854-60 edition, The Collected Works of 
  Dugald Stewart, edited by Idem, (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994), v-xiv. 
_______________, ‘Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis’, in Studies in 
  Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by M.A, Stewart, (Oxford: Oxford 
  University Press, 1991), 61-85. 
_______________, ‘From moral philosophy to political economy: The contribution of 
  Dugald Stewart’, in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Hope,  
 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 211-32. 
Harris, Bob, ‘Political Protests in the Year of Liberty, 1792’, in Scotland in the Age of the 
  French Revolution, edited by Harris, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 2005),  
 49-78. 
Harris, James, ‘Reid and Hume on the Possibility of Character’, in Character, Self, and  
 Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Ahnert and Manning,  
 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2011), 31-45. 
Howe, Daniel, ‘John Witherspoon and the Transatlantic Enlightenment’, in Atlantic 
  Enlightenment, edited by Susan Manning and Francis Cogliano, (Hampshire: 
 Ashgate, 2008), 61-80. 
Jacob, Margaret, ‘Polite Worlds of Enlightenment’, in The Enlightenment Worlds, edited by 
  Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Chrita Knellwolf, and Iain McCalman, (London:  
  Routledge, 2004), 272-287. 
Kimnach, Wilson, ‘Edwards as preacher,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan 
  Edwards, edited by Stephen Stein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
  103-123. 
Klemme, Heiner, ‘Scepticism and Common Sense’, in CCSE, 117-135. 
Laudan, Larry, ‘Thomas Reid and the Newtonian turn of British methodological thought’, in 
  The Methodological Heritage of Newton, edited by Butts and Davis, (Toronto:   
  University of Toronto Press, 1970), 103-131. 
Malherbe, Michel, ‘The Impact on Europe’, in CCSE, 298-315. 
Mitchison, Rosalind, ‘Patriotism and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in  
 Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence, edited by T.W. Moody, 
  (London: Appletree Press Ltd., 1978), 73-95. 
Monk, Samuel, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith (1751-1812): Friend of Rational Liberty’, in The 
  Lives of Eighteen from Princeton, edited by Willard Thorp, (Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 1946), 86-110. 
! $+-!
Murrin, John ‘A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity’, in 
  Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, 
  edited by Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward Carter, (Chapel Hill, NC: 
  University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 333-348. 
Pentland, Gordon, ‘The French Revolution, Scottish Radicalism and “People Who Were 
  Called Jacobins”’, in Reactions to Revolutions: The 1790s and their aftermath, 
  edited by Ulrich Broich, H.T. Dickinson, Eckhart Hellmuth, and Martin Schmidt, 
  (Berlin: Lit Veriag, 2007), 85-108. 
Phillipson, Nicholas, ‘The Making of an Enlightened University’, in The University of  
 Edinburgh: An illustrated history, edited by Robert Anderson, Michael Lynch, and  
 Nicholas Phillipson, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 79-81. 
________________, ‘Politics and Politeness in the Reigns of Anne and the Early 
 Hanoverians’, in The Varieties of British Political Thought, edited by J.G.A. Pocock, 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 211-245. 
________________, ‘Politics, Politeness and the Anglicisation of Early Eighteenth-Century  
 Scottish Culture’, in Scotland and England, 1286-1815, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
 University Press, 1987), 226-246.  
________________, ‘The pursuit of virtue in Scottish university education: Dugald Stewart  
 and Scottish moral philosophy in the Enlightenment’, in Universities, Society and the  
 Future, edited by Phillipson, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 82-101. 
________________, ‘Culture and Society in the Eighteenth-century Province: the case of  
 Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment’, in The University in Society, edited by 
  Stone, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 407-448.  
________________, ‘Towards a Definition of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in City and 
  Society in the Eighteenth-century, edited by Fritz and Williams, (Toronto: Hakkert,  
 1973). 
________________, ‘Nationalism and the Ideology’, in Government and Nationalism in 
  Scotland, edited by Wolfe, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 167-188. 
Philp, Mark, ‘The Fragmented Ideology of Reform’, in The French Revolution and British 
  Popular Politics, edited by Idem, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
  50-78. 
Rorty, Richard, ‘The historiography of philosophy: four genres’, in Philosophy in History, 
  edited by Rorty, Skinner, and Schneewind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
  Press, 1984), 67-74. 
Schrager Lang, Amy, “‘A Flood of Errors”: Chauncy and Edwards in the Great Awakening’,  
 in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, edited by Nathan Hatch and  
 Harry Stout, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 160-177. 
Bibliography $+,!
Sher, Richard, ‘Professors of virtue: The social history of the Edinburgh moral philosophy 
  chair in the eighteenth century’, in Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish 
  Enlightenment, edited by M.A. Stewart, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),  
  87-126. 
Stalley, R.F., ‘Reid’s Defence of Freedom’, in Thomas Reid: Context, Influence and 
  Significance, edited by Joseph Houston, (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 
  2004), 29-50. 
Harry Stout, ‘Edwards as revivalist’, in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards, 
  edited by Stephen Stein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 125-143. 
Sweeney, Douglas, ‘Evangelical tradition in America’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
  Jonathan Edwards, edited by Stephen Stein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
  Press, 2007), 217-38. 
Turco, Luigi, ‘Moral Sense and the Foundations of Morals’, in CCSE, 136-56. 
Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson, ‘John Witherspoon, Father of American Presbyterianism;  
 Maker of Statesmen’, in The Lives of Eighteen from Princeton, edited by William 
 Thorp, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 68-85. 
Williams, Lawrence, ‘Pulpit and Gown”—Edinburgh University and the Church, 1760-1830’,  
 in Scottish Universities: Distinctiveness and diversity, edited by Carter and 
 Withrington, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishing, 1992), 87-95. 
Winch, Donald, ‘The system of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils’, in That noble 
  science of politics: A study of nineteenth-century intellectual history, edited by 
  Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
  Press, 1983), 23-62. 
Wood, Paul, ‘Thomas Reid and the Culture of Science,’ found in The Cambridge Companion 
  to Thomas Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo and Rene van Woudenberg, (Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53-76. 
_________, ‘The Hagiography of Common Sense: Dugald Stewart’s Account of the Life of  
 Thomas Reid’, in Philosophy, its History, and Historiography, edited by Holland, 
 (Lancaster: Springer, 1983), 305-322. 
Wright, John, ‘The Scientific Reception of Hume’s Theory of Causation: Establishing the 
  Positivist Interpretation in Early Nineteenth-Century Scotland’, in The Reception of 
  David Hume in Europe, edited by Peter Jones, (New York: Continuum International  
 Publishing Group, 2005), 327-347. This essay first appeared in Hume and Hume's 
 Connexions, edited by John Wright and M.A. Stewart, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh  




Forthcoming Papers and Unpublished PhD Dissertations 
 
Bow, Charles Bradford, ‘In Pursuit of “Moral Beauty” and Intellectual Pleasures: Dugald 
  Stewart and Edinburgh’s literary culture, 1772-1810’, in The Scottish Enlightenment 
  and Literary Culture, edited by Kenneth Simpson, Ralph Mclean, and Ronnie  
 Young, (Tuckwell Press in association with Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies 
  Society, forthcoming in 2014). 
___________________, ‘In Defence of the Scottish Enlightenment: Dugald Stewart’s role in 
  the John Leslie Case’, Scottish Historical Review, 92:1. (2013): 000. 
___________________, ‘Reforming Witherspoon’s Legacy at Princeton: John 
  Witherspoon, Samuel Stanhope Smith and James McCosh on didactic Enlightenment,  
  1768-1888’, History of European Ideas, (forthcoming in 2013). 
___________________, ‘The Science of Applied Ethics at Edinburgh University: Dugald 
  Stewart on moral education and the “auxiliary principles of the moral faculty”’,  
 Intellectual History Review, 22:4, (Dec., 2012): 000. 
Brown, David, ‘Henry Dundas and the Government of Scotland’, (Unpublished PhD 
 dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1989). 
Craig, Cairns, ‘Scotland’s Migrant Philosophers and the History Scottish Philosophy’,  
 History of European Ideas, (forthcoming in 2013). 
Jessop, Ralph, ‘Resisting the Enlightenment’s Instrumentalist Legacy: James, Hamilton, and 
 Carlyle on the Mechanization of the Human Condition’, History of European Ideas, 
 (forthcoming in 2013). 
Herman, Luciana Louise, 1794: American Race, Republicanism and Transnational 
  Revolution, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley  
 (Fall 2007). 
Rendall, Jane, ‘“Elementary Principles of Education”: Elizabeth Hamilton, Maria Edgeworth 
  and the uses of Common Sense Philosophy’, History of European Ideas, 
  (forthcoming in 2013). 
Tannoch-Bland, Jennifer, ‘The Primacy of Moral Philosophy: Dugald Stewart and the  
 Scottish Enlightenment’, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Griffith University, 2000). 
 
Digital Sources 
The Carlyle Papers Online 
Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800  
Early American Imprints, Series II: Shaw-Shoemaker, 1801-1819  




















In this article, I discuss how Samuel Stanhope Smith advanced Reidian themes
in his moral philosophy and examine their reception by Presbyterian revivalists
Ashbel Green, Samuel Miller, and Archibald Alexander. Smith, seventh president
and moral philosophy professor of the College of New Jersey (1779–1812),
has received marginal scholarly attention regarding his moral philosophy and
rational theology, in comparison to his predecessor John Witherspoon. As an
early American philosopher who drew on the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment
including Common Sense philosophy, Smith faced heightened scrutiny from
American revivalists regarding the danger his epistemology presented to the
institution of religion. The Scottish School of Common Sense was widely praised
and applied in nineteenth-century American moral philosophy, but before the
more general American acceptance of Common Sense, Smith already appealed
to Reidian themes in his methodology and treatment of external sensations,
internal sensations, intellectual powers, and active powers of the human mind.
In this paper, I argue that Smith’s use of Reidian themes for grooming his
student’s morality conflicted with the educational expectations from revivalists on
Princeton’s board of trustees who demanded more attention on orthodox theology.
I identify Smith’s notions of causation, liberty, and the moral faculty as primary
reasons for this tension over Princeton’s educational purpose during the first
decade of the nineteenth century.
Key Terms: Reid; Samuel Stanhope Smith; American revivalism; religion;
morality; causation; liberty
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Samuel Stanhope Smith, seventh president and moral philosophy professor of
the College of New Jersey (1779–1812), provides a compelling example of an
early American who drew on the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment including
the Common Sense philosophy of Thomas Reid. Reid’s influence on Smith’s
epistemology is particularly evident in his treatment of active powers of the
human mind. Smith remarked that ‘in this field no writer has distinguished
himself with greater zeal, ability, and success than Dr Reid of Glasgow, first in
his treatise on the human mind, and afterwards in his essays on the intellectual,
and the active powers of man’ (Smith 1812: 139). He continued by stating that
‘to no author is this branch of science, not to Locke himself, more indebted for
its approaches towards perfection’ (Smith 1812: 139). However, Smith did not
strictly follow all of Reid’s theories or limit his philosophical inquiries to those
found in Reid’s publications. Yet, Smith drew on the methodology of Reid’s
Common Sense philosophy as an empirically based and religiously acceptable
system for Princeton’s moral philosophy curriculum. This article investigates how
Smith developed Reidian Common Sense themes to advance his objective of
moulding future virtuous leaders of the new republic.
The new republic’s educators, politicians, and ministers feared that civic virtue
and social order were in danger after the Revolution’s republican zeal faded at
the turn of the nineteenth century. During the rise in religious revivals, many
Presbyterian ministers continued the earlier revivalist belief that Scripture and the
conversion experience motivated moral actions. In contrast, Smith relied on Reid’s
notions of moral liberty and moral judgement which made men responsible for
determining moral and immoral actions. Reid noted that ‘by the liberty of a moral
agent, I understand, a power over the determinations of his own will’ (Reid 1788:
267). An enlightened education based on the philosophic study of human nature
coupled with experience, for Smith, cultivated a person’s innate moral judgment
in determining moral or immoral actions. Furthermore, Smith believed that, via
moral liberty, the divinely inspired human constitution could morally act or refrain
from action when this was fairly evaluated by the mind. He remarked that ‘moral
philosophy is an investigation of the constitution and laws of mind, especially as it
is endued with the power of voluntary action, and is susceptible of the sentiments
of duty and obligation’ (Smith 1812: 12). Therefore, by extension an enlightened
education which was centred on Common Sense philosophy, for Smith, produced
moral or virtuous citizens who could potentially influence the moral character
of the early republic as professional and political leaders. In this article, I argue
that Smith’s use of Reidian themes, particularly his notions of liberty, causation,
and the moral faculty, for grooming his student’s morality conflicted with the
educational expectations from revivalist trustees who demanded more attention
on orthodox theology. This tension never surfaced in American print culture or in
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a climactic event, but it suggests how and why revivalism resurfaced at Princeton
after a brief glimpse of liberalism under Smith’s presidency. This investigation
focuses on the arrival of Common Sense to Princeton; Smith’s balance between
rational theology and Common Sense philosophy; and the revivalists’ reception
of Smith’s notions of causation, liberty and the moral faculty. These together
demonstrate that Reid had a profound impact on Princeton’s educational aims
during Smith’s presidency.
i. the arrival of common sense to princeton
From what little we know about Samuel Stanhope Smith, born on 15 March
1751 in Pequea, Pennsylvania, evidence suggests he displayed an intellectual
curiosity that often did not conform to Presbyterian and philosophic traditions.
His intellectual pursuits in the subjects of morality, theology, mathematics,
history, poetry, jurisprudence, metaphysics, political economy, Belles Lettres and
natural sciences demonstrated his versatility across disciplines, not unlike his
Scottish polymath contemporaries. Fredric Beasley remarked that even at a young
age ‘Smith made the best of his opportunities, and was distinguished for his
improvement in every branch to which he directed his attention’ (Beasley 1860:
335). Smith’s auspicious childhood education at his father’s, Robert Smith’s,
Presbyterian academy in Pequea encouraged his interest in the ministry and
helped to establish the foundations of his knowledge of classical languages and
English prose. His early education undoubtedly included further instruction and
useful connections with leading Presbyterian revivalists from his mother, Susan
(Blair) Smith, whose father, Reverend Samuel Blair, garnered praise for educating
revivalist ministers at Fagg’s Manor academy. Blair’s Fagg’s Manor academy
‘trained several eminent Presbyterian ministers and laymen, including Revd
Samuel Davies (1723–61), colonial Virginia’s greatest Presbyterian revivalist and
a future president of the College of New Jersey’ (Miller 2003: 412).
The decision for Smith to continue his seminary preparation at the College
of New Jersey appeared logical considering Robert Smith’s fervent revivalist
sentiments and the fact that the College was temporarily governed in 1766 by
his maternal uncle Revd Dr John Blair. Smith’s mastery of Latin and Greek
during his training at Pequea permitted him to enter Princeton’s junior class at
the age of sixteen under the tutelage of Joseph Periam. Samuel Monk noted
that to Robert Smith’s dismay ‘Periam was one of the zealous adherents that
Bishop Berkley’s idealism had found in America, and under his influence Smith
adopted Berkeley’s philosophy’ (Monk 1946: 89). George Berkeley believed his
notions of immaterialism supported revealed religion by rationally disproving
the materialistic distractions of the external world. Berkeley remarked ‘that if
we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring
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their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense’ (Berkeley 1820: 31).
Smith excelled in his studies at Princeton and graduated valedictorian in 1769 at
the first commencement during John Witherspoon’s presidency. James Madison,
as a Princeton student in attendance, commented that ‘the head oration, which is
always given to the greatest scholar by the President and Tutors, was pronounced
in Latin by Mr. Samuel Smith, son of a Presbyterian minister in Pennsylvania’
(Madison 1865: 2). After graduation Smith continued his seminary studies first
with his father at Pequea Academy and the following year with Witherspoon
at Princeton. His connections with Princeton’s faculty and the board of trustees
during his tenure as a student, tutor, and later as a professor provided Smith
more latitude during the eighteenth century in developing his moral philosophy
than previous scholarship has shown. Monk remarked that ‘the homogeneity of
the Presbyterian community into which he was born accounts for the apparent
inbreeding which connected him by blood or by association with the men who
founded the college or who guided it throughout its first half-century’ (Monk
1946: 86). These close connections with Princeton’s faculty and trustees certainly
had a significant influence on his decision in returning to New Jersey after his
graduation in 1769 for a couple of years as a tutor and from 1779 to 1812 as
the professor of moral philosophy and eventually succeeding Witherspoon as
president in 1795.1
Calvinism at the College of New Jersey from its establishment in 1746 until
well after the end of Smith’s academic tenure in 1812 had a great influence
on the trustees’ vision of the purpose of the University. William Armstrong
Dod, for example, commented that ‘it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that
the College of New Jersey is not only religious in its principles, but was the
necessary and only possible product of religion’ (Dod 1844: 2). Dod’s claim
might appear obvious since Princeton initially served the educational needs of
aspiring Presbyterian pastors and the first five Presidents made their names as
revivalists.2 Early descriptions of Princeton provide insight into how religion,
particularly the tenets of revivalism, shaped its initial educational purpose. During
the founding years, the College of New Jersey solicited funds from British
individuals and societies with the clear purpose of educating future ministers.
The SSPCK, an Edinburgh based Presbyterian society, financially contributed
to the College in support of their aim to educate students ‘intended principally
for training up for the ministry’.3 In 1754, Gilbert Tennent and Samuel Davies
reported to the Synod of New York, during a British fund raising tour, of
their success. In this report, Tennent and Davies commented that their students
exhibited ‘promising genius, Calvinistic principles, and in the judgement of
charity, experimentally acquainted with the work of saving grace, and to have a
distinguished zeal for the glory of God, and salvation of men.’4 In the context
of an ecclesiastically divided colonial America, their description of religious
enthusiasm amongst the student body exemplified their attachments to revivalism
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supported by the Synod of New York. The death of President Samuel Finley in
1766 offered the Princeton trustees an opportunity to bridge the gap between
the New Side (revivalists) and Old Side (orthodox Calvinists).5 The decision
to elect John Witherspoon, who as a Paisley minister acquired notoriety for his
satirical attacks against the Moderate Scottish literati, seemed logical considering
he did not partake in earlier American ecclesiastical debates over the Westminster
Confession of Faith on which differing opinions persisted even after the resolution
of 1758.6
As Princeton’s sixth President (1768–94), Witherspoon surpassed his
predecessors in educational modernization by removing George Berkley’s
idealism from the curriculum and restructuring the College with an emphasis
on modern Scottish texts.7 Witherspoon commented that ‘the immaterial system
is a wild and ridiculous attempt to unsettle the principles of common sense by
metaphysical reasoning, which can hardly produce anything but contempt in
the generality of persons who hear it’ (Witherspoon 1822: 21). Philip Lindsley
noted that ‘when Dr Witherspoon arrived from Scotland, he brought with him
the works of several distinguished Scottish philosophical writers, particularly
Reid and Beattie’8 (Lindsley 1858: 336). Witherspoon anticipated that revivalists
would misunderstand why he included works of the Scottish Enlightenment
considering they believed revelation provided an absolute moral code of conduct.
Witherspoon clarified that ‘I do not know anything that serves more for the
support of religion than to see, from the different and opposite systems of
philosophers, that there is nothing certain in their schemes, but what is coincident
with the word of God’ (Witherspoon 1822: 6). Smith’s religious publications
reflected Witherspoon’s fundamental belief that ‘if the Scripture is true, the
discoveries of reason cannot be contrary to it’ (ibid). Smith’s close relationship
with Witherspoon however must not obscure Smith’s enthusiasm for Reid’s
philosophy in his published Lectures (1812). Smith’s moral philosophy lectures
incorporated a sophisticated metaphysics which was clearly inspired by Reid.
Witherspoon’s success in advocating the balance between Christianity and the
humanistic perspective of the Scottish Enlightenment during his presidency
certainly permitted Smith’s later devoted use of Common Sense philosophy.
But instead of following Witherspoon’s example, as an educator, of avoiding
a definitive stance on controversial philosophical topics such as liberty and
necessity by eclectically drawing on various positions, Smith assumed, like Reid,
a common sense stance (Sloan 1971: 123–5). During the Revolution and the
Federalist debates Witherspoon, as a signer of the Declaration of Independence
and Constitution, was sporadically absent from Princeton and during his absences
he relied on Smith for College administration and teaching of the senior year
moral philosophy course. However, ‘it was he (Witherspoon) who gave range and
spirit to the course of study’ (Memorial 1898: 110). Therefore, the content and
reception of Smith’s moral philosophy is best judged during his presidency from
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1795 to 1812. Smith’s reliance on Reidian themes for his objective of grooming
virtuous citizens was not initially problematic to Princeton’s trustees.
The American Revolution caused havoc on Princeton’s campus and also
temporarily altered the board of trustees’ vision of the College’s educational
purpose. During the Revolution, Princeton’s campus served as barracks for British
and American soldiers and the scene for a battle which ‘the inside of the church, as
well as of the College edifice, was destroyed by the British and American armies’
(MacLean 1877: 265). The trustees expressed a desire to remake Princeton into
the premier American institution for a liberal arts education and attract students
from the southern states who often sought advanced degrees in Europe.9 The 19
February 1796 amendment to the Charter of the College of New Jersey, one year
after Smith’s election to the office of president, exemplified this new emphasis on
liberal arts and Smith’s goal of moulding virtuous leaders. The amended Charter
outlined financial support from the state of New Jersey with the intention to
‘patronize and promote the interest of science and literature, as the surest basis
of their liberty, property and prosperity’ (Princeton Charter 1868: 19). Although
Princeton’s trustees influenced the laws and administration of Princeton, Smith
as president directed the curriculum and proposed modern alterations in sciences
and languages. During his presidency, Princeton witnessed the birth of America’s
first degree awarding scientific program in 1799 and liberal educational initiatives
clearly intended to foster the moral development of potential enlightened scholars
and statesmen not ministers. Within his first year as president, Smith oversaw
the appointment of Princeton’s and America’s first professor of chemistry, John
MacLean. Smith publically remarked in the Woods Newark Gazette and New
Jersey Adviser on 11 November 1795 that MacLean’s mastery of chemistry and
comparative anatomy also has ‘application to agriculture and manufactures, so
useful in every country, but especially in a new one’ (MacLean 1876: 20). In the
spirit of a practical liberal education, Smith did not ignore the political currents of
the world and the impact that they would undoubtedly have on his students after
graduation. European and American heads of state anxiously observed French
politics and the later aggressive expansion of Napoleonic France. With this in
mind, it is reasonable to assume that Smith believed his students, as potential
American politicians, would benefit learning French, since France owned western
territory well beyond the Appalachian Mountains until 1803 and France played
a prominent role in American foreign affairs. The appointment of William
Thompson as Professor of Language (1802–08) exemplified Smith’s clear aim to
groom enlightened and polite leaders of the new republic. He remarked to Revd
John Hobert that ‘there is a young gentleman of very polite accomplishments
from Paris, already teaching the French language in the college’.10 His praise
of Thompson’s ‘polite accomplishments’ and his own personal practises of
politeness in manner and dress partly indicate that Smith’s values were not typical
amongst Presbyterian divines who promoted modest manners and appearance.
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Archibald Alexander commented on Smith’s noticeable differences compared
with his Presbyterian contemporaries during their encounter at the 1791 American
General Assembly. Alexander observed:
When he entered the house I did not observe him, but happening to turn my
head I saw a person whom I must still consider the most elegant I ever saw. The
beauty of his countenance, the clear and vivid complexion, the symmetry of his
form and the exquisite finish of his dress, were such as to strike the beholder
at first sight. The thought never occurred to me that he was a clergyman, and
I supposed him to be some gentleman of Philadelphia, who had dropped in to
hear the debate. I ought to have mentioned that Dr Witherspoon was as plain an
old man as ever I saw, and as free from any assumption of dignity. (Alexander
1854: 99)
Alexander’s description of Smith’s polite appearance alone did not give an
impression that he disapproved of clergymen engaging in politeness. However,
his comparison between Smith and Witherspoon, who many revivalist clergymen
including Alexander and Green idealised, insinuated that Witherspoon was their
prototype for a pious and enlightened minister. The 1791 American General
Assembly also observed a clear distancing on the part of Smith from revivalists.
Ashbel Green, after returning from the General Association of Connecticut,
proposed that the General Assembly join Connecticut’s enthusiastic revival of
religion movement. Although Smith was not as outspoken against this proposition
as Dr Francis Alison, he still boldly opposed the spread of revivalism (Alexander
1854: 100). Although his 1791 public opposition to revivalism marked one of
many impending religious divisions between him and future Princeton trustees,
the root of their subtle discord involved their conflicting visions of Princeton’s
education. As a consequence of the increased demand for ministers in newly
populated regions of the early republic and the appointment of revivalists to
the board of trustees at the turn of the nineteenth century, Princeton trustees
led by Ashbel Green, Samuel Miller, and Archibald Alexander questioned the
effectiveness of Smith’s curriculum in grooming moral citizens and generating
direly needed Presbyterian ministers. How Smith drew on Reidian themes
partially shows why Princeton revivalists who wanted to rekindle the College’s
seminary preparation disapproved of his Common Sense curriculum.
ii. smith’s common sense and rational theology: a perfect
marriage or separate offices?
During Smith’s presidency, Common Sense philosophy and Reidian notions of
the external and internal sensations of the human mind provided the essential
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foundation for Smith’s philosophical teaching and helped to precipitate his
conflicts with orthodox Calvinism. Mark Noll’s Princeton and the Republic
(1989) demonstrated how Smith’s moral philosophy drew on Common Sense
methodology and the Reidian themes of external sensations and internal
sensations in advancing Witherspoon’s ‘republican Christian Enlightenment’.
Noll argued:
Stanhope Smith erected his intellectual system on four principles: that
philosophy in a Newtonian mode yielded rewards as rich for the moral world
as the physical world; that human nature was a source of experience from
which moral laws could be formed; that moral principles influenced social life
directly; and that the results of moral principles could be harmonized with an
enlightened interpretation of biblical religion. (Noll 1989: 191)
Smith’s Lectures on Moral Philosophy (1812) provided ample support for the
first three principles that Noll identified and his Sermons (1799) encouraged
the marriage of ‘true’ reason and biblical religion. However, Smith’s varied
treatment of revelation suggests that a paradoxical relationship existed between
his rational theology and his support of Reidian active powers of the human
mind. Smith’s attempt to balance his Common Sense conclusions and his
religious faith shows the difficulty of this enlightened objective. It is plausible
that Smith compartmentalized his metaphysical philosophy from his sermons
based on religious faith. The difference in his treatment of revelation from
the pulpit and lecture halls gives weight to this possibility. Of course, Smith
formatted his sermons and lectures differently in tone and substance to
support his separate agendas of guiding his congregation toward Christian
conversion and, by extension, salvation, and cultivating his students’ innate
faculties of the mind. I argue that Smith’s perspective on the practical
uses of revelation, as Princeton’s president and moral philosophy professor,
differed in significant respects from the revelation he preached. An accurate
interpretation of these distinct agendas requires an understanding of the role
that revelation played in his sermons and of the pillars of Common Sense on
which Smith built his metaphysical philosophy. His clear support of Common
Sense philosophy at Princeton, while still complementing his rational theology,
treated revelation differently from his sermons in certain respects based on the
circumstances.
Smith’s use of Reidian Common Sense themes did not occur without subtle
and obvious adaptations that served his objective of expanding the liberal
arts and natural sciences at Princeton. Common Sense philosophy offered
an empirical alternative to what Reid identified as the ‘ideal system’ or
‘ideal hypothesis.’ Reid contended that the metaphysical theories that followed
the Cartesian tradition, particularly those of Hume, Malbranche, Descartes,
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Berkeley, and Locke, err in their method founded on rational hypotheses. He
remarked:
I thought it unreasonable, my Lord, upon the authority of philosophers, to
admit a hypothesis which, in my opinion, overturns all philosophy, all religion
and virtue, and all common sense and finding that all systems concerning
the human understanding which I was acquainted with, were built upon this
hypothesis, I resolved to inquire into this subject anew, without regard to any
hypothesis. (Reid 1785: viii)
Smith advanced this central Reidian belief that metaphysical philosophy should
‘be relieved from the philosophic delirium of hypothesis, and form her judgments
on experience and fact, interpreted by plain common sense’ (Smith 1812: 20). The
Common Sense alternative to the ‘ideal hypothesis’ depended on reconfiguring
metaphysical philosophy’s methodology from rationalism to an empirical realism.
Hume’s Treatise also aimed at legitimizing the scientific study of the human mind
by utilizing the scientific method of observation and experiment. Hume’s Treatise
claimed to encourage a ‘cautious observation of human life, and take them as they
appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in
affairs, and in their pleasures’ (Hume 2007: 46). Within this vein, Reid completely
concurred with the Humean empiricist belief that the ‘science of man’ could
be furthered from careful observation of human nature. However, by making
our knowledge of the world wholly dependent on psychologically intermediate
‘impressions’, Hume (as Reid showed and Hume acknowledged) could not defend
his ‘science’ against radical scepticism. Reid, a polymath whose interests included
scientific endeavours, observed the progress that natural philosophy received
from building on undisputable maxims.11 The Common Sense system aimed to
legitimize the study of human nature and the human mind as part of natural
philosophy. Reid believed this aim was achievable due to the universal natural
faculties and innate human reasoning. He remarked:
Common sense and reason have both one author; that almighty Author, in all
whose other works we observe consistency, uniformity, and beauty, which
charm and delight the understanding; there must, therefore, be some order
and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his
workmanship. (Reid 1785: 132)
From their shared perspective that God created a uniform human constitution,
Smith noted that ‘the basis of all true science rests on the uniformity of nature in
all her operations’ (Smith 1812: 121). In their view, if every sane and lucid person
possessed the same innate constitution they could reasonably deduce maxims
based on the observation of human nature and introspective reflection of the
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human mind. The uniformity of the human constitution continued as a significant
thread throughout both Reid’s and Smith’s metaphysics and notions of morals.
Smith clearly advanced that everyone possessed innate uniform faculties of the
constitution that were susceptible for improvement. As a pragmatist, Reid made
a case for the cultivation of various faculties of the human mind in advancing
practical aims of improvement. Reid argued that even the
savage hath within him the seeds of the logician, the man of taste and breeding,
the orator, the statesman, the man of virtue, and the saint; which seeds, though
planted in his mind by nature, yet, through want of culture and exercise, must
lie forever buried, and be hardly perceivable by himself or by others. (Reid
1822: 5)
The cultivation of these innate ‘seeds’ within the human constitution, for Reid,
required experience observing human nature and an enlightened humanistic and
liberal arts education. He later remarked ‘that our happiness or misery in life, that
our improvement in any art or science which we profess, and that our improve-
ment in real virtue and goodness, depend in a very great degree on the train of
thinking that occupies the mind both in our vacant and in our more serious hours’
(Reid 1855: 297). This Reidian theme, if accepted, prioritised the cultivation of
the innate faculties of the mind over other perceived avenues of improvement
for the betterment of the individual and the wider society. Smith fully assumed
this perspective by empirically explaining the faculties and operations of the
human constitution with the clear intension of improving the Princeton students’
morality. Smith certainly shared Reid’s notions of improvement by claiming that
‘human nature is discovered on more mature reflection, to be a means of carrying
its faculties eventually to the highest pitch of improvement, and building on their
improvement, the felicity of mankind’ (Smith 1812: 34). The expanding cultural
and religious diversification of the United Stated undoubtedly influenced Smith’s
belief that after his students’ matriculated they would potentially encounter
unfamiliar moral customs. On this note, Smith remarked:
Great equality of condition in the citizens of the United states, similarity of
occupations, and nearly the same degree of cultivation, and social improvement
pervading the whole, have produced such uniformity of character, that as yet,
they are not strongly marked by such differences in the expression of the
countenance, the composition of their features, or generally in their personal
properties, as, in other countries, mark the grades between the superior and
inferior orders of people. And yet there are beginning to be formed certain
habits of countenance, the result chiefly of manners, which already serve, to
a certain degree, to distinguish the natives of some of the states from those
of others. Hereafter, doubtless, they will advance into more considerable, and
characteristic distinctions. (Smith 1810: 168–9)
198
Samuel Stanhope Smith and Common Sense Philosophy at Princeton
Smith’s stance that morality was best understood by the relative moral norms
that varied due to different climate and cultural circumstances surely appealed to
Reid’s emphasis on improving the faculties of the constitution by observing their
situational practises within a given society. Smith remarked ‘that although the
Author of our being has planted within the human breast the seeds of moral dis-
cernment, they require, in order to arrive at full maturity, to be carefully cultivated’
(Smith 1812: 311–2). The cultivation of moral judgement ‘acquires strength by
experience and reflection, and especially by profoundly observing the course of
human conduct, and tracing its causes, motives, disguises, and consequences’
(Smith 1812: 311–2). Smith later stipulated that ‘the justice or benevolence of
an act ought to be judged of differently, according to the mutual dependence of
men and their natural expectations from one another, arising out of their social
condition and the habits of their education’ (Smith 1812: 322). The growing
diversification of the new republic influenced Smith’s support of Common Sense
in his moral philosophy curriculum with the aim of equipping his students’ to
adapt their moral judgements within potentially varied moral customs.
By following Francis Bacon’s inductive method the Common Sense system
established unquestionable principles and from them tried rationally to deduce
axioms on the operations of the human mind. Reid argued that Newton’s Regulae
Philosophandi, which drew on the inductive method, succeeded as ‘maxims of
common sense’ and ‘he who philosophizes by other rules, either concerning
the material system, or concerning the mind, mistakes his aim’ (Reid 1785: 3).
Smith clearly shared this enthusiasm for the inductive method by stating that
‘in the philosophy of man the same rules ought to be observed which have
been followed in natural philosophy ever since the age of the great Newton’
(Smith 1812: 19). Their shared praise of the inductive method as the best method
for seeking replicable and verifiable truths in metaphysical inquiries does not
necessarily demonstrate that Reid influenced Smith. However, the way Smith
organized the first volume of his published lectures clearly drew on the structure
of Reid’s publications that systematically included ridiculing the ‘ideal system’
in the context of advancing Common Sense, investigating the principles and
operations of the external sensations, and a lengthy discussion of the intellectual
and active power of the mind.
The Common Sense system’s scientific approach to moral and metaphysical
philosophy advanced the existence and importance of God as the first cause of
everything as the architect of the material world and the human constitution.
However, it did not, like other philosophical systems, aim to prove the truthfulness
of revelation as the exclusive or primary vehicle of human morality. On the
contrary, they argued that God designed the human constitution with natural
faculties that if properly conditioned could determine morality independent of
revelation. Reid commented that ‘revelation was not intended to supersede, but to
aid the use of our natural faculties’ (Reid 1788: 383). Smith advanced this Reidian
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concept that ‘there is no doubt that these principles of our nature are liable to
great imperfections and sometimes to gross mistakes, in judging both truth and
duty; but they are the best means of directing our conduct and opinions which our
Creator hath placed in our power’ (Smith 1812: 312–13). This might appear out
of character for Smith who adamantly sought to prove the truthfulness of biblical
religion in his Essay on the Causes of Variety of Complexion and Figure in the
Human Species (1787). In reading Smith’s publications an accurate understanding
of his intended audience provides insight into his complex views on revelation and
metaphysics.
Smith’s assertion that people instinctively possessed morality, albeit
uncultivated, independent of revelation might appear religiously problematic
for a Presbyterian minister, even one propagating rational theology. However,
his published moral philosophy lectures, as a corrected version of those he
delivered at Princeton, were narrowly intended for the improvement of young men
between the ages of 14–18 and not the wider literate public. His well-received
religious publications are one plausible reason why his Presbyterian peers did not
immediately question his religious orthodoxy earlier in his academic career, aside
from the fact that his lectures were published the same year as his resignation
from the office of president. Although his rational theology reformed the Calvinist
interpretation of biblical religion to compliment empirical science, there were no
complaints about the content of his sermons. Smith did not receive these defaming
criticisms, because he treated the role of revelation in human moral conduct
differently in his sermons and in his lectures. In his lectures, revelation aided in the
innate principles that guided voluntary moral or immoral actions as a subsidiary
source of knowledge, and, by extension, a matured moral faculty enabled a better
understanding of the author of the human constitution, God. However, from the
pulpit, revelation remained the only source, in Smith’s view, for understanding
the ‘essence of the Deity.’ On the topic of understanding God Smith remarked:
On a subject of which it is so far beyond the present powers of the human mind
adequately to conceive, it becomes us to speak with modesty and caution. In
judging of it, reason affords no lights to guide us – the fires of imagination will
only mislead us – we must take our ideas solely from the Scriptures of Truth.
(Smith 1821: 342)
Common Sense philosophy equally ridiculed the role of imagination in
metaphysics practised by rationalists, but the cultivation of the human moral
faculty or moral sense clearly aimed at providing insight into God’s moral
intention for mankind. Smith’s contention in this sermon that revelation ‘solely’
informed mankind of divinity without mention of the divinely inspired human
constitution suggests he either guarded his reputation as a minister against
potential attacks or he harboured different beliefs on the relevance of revelation
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relative to his positions as a clergymen and teacher. It is likely that for Smith
both possibilities existed. In a sermon discussing the causes of infidelity, Smith
commented:
In proportion as our manners daily degenerate, irreligion in principle more and
more prevails. All moral and religious opinions, except those that are fixed
by revelation, are in a state of perpetual flux and mutability. They have their
fashions and pass away. (Smith 1799: 50–1)
Smith’s belief, from the pulpit, that revelation functions as a permanent source
of morality seems inherently contradictory with his metaphysical views on the
active powers associated with the moral faculty. His development of Reid’s notion
on the uniformed human constitution and its susceptibility for improvement in
his metaphysical lectures offered various avenues for the cultivation of morality
including the study of human nature in history, introspective reflection, and
observing morality in a given society. The perceived decay of societal morality
and manners might hinder that particular avenue for the cultivation of the moral
faculty, but it would not forfeit the others. I contend that Smith’s notion of
religious faith justified his dual treatment of revelation in his sermons and moral
philosophy. Smith remarked:
An enlightened conscience imposes the most effectual restraints upon
passions, which are the principles of evil in man. It unfolds the law on each
case of conduct as it arises, and adds to the prescriptions of duty, the most
powerful motives of obedience. Hence it is that faith, not, as the enemies of
religion assert, a blind belief of uncertain facts, and unintelligible mysteries,
but a clear understanding, and firm persuasion of the truths of the gospel, is
laid, by the apostles, at the foundation of a good life, and thereby made the
condition of our salvation. (Smith 1799: 322)
His notion of an enlightened conscience was interchangeable with his usage
of the metaphysical concept of the moral sense or moral faculty. Smith’s
rational theology, similar to his metaphysical philosophy, acknowledged that
an ‘enlightened conscience’ directed moral conduct. But his religious ‘faith’
dictated observing the ‘truths of the gospel’ for God’s promised salvation
after death. As a Presbyterian minister, Smith undoubtedly perceived that his
primary responsibility involved promoting revelation as the only path towards
his congregations’ salvation. In contrast, his clear objective at Princeton, as
evidenced by his moral philosophy modelled after Reid’s Common Sense, centred
on grooming his students’ morality as potential leaders of the early republic.
This suggests a different understanding of Smith’s union of enlightened reason
and religion than an unqualified harmonious one. Although Smith clearly infused
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aspects of his metaphysical philosophy within his rational theology, his asserted
faith as a clergyman, that revelation served as the only source to ascertain
God’s design marked his division not unity between religion and philosophy. As
previously mentioned, Smith’s division of his clerical and professorial objectives
did not initially attract disapproval from Princeton’s trustees. His philosophical
notions of causation and liberty, on the other hand, fundamentally differed from
those of the revivalist trustees.
iii. the controversy over causation and liberty
In the midst of the Revolution and the final years of his presidency at Hampden
Sydney College in the late 1770s, Smith demonstrated a deep interest in the
metaphysical themes of causation, liberty, and necessity. Smith remarked in a
letter to James Madison:
You have frequently attacked me on that knotty question of liberty and
necessity that has so much embarrassed philosophers, and has raised such
furious war among divines. I have lately had occasion to write on philosophical
subjects, and among others, on this question. I have read over your objections
against the doctrine of moral liberty, for practically you seem to be one of
its disciples. I remember the manner in which you have formerly expressed
yourself upon that intricate subject; and, indeed, that express the difficulties
that occurred to me in attempting to solve it. (Madison 1866: 187–8)
Smith’s previous letter that he referenced has yet to surface, but his response
indicates that he contemplated the themes of causation and liberty more than
a decade before the publication of Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of Man
(1788). The religious implications regarding God’s perceived involvement in
earthly actions and causes attracted controversy in the philosophical discussion
of causation and liberty. As previously noted, Smith distinguished his rational
theology from his metaphysical philosophy, the former spiritual and the latter
practical, based on his religious faith that revelation provided the only avenue
for salvation. While upholding central Calvinistic principles regarding revelation
in his sermons, Smith avoided questions of his religious orthodoxy. Noll’s
Princeton and the Republic argued that, for Smith, ‘problems came rather
when these other disciples of John Witherspoon had occasion to question the
results of Smith’s educational leadership’ (Noll 1989: 206). Revivalists on the
board of trustees did indeed find cause to investigate Smith’s Common Sense
based curriculum after the number of Princeton graduates entering the ministry
drastically dropped. Princeton’s trustees, led by Green, Miller, and Alexander,
heightened awareness of Smith’s Common Sense curriculum surely pinpointed
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the religious consequences of his treatment of causation, liberty and the moral
faculty as problematic for the religious purpose that Princeton was intended to
serve. Smith’s undeveloped theories on liberty and causation circa 1778–79 once
again found clarity in Reidian themes. Although Smith’s religious publications
advanced an enlightened interpretation of the gospel stylistically modelled after
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century French divines, he developed
his metaphysics after the belief that ‘the soundest metaphysicians, and the most
accurate observers of the operations of the mind, agree with the learned and
profound Dr Reid of Glasgow’ (Smith 1816: 297). His advancement of Reidian
notions of active powers of the human mind with original adaptations compared
with revivalist views from Jonathan Edwards, Ashbel Green, and Samuel Miller
suggests that the Princeton trustees’ objections to Smith’s presidency were
ideologically deeper than merely his deficiency in producing ministers.
Reid’s and Smith’s notions of liberty and causation, as operating principles,
had direct connections with their understanding of the moral faculty. The moral
faculty or moral sense of the human mind perceives moral facts of the external
world in a similar fashion as the self-evident external senses. Reid argued that ‘the
testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony
of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it’ (Reid 1788: 238). The
instinctive ability to perceive morality did not, for Smith and Reid, exist from birth
in full maturity, but, as previously mentioned, required cultivating its judgment
which was made possible by moral liberty. Reid remarked that ‘every man is
conscious of a power to determine, in things which he conceives to depend upon
his determination’ (Reid 1788: 59). Smith advanced a similar belief that God
designed mankind in an image of his power to determine actions and ‘in the
control that he enjoys over his own will and over the actions of his mind, as well
as of his body’ (Smith 1812: 291). They maintained that God designed the human
constitution with moral liberty which explained their observations of mankind’s
innate powers as agents of cause and moral agents. Smith appealed to Reid’s
notion of voluntary determination over the will by stating;
Although the mind determines all our other voluntary operations by the agency
of the will; yet it does not thus determine the acts of the will. An act of the
will is the determination of the mind with regard to some other object; not
with regard to itself. The volitions of the mind are the effect of its own internal
energy, not by a previous volition, but by an original, innate power over its own
actions, of which every man who reflects upon himself is conscious. (Smith
1812: 283)
Their belief that the human constitution, if cultivated, innately possessed God’s
intended moral code independent of revelation proved problematic to orthodox
Calvinists. William Weeks, a Princeton student, complained in 1808 that ‘Reid
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is grossly Arminian and advocates a self-determining power, which if it means
anything, means that the creature is independent of the Creator’12 (Sloan 1971:
166). Princeton’s trustees, particularly Ashbel Green, shared Weeks’ worries that
Smith’s reliance on Reidian themes endangered the theological development of
Princeton’s seminary students. The conflict between Smith’s notion of moral
liberty and Jonathan Edwards’ concept of moral necessity involved the degree that
motives influenced actions. Edwards argued that ‘if the acts of the will are excited
by motives, those motives are the causes of those acts of the will; which makes the
acts of the will necessary; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause’
(Edwards 1840: 264). The Edwardian argument that mankind necessarily acts
according to the strongest motive resulted in prioritising revelation as motivating
moral actions and forming ‘a strong habit of virtue’ (ibid: 46). Smith rejected that
people were victims of motives and slaves of ‘inclination, appétit, or passion, as it
arises’ (Smith 1812: 283). A cultivated moral judgment via humanistic education
and experience, in Smith’s view, could curb immediate immoral passions and
appetites. Smith remarked:
True it is, the mind seldom or never acts without some present motive, that
is, without some end in view at the time, although Dr Reid has rendered it
probable that, on many occasions, it forms determinations without motive,
by the immediate energy of its own self-control; yet no one motive, nor any
assemblage of motives, has power to compel it to act in this or that particular
direction. (Smith 1812: 284)
His central use of Reid’s notion of moral liberty as a rational refutation of
Edward’s moral necessity made him more vulnerable to scrutiny from revivalist
trustees who drew on Edward’s moral theology. Green advanced that God
directly influenced human actions of His converts. He noted that ‘to the eye
of contemplative and sober reason, willing to discern its Creator, a present
God is recognised in all that we behold’ (Green 1841: 216). For Green, the
early republic’s and Princeton’s morality required Christian conversion and a
close adherence to biblical doctrines of morality. Therefore, Green’s moral
theology intrinsically conflicted with Smith’s moral philosophy that promoted
the cultivation of the moral faculty. After students burned Nassau Hall in 1802,
Princeton’s primary teaching hall, the board of trustees reassured potential
students and parents of the central role that revealed religion would in future
have in Princeton’s moral instruction.13 While Smith solicited money for campus
repairs in South Carolina, Green authored an eight page pamphlet on Princeton’s
educational aims. Green emphasised Princeton’s ‘aim to make this institution an
asylum for pious youth’14 (Green 1802: 2). In light of Green’s moral theology, his
perception of piety and its conflicted relationship with Common Sense philosophy
greatly differed from those of Smith. Princeton trustees attributed the drastic drop
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in ministers graduating from Princeton and the student disruptions in1802 and
1807 as proof that Smith’s reliance on Common Sense philosophy failed to fulfil
their religious aims for the College. Smith’s bold lectures supporting moral liberty
undoubtedly added to the suspicion that Smith belonged to a former enlightened
age.
Smith’s 1799 election as Moderator of General Assembly and published
Sermons (1799) undoubtedly delayed any immediate actions to replace him as
Princeton’s President and moral philosophy professor. Philip Lindsley observed
that ‘throughout the Middle and Southern States, he was regarded as the most
eloquent and learned divine among his contemporaries’ (Lindsley 1866: 653).
However, his celebrated reputation as an enlightened divine did not prevent
industrious actions on the part of Alexander and Green aimed at reforming
Princeton’s educational purpose and effectually replacing Smith as president.
Smith undoubtedly realised this revivalist objective after the 1808 American
General Assembly. Revd Archibald Alexander, as the former 1807 Moderator,
addressed the 1808 General Assembly on the perceived problems in the seminary
preparation of Presbyterian ministers. Alexander declared:
Our seminaries of learning, although increasing in literature and numbers,
furnish us with few preachers. The great extension of the physical sciences,
and the taste and fashion of the age, have given such a shape and direction
to the academical course, that I confess, it appears to me to be little adapted
to introduce a youth to the study of the sacred Scriptures. (Alexander 1854:
314–15)
Alexander obviously had Princeton as the target of this plea for revived piety and
religion in American universities for the survival of presbyteries and by extension
the salvation and morality of religiously unequipped Americans. Princeton, as the
first and only American university at that time to offer a degree awarding program
in the natural sciences, clearly received heightened attention after Alexander’s
speech. Ashbel Green clearly shared Alexander’s proposed plan to revive formerly
observed orthodox religious principles in Princeton’s curriculum. Green stated
that ‘encouraged by this, I used all my influence in favour of the measure’ (Green
1849: 333). Smith’s defence of revelation in Lectures on the Evidences of the
Christian Religion (1809) and A Comprehensive View of the Leading and Most
Important Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1815) could be viewed
as an attempt to contradict emerging doubts about his orthodoxy. However, it
was not Smith’s actions as a minister that revivalist trustees questioned but the
metaphysical theories he espoused as Princeton’s president and moral philosophy
professor.
His support of the ability to acquire the divine moral code of conduct through
the moral faculty undermined the importance of revealed religion for morality.
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In contrast, Smith’s chief critic, Ashbel Green, advanced the revivalists’ belief
that God’s will ‘is indicated by the connexion between his volition and the effects
produced.’ ‘This connexion,’ Green stressed, ‘according to the sure testimony of
divine revelation, is illimitably certain’ (Green 1832: 104). Green accounted for
the new republic’s and Princeton’s immorality as the result of a lack of religion.
As the eldest son of Robert Smith, an ardent revivalist and founder of the Pequea
Academy, Smith fully understood the American revivalists’ educational aims. His
decision to emphasise Common Sense philosophy during his presidency indicates
his ideal type of Princeton graduate. He believed, like Reid, that the success of
a civilized society depended on the promotion of enlightened education which
cultivates individual citizens’ moral faculties.15 Smith noted ‘that by such a fair
and equitable use of reason as auxiliary to the moral sense, we shall often perceive
the necessity of equal candour and caution in judging both of national manners
and of individual conduct’ (Smith 1812: 318). This explained why Smith’s moral
philosophy lectures, contrary to orthodox Calvinism, stressed actively improving
moral judgement through enlightened education. Smith, during his forty years
as an educator, clearly placed a higher priority in the moral development of his
students as potential leaders of the new republic than avoiding potential religious
controversy.
conclusion
The philosophical and religious discord over the construction of the new
republic’s morality placed Samuel Stanhope Smith in a precarious situation
between his support of Common Sense philosophy and revivalists on Princeton’s
board of trustees. The rise in religious revivals did not deter Smith’s conviction
that Reid’s Common Sense philosophy had universal merit in building the
moral character of the new republic. His goal of modelling Princeton after
the ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment with an emphasis on Reid’s Common
Sense began to crumble when his opponents disbanded his degree awarding
scientific program in 1809.16 In 1812, Smith submitted his resignation supposedly
due to his life long battle with tuberculosis, but it was no coincidence that
his chief critic filled his vacated presidency.17 Samuel Miller, a revivalist who
shared Green’s educational vision, individually petitioned the Princeton trustees
to unanimously appoint Ashbel Green as President, not vice president as had
been initially suggested. Smith noted years after his resignation that ‘Dr Green
has entirely disused my lectures on the Evidences of Religion and on Moral
Philosophy, on the plea that they are not exactly conformed to his notions on
the subject of divine grace’ (Gillett 1864: 223). The fact that Green did not use
Smith’s moral philosophy lectures on the grounds of conflicting views of divine
power provides further evidence that the revivalist trustees’ objected to Smith’s
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use of Reidian themes. In the same year as Green’s election, Green returned
the favour by nominating Samuel Miller as Professor of Ecclesiastical History
to the newly established Theological Seminary at Princeton that Archibald
Alexander governed as president.18 The election of Green, Alexander, and Miller
to influential offices within Princeton and its infant seminary demonstrated
the revivalists’ triumph over Smith’s Common Sense philosophy. The shift in
Princeton’s educational direction from Smith’s liberal common sense to Green’s
orthodox Calvinism with an emphasis on revivalism exemplified one of the many
consequences of the heightened religious interest within the new republic. As
evidenced by the later acceptance of Common Sense philosophy in American
universities, the religious objections to Smith’s moral philosophy did not extend
beyond the first half of nineteenth century. However, it showed the prevailing early
American revivalist belief that at the turn of the nineteenth century American
morality needed religion as a facilitator of morality more than Common Sense.
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notes
1 During the last half of the eighteenth century Smith had family and friends who were
trustees and presidents of the College of New Jersey. His father was close friends with
Samuel Davies and shared the revivalist sentiments of Edwards and Tennent. Samuel
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Finley baptised Smith. Witherspoon was Smith’s father-in-law. Finally, his father and
maternal cousins were also trustees. The interconnected relationships amongst the New
England Presbyterian divines afforded educational and ecclesiastical opportunities for
those, like Smith, who were well connected.
2 The first five presidents of Princeton were Jonathan Dickinson (1747), Aaron Burr, Sr.
(1748–57), Jonathan Edwards (1758), Samuel Davies (1759–61), and Samuel Finley
(1761–66). For more information on the New Side and Old Side debates reference
MacLean’s History of the College of New Jersey, volume one; Sloan’s The Scottish
Enlightenment and the American College Ideal.
3 Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the Society in Scotland for Propagating
Christian Knowledge, pp 435–436. I owe my knowledge of the SSPCK’s financial
connections with the College of New Jersey to Rusty Roberson’s doctoral research.
4 Gilbert Tennent and Samuel Davies letter dated 25 October 1754 to the Synod of New
York. Found in Records of the Presbyterian Church, p. 264.
5 ibid. pp. 285–286.
6 ibid.
7 For more information on Witherspoon’s curricula policies reference John MacLean’s
History of the College of New Jersey, volume one, pp. 300–367.
8 Lindsley, ‘Samuel Stanhope Smith,’ p. 336.
9 MacLean, History, vol. 1, pp. 14–17.
10 Smith to Hobart on 7 Aug 1804. Found in Archives of the General Convention, p. 463.
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